The ordeal of Edward Greeley Loring : fugitive slavery, judicial reform, and the politics of law in 1850s Massachusetts. by Gilbert, Kevin L.
University of Massachusetts Amherst
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014
1-1-1997
The ordeal of Edward Greeley Loring : fugitive
slavery, judicial reform, and the politics of law in
1850s Massachusetts.
Kevin L. Gilbert
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gilbert, Kevin L., "The ordeal of Edward Greeley Loring : fugitive slavery, judicial reform, and the politics of law in 1850s
Massachusetts." (1997). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 1242.
https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/1242

THE ORDEAL OF EDWARD GREELEY LORING:





Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment




(c) Copyright by Kevin Lee Gilbert 1997
All Rights Reserved
THE ORDEAL OF EDWARD GREELEY LORING:





Approved as to style and content by:
/
Leonard L. Richards, Chair
Bruce Laurie, Member
Stephen B Oates, Member
Jerome M. Mileur, Member
Bruce Laurie, Department Head
Department of History
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Every friendly person I met while tracing Loring's ordeal deserves my heartfelt
thanks for lightening my mental and emotional burdens, but special thanks are owed to
the following people and institutions. My dissertation committee should have pride of
professional recognition. Leo Richards gently imposed clarity on my awkward first
expressions of the Loring theme, and demonstrated heroic patience in repeated
excursions through early drafts of the dissertation. Bruce Laurie performed above and
beyond the requirements for a second reader; his influence will be more apparent yet in
future versions of this material Stephen Gates and Jerome Mileur were liberal with their
time and enthusiasm for the evolving project, and reminded me of the needs of fiiture,
larger audiences. From the research trail, I owe thanks to the helpful, considerate
librarians at the Boston Public Library's Rare Book and Manuscript Collection, the
Harvard University Archives and Houghton Library, the Massachusetts Historical
Society, and the Massachusetts State Archives. From day to day, I was fortified by the
simple, casual camaraderie of innumerable colleagues in the graduate history program at
Herter Hall. On the home front, I owe a deep debt to my family and my closest friends:
Jacob G., Mary, and Jacob C. Gilbert, David Bassett, Aaron Christensen, and Vince
Purcell deserve to see their names preserved in a historical document.
IV
ABSIRACT
THE ORDHAL OF RDWARD GRF-ELEY LORING:
FUGITIVE SLAVERY, JIJDK lAI. RF.FORM, AND TIIF. POFFFIC S OF LAW
IN IS.SOs MASSACHUSETTS
FEBRUARY 1997
KEVIN L. GILBERT, B A
,
S I AHi UNIVERSI FY OF NEW YORK ALBANY
M A
,
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NliW YORK ALBANY
Ph D
,
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Leonard L Richards
In 1 854, acting as a federal commissioner under the Fugitive Slave Law, Sullblk
County probate judge Edward Greeley Loring returned the alleged runaway Anthony
Burns to slavery In protest, antislavery activists petitioned legislators to exercise a
little-used power to demand that the next governor remove Loring from state office For
three years, Know-Nothing governor Henry J Gardner refused to do so, and Republican
Nathaniel P Banks removed the judge in 1858 with considerable reluctance. For both
men, and for their parties, Loring's ordeal had ideological signilicance beyond his
personal fate This dissertation traces this significance to a lasting debate between
conservatives and radical reformers over the principle ofjudicial independence from
popular influences Advocacy of elections forjudges and other reforms went back to the
Jeffersonian era, but antislavery activists took up the theme to protest judicial submission
to the 1850 fugitive law, fhey joined earlier critics who condemned the state judiciary
V
as a self-serving clique. Loring, who owed his position to family, social, and political
ties, made an exemplary villain despite his efforts to show objective fairness during the
Burns trial. Radicals demanded his removal in the name of popular moral sovereignty,
while conservatives defended him in the interest ofjudicial independence. The radical
implications of removal were somewhat muted by the Personal Liberty Law of 1855,
which lent the campaign some statutory authority. The states-rights aspect of the
controversy, however, remained divisive even after Republican victories made the
judge's fall a reasonable certainty. The final debates over Loring in 1858 exposed a
continuing conflict between conservatives and radicals within the Republican party that
had already hindered its early development. Loring' s story as a whole illustrates the
enduring significance of Jackson-era reform politics beyond the acknowledged demise of
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 1 860, at Baltimore, the Democratic party made their second try at
nominating a Presidential candidate. Among the first speakers at the acrimonious
meeting, the chair recognized "Mr. Loring of Massachusetts," who advocated seating
Southern delegates who had walked out of the Charleston convention weeks before.
Speaking for the Bay State delegation, he threatened to quit the meeting if the
Southerners, enemies of Stephen Douglas, were denied admission. The sympathetic
Governor of Missouri applauded the speech and admired its author. 'T heard with
pleasure the remarks of the gentleman from Massachusetts," he said, ''When I heard it
was Judge Loring, it made my heart beat with pride."
Laughter rose from the crowded floor. "It's not Judge Loring,'' someone
explained, "He's a doctor!" The delegates had heard George B. Loring, a physician and
lifelong Democrat. ''Well," the Missourian replied abashedly, "his name is Loring, and
he is from Massachusetts." Reporters shared delegates' confijsion; not all corrected
their mistakes.^
' New York 71mcs\ 19 June 1860. Pioneering political writer Mural Halstcad made the same
mistake, which surv ives for posterity in William B. Hesselline. ed.. Three Against Lincoln: Mural
Ilalstead Reports the Campaign of IH60. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 1960). Only
once, on page 201. docs Halstcad explicitly nnsidenlify the Bay Stater as Judge Loring: otherwise, he is
"Mr. Loring." Hesseltinc or his indcxer. however, lists all references to a Loring under the Judge's
name.
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The Democrats owed their conftision to the modest celebrity of Edward Greeley
Loring, former probate judge for Suffolk County, Massachusetts, whom Governor
Nathaniel P. Banks had removed from office at the formal request of the state legislature
in 1858. In 1854, Judge Loring first achieved notoriety as the presiding federal
commissioner at hearings leading to the extradition from Boston of Anthony Burns, an
alleged fugitive from Virginia slavery. During the hearings, antislavery rioters killed a
federal deputy marshal while attempting to liberate Burns, provoking a military
occupation of the city, which dissidents equated with conquest by a tyrannical power.
Their anger focused on Loring, whose removal they sought for the next four years. For
Democrats and many conservatives in the antislavery Republican party, his removal
marked the ascendancy of radical extremism in the Bay State. Democrats, especially,
celebrated the deposed Loring as a martyr to abolitionist fanaticism, and President
Buchanan honored him with a judgeship in the federal Court of Claims. In 1860
politicians and journalists remembered the name, even if they lacked an image of the
man.
In the subsequent century and beyond, the judge's name faded into contusion
with other Lorings: George the physician, no relation; Elisha Grey Loring, again no
relation, an abolitionist whose views greatly differed from the judge's; Charles Greeley
Loring, his cousin and sometime patron, a prominent lawyer and Fellow of the Harvard
College Corporation. Historians have blamed each for Burns' s extradition, some
discovering irony in the deed where there was none. This confusion reflects the judge's
" Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology ofthe Republican Party Before
the Civil War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), 346, attributed the Burns verdict to Charles
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historical obscurity. At best, in many histories, he appears as a footnote to the story of
Anthony Burns. In some accounts, he is never mentioned by name.
Relatively few writers discuss the four-year campaign for Loring's removal as
anything other than an epilogue to the Burns case. Very few acknowledge the struggle
as a controversy in its own right, with serious implications for statewide, if not national
politics. Yet Loring was obviously a celebrity of sorts in 1 860, even if only among the
political class His removal was significant not only to his enemies, but to those
politicians who thought they were applauding him in Baltimore. To each group, he
represented something diflFerent: a humbled traitor to his state, a martyred defender of
Union, an embodiment of the constitutional rule of law. Accordingly, his removal
symbolized different trends to different observers: an affirmation of state sovereignty; the
imminence of disunion; the overthrow of law and order.
Historians have conveyed little of this. Among the ambitious national historians
of the late nineteenth century, James Ford Rhodes dismissed the removal controversy in
less than one paragraph,' while James Schouler paused slightly longer to compliment
Loring, who ''had not dealt with [the Burns] case dishonorably," but had aroused the
anger of Massachusetts radicals who ''would not tolerate the idea that anyone holding
G. Loring in the index. Fred Halhaway Chase. Lemuel Shaw, Chief Justice ofthe Supreme Judicial
Court ofMassachusetts, 1830-1860. (Boston. 1918). 176. found irony in the abolitionist Elisha Grey
Loring's extradition of Burns. George B. Loring was often confused w ith the judge b\ contemporary
Democrats: one of w hich attributed a letter the physician w rote to Virginia Governor Henrv Wise to the
embattled judge. Richmond Enquirer, quoted in and corrected by Boston Daily Bee, 17 April 1855.
^ James Ford Rhodes. History ofthe United Statesfrom the Compromise of 1850. 4 vols.. (New
York. 1893). 1 : 505: "The 1 1855] legislature sent an address to the governor requesting him to remove
Loring from the position of probate judge: this the governor declined to do. The agitation against
Loring was. however, kept up. and w hen Banks became governor in 1858 he made the remov al of the
probate judge on an address from the legislature/^
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an office or emolument under her should earn the blood-money of slave hunters;'"*
Schouler^s account was reasonably neutral, if more opinionated than Rhodes' s; neither
editorialized as vehemently as Allen Nevins did five decades later. For Nevins, Loring's
removal typified the fanaticism that rent the Union, and demonstrated that Northerners
were often as blameworthy as Southern fire-eaters.
Though antislavery journalists continuously arraigned Southerners for their intolerance, no
more dishonorable example of political lynching can be found than the renio\ al of Judge
Edward G. Loring in Massachusetts in 1858 An upright, capable magistrate. [Loring fell
because
1
in the face of angrv public antagonism, he had faithfulh done his duty as a Federal
officer.
.
Enlightened editors of Massachusetts, without regard to part\
. condemned the
action as arbitrar\' and vindictive. ... A later generation of New England historians was to
admit that even South Carolina
. . .
had placed no such stain upon her escutcheon."
No other historian denounced the removal with Nevins' s passion, but many
shared his suspicion that Loring' s enemies acted out of hate rather than from any
substantive political purpose. Such a characterization fit the popular stereotype of
antislavery activists as mean-spirited fanatics, and betrayed an assumption that the
removal campaign was an extremist abolitionist movement.^ Dismissing the removal as
^ James Schouler. History ofthe United States ofAmerica, Under the Constitution. 1 vols..
(New York. 1894). 5: 295 - 6. On the Burns trial. Schouler wrote that '^Commissioner Loring conducted
his hearing w ith all the decorum and prolixity that so simple a statute case admitted
"
Allen Nevins. Ordeal ofthe Union: The Emergence ofLincoh. vol. 2. Prologue to Civil
War. (New York: Scribners. 1950). 30. Nevins does not cite any of the repentant historians referred to
above, though he may mean Schouler. a Connecticut writer, and more probably Claude Fuess (see
below).
^ A representative account that emphasi/ed the unfairness of the removal campaign is Claude
Fuess. Caleb Cushing. 2 vols.. (New York. 1923). 2: 213 - 16. in which Fuess sympathizes with his
subject. Loring s last-ditch defender in 1858. without denouncing the removal camp with Nevins's ire.
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an act of vengeance, however, blinds scholars to constitutional and ideological issues
raised by the Loring drama that transcended the abolition agenda.
Historians of Massachusetts politics have occasionally viewed the Loring issue
more closely 1 he judge's late hung in suspense at a transitional moment, during which
an old party system pitting Whigs against Democrats disintegrated under pressure from
antislavery activists, anti-liquor prohibitionists, anti-Catholic nativists, and urban
advocates of workingmen's interests Know-Nothingism, a fraternal movement grown
into a political phenomenon, temporarily claimed the political field, but was soon
challenged by Republicans seeking to unify all Northern slates against a ^'Slave Power"
menace in Congress and the White House. Modern historians no longer characterize this
struggle as a fight between rabid bigots and noble liberators, but there is no new
consensus on each side's essential qualities, or on the main significance of their rivalry.
A study of the Loring question cannot offer the last word on the mid-centuiy upheaval,
but it should illuminate aspects of the conflict, both between the parties and within them,
that can provide a better understanding of the period.
Because Loring owed his sui"vival in otTice between 1854 and 1858 to vetoes
issued by Know-Nothing Governor Henry J. Gardner, historians are tempted to view the
judge's ordeal as a struggle between committed antislavery forces and a conservative,
compromising governor, or, more broadly, as a clash between "antislavery" and
"nativist" blocs, the latter presumably indifferent to slaveiy issues in the interest of
national unity. Dale Baum, a chronicler of Republican ascendancy in The Civil War
Parly System, marks Gardner's veto of the 1855 removal address as the opening of an
5
^'iiirv(u;il)k' hirach lulwcvii Ihrsr forces in ai» alinosl-unaniinouslv Know-Nolhinj.^
Icgislaluir ' liaiiin s alli ihiilion of hoslility hrtwccMi ^^iialivisl^^ and ^^anlislavci y ^ blocs (o
(lie l.oiii)f» (|iies(ioii has Ihtm challnu'.ul by John K Mulkcin, (nil Mulknn hnnselldocs
nol (lueslion liannrs dclinition ol blocs chaiacleii/ed by hoslility oi iiuhlVcicncc lo
slaveiy Holh idcnlily Know-Nolhinjj;isni wilh a disici',ai(l loi Ihc scclional (lucslions
agitaled passionately by Ihc Kc^piiblicans " In a bioadt'i snivcy oI Knovv Nolhin^isni
Ihtoui'houl Ihc Noilh, howcvci
,
I ylci Anbnulci cnipliasi/es the iniporlancc of
nnlishivery agitation for the new parly's inilial successes, In his briefcoinnicnls on
Loiing, Anbindci pits Know-Nolhinu. legislators against a icactionaiy governoi, lathei
than opposing an antislavciy faclion lo indiircicnt nalivists. More iin|)oitanlly, Anbinder
atliibules (iaidnei s velo to his lingering Wing senlinienis, and lo his ic)eclion ol a
"higher-law" idcolop.y, lalhci lhan lo Midillcicncc lo slavciy
'
I lu* i(lcM>lor.ical aspect of the Loring controversy eineiges again when Kichard
Henry Dana's role is considered Dana, a conseivalive antislavery politician, delended
Anthony liurns belbic 1 -oiing, and ciilici/ed the judge's decision in piinl When 1 .oiing
hiinsell was in peril, Dana teslilied in his delcnse belbie a hostile legislative connnitlee.
Dana s intei venlion laiscd an ideological (juestion thai cut acioss divisions ovei sectional
l);ilc liaiim ihr ( 'ivtl U nr I'drfv S\ .\(c/n The ( 'dsf i>lMassa( husctts. IS4H - (( 'hapcl
Mill; Dnivcrsily ol Noilh ( ;M(>lii!a Puss r)KI) i|
" John K Miilkcni, Tlir know Nolhiny^ l*(trty ofMdssachuscUs: 7//c Ktsr <tti<l hall oj it I'mplc 'v
Movrntciit (liosloii Noilhcaslciii Univcisily Press. I WO). 212. n. U'l. While Mulkciii ininiini/rs Ihc
si;^,inticaiK:c ol Ihc \.o\n\)\ issue in IKSS he acknowlciO'.cs its iinporlaiue in IXS7 wlu n (.indnn
hoasUd ol his vetoes as piool ol his eonsci\ alisni See \y,\yys I "^X. I().> - i.
''
I'vlci Aiihiiulcr, Nalivisin and Shnvrv Ihc Xorihcni Kmnv Nolhin^s aiul tlw lUthtH s aj the
is>0s^ (New York: Oxioid IJiiiveisilv Picss IW2). 155 -(>.
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questions; should judges be accountable to the people and their governing
representatives'^ Dana feared that Loring's removal would encourage the executive and
legislative branches to intimidate judges into conformity with the partisan majority will.^*^
On this point, if on few others, Gardner agreed with Dana. He also agreed, to an extent,
that slavery should be excluded from the western territories. So did nearly every
political figure in Massachusetts outside of the Democratic party. Fewer agreed with
Gardner or Dana that Loring had to be saved for the sake ofjudicial independence. The
removal controversy divided politicians along different lines from those taken for granted
by most historians.
The most ambitious commentary on the ideological aspect of the Loring issue
takes up only five pages of Robert CowefsJuslice Accused, a sensitive study of the
moral dilemmas faced by judges under an apparently pro-slavery federal Constitution.
Lamenting that "the jurisprudential implications of the Loring removal [had] not been
adequately explored" as of 1975, Cover calls attention to 'its connection with conflicting
bases of role and personal responsibility'' forjudges. While he had earlier recommended
a closer study of the relationship between antislavery activism and an antebellum
campaign to democratize the courts, he does not pick up that thread when discussing
Loring. His analysis focuses on the paradoxical legal formalism propounded by Wendell
Phillips, the leading advocate of removal in 1855. Phillips held that officials swearing
fidelity to an immoral constitution were bound to execute its provisions to the letter. It
followed that Loring was immoral, and deserving of removal, less for actually ordering
Samuel Shnpiro, RichanUIenry Dana, Jr.. (East Lansing: Michigan Slalc University Press,
1961). 9X - 100.
7
Burns'
s extradition than for accepting a "Slave Power" commission in the first place.
This, Cover writes, was Phillips's argument before the Loring committee. Dana,
meanwhile, is shown wishing to give moral judges a chance to interpret the constitution
as hostile to slavery
,
and thus subvert the Slave Power. Most Know-Nothings, Cover
notes, approached Loring less scrupulously; they "simply wanted to beat [him] into
line.""
In fact, none of the protagonists of the Loring debates argued as Cover describes.
Phillips explicitly eschewed his usual argument that federal commissions were inherently
immoral, declaring instead that Loring deserved removal for mistreating and prejudging
Burns. Dana argued less for the potential good to come from antislavery commissioners
than for judges' right to err (as he saw it) honestly. Legislators proved more ready than
Phillips to argue that Loring' s commission inherently disqualified him from Bay State
honors or offices. Many were less concerned with establishing any inherent moral
incompatibility between Loring's two jobs than with aflfirming a popular right to demand
a judge's removal on the ground that he had violated the people's moral sense. Cover
does not acknowledge this line of argument, or worse, he dismisses it as a pretext for
Robert M. Cover. Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process, (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1975), 178 - 82.
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hcatiiii; rorint; into line" I Uliiniilcly, lie poilrays iho removal as an adinission of
dcfcal, ail ^^acquiesccnce in llic loss ofthc (\)nsliUilioii to slavei^;'''"*
Inevitably, (Ywcr's perspective was narrowed by his thesis. Jiisiur Accnscil
describes a debate over the moial potential oTtlie ( onstitntion and its judges, and (\>ver
synipathi/es with Constitutional ulopians^^ who iiitei |)i eletl the document accordinu to
hiuliei-law standards that entitled them to judue or legislate against slavery That debate
has considerable relevance to the Loring issue and its antecedents, but it was not the
central cjuestion Massachusetts legislators did not seek to "legain the Constitution I'oi
Massachusetts aiitislavery/^" Hie anti-l>oring majority was more concerned with
regaining Massachusetis loi beedom, and with bunging Massacluisells ludges uiulei
po|)ulai control, however iiidiiect, in the interest oriVeedom.
Loring's enemies believed tliat judges, as public servants, had to rellect the will
olMheii masters, the electorate If the people of Massachusetts o|)posed slavery, so must
its judges Bay State politicians had demanded judicial accountability Ibi a generation
belbre Loiing met Ikirns In ISS Massachusetts reformers dialled a new constitution
that would make infciioi judges elective, while sub|ecling highei couit |udgcs to limited
' (\ncr. Justice Accused. IS2, (\ncr |»ia\cly luisinlcrpivls Icj'jslators' resistance to an cIToil
to (lccl;irc l.oring s (wo olliccs incoinpalil)lc l)clbrc lie was ivmo\cd, conlciulinj'. Ilial llicv piclciivd lo
give anlisla\cry oHicclioltlcis ihc ch;MiLC lo lieconie a)ninnssi(>neis and uilc ;i)',;unsi Ihc I ii.i'ili\e Slave
Law In fad- as Chapler ^ slums lielow, radicil lei'jsLiIois pielciied lli;il the ieiiu)\;il he l>;ised on llie
will ol the people, as lepiescnled by 12,000 petitioners, lalliei lhan on legislative winin
' * (over, Jusficc . Iccusvd. 1S2: "II was an aceeplanee nol only ol Weiulell IMnllips s slern
morality, but also ol Ins conslilulional posilivisin/' l e . Ins lieliel lhal consliliilional ollieers eonid nol
appeal over the ( onslilnlion lo hig.hei laws.
" Co\cr.,Justice Accused. 1*^6, \H? Cover may not have investigated the Lorin;'. deliales
beyond liie pnhlislied speeches of IX.S5 lie refers to 'Mhe suecesshil removal oI Lorinif aller describing
the ISSS dclKile. willioni acknowledging that llie |iulg,e was nol leinowd lor Ihive more years
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Icniis and icappoiniiiicnls al Ihc discretion ofa partisan governor For various reasons,
tlic constitution failed at the polls by a narrow margin While conservatives in and
out of the Whig party sighed with relieC they feared renewed agitation lor an elective
judiciary, which threatened to make judges the puppets of unscrupulous partisan
demagogues, liay Staters^ resort to removal by address as an alternate means to the
same end promised an equal disaster Regardless of their opinions on slavery, Whiggish
conservatives regarded tlie prospect of Loring's removal with horror.
The length and bitterness of the Loring controversy cannot be understood
without reference to the struggle over judicial tenure Accordingly, a discussion of the
politics of law opens this dissertation (Miapter I traces the origins of the judicial reform
movement to popular anxiety at the consolidation of economic and political power in the
hands of Boston capitalists and their allies in government Widespread mistrust of the
centralization of power in liostonians' hands led to a determined defense of small towns'
right to corporate representation in the legislature in the face ofa Whiggish movement to
rationalize that body While advocates of population-based district repi esentation
argued |)lausibly ioi the greater democracy and individualism of their system, o|)ponents
feared that the elimination of community-based representation would strip communities
of their delenses against fui ther consolidation al ihe expense of local economies Hie
same fear of consolidated power motivated the judicial reform movement, since critics
believed that the courts had become more exclusive and cli(iuish, abandoning traditional
jurisprudence in favor of their own class. Workers resent lul ofjudges' anti-labor rulings
and drinkers angiy at jurists' apparent prohibitionist biases strengthened the movement
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for popular judicial cicclions. Their opponents in (lie Whij^ parly, and laler in the
conservative wing of the I'l ee-Soil party, considered any democratization of the courts
fatal to the stable rule of law on which liberty and property depended They associated
attempts to compromise judicial tenure with demagoguery, anarchy, and immorality.
When I.oring's enemies inferred from the constitution^ removal clause a right to petition
for his ouster, conservatives reacted predictably.
(Miaptcr 2 describes antislavery politicians' late and sustaining involvement in the
judicial reform movement. Massachusetts jurisprudence had a mixed record in slavery
cases. In ( \>mm()n\\ callh v. A vcs ( 1 836), the slate's supreme court ruled that a slave
brought into a free slate in her master's custody could not be detained or returned to a
slave state against her will, since Massachusetts law denied people the power to enslave
others, and thus to coerce them In the area of fugitive slaveiy, however. Bay State
jurists deferred to the federal Constitution, which obliged states to return runaway slaves
to their masters without obstruction from stale laws. Antislavery activists attributed the
seeming contradiction between {\\QAves principle and fugitive-law jurisprudence to
judges' self-interested subservience to a South-dominated federal government Their
anger grew when judges slopped antislavery lawyers from arguing against the 1SS()
I
Fugitive Slave Law during trials of accused slave rescuers and disqualified avowed
I
enemies of slavery from serving on rescue-ti ial juries. Radical antislavery politicians
decided thai the only remedy for judges' servitude to slavery was popular judicial
elections fhey became the leading advocates ofjudicial reform at the 1853
constitutional convention, where conservative colleagues in the Free-Soil party opposed
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them. While tensions between radical reformers and ex-Whig "patricians" dated from
the origin of the antislavery party, the 1853 conflict over the courts rent Free-Soil
beyond repair. The judicial controversy led Free-Soil patricians like Richard Henry Dana
to distrust any attack on judicial independence conducted under antislavery auspices.
After the first chapters advance the political narrative to 1854, Chapter 3
.
introduces our ostensible protagonist, Edward Greeley Loring. While the judge left little
record of his private opinions, most of what exists is illuminating about his character.
More importantly, this chapter locates Loring within a social milieu that made him an
ideally representative target for both antislavery activists and judicial reformers. Loring
was one of the "Curtii," a clique of arch-conservative Whig jurists who unrelentingly
interpreted the laws in favor of slavery while opposing local judicial reform. He taught
at the Harvard Law School, an institution condemned by reformers as a bastion of local
elitism and proslavery jurisprudence. In attacking Loring, activists struck symbolically at
the groups he represented. His friends recognized this, and warned him that his
presiding over the Burns hearing might provoke renewed reform efforts. Loring was
trapped, however, by the expectations of his clique, the demands of the federal
government, his friends' unwillingness to take his place, and his own stubbornness.
Loring had once been a law partner, ally, and friend of the public school reformer Horace
Mann, but he repudiated reformers when their attacks on proslavery Bostonians sunk
beneath a level acceptable to gentlemen. He retained many of the reformers'
sensibilities, however, and conducted the Burns hearings much like a real trial, with
every possible indulgence of the prisoner's rights as a defendant within the bounds of the
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fugitive law I lltimately, his reading of llic law and the Conslilulioii coiupdlcd liiin to
turn Rums over to his master In 1854, he disclaimed any righi to interpret laws
accoiding to a personal moial standard. Wlien Massachusetts passed a law mandating
his removal, however, he asserted a sus|)iciously similai right to dely it
I he remaining three chapters constituie the "Oideal of l-.dward (ireeley l.oring"
proper (Miapler 4 places his initial vilification and the first petition campaign against him
in the context of the political upheaval of 1854 and the social and cultural tumult of the
anlchcllum decade Politically, Know-Nothingism rose to power with shocking
suddenness, as Free-Soil collapsed and Whiggery more slowly disintegrated. In
e\[)loring the relationship l^etween the petition campaign and the Know-Nolhing
phcnomenoiK the chaplci speculates on then common loots in the increased
politici/ation ol^the l*rotestant impulse for moral reform during the I85()s Rising
frustration with the a|>parent inenieacy of moral suasion led many reformers to greater
insistence on a state role in achieving a moral society Whclhci that role should be
played democratically by voteis or absolutely on the authoiity ol^noral law remained a
sticking point throiighoul the pci iod, as did, tor Know-Nothings, ihc extent of the
Protestant domain they adhered to The latter dilemma had significance for l .oring, since
those nalivists who identillcd the entire Union with the l*roteslant homeland were less
likely to i)rovoke sectional discord by attacking him than those who identified more
narrowly with Puritan Massachusetts or New l^ngland I Inlbitunately tor Koring, more
Bay Staters, in the legislature at least, took the latlci position, l o his liiither peril,
erstwhile liieiuls in the beleaguered ci)nsci valive camp incicasmgly consideieil him a
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necessary sacrifice if they hoped to preserve themselves and their institutions. The
judge's removal from Harvard Law School seemed to signal Whiggery's abandonment of
his defense.
Chapter 5 covers the 1855 legislative session, at which Loring's fate was
extensively and publicly debated. The Loring hearings conducted by a radical Federal
Relations Committee were among the highlights of a controversial session marked by
scandal, confusion, and purposeful reforms The Loring debates also marked a struggle
for legislative dominance between Know-Nothings sympathetic with Governor Gardner's
national ambitions and a "Know-Something" faction more committed to establishing
Massachusetts sovereignty and proving popular control over judges. Dana's dramatic
appearance in Loring's defense brought the judiciary question to the forefront of the
debate, making the issue, in a sense, less about whether Loring had done wrong than
about whether the people had a right to declare him wrong and demand his ouster. As
Know-Nothings and Republicans prepared to compete for control of the state in a new
political era, this older question remained significant, even as both sides tried to buiy it.
Chapter 6 describes the consequences for Loring of the passage of the 1855
Personal Liberty Law, and the rise of the Republican Party. Provisions of the liberty law
were tailor-made for Loring after Gardner vetoed the 1855 removal address. The new
law changed the emphasis of debate, as later petitioners demanded Loring's removal on
its authority, while critics, including Loring and Gardner, dismissed it as self-evidently
unconstitutional. Until nearly the end of Loring's tenure, his legislative enemies urged
his fall as a vindication of their own authority, as institutional authors of the liberty law,
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rather than on the people's authority. In response, Loring and Gardner asserted an
individual right to nullify laws they deemed unconstitutional, a prerogative previously
reserved, as far as Whigs were concerned, to the appellate courts. Conventional
jurisprudence favored legislators at this point, since laws were usually considered binding
until formally overturned by an appropriate court. As a resuU, Loring became a less
plausible stand-in forjudges in general, even as conservatives still condemned political
removals as inherently wrong. While his last Whiggish defenders argued that legislators
were no better judges on constitutional questions than Loring, pro-removal solons
appealed anew to the supremacy of pubhc opinion, which, they claimed, demanded both
the liberty law and Loring' s removal.
To a large extent, the final debates over Loring were waged within the
Republican party. As with the Know-Nothings, the newly-triumphant antislavery party
was divided between men with national ambitions, and thus compromising impulses, and
a radical faction more interested in securing Massachusetts against Slave Power
outrages. When the moderates, led by Nathaniel P. Banks, proposed ehminating
Loring' s office without formally removing the judge, radical Republicans defied him by
moving removal to the head of the legislative agenda. Banks worried that likely
Republicans outside Massachusetts would condemn removal as an extremist act, hurting
the party's national chances, including his own. The radicals dismissed outside
objections, but their emerging leader, the fijture governor John A. Andrew, steered
removal through the legislature carefiilly, striving not to appear an opponent of Banks's
scheme. Given an opportunity to vindicate the removal, however, Andrew boldly
avowed radical sentiments, proclaiming the act a dutiful execution of the people's will
and a correct expression of state sovereignty.
The Loring story, in its full dimensions, covers a period of drastic social
upheaval, during which traditional communities lost much of their old coherence, and
outside forces seemed to threaten older feelings of community sovereignty and solidarity.
At the local, small town level, these developments flieled a reaction against consolidating
Whiggery in defense of community rights. In cities, traditional working-class
communities were similarly beset by industrialization in factories and the imposition of
unwelcome workplace discipline. To many nativists, the mass immigration of allegedly
stupid and servile people seemed to further the process of wholesale subjection to an
incipient aristocracy. Massachusetts itself seemed likely to fall in thrall to slaveholding
magnates from the South, to whom the Bay State's own aspiring rulers were tied by
trade links and (many thought) a shared contempt for common people. Know-
Nothingism seemed responsive to all these concerns, attracting voters seeking a sense of
community familiar to them and safe from infiltration, subversion, and outside
domination. Judge Loring was one of the ruling class who collaborated in humbling
Massachusetts before the Slave Power. He was an ideal target for a movement seeking
to define itself as the true representative of the authentic people of Massachusetts, and
the guarantor of their sovereignty. Know-Nothings and Republicans vied for that role,
making Loring' s removal a volatile issue throughout their struggle for power, and a
dangerous issue within each party. An appreciation of the deeper issues involved in the
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Loring controversy is important for any analysis of this crucial struggle in local political
history.
As well, Loring' s ordeal demonstrates the significance of the fugitive slavery
issue for party consolidation in a volatile period. Many contemporary observers believed
that fugitive slave cases, culminating in the Burns trial, did more to galvanize Northern
opinion against the ^^Slave Power" than the Kansas-Nebraska Act. To its opponents, the
fugitive law represented a Slave-Power subversion of Northern state sovereignty and the
rights of white Americans. As such, it was a more inimediate proof of slaveholders'
dangerous ambitions than any claim on the western territories, and probably brought the
sectional crisis home to many Northerners who never planned to migrate westward.
Resisting the fugitive law was more controversial politically than resisting frontier
slavery, since slave-hunting's alleged Constitutional sanction drove resisters to challenge
the authority and the very foundations of federal law, if not all law. Conservative
Republicans in Massachusetts recognized the radical implications of resistance, and tried
to exclude the issue from party platforms. This put them at odds with radical colleagues,
many of whom embraced the full implications of resistance at both the national and local
levels. The struggle over Loring spotlighted this conflict within antislavery politics. It
demonstrates that the consolidation of the Republican party and its views was a strongly
contested process within its own constituencies, and that it remained so even after the
party won power in Massachusetts. Loring' s ordeal demands attention as an important
chapter in a struggle waged by Republicans and Know-Nothings, as much amongst
themselves as against each other, to define the scope of antislavei-y politics.
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CHAPTER 1
THE POLITICS OF LAW IN ANTEBELLUM MASSACHUSETTS
Edward Greeley Loring's enemies saw the campaign to remove him as part of
their struggle against the Fugitive Slave Law. His defenders saw it as another onslauoht
in a decades-long political campaign to undermine the rule of law. Consei-vative
Whiggish opinion saw Loring less as a minion of slavery than as an embodiment, albeit
flawed, of principled judicial independence. They believed that the law, the safeguard of
individual liberty and private property, should be interpreted exclusively by a judiciary
free from popular or partisan influences. Loring's opponents often argued for a greater
popular role in both the making and the interpretation of law. They trusted the people as
a whole to know the moral sources of law, and to pass judgment on judges as well as
legislators. Loring's Whiggish allies dreaded any democratization ofjurisprudence as a
harbinger of anarchy, demagoguery, and tyranny. As long as conservatives identified the
campaign against Loring with the movement for radical judicial reform, they opposed the
judge's removal.
Judge Loring's two principal defenders in 1855 were former Whigs. Richard
Henry Dana, Jr., his ablest advocate, was a "Conscience" Whig who defected to the
Free-Soil party to protest Whiggish acquiescence in Slave Power gains after the Mexican
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War. Loring's ultimate protector, the Know-Nothing governor Henry J. Gardner, had
been a "Cotton" Whig adherent of Daniel Webster's policy of Unionist compromise
with slavery. Despite the Whig schism, and the eventual death of the Whig party,
Whiggery remained a consistent ideology throughout the period of upheaval ' That
ideology paradoxically exalted rational individual liberty while recommending deference
to an educated elite. Whigs opposed a democratic doctrine that remained suspicious of
power consolidated in the hands of individuals or factions outside popular surveillance.
Their antagonists believed in interest-group politics, in workers uniting in labor unions,
and in the organic unity of small towns. To Whiggery, all these notions endangered
individual liberty and the rule of law upon which liberty depended. The Whig struggle at
mid-century was to secure the rule of law, as they interpreted it, from democratic
subversion. Whether the issue was the basis of representation, the method of voting, or
the rights ofjudges and juries, Whigs and their rivals in effect debated the very nature of
the law, if not the basis of politics itself These debates underlay the struggle over
Loring
' The basic account of the Conscience-Cotton schism is Kinley J. Brauer, Cotton versus
Conscience: Massachusetts Whig Politics and Southwestern Expansion, J843-J848. (Lexington:
University' of Kentucky Press. 1967). See also Thomas H. O'Connor, Lords ofthe Loom: The Cotton
Whigs and the Coming of the Civil War. (New York: Scribners. 1968). On Dana see Charles Francis
Adams. Jr.. Richard Henry Dana: A Biography. 2 vols. (Boston. 1891). and Shapiro. Dana.
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Individual Liberty Versus Communal Surveillance
Whiggery preached the "harmony of interests" and an "organic" vision of society
that encouraged historians often to view Whiggish ideology as corporatist rather than
individualist. Whigs' enthusiasm for imposing behavioral norms on recalcitrant workers
and urbanites made them unconvincing to posterity as defenders of individual liberty.
Nonetheless, the Whigs were individualists, if not libertarian individualists in the modern
sense. They can best be described as contractarian individualists. Contracts, Whigs
contended, were the mode of social organization approved by natural law.^ Contracts
distinguished "free labor" from chattel slavery. Through contracts, individuals
voluntarily subordinated themselves to wise employers for their mutual benefit. Whether
the contract distributed responsibilities and benefits equitably, or whether parties
consented to it under coercive conditions (poverty, monopoly, and so on) counted for
little. A dissatisfied contractee, Whigs argued, could seek his fortune elsewhere as
readily as he had made his current contract. Any attempt to regulate contract labor
through collective coercion or government fiat reduced individual freedom and hindered
social progress. Implicit in contract labor, of course, was voluntary deference to an
employer's guidance. For Whiggery, this was a model for politics.
" Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture ofthe American Whigs. (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1979). 228 - 9.
^ The "free-labor" ideolog\ is actually a historiographic construct- posited to explain why many
antislaver\ acti\ ists proved unsx mpathetic to the complaints of wage laborers. Critics of this discovered
ideology find its indifference to factor\ exploitation and alienation inconsistent with its concern for the
plight of the slave. There might be cause to accuse the abolitionists and Republicans of "self-deception"
(in Dav id Brion Davis's words), if not hv pocrisy, if these groups criticized slavery chiefiy as an
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The Whigs' contractarian society required political individualism. They viewed
the sovereign individual as the fundamental unit of a comractarian society.^ Whiggery
abhorred group politics, whether oriented around class, region, or caucus, as a surrender
of individual conscience. Whigs urged voters to think for themselves at the polls as they
did in the marketplace or on the job. They believed that dispassionate reason would
counsel deference to those best qualified to lead. These natural leaders deserved the
public's trust on the basis of their disinterested understanding of the community's needs.'
Whiggery'
s acceptance of class hierarchies did not contradict the individualist doctrine.
The rational citizen, Whigs believed, would not view classes as inherently hostile tribes,
but would recognize their natural interdependence, as demonstrated in contractual
relationships between employees and employers. The same principle applied for voters
and rulers.^
alienation of the sla\ es" labor. While Lincoln attacked slavey on the Lockean ground that it denied the
slaves the fruits of their labor, most antislaver> commentary focused on the basic fact that slaves were
coerced into labor without benefit of contract The debate on the dialectical relation between evolving
social relations and evolv ing views of labor morality, waged by Davis. Thomas Haskell, and John
Ashworth in the. Imerican Historical Review, is collected in Thomas Bender, ed.. The Antislavery
Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation. (Berkeley: University of
California Press. 1992). See also John Ashworth. "Free Labor. Wage Labor, and the Slave Power:
Republicanism and the Republican Party in the 1850s." in MeKyn Stokes and Stephen Conway, eds..
The Market Revolution in America: Social, Political, and Religious Expressions, 1800 - 1880.
(Charlottesville: Universit\' Press of Virginia. 1996). 128 - 46. in which he emphasizes mobilit> as an
essential part of the idealized free-labor system. The basic book on free-laborism. despite criticisms
summarized by Ashworth. remains Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. w hich was reissued with a
new historiographic introduction in 1995.
Howe. American IVhigs. 29. Robert H. Wiebc, The Opening ofAmerican Society: From the
Adoption ofthe Constitution to the Eve ofDisunion. (New York: Knopf 1984). 265 - 90; Ronald P.
Formisano. The Transformation ofPolitical Culture: Massachusetts Politics, 1790s- 1840s, (New York:
Oxford Universit> Press. 1983), 275 - 7.
^ Howe. American Whigs, 33-4. 181 - 2.
* Lawrence Frederick Kohl. The Politics ofIndividualism: Parties and the American Character
in the Jacksonian Era. (New York: O.xford University Press). 78 - 84.
21
Massachusetts Whiggery was most explicitly individualist when criticizing the state's
system of corporate representation. Until 1836, the state constitution guaranteed every
Massachusetts town annual representation in the General Court. Towns could opt not to
send delegates, but in peak political years the lower house swelled to over 700 members.
Increasing impatience with oversized, allegedly wasteful legislatures led to ratification of
the Twelfth and Thirteenth Amendments in 1836 and 1840. These stripped the smallest
towns of their annual representation, but preserved a corporate right to a minimum of
representation per decade.^ Mid-century Whiggery remained dissatisfied, and demanded
that legislatures reflect a new balance of economic power.
Expanded productivity and improved communications since 1780 had created
statewide and nationwide markets that escaped customary small-town controls.
Cosmopolitan market demands affected the priorities of farmers and small producers,
who increasingly devoted resources to cash crops that were once directed towards local
barter. In an increasingly complex economy, rural towns' identities as organic
communities, and their entitlement to representation as distinct economic interests, came
into question.** Given the increased mobility of labor as surplus workers left the farms
Formisano, Transformation oj Political Culture. 34 - 6: Arthur P. Darling. Political Changes
in Massachusetts, 1824-1848: A Study oj Liberal Movements in Politics, (New Haven. 1925; reprint,
Cos Cob. Ct.: J. E. Edwards, 1968). 169 - 70. 259. The 1836 amendment based each town^s quota of
representation on its population of ' legal v oters." The 1840 amendment, ratified under a Democratic
administration, changed the basis of representation to total population, which led. in theory , to larger
legislatures.
^ Christopher Clark. The Roots ofRural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860,
(Ithaca: Cornell Universit>^ Press. 1990). 198 - 9. 203; Winifred B. Rothcnberg. From Market-Place to
Market Economy: The Transformation ofRural Massachusetts, 1750- J 850, (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press. 1992). 47 -8. A general national account of these developments is Charles Sellers. The
Market Revolution, 1815-1848, (New York: Oxford University Press. 1991).
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and immigrants arrived from Europe, fewer voters were likely to identify their own
interests with those of their current domiciles.^
Recognizing changing conditions, Whiggery called for the end of town
representation. "By reason of the effect of water power and railroads, and emigration,"




the relative value of property, and the relative influence of men, have been
changed " "[T]he vast expansion given to its industry in all directions," a Salem delegate
added, "has entirely changed the face of the Commonwealth, and now we are to frame a
government adapted to the present state of things, and to the impending and probable
fiiture state of things"'" Whiggery contended that the people, not the towns, had always
been the real basis of representation "The town is an incorporeal thing," one Whig
declared, "without flesh and blood; it is a creature of a statute It is without a soul and
has no more right to representation than the brute cattle on the thousand hills about
us "" To defend corporate rights for towns violated individualism by denying that "a
^ Rothcnbcrg, From Market-Flace to Market Economy^ 15 - 16, 210 - 12, 243 - 4; William G.
Bean. "Part> Transformation in Massachusetts, With Special Reference to the Antecedents of
Republicanism, 1848-1860," (Ph D dissertation. Harvard University, 1922), 153; Jonathan Prude. The
Coming ofIndustrial Order: Town and Factory Life in Rural Massachusetts, 1810-1860. (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press. 1983). 232 - 3. Sec the same author's "Town-Factory Conflicts in
Antebellum Rural Massachusetts." in Steven Hahn and Jonathan Prude, eds.. The Countryside in the
Age of Capitalist Transformation. (Chapel Hill: Uni\ersity of North Carolina Press. 1985). 75 - 8.
Official Record of the Debates and Proceedings ofthe State Convention Assembled May 4th,
]8.'>3, to Revise and .Amend the Constitution ofthe Commonwealth ofMassachusetts [hereafter OR], 3
vols.. (Boston, 1853), 2: 139, 168, 179, 227.
" OR. 2: 48: 3: 349. Charles Francis Adams opposed town representation, but admitted, unlike
man> Whigs, that the 1 780 framers had acknow Icdged. albeit mistakenly, the idea of corporate
representation in granting the towns the option not to send representatives. See his anti-constitulion
address in Quincy. reprinted in George T. Curtis, ed.. Discussions on the Constitution Propo.'ied to the
People ofMassachusetts by the Convention of 1853, (Boston. 1854), 264 - 8.
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man is a man wilhoiit rcuaid to his position in the coniiniinity." "Town corporations;'
said the Whig newspajiernian Nathan I lale, "have no interests except those belonging to
the inchvidiial persons who compose those towns."'^
In practical terms, Whigs denounced town representation as a system oi lotten
boroughs" because rural towns mostly favored the mid-ceiitury Coalition of I )cmocrats
and Free-Soilers, Coalitionists played on rural fears, shared bv many urban Democrats,
that economic expansion had given too much power to an aspiiing itoslonian
arist(Kracy united by lamily and business ties Massachusetts was threatened.
Democratic governor Marcus Morion warned in 1840, by "an I'MIMKI- of business men
. . .
in the city of Boston," who would legislate in the interest of capital rather than ni the
interest of men." In 1850, Anti-Boston sentiment catapulted Ihc Coalition to victory
over a Whig parly divided over slavery Although presidential politics undermined the
Coalition in I8S2, it won a majority of delegates at the 1853 convention, where reform
leaders boldly proposed restoring annual representation for all towns As a counter, the
Whigs proposed the creation of equal electoral districts based on population as a
democratic, individualist alternative to corporate representation. When Whiggeiy
condemned expanded town lepreseiitalion as a cynical power grab, radical Coalitionist
Frank Bird judged "rotten boroughs" preferable, on the chance that they "might
^U)R, I: 8.17. X.ss.
'
' Mullvcm. Know-Nothiiiji Party, 20 - 2 1 . Iklly G. Farrcll, I'litc lumiilics: ( loss and Power in
Nhu'k'cnih ( cnliiry liosloii. (Allianv: SUNY Press. \'m). 149 - 51; .lane II. Pease and Willi.iiii II
Pease. I'lu' H'ch oj Proiircss: Private Values and Piihlic Styles in lioslon and Charleston, IH2H-IS43.
(New York: Oxlbid IJniveisily Press. I^S.S). .10 - 2; Ronald Slorv. The I'orsini^i oj on Aristocracy:
Harvard and the Boston Upper Class. IS00-IH70. (Middlelon. Cl : Wcslcyan llnixcrsitv Press. I WO).
18.
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occasionally fall into the hands of representatives, who should have some sympathy in
common with the people^ to the guaranteed hegemony of aristocratic Whiggery
promised by the creation of a district system,
Coalitionists' ideal of democracy was the small town as an organic cuhural whole
with distinct interests shared by all its citizens. "There are none of those festering,
aristocratic, 'central cliques' in the towns," a Coalitionist declared, "as there are in large
cities, and in counties or [electoral] districts, to control and bamboozle the voters." "A
House chosen in good part by the towns is a house coming from the people,^' another
wrote, "while a House chosen by districts comesfrom the caucuses" Public servants'
virtue was most certain, radical Coalitionists believed, when the most people had a voice
in their appointments. If all people are assumed capable of "justice and truth," Frank
Bird asserted, "they are more liable to right than individuals, [and] are to be trusted
rather than individuals."^^ To change the basis of representation from communities to
individuals, cautioned Democratic leader Benjamin F. Hallett, was misguidedly Utopian:
"A sense of right and morality, in this commonwealth, would no more admit of breaking
up or disfranchising the towns for such a theoretical representation [of individuals], than
they would admit of breaking up families to establish socialism." Rather than empower
OR. 1: 840. 851. 857: 2: 158. Whigs noted mocknigly thai for all the Coalition paeans to the
authentic representation engendered by the town system, leading Coalitionists from Boston and other
large. Whig-dominated cities had arranged to be elected as delegates for distant rural towns.
OR. 2:779. See also Kohl. Politics ofIndividualism, 24 - 5. 55 - 62.
Northampton Courier. 14 June 1853: Boston Daily Commonwealth. 18 June 1853: Boston
Post, 1 July 1853. Hereafter, unless identified by city in a second citation, newspapers cited were
published in Boston.
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individuals. Democrats teared, the Whigs would revolutionize the political order to
further consolidation power in aristocratic Boston.
Coalition anxieties about Whiggish individualism rellected longstanding
biblically-based apprehensions about relying on sinful, fallible individuals for community
stability. A historian of the eighteenth century writes that ^'most Americans did not have
confidence in the unaided ability of humans to live a life of rational liberty without the
intervention of concerned brethren (and usually the Holy Spirit as well) " A free society
of smallholders required "a community where men and women could reciprocally bind
themselves to follow the laws of God and nature -- in effect, collectively to forge their
own chains." An individual unconstrained by "intrusive community oversight," according
to this view, menaced himself and eveiyone he knew.'^ This attitude persisted into the
nineteenth century A writer for the Lowell I 'oicc of hidiislry held that "there can be no
such thing as a merely individual Redemption for man." Even when Protestantism
preached individual salvation, a recent historian contends, political radicals believed that
"this was to be carried out as part of a process of social transformation." From this
Barry Ai;in Sliain. The Mylli of Americon Individualism: The Protestant Origins ofAmerican
Political 'I'hoiiiiht. (l>rmccton: Princcloii IJiiivcrsily Press. 1994), 86 - 100. 1X2 - 4. 188. .112 - 18.
Sliain's iiuim thesis is thai Amei ieaii politics was neither liberal nor republican, but grounded ni a
Protestant ethic of reciprocal obligalions. .loyce Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the
Historical Imoiiination. (Cantbridge: Hanard University Press, 1992). defends liberalism against the
"civic virtue" republican school, which is founded on the writings of J. G. A. Pocock. in a general
"Atlantic" context, and on the work of Gordon Wood in a more specifically American context. Sec
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Plorentine Political Thouiilit and the Atlantic Republican
Tradition, (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 197.S). and I 'irtue. Commerce, and History,
(Cambridge: Cambridge Umversity Press. 198.S). and Wood. The Creation oj the American Republic.
1776-I7S7, (Chapel Hill: Uimcrsily of Norlh Carolina Press. 1969).
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critical perspective, 'individualism as it was then flowering ' in Massachusetts ^ was the
root of the probIem[s]" facing society.^**
As Democrats and Coalitionists saw it, Whiggish individualism led to intimidation
of the individual whenever one partner in a contractual relationship had a preponderance
of power. Too often, wealthy employers or Whig politicians demanded deference from
individuals whom they considered their dependents. Boston lawyer George S. Hillard
scandalized the 1853 convention by characterizing an anti-Boston speech by Coalitionist
Richard Henry Dana, Jr. as biting "the hand that feeds us/'^*^ Privately, Hillard told
Dana "that if a man lives in Boston and feels about her position and action as you do,
.
. .
he ought either to keep silent or leave the city/^ Hillard, Dana complained, spoke as if
Massachusetts was ^^a club their club," rather than "a community of equal rights "
When men like Hillard preached democratic individualism against town representation.
Coalitionists concluded that they meant individual deference to the ^^hand that feeds
Jama Lazerow. Religion and the Working Class in Antebellum America. (Washington:
Smithsonian Institution Press. 1995). 198 - 202.
OR. 1: 947: 2: 133-6: Shapiro. Dana. 73-6. Dana argued that, besides having a
disproportionate number of immigrants and transients. Boston had a surplus of people employed in vice.
Hillard himself admitted that Boston had "a larger proportion of the worthless classes, and a larger
proportion of the dangerous classes." than the rural towns. It was left to fellow Boslonian William
Schouler to argue that, at the least, there were enough riffraff in the towns to counterbalance Boston's
share.
^" Robert F. Lucid, cd.. The Journal ofRichard Henry Dana, Jr.. 3 vols.. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. Belknap Press. 1968). 2: 553-4; According to Frank Bird, the Whigs blatantly ad\ ised
withholding business or employment to political enemies. S^ct Commonwealth, 22 Februar\ 1853. For
Boston as a halter, see OR, 2: 533.
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Coalitionists feared that the same "hand that feeds us ^ would exploit individual
weakness to consolidate control in the workplace and the polls. Urban representatives
had long known that Whiggish employers and Whiggish courts opposed workers'
attempts to equalize contractual negotiations by forming unions. Whiggery condemned
unions as conspiracies in restraint of individual contractors, but labor activists had
warned since the 1830s that ^^all those rights which it is impossible to enjoy without the
aid of others become social rights, and must be enjoyed, if at all, in concert with others."
Whiggish individualism, however, left workers to compete against each other, lowering
wages and working standards for all. This "every man for himself^ ethic, a radical
Democrat observed in 1834, amounted to ^^a kind of suicide ^ for the factory worker.^^
Whiggish individualism, some Coalitionists charged, also led frequently to blatant
intimidation of voters. Before 1839, voters had the option of depositing their ballots in
sealed envelopes. The 1839 Whig legislature made unsealed ballots mandatory, forcing
voters to reveal their opinions at the polling place, often in the presence of employers or
Frederick Robinson. "An Oration Delivered before the Trades' Union of Boston and Vicinity,
July 4, 1834r in Joseph L. Blau, ed.. Social Theories ofJacksonian Democracy: Representative
Writings ofthe Period 1825-1850. (New York: Harper and Row. 1947). 328; Christopher L. Tomlins.
Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American Republic, (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni\ ersity Press,
1993). 198: Formisano. Transformation ofPolitical Culture, 235. 335 - 40. The individuaUst bias
against collective bargaining wasn't held by Whigs alone. See Luther Hamilton, ed. Memoirs,
Speeches, and Writings ofRobert Rantoui Jr., (Boston. 1854). especially the 1836 "Oration at
Scituate." for the objections of a reform Democrat. David A. Zonderman. Aspirations and Anxieties:
New England Workers and the Mechanized Factory System, 1815-1850. (New York: O.vford University
Press. 1992). 213. 224 - 5. 254 - 60. discusses the ambiguous opinions of workers themselves. On the
"free-labor ideolog> " and its response to labor protest, see Eric Foner. "Abolitionism and the Labor
Movement in Antebellum America." in Christopher Bolt and Seymour Drescher. Qd.s..Anti-Stavery,
Religion, and Reform, (Folkstone. UK: Dawson. 1980). 259 - 60; Jonathan A. Glickstein. -Poverti' is
Not Slaver\':^ American Abolitionists and the Competitive Labor Market." in Lewis Perr\ and Michael
Fellman. eds.. Antislavery Reconsidered: New Perspectives on the Abolitionists, (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press. 1979). 216 - 7. While these articles focus on antislaver\ opinion, they
discuss an issue on which Whigs and abolitionists usually agreed.
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agents who threatened to fire and blacklist those who went against the company interest.
In 1851 the Coalition imposed a mandatory secret ballot to prevent intimidation, but
resurgent Whiggery restored the original optional ballot two years later. Coalitionists
now complained that the deposit of a secret ballot would endanger voters' jobs if
employers inferred opposition from their secrecy. When the Coalition tried to make
the secret ballot a constitutional right at the 1853 convention, Whiggery denounced
secrecy as political cowardice The sovereign individual, Whigs boasted, fearlessly told
the world how he voted, whatever the consequences. Secrecy encouraged class distrust,
and served only "to separate more and more the elements of society, to deprive the
proprietor, the employer, the more educated, of all means of direct influence over the
employed, the laborer, the less educated On this issue also. Coalitionists believed
that Whiggery' s individualist rhetoric concealed a scheme for aristocratic control.
" Carl Siracusa, A Mechanical People: Perceptions ofthe Industrial Order in Massachusetts,
1840-1880. (Middlcton, Ct.: Wcslcyan Uni\crsit\ Press. 1979). 183 - 5. In 1840 a Whig majority in the
lower house defeated a secret-ballot bill after appro\al by a Democratic senate. A bill introduced during
Morion s second administration in 1843 failed by one vote.
Despite the secret ballot, employers tried different strategies to control workers' votes. See
Greenfield Franklin Democrat, quoted in Fall River News^ 20 November 1851. and Benjamin F. Butler.
Butler's Hook, (Boston. 1892). 1 14 - 5. The repeal of the 1851 law complicated the 1853 elections.
While the March 1853 election of delegates to the conv ention was conducted under the new optional
ballot, the new constitution itself had to be v oted on. according to the provisions of the 1852 act calling
the convention, by the secret ballot. On election day. voters had to submit separate ballots for the
regular elections, which were conducted under the new rule, and the constitutional referendum. See Fall
River News, 3 November 1853. and other papers for a joint communique from the three party chairmen
explaining the procedure. The comparativ e significance of indiv idual conscience (or as some Whigs put
it individual courage) and corporate intimidation were debated in OR. 1: 547 - 702. 746 - 58. See also
Michael Brunet. ^The Secret Ballot Issue in Massachusetts Politics from 1851 to 1853," New England
Quarterly 25 (September 1952): 354 - 62. which characteri/es the Whig position not as ^ progressively"
individualist but as "obstinate and senile." The quoted sample of actual Whig opinion is from Monthly
Law Reporter, new scries. 4 (July 1851). 1 10.
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Coalitionists saw Whiggish individualism as a divide-and-conquer strategy. For
Benjamin F. Hallett, the stmggle over constitutional reform was not a battle for
individual liberty, but "a question between corporations," pitting ^'corporations that have
souls " the towns, against ^'those corporations
. . . which are soulless." Whiggery sought
to tear voters away from the healthy influence of their neighbors and co-workers only to
put them in the hands of the aristocratic party. Partisan gerrymandering in the creation
of electoral districts would destroy traditional political ties and strengthen the influence
of capital. The only alternative to government by moneyed corporations, Hallett warned,
was government by town representation. Corporate rights, not individual rights, would
best safeguard liberty.
At the 1853 convention, the Coalition retreated under Whig pressure from annual
representation for all towns, promising the smallest towns only six years' representation
per decade. This remained unacceptable to the Whigs, who inflamed urban voters with
statistics showing that the Coalition scheme gave a farmer far more political power than
the average city dweller. They interpreted the failure of the reform constitution as a
mandate to dismantle town representation, and approved a constitutional amendment
creating a district system in 1854. The Know-Nothing legislature of 1855, however,
denied the amendment its required second passage. Only with the emergence of the
Republican party did a district system become law. During the intervening period of
OR. 1 : 908-919. Some Whigs charged that the secret ballot was needed, if am^vhere. in the
small towns w here local grandees could exert more influence over a larger proportion of voters than any
factorv owner in the cities. The Coalition exempted the rural towns from the secret ballot requirement
because it was impractical for town-meeting government. To the Whigs this was obvious h\pocris\
.
Coalitionists countered that the malignant influence of moneyed corporations and their mill agents made
the secret ballot necessar>^ in the cities. See OR. 1: 691 - 702. 746 - 58.
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party upheaval, the representation question, and the deeper philosophical questions
behind it, remained unresolved.
At stake in the debate over representation was the premise that rational
individuals could vote or govern disinterestedly. While many Coalitionists preached
individual freedom as readily as their Whig rivals, they questioned individuals' capacity
for political independence from their peers or patrons. Town representation more
certainly insured that all local interests, and thus all the people, had a voice in state
government. Democratic reformers insisted that government and the laws it enacted
depended on universal consent. This insistence also drove the campaign for judicial
reform. On this question, however, Whiggery had little opportunity to pose as tribunes
of democracy.
Divergent Visions of the Law
In December 1854, Benjamin Robbins Curtis, the Bay State's representative in
the United States Supreme Court, complained to his uncle that the Massachusetts
'^^ Massachusetts General Court. 1855 House Journal, manuscript. Massachusetts State
Archives. Appendix 2: Post, 16 November 1853: Fall River News, 17 November 1853. Mulkern. Know-
Nothing Part\\ 28. asserts that a shift by formerly pro-convention cities against the rural agenda
supposedly embodied in the constitution pro\ es urban hostility to both the Coalition and its
representation scheme. Mulkern concludes that, despite its reformist reputation, the Coalition was
indifferent to the specific needs of urban workers. However, the Coalition specifically promised to
divide large cities into electoral districts that would theoretically allow^ working-class voters to elect
authentic representatives rather than submit to Whig-dominated cit\Avide tickets. In any event, all
conclusions on the meaning of the 1853 vote arc provisional, since voters had lo pass judgment on a
frame of government (Proposition 1) that encompassed many controversial measures, including both
town representation and the secret ballot. This makes it nearly impossible to attribute a positive or
negative vote to one issue. Mulkern (212. n. 65) attributes the Know -Nothings' rejection of district
representation in 1855 to their dissatisfaction to a Whig amendment that apportioned representation
according to the population of "legal voters" rather than according to the complete population.
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judiciary was under an attack ''such as no honest judiciary, in any country within my
knowledge, have been subject to." Even though most people still respected the courts,
Curtis found that they "are ready to listen without indignation to the grossest charges
against those who administer the judicial power." That same month, the conservative
Free-Soil leader Charles Francis Adams heard an abolitionist lecturer at Boston's
Tremont Temple lambaste the judicial branch While Adams grumbled that such talk
"will always catch sympathy from men who have the best reasons to dread [judicial]
impartiality," he admitted, unlike Curtis, that the courts, through a series of arbitrary,
bigoted rulings, had given the radicals ample cause for complaint. Adams probably
referred only to recent court decisions upholding the Fugitive Slave Law, including
Loring's ruling against Anthony Burns; opposition to the Massachusetts judiciary,
however, had deeper, older roots.
Conservative antislavery opinion on the judiciary question was shaped by the
juridical controversies of past decades rather than by the Fugitive Slave Law.
Conservatives denounced that law, but considered it binding until Congress repealed it or
an appeals court overturned it. They could not simply nullify it on their own moral
authority, nor could they condemn judges for obeying it. To attack judges for fulfilling
their constitutional duty was to sacrifice the rule of law, and with it individual liberty, to
Benjamin R. Curtis to George Ticknor. 20 December 1854. in Benjamin R. Curtis Jr . cd.,
lAfc ami Writings ofBenjamin R. Curtis. 2 vols.. (Boston. 1874). 1: 175 - 6: Charles Francis Adams
Diarv'. 14 December 1854. Adams Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, micronim.
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popular opinion. It made no difference whether the aggrieved parties were abolitionists,
working men, or liquor dealers; all owed deference to the courts, whatever their beliefs.^^
The ruling text for all commentary on the courts was Article 29 of the
Massachusetts Bill of Rights: "It is essential to the preservation of the rights of every
individual, his life, liberty, property, and character, that there be an impartial
interpretation of the laws, ... It is the right of every citizen to be tried by judges as free,
impartial, and independent, as the lot of humanity would admit " To insure this right,
state judges "hold their offices, as long as they behave themselves well, and that they
should have honorable salaries, ascertained and established by standing laws." The
framers assumed that a judge who feared neither for his job nor for his pocketbook
would be guided solely by intellect and conscience. Whether individuals were capable of
such independence remained debatable, as we have seen, well into the nineteenth
century.
Whiggery saw lawyers and judges as defenders of the unpopular defendant and
the hated minority. Joseph Story, the Bay State's representative on the Supreme Court
during the Jacksonian era and the epitome of Whiggish jurisprudence, painted a heroic
portrait of the conscientious lawyer defending "at hazard [of] the popularity of a life
devoted to the public service," the persecuted victim, "already bound for immolation,"
for the sake of "the supremacy of law against power, and numbers, and public applause,
and private wealth." The law, Whigs proclaimed, protected the weak from the strong.
Kermit L. Hall. ^The Judiciar>^ on Trial: State Constitutional Reform and the Rise of an
Elected Judiciary. 1846-1860^ The Historian 44 (1983): 351. See also Hall, The Magic Mirror: Law in
American History. (New York: Oxford Universit\ Press. 1989). 104. which misdates the Massachusetts
comention.
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the few from the many. These sentiments lent a certain irony to the politics of law in
Massachusetts, since Whig jurists almost invariably sided with prosecutors in
controversial cases.'^^
The Whigs' predicament was ironic not because they contradicted themselves,
but because they remained true to their principles. Individual liberty, they believed,
depended on the impartial rule of law Liberty was based on property rights '^What is
personal liberty, if it does not draw after it the right to enjoy the fruits of our own
industry Story asked The law was dedicated to "the protection of property; and not
of property only, but of personal rights, and personal character, of domestic peace, and
parental authority." First among these, according to jurist Rutus Choate, was man's
primeval desire for "security" in his property. Men knew instinctually, Choate claimed,
"that a learned, impartial, and honored judiciary is the only means" of guaranteeing this
29
security.
An impartial bench was especially necessary in a contractarian society Judges
were the final interpreters of contracts, and played a crucial role in defining legitimate
contractual relations. They could admit no challenge to their "monopoly of legitimate
coercion" from legislators or labor unions Only the courts could be trusted not to
"interfer[ej with the free interaction of private interests." Judges, then, should be
Joseph Stoiy. "Discourse pronounced Upon ihe Inauguration of the Aulhor, As Dane
Professor of Law in Har\ ard lJni\ e!sily. August 25. 1829. " in Pern Miller, ed.. ilu' Legal Mind in
America: I'rom Independence to the ( Ivil W ar. (New York: Anchor, 1%2), 181.
SloiA. "Discourse," in Miller. I.eiial Mind. 180-1; (W. .V 809 - 10; Kohl, roliticsoj
Individualism. 178-80.
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immune from political influences.'" "For what purpose is a judge put upon the bench?"
George S. Hillard asked. "Is h to do the will of the people"^ By no means; it is to do
justice between man and man. In doing this, he may be called upon to act in direct
opposition to the will of the people."
Democratic radicals questioned the Whiggish distinction between the people's
will and the law of the land. Some rejected the idea of any distinction between the two.
Their criticisms raised a fundamental question: what was the law'^ Theorists and
polemicists disagreed on its nature and origin. Three definitions predominated. The
common Icm' enshrined the accumulated knowledge of generations ofjurists in
precedents directly or analogically applicable to future cases. Natural law was eternal
and unchanging, the rule of "nature and nature's God," neither man-made nor mediated
by men. Positive law, or statute law, derived its authority from the enactments of human
lawmakers, regardless of any theoretical basis. These three ideas mixed together in many
minds. Common law scholars and legal positivists readily claimed to study natural law,
but unlike radical natural-law thinkers, they deferred to judicial precedents and legislative
enactments. Without the enabling authority of a judicial ruling or a legislative majority,
they thought, natural law had no effective force. Natural-law thinkers, meanwhile,
rejected any rulings or enactments that violated the eternal law as they perceived it.
In post-Revolutionary America the distinctions between common law and
positive law blurred further. While colonial courts had always applied the body of
Tomlins. Law, Labor, and Ideologv, 190, 225. 270.
^' OR. 3: 213.
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English common law selectively by excluding precedents deemed irrelevant to local
conditions, independence threw any relationship between English and American law into
doubt Many judges refused to accept post- 1776 English rulings as precedents. Others
advocated rejecting the English system entirely in favor of democratically enacted legal
codes. Americans subjected the common law tradition to an ideological test: authentic
laws must conform with the timeless principles of individual liberty and property rights.
When familiar precedents went against these principles, or when customary rules
hindered creative, entrepreneurial usage of property, judges often ruled contrary to the
common law. While they justified such departures by appealing to natural law and
liberty, their critics accused them of rationalizing faulty rulings for the benefit of the
rich;^'^
Some Whiggish jurists were uncomfortable with the ambiguity of their position.
Admitting the malleability of the law implied the possibility of more radical change. "It is
certain that in the American theory, the free theory of government, it is the right of the
people, at any moment of its representation in the legislature, to make all the laws and
. . . to make the Constitution anew/' Ruflis Choate admitted. ''But 1 do not know," he
went on, "that any wise man would desire to have this theory every day, or ever, acted
" HalK Magic Mirror. 50.
Morion J. Horwilz. The Transformation ofAmerican Law, 1 780- 1860. (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press. 1977), 10 - 1 1. Horwilz is credited as ihc pioneer scholar of "inslrumcnlalisl"
jurisprudence, which purportedly replaced nalural-law or conmion-law lests with rcsulls-based
reasoning. Inslrumenlalism Ihus defined would be al odds with Ihe mlc of law. Horu il/ has been
accused of Beardian determinism, perhaps because his thesis seems consistent with antcbeUum radical
critiques of the courts. For a brief critique of Horw it/ on other grounds, sec Hall. Magic Mirror. Ill -
8. On instrumentalism see also Tomlins. Law, Labor, and Ideology. 303 - 4.
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upon to its whole extent.'^ Choate advised concealing the revolutionary implications of
the American founding from popular notice. 'True wisdom would seem to advise to
lock up the extreme medicine till the attack of the alarming malady, ... to throw over it
a politic, well-wrought veil." The law, he proposed, should be seen as a discovery rather
than an invention, a natural science rather than an act of will.
Choate contrasted the "American
. . . free theory of government," with ''our
system," according to which, "the law is not the transient and arbitrary creation of the
major will, nor of any will. It is not the offspring of any will at all." The law was "the
absolute justice of the State, enlightened by the perfect reason of the State.
Enlightened justice assisting the social nature to perfect itself by the social life." How
could law otherwise defined "gain a moment's hold on the reverential sentiments of the
heart, and the profounder convictions of the judgment? How can it impress a filial awe;
. . .
how can it sustain a sentiment of veneration; how can it command a rational and
animated defence*^" How could it, indeed, when many observers believed that judicial
innovators trampled ancient precedents and eternal principles for their own aristocratic
benefit?'^
Choate' s obfiiscatory purposes were sabotaged when his fellow Whigs celebrated
legal innovation as part of the progressive spirit of the age. Emory Washburn, the state's
^'^ Rufus Choate. "The Position and Functions of the American Bar, As An Element of
Conservatism in the State: An Address Delivered Before the Law School in Cambridge. July .3, 1845."
in Miller, ed.. I.e^al Mind 266 - 7. See also Pcrr\ Miller. The Li/e of the Mind ui . Uncrica: From the
Revolulion to the Civil War, (New York: Harcourt. Brace. 1%5). 158-61.
Choate. "Position and Functions. " in Miller, ed.. Lef^al Mind, 264. A representative
contcmponm complaint against aristocratic Judicial usurpation is The Judiciary System of
Massachusetts, By a Member ofthe Bar. (Boston, n.d.).
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last Whig governor, and Judge Loring's replacement at the Harvard Law School, told his
fellow lawyers that "It has seemed to me that there was something like a public pulse in
the law, which accurate obseivers, situated as our courts are, often feel without knowing
how its movements reach their consciousness " Priorities change with the times,
Washburn noted, and ^Trinciples which at one period are little more than hinted at,
. . .
become, in time, elementary in their character, and their soundness no one presumes to
question;^ Constantly changing conditions required "that those who are to act as
interpreters of the law, should take part in the actual administration of it /^ Judges'
"trained sagacity, and authoritative opinions," would give the public pulse coherent form
and rational direction.
Washburn unintentionally echoed the views of an anonymous correspondent for
the IJherafor, the Garrisonian abolitionist weekly: ^^Society is progressive, and opinions
that today are held as sane and rational, to-morrow may find
. . . obsolete, exploded, ~
for current events shadow, and finally transfix, what was once looked on as chimerical "
The abolitionist, however, believed that precedent-bound had not kept up with the times.
A third writer found judges guided by neither precedent nor the spirit of the age, but by
"the circumstances of the parties'' or ''the character of the litigants ' arguing before them.
Given these perceptions, Choate's idealization ofjudges as disinterested legal scientists
was unpersuasive.^^
Emory Washburn. Address at the Social Festival ofthe Bar of Worcester County,
Massachusetts, February 7, 1856. (Worcester. 1856), 30 - 1.
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Liberator. 23 March \^55\ Judiciary System ofMassachusetts. 3,
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Critics claimed that Whiggery's avowed disinterested objectivity masked self-
interested ambition. To Jacksonian Democrats, the development of academic and
professional standards of legal practice, led by law schools and bar associations, was a
usurpation of a prerogative once enjoyed by anyone who could read Blackstone's
manual. To many critics, this threatened monopoly of legal discourse represented a
greater danger than any presented by Masonry, the bogey of the Jacksonian North.
Antimasonic activists and politicians who ignored the danger of monopoly in the courts
were "fishing for minnows," one orator warned, while "let[ting] slip the leviathan."^^
The common law itself came under attack once its interpretation was effectively
reserved to an educated elite Jurists' selective application of precedents made the
American common law seem obscure and arbitrary. While law schools praised a
common law "augmented and rectified by the superior light of universal knowledge,"
Democratic critics portrayed it as a ''dark chaos," that "sprung from the dark ages," and
"had its origin in folly, barbarism, and feudality." Radical critics charged that bar
associations suppressed free competition in the legal trade Lawyers had "always
regulated the price of their own labor," one orator observed, "and by the strictest concert
[now] contrived to limit competition by denying to everyone the right of working in their
trade who will not in every respect comply with the rules of the bar." This "secret trades
Frederick Robinson. " Oration." in Blau. ed.. Social Theories, 330; Gerard W. Gawah, 7he
Promise ofPower: The Emergence of the Legal Profession in Massachusetts, 1760-1840. (Westport,
Ct.: Greenwood Press. 1979). 179 - 80; Gawalt. "Sources of Ami-Lawyer Sentiment in Massachusetts,
1740-1840," American Journal ofLegal History 14 (1970): 296 - 7.
Josiah Quinc\ . "An Address Delivered at the Dedication of the Dane Law College in Harvard
Unn crsity. October 23. 1832." in Miller, ed.. Legal Mind. 208; Robinson. "Oration," in Blau, ed.,
Social Theories, 33 1; Ranloul. "Oration at Scituate." in Hamilton, ed.. Rantoul, 279.
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union of the bar/' critics noted, hypocritically condemned labor unions as conspiracies in
restraint of trade. Hypocrisy aside, many workers condemned court rulings against labor
for lacking authority either in common law or in legislative statute. ^The Lawyers and
Judges," a "Boston Mechanic" concluded, "lay their heads together, and impose upon us
just what laws they please, and execute them as they please. ""^^
Democratic radicals advocated clarifying and democratizing the law by replacing
common law with a published code that the general public could understand. Legislative
codification would allow laymen to judge judicial opinions for themselves, rather than
"tamely submit [to them] with the same patience, and the same spirit of intelligence, too,
as a horse in a bark mill " It would also minimize judicial discretion by holding judges to
a recognized standard of law. However, as one radical warned, "[Ujntil we can fill the
bench with men of learning, good sense, and sound judgment who do not belong to the
secret fraternity of the bar, all attempts to simplify the law and the practice of the law
will be in vain." In Massachusetts, an 1835 law stripped bar associations of the power to
accredit lawyers. While granting this power to the state theoretically liberated the bar
from cliquish influence, state government remained dominated by lawyers.
Robinson. " Oration." in Blau. ed.. Social Theories. 329; "A Boston Mechanic.'' in John R.
Commons, ed.. A Documentary History ofAmerican Industrial Society, 10 vols., (Cleveland, 1910), 6:
93. On judicial "innovation" in labor cases, see Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology, 275 - 6, 281 - 2:
Stark V. ParA'^r (1824). despite precedents cited in the ruling, innovatively required complete fulfillment
of a laborer s contract before he could claim any compensation, while the doctrine of enticement,
applied in trials culminating in Commonwealth v. ///y/?^ (1842). was creatively extended from its original
application to bound ser\ ants to cover contract laborers, who might then be criminally enticed by rival
employers or, as in Hunt, by a union.
''^ Robinson, "Oration." in Blau. ed.. Social Theories, 332: Rantoul. ^^Oration at Scituate," in
Hamilton, ed.. Rantoul, 280: Gawalt. Promise ofPower, 182. 189: GawaU. "Sources of Anti-Lawyer
Sentiment" 306: Hall. Magic Mirror, 126: Lysander Spooner. ""To the Members of the Legislature of
Massachusetts." 26 August 1835. facsimile in Charles Shively. ed.. 77?^ Collected Writings ofLysander
Spooner, 6 \ols., (Weston. Ma.: M&S Press, 1971), 2: 11 - 14. Victoria C. HaiXam, Labor Visions and
40
Codification itself was not inherently radical; some Whigs supported it as a
definitive rationalization of the legal system. They worried, however, that legislative
codification would be influenced by popular prejudice and partisanship These concerns
hobbled the codification movement, despite a favorable report from a special commission
headed by Joseph Story. By the 1840s, popular enthusiasm for codification had yielded
to calls for a simpler solution to judicial usurpation; the popular election ofjudges."*^
Democratic reformers considered judges as much servants of the people as other
state officials, and therefore equally accountable to voters. Exempting the courts from
democratic accountability was dangerous for everyone. "Those who are responsible to
nobody," a radical orator advised, "ought to be [trusted] by nobody " Judges should
"return to their constitutional masters," an anonymous lawyer recommended, "lay down
at their feet the power they have been intrusted with and render a strict account of their
stewardship." Feeling "the eye of his master
. upon him," the judge would "lay aside
his caprices, prejudices, biases, and partiality," and "discharge his duties faithfijlly to the
whole people, whose servant he is, and by whose money he is paid." Further, by
returning regularly to the people, judges would absorb "those great ideas of freedom and
progress,
. . . which in all ages past have first sprung, and in all ages to come will first
spring from the very heart of the people themselves."
'
State Power: The Origins ofBusiness Unionism in the United States, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 75, 89 - 91, argues that political activists (e.g., Locofoco Democrats) took more interest in
reversing judicial usurpation than Workingmen and other labor activists did.
^" Hall, Magic Mirror. 126 - 7; R. Kent Newmayer, Joseph Story: Statesman ofthe Old
Republic. (Chapel Hill: Universit> of North Carolina Press, 1985), 280.
Robinson. "Oration,'' in Blau, ed.. Social Theories, 332\ Judiciary System ofMassachusetts,
40; "E. L. P." in Pos% 20 July 1853.
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Reformers had called for an elective judiciary since the Founding. The minimal
accountability mandated forjudges in the state constitution troubled many critics as a
distortion of the balance of powers in government, Jeffersonian Republicans considered
life tenure an unconditional license for Federalist jurists to overturn popular laws.
Jacksonians feared that Whigs would do likewise. Judge Loring's enemies also asserted
legislative supremacy once he declared his defiance of the Personal Liberty Law, but the
removal campaign, and the mid-century campaign for an elective judiciary was led less
by advocates of legislative supremacy than by supporters of the rights ofjuries.'*'*
The Jury on Trial
Trial by a jury of peers is commonly understood as a defendant's right. To the
democratic radicals of antebellum Massachusetts, however, jury trial was just as much a
right of the "peers." The American jury, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote, "is, above all, a
political institution" because it is "that portion of the nation to which the execution of the
laws is entrusted.""*^ The abolitionist Lysander Spooner defined the jury trial as a "trial
by the country," i.e., the people, as opposed to a trial by the government. The difference
between the two, Spooner wrote in 1852, was "simply a question between liberty and
Hall, "Judiciarv On Trial." 341; Tonilins. Law, Labor, and Ideology, 67: Richard E. Ellis,
The Jeffersonian Crisis: Courts and Politics in the Young Republic, (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1971). 184 - 230: Cower, Justice Accused, 131. 146. attributes the 183()s reform impulse to
judicial assumption of a "quasilegislative" role in crealively applying old principles to new
circumstances, but does not discuss judicial impingement on jury rights.
'^^ Alexis de Tocqueville. Democracy in America, edited by Phillips Bradley. 2 vols.. (New
York: Vintage. 1956). 1: 293 -4.
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despotism." He believed that jurors had a veto power over unjust laws, and could
overrule misguided legislators and judges alike. This veto power ftilfilled the
requirement of consent by the governed in the intervals between elections. Denying this
right would grant legislators an absolute power that was intolerable, even for a limited
time, in democratic government, "[N]o law can be enforced," Spooner contended,
"except it be such as all the members [of society] agree that it may enforce."^^
Ancient precedents endowed juries with the right to determine questions of both
fact and law in arriving at a verdict While the right to determine facts was
straightforward and unobjectionable, the right to interpret the law was ambiguous. It
was implicit in the distinction between special verdicts, in which jurors determined only
the facts of the case, while judges determined the guilt, and general verdicts, in which
jurors alone determined both facts and guilt. Defining their rights conservatively, jurors
could determine whether a law was applied correctly to a given case. They might rule,
for instance, that while a defendant committed the acts he was accused of, those acts did
not constitute a violation of the law under which he was tried. Defining their rights more
expansively, jurors might rule that the law in question null and void on statutory,
constitutional, or moral grounds. Spooner' s radical doctrine embraced all such
options.'*^
Lysandcr Spooner. An Essay on the Trial By Jury. (Boston, 1852). 6. 10. 12 - 15; Post, 8
November 1853. in which "Bill of Rights" boasts that democratic reformers were "not ashamed to go
back to the dark ages." to prove the rights ofjuries. See the same paper. 18 April 1855 for an equation
of the jur> with the "country " similar to Spooner's from an anti-abolitionist organ.
Northampton Hampstiirc (lazette. 20 March 1855. draws a distinction between jurors' right
to determine w hcther a law had been violated and an insmuated power to declare laws unconstitutional,
which the author disavows.
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Jurors' unrestrained exercise of their assumed prerogatives threatened jurists'
efforts to rationaHze the common law. A jury's legal ruling was useless as a precedent
because jurors were not obliged to explain the reasoning behind their decisions. If two
juries disagreed on a question of law, legal scholars had no way to decide which was
right. A rational legal system required a court of last resort whose published rulings
would be considered definitive. Supreme courts at the state and federal levels were
"necessary to the security of public and private rights, to the liberty of the subject, and
the safety of the community," as a Whig jurist wrote, and had to provide "an
authoritative exposition as well as an authoritative enactment of all laws.'' This task was
impossible ifjuries could disregard the opinion of the bench on points of law.^^
Whiggery never denied that trial by jury was "a valuable safeguard to liberty,"
but Massachusetts Whigs followed Alexander Hamilton in warning that liberty depended
ultimately on conscientious jurors. To Whigs, conscience meant deference to authority.
According to the arch-conservative George Ticknor Curtis, the juror's oath was "a direct
invocation to conscience" forbidding him from deciding willflilly against either the
evidence or the court's interpretation of the law. Without judicial authority, the
uninformed juror had no truth to which his conscience could refer. In most cases, "it is
impossible for a juror, who is made a judge of the law, with a right to disregard the
instructions of the court, to know whether his own view of the law is correct or not."
Commonwealth v. Anthes. 71 Mass. 5 Gra\ (1857). 194 - 7; Law Reporter 2 (October 1839),
187 -92.
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Without judicial guidance, jurors relied on mere opinion, or worse, on prejudice.
Inevitably, Curtis assumed, unpopular men and minorities suffered.'*^
According to a modern historian, jurors' interpretive prerogative "became
unsatisfactory
... for the certainty and predictability of substantive rules that a
commercial economy required" in the early nineteenth century. Federalist critics charged
that jurors wasted judges' time with uninformed deliberation while dockets swelled




compelling the execution of contracts by fixed, established rules,"
one governor wrote, "forms the strongest lines of a good government
. Bipartisan
measures transferred small claims cases from jury trials to judicial hearings, and replaced
contentious judicial panels on circuit with single judges who could offer jurors
undisputed opinions on points of law. Along the same lines, the 1808 Coffin v. Coffin
ruling clarified a judicial duty to ^^assist" jurors on points of law. On the other hand, an
1807 declaratory statute reasserted jurors' right to interpret the law themselves.
Increasingly, however, judges overturned jury convictions in criminal cases by citing
errors on points of law. Jurists now drew a distinction between jurors' admitted /^omw
to interpret law as they chose and their right to do so with impunity.
Clinton Rossitcr. ed.. The Federalist Papers, (New York: Mentor. 1961), 499: George
Ticknor Curtis, "Phocion 10." in Curtis, ed.. Discussions, 66-73.
William E. Nelson, The Americanization ofthe Common Law: The Impact ofLegal Change
on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830. (Cambridge: Harv ard University Press. 1975), 165; Ellis,
Jeffersonian Crisis. 190. 221.
Nelson. Americanization, 97. 167. 170. Subsequent events suggest that Nclson^s conclusion
that by 1810. "the jur\ had ceased to be an adjunct of local communities which articulated uito positive
law the ethical standards of those communities, [and] had become instead the adjunct of the court." is
premature w hen criminal cases are taken into consideration.
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Most supporters ofjury rights acquiesced to judicial supremacy in civil cases that
involved "artificial and technical" laws and provided judges "little motive for tyranny."
Criminal trials, however, involved questions of conscience and natural law that citizens
understood almost innately. Since all written law was based on natural law, democrats
believed that anyone with common sense could interpret criminal law " Whiggery,
however, was more pessimistic. "Juries are often quite as eager to convict as to acquit,"
George T. Curtis wrote," and it sometimes requires all the authority of the bench to
show a jury that, whatever the moral guilt of the [accused] may be, he is not guilty,
according to law, of the crime charged " Morality and law, in this view, were often
different things. Judges themselves might show moral bias, -- Lemuel Shaw once
censured an atheist for subverting the Christian foundation of common law, - but jurors
seemed, to Curtis, more susceptible to sectarian moral prejudice, and more in need of
guidance from conscientious judges.^' Radical Coalitionists rejected the elitist pretense
"that all judges are pure, that all juries are corrupt - that judges are always wise, and
that juries are always ignorant." Judges' superior learning, they warned, did not exempt
them from prejudice and corruption.^'*
Quoted is Anson Burlingamc. a Free-Soil Coalitionist, presenting the minority report in favor
ofjury rights at the 185.1 convention. OR. 3: 4.10 - 40. See also Spooner. 'Iriol By,Jury. 135. George T.
Curtis denies the viability of common sense in legal matters in "Phocion 10," in Curtis, ed.. Discussions,
11.
" Curtis, "Phocion i 1," in Curtis, cd.. Discussions. 74: Miller, Life ofthe Mind, 194-5. Chief
Justice Shavv s pious reasoning in the Kneeland case was refuted by Justice Story in the "Girard" case,
despite Daniel Webster's advocacy of the biblical basis of the connnon law.
OR. .3: 498 - 99, 439,
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Moral prejudice from bench or jury-box was greatest during trials involving
controversial laws Under such circumstances, the Whigs consistently presented
themselves as defenders of unpopular defendants. "The rights of prisoners and the
security of human life and liberty," Curtis argued, required that judges alone interpret the
law, not according to vague moral notions, but according to the state and federal
constitutions. Whiggish judges, however, often used their authority to endorse
politically disputed laws over the objections of defendants, defense attorneys, and
dissident jurors Radical Coalitionists considered Whiggish jurisprudence the political
prisoner's greatest enemy."
Judges regularly excluded political dissidents from the jury-box through the voir
dire process, rejecting those who admitted disagreement with controversial statutes as
incapable of objective deliberation. Dissidents often escaped this screening process by
lying about their beliefs, but radical reformers resented the apparent necessity of
concealing their consciences. They complained that judges and local jury boards never
deemed agreement with a law a sign of bias. "[I]f one board of Selectmen may cany
their prejudices" to the point of barring all known opponents of the I'ugitivc Slave Law
from the jury pool, a writer warned, ''another may [do the same] on the liquor law, a
third on the Sunday laws, and thus confusion runs through the whole arrangement " The
radical answer was to allow all adult males to serve on juries unconditionally. Whigs and
OR, .1; 300 - \.
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moral reformers, however, insisted on identifying dissent with moral incapacity tor jury
duty.^'
Many of the firmest defenders ofjurors' rights were trial lawyers. Defense
lawyers especially linked jurors' right to interpret law with their own right to interpret it
for them. Outside of the bar, voters' opinions on the jury question depended on which
laws had been challenged When judges upheld the Fugitive Slave Law at lawyers and
jurors' expense, support grew for jury rights and judicial retbrm When liquor laws
dominated the discussion, popular feeling was more mixed Only lawyers' jealousy of
judges remained consistent.
Whiggei-y saw the jury question as a struggle for authority between judges and
lawyers. Since Joseph Stoi-y^s death in 1845, no judge seemed capable of matching the
celebrity or influence of lawyer-orators like Daniel Webster and Rufus Choate, or worse,
of forensic demagogues like the Democrats Benjamin F. Hallett and Benjamin F Butler.
Judicial salaries lagged far behind the fees leading attorneys collected annually.
' Spooncr. Trial By Jury. 154; Ncwburx porl Herald. 1 April 1S57. lii 1857 pctilioncrs urged
Ihc stale legislature to strip municipalities of Iheir prerogali\c of scrccniug jurors, w ith ao success.
(\)mmon\\calth \\ Porfcr, 51 Mass. 10 Mclcall^( IS45), 278. Accordiug to the Revised
Statutes pre\ ailing in 1846. Ihc judge could o\ erturn a con\ iclion on his ow n iniliali\ e. even w hen the
derendani did not or could nol appeal Chief Justice Shaw uiferred from this judicial preiogalive the
definilive aulhorily of the bench on all questions of law .
OR. 3: 768. Bay State voters sent mixed signals on the Jurx question In 185 V Proposition
3, which would ha\ e made Jurors* law -finding prerogative a constitutional right. I'ared marginally worse
than the revised constitution itself. In 1855. however, the Know-Nothing legislature passed a law
making the same guarantee to jurors w ithout suffering Ibr it For conserv ative view s of the jury question
sec OR, ^: 461; Chase. Lemuel SInuw 181; Flijah Adlow. The (lenius of Lemuel Shaw: F.xpoumler ofthe
Common Law. (Boston: Court Street Press. l%2). 162. On lawyers' interest in judicial reform, see Hall.
"Judiciar> On Trial," 345. which shows surprise that a greater percentage of lawyer delegates than
farmer delegates supported judicial reform m 1853.
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Whiggery hoped that greater authority might compensate for judges' relative poverty
and thus attract talented lawyers to the bench. '^If the Bar predominate over the Bench
m learning, quickness of apprehension, clearness and soundness ofjudgment," George T.
Curtis warned, "justice cannot be well administered." Whiggish jurists demanded
deference from lawyers and jurors alike.^^
United States v. Battiste (1835) saw the first assertion of the Whigs' doctrine of
mandatory deference to the bench. During the opening statements, Joseph Story
prevented Daniel Webster from arguing to jurors that prosecutors had misinterpreted
laws forbidding the slave trade Over Webster's protests. Story forcefully denied "that in
any case, civil or criminal, [the jurors] have the moral right to decide the law according
to their own notions, or pleasure." Instead, Story proclaimed " the duty of the jury to
follow the law as it is laid down by the court." His justification was paradoxical; denying
defense counsels the right to challenge the state's interpretation of law was necessary, he
said, to preserve the rights of the accused.*'*^
Massachusetts precedents still favored jurors. The 1 820 constitutional
convention took jurors' right to interpret law for granted. The Supreme Judicial Court
reaffirmed that right in Commonwealth v. Knapp (1830). The immediate response to
The Whigs" concern that judges outshine lawyers emerged in the 1853 debates on judicial
tenure. If the courts had difficulty attracting the best minds under the current life-tenure system. Whigs
complained, term limits and popular elections would leave only inferior political hacks on the bench.
See OR. 3:212, Curtis. "Phocion 5." and Free-Soilcr Samuel Hoar s "Address, " in Curtis, ed..
Discussions. 38 -9. 180.
Jeffrey L. Abramson. lie, The Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal ofDemocracy. (New
York: Basic Books. 1994). 78-9; Conrad Reno. Memoirs ofthe Judiciary and the Bar ofNew England





sic was ambiguous The 1807 law confirming jurors' rights was left out of the
Revised Statutes of 1836. but it was unclear whether Story's ruling had abrogated
Knapp A reckoning with Ballisle was inevitable, however, once Massachusetts courts
heard trials involving the rights of workers and, more significantly, the rights of
drinkers/'^
Judges confronted labor activists in a series of conspiracy trials culminating in
( 'ommonwcallh v. HunI ( 1 840). During this last trial, Peter Oxcnbridge Thacher, the
presiding judge of the Boston Municipal Court, instructed jurors that unions ^1end[edj
directly to array [classes] against each other, and to convulse the social system to its
centre " Labor activists attributed Hunt's conviction to Thacher's unjustified
instructions. To counter this malign influence, they proposed ^^making the Judges
. . . the
servants, instead of the masters of the people" through judicial elections/*^ In 1842 the
Supreme Judicial Court overturned Hunt's conviction While Chief Justice Lemuel
Shaw's ruling was less than a ''Magna Charta" for workers, it apparently mollified many
labor activists. As a result, unions were not at the forefront of the mid-century judicial
reform movement.^' ' Instead, opponents of the liquor laws took the lead.
Abnnnson. The Jury, 76; Reno. Memoirs oj the Judiciary, 1: 8.S; Greenfield I'mnkliu
DcmocraL 12 Februarv 1X55, has a sliorl hislory ofjurors' righls.
^^'^ Third (rrcal Ridly of the IVorkiri^men of( liarlcston, Massachusetts, October 2S, IS4(),
quoled in l oinlins. Law, Labor, and Ideolo}^v. 204 - 5. See also Half Magic Mirror, 1 13.
On the hisloriography ofllunt sec Tonilins, Law, Labor, and Ideology. 2()9-l(); two
conlradiclor\ opinions are Leonard W. Levy, The Law ofthe (\)mmonwealth and (liiefJustice Shaw^
(New York: Scribners. 1957), 183 - 205, and Robcrl DeGrafTRulkley. "Roberl Ranlouf Jr.. 1805-1852,"
(Ph.D. disserlalion. Princeton University, 1971). 299 - 300 Paul Goodman, ' 'i'hc Politics of
Industrialism: Massachusetts. 1830-1870/' in Richard L Bushman, et al, eds.. I Uprooted Americans:
Essays to Honor Oscar llandlin, (Boston: Litlie. Brown, 1979), 177, portrays /////// as retarding the
dcvelopinenl of anii-slalc opinion among workers. The works mentioned in Tomlins should be
considered correctives to the comparatively rosy views of Goodman and Levy.
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Ill Massaclnisctls, ihc dcfinilivc dcclaialions of iudicial supremacy came during
lic|iu)r-law cases Licjiior Irials tested the viability of slate temperance slalules in
localities where majorities opposed them Dissidents rarely challenged Ihe
constitutionality of licjuor laws, but often questioned their intei pi elation and application,
Whiggish judges saw these as intolerable challenges to their sole authority to deline the
law Since a divisive moial question lay at the heart ol li(|uor cases, dissidents' aiaim at
perceived judicial usurpation of lawyers and luioi s' Iradilional rights was all Ihe greater.
'I he most haled li(|uoi law, approved in IX ^X, forbade purchases of licjuor in
quantities less than filleen gallons Working-class communilies resented the obvious
attempt to destroy their corner taverns and grog-shops Whole neighbor hoods, if not
entire towns and cities, resisted Ihe law with the implicit connivance oi'local olficials,
leaving enforcement to private temperance societies and their hired infofmeis I'hese
spies, when discoveied, were often beaten, tarred and featheied to little elfcctive protest
from the towns Before its repeal in IS4(), the fifteen-gallon law initiated a contest of
wills between Democratic lawyers and Whig jurists that continued for a generation/''
I he li(|u(>i controversy brought iienjamin f ranklin llallctt to the forelront t)f the
judicial refoiin movement, where he remained until Ihe failure ol thc 1853 convention
initially an Antimason, I lallelt led his followers into the Dernocialic |)arty, wheie he
became a leading manager and propagandist i le sided with Ihe palronage-oriented
faction of David I ienshaw, the erstwhile rollector of the Port of Roslon, against a rural-
based r eform faction for control of Ihe Bay Stale Democr acy. In the IKIOs, the
"'
Jolui Allen Kraiil, The Orii-iiis oj I'rohihilion. (New York: Kiiopl. I')25), 266 - 71; Peases.
W'ch uj I'rofircss. - 60; Law Jicporkr 2 (July 18^9), 94.
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Hallett/Henshaw faction sided with John C Calhoun against Martin Van Buren, the
favorite of the reform Democrats. Like Calhoun, Hallett believed in a politics of interest
groups rather than in political individualism. As a constitutional reformer he advocated
breaking up the large Whig cities into electoral districts to guarantee his charges
authentic representation in government, while leaving the corporate representation of
small towns intact. As a champion of the urban working class against an arrogant
cultural elite, Hallett offered his legal services to anyone accused of violating the fifteen-
gallon law,^^
Hallett argued his cases before the same Judge Thacher who presided
controversially in Commonwealth v. Hunt. Thacher screened the jury pool to eliminate
avowed opponents of the law, strictly instructed the remaining jurors, and threatened to
overturn any verdict that violated his instructions. The popular Hallett attracted
sympathetic throngs to the courtroom, triggering Whig fears of mob rule in the halls of
justice. Through Hallett's skill, or through biases concealed from Thacher, many fifteen-
gallon cases ended in hung juries. During the trials, Hallett and Thacher jousted
inconclusively over who had the last word on points of law. Only an appeals court could
decide the question definitively.^*'
After the fifteen-gallon law's repeal, Hallett continued arguing cases involving
the shifting status of licenses to sell liquor. He took over the climactic liquor case,
Formisano. Transformation ofPolitical Culture, 2 16: Kraut. Origins ofProhibition, 266 - 7.
For more detail on the Bay State Democracy. Darling. Political Changes, and Formisano are especially
useful. For more on Hallett, see Russell B. Nye. George Bancroft: Brahmin Radical. (New York:
Knopf. 1945). 90. 114 - 17.
'^^ Peases. Web ofProgress. 159 - 60: Law Reporter 2 (July 1839). 94: 2 (August 18.39), 126.
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Commonwealth v. Porter (1845), after Porter's original attorney was prevented from
arguing his interpretation of the current licensing statutes to the jury. Pliny Merrick, the
presiding judge, instmcted jurors to ignore all legal arguments from counsel, as questions
of law were beyond their competence When the attorney protested, Merrick silenced
him.*^^ To overturn his conviction. Porter turned to Hallett. The Democrat had only to
prove that Merrick had unjustly prevented Porter's counsel from arguing his case. Here
he succeeded, Chief Justice Shaw ruled that Merrick had gone too far in restraining
Porter's counsel. When Hallett argued for the rights of lawyers and jurors, however,
Shaw responded with what the Democrat called "the worst reasoned opinion that can be
found in the Massachusetts Reports."^^
Hallett's legal team argued that no precedent compelled jurors to accept the
"assistance" ofjudges on points of law. United States v. Battiste, he claimed, had only
forbidden jurors from ruling "according to their own notions and pleasure," not from
ruling according to conscientious convictions. Common law and state law implicitly
assumed jurors capable of determining the law on their own Assume otherwise, Hallett
argued, and Coffin v. Coffin 's provision for judicial assistance to jurors was pointless.
When delivering general verdicts, as opposed to facts-only special verdicts, jurors must
be assumed competent in the law. Basing his case on precedent and tradition, Hallett
hoped to stress the dangerous novelty of Merrick's conduct. Massachusetts judges, he
' Commonwealth v. Porter, 264 - 5.
Commonwealth v. Porter, 286 - 7; OR, 3; 449.
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noted, had never denied jurors the right to interpret law in criminal cases "until the
excitement growing out of the liquor cases."^^
Justice Shaw saw history differently. "We consider it a well settled principle and
rule, lying at the foundation ofjury trial, admitted and recognized ever since jury trial has
been adopted as an established and settled mode of proceeding in courts ofjustice," he
ruled, that judges decided all questions of law in civil and criminal cases. Following
Story's reasoning in Batliste, Shaw declared that Massachusetts jurors had a duty to
accept the bench's interpretation of the law. Significantly, he cited no common law
precedents, nor Baltisle itself, in his decision Instead, he appealed to the state
Declaration of Rights, particularly to its safeguards for life, liberty, and property. These
made necessary a due process of law through which alone could civil rights be abridged.
Rules of due process required that everyone agree on what the law was. Agreement
could come only from deference to the bench. Since the law existed to guarantee
fundamental individual rights, jurors had no moral right, whatever power they had, to
ignore or dispute judicial rulings on points of law. Judicial opinion, Shaw insisted, was
law itself'"
Shaw refined his doctrine in Commonwealth v. Abbott (1847), another test of
liquor licenses. This time, Abbott's counsel requested that Judge Merrick ask
prospective jurors whether or not they thought licenses abrogated by the fifteen-gallon
Commonwealth v. Porter, 266 - 7, 271 - 3.
^° Commonwealth v. Porter, 276 - 83. Of Shaw's biographers. Levy, the most scholarly, has
the least to say about Porter, while Chase. Lemuel ShaM\ 180 - 1, and Adlow. Genius ofLemuel Shaw,
163 - 4. identify it as the beginning of the judicial reform movement that was defeated by the voters in
1853 and in the courts by Commonwealth v. Anthes in 1857.
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law had been rcactivaled upon its repeal Merrick complied, but rejected counsel's
argunienl lhal lliose who ai;iced with the stale, against Abbott, should be disqualified for
bias Abbott blamed his conviction on Merrick's decision, and appealed to the high
court, where Shaw contemptuously dismissed the defense argument ^' The same
lawyers who wanted jurors to interpret the law, he noted, now would disqualify anyone
who had interpreted it before the trial. On the same grounds, "the devoted study, long
practice, extensive and varied experience
. .
.
which may have enabled a judge to form
clear, maluied and settled opinions
, would render him partial and unfit for the
performance of judicial functions. "^^ Agreement with the law was no sign of bias, the
questions raised by Abbott's counsel were "pure abstract questions of law, upon which it
is the privilege and the duty of the juror to be governed definitively by the instructions of
the judge before whom the indictment is tried." If a juror thought diHeiently, 'it is his
duty to yield his own |opinion| and follow those of the judge," Not to do so ''would
show him [)artial and disqualified"^'
With roller and AhhotI, Shaw had drawn a line in the sand delimiting the rights
and responsibilities ofjuries I lis doctrine was probably a necessary antithesis to the
veto power ofjurors asserted by Lysandei Spoonei, but neither Porter's nor Abbott's
lawyers held Spooner's radical views. Just the same, Shaw rejected them as il'they were
radical firebrands As a Whiu, he based his iulinu,s on concern Ibi civil liberties Poller
" Coinmoiiwcallh v. Ahhoti. >i Mass I ^ Mclcall ( IS 17). 12(1 - I.
" ( \>ninnni\vciil{h v. Ahhotf, 122.
'^
( \)mnumwcalih v. Abbott, 122-3.
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was consistent with '^a favorite maxim of the friends of civil liberty, regulated by law:'^ a
separation of powers in the courtroom was necessary, '^so that each shall keep within its
own sphere, and the one be a check upon the other/^'' Anti-prohibition Democrats
disagreed; they believed that Shaw had eliminated a vital check on state power. They
saw him simply as a Whig enforcing the will of his party and his class. They countered
his assauh on jury rights by reviving the Jacksonian call for judicial elections^^
Disciplining the Courts
Massachusetts judges had always been accountable to the other branches of
government. While the 1 780 constitution guaranteed their offices during good behavior
(excepting justices of the peace, who held office for limited terms), judges could be
impeached for misconduct in office. As well, the governor, with the consent of his
executive council, could depose judges ''upon the address of both houses of the
legislature/' If legislators, governor, and council agreed, judges (and other executive
appointees) could be removed for any reason, or for none. This formidable power was
exercised only thrice between 1780 and 1854. Two removals spared judges the
Commonwealth v. Porter, 280 - 81.
^ Adlow. Genius ofLemuel Shaw. 103-4. identifies Abbott as the last straw that launched "a
drive to revise the basic laws of the Commonwealth, with a view to definitely establishing the jury's
right to decide both the law and the fact." a right Adlow himself found absurd. In other books on Shaw
or Massachusetts law. Abbott is neglected as an anticlimax following Porter. In all such books, the
common thread of liquor law linking these two cases with subsequent cases in the 1850s culminating in
Commonwealth vAnthes goes unmentioned. Abramson's We, the Jury, however, notes the liquor cases
as an ironically modest occasion for the decisive struggle over jurors' rights.
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cmbanassincMil ol iiupcachincni loi cinlHv/kMiKMil ol'couil fees Tlic Ihiid deposed the
vicliin ol 'A slioke While eoiiservatives inferred from the hist case that ^^leinoval l)y
address^^ apphed only to the inenlally iiifiriiK the 1820 conslitulional eoiivention tailed to
make that or any other ciualiliealion e\|)heil Despiie the sweep of this ready-made
means of disciplining; judges, many Jacksonians ignored it in their enthusiasm for regular,
|)opulai elections.
The removal power returned lo public notice in IS I v. when lleniy Dearborn, the
Adjulani (ieneial ofihe slale militia, was deposed at the request of a Democratic
legishiture for intervening in Rhode Islaiufs ^M)oii Rebellioir on the side of that state's




n)ay be used in times of political excitement'^ to purge
judges wholesale, bul neithei labor activists noi lK|uor-selleis |)ounced immediately
iMnally. in I 8-4^), citizens of ihe (own of 1 ancaslei pelilK>i»ed legislalois lo lemovc James
G Carler, a piohibilionist justice of the peace, ostensibly Ibr withholding witness lees,
but actually for vigorous enforcement of the liquor laws A special commit lee
consideied this retiuesl, only to reject it when Rufus Choate explained lhal (\»rtei \
limited term exempted him Iron) removal by address, Justices Shaw and Meiiick, (he
principal enemies ofjudicial reformers, were never m serious daiigci t)f icnu)val Their
Massachusetts Conslilnlioiv ch. 3, art. I: Reno, Memans nfthe Judiciary. I; 6*), Ullis,
Jeffersonian ( '/v.v/.v, l*)4 - (» l lic IS20 coincntion acliiallv conlradiclcd ilscif llisl uilini* il incxpodieni
(o aiuciul Ihc consliliiliDM al all rc^vudiii)', the nidiciarv. and Ihcn appiin in;' a scpaialc proposiliDii
ro(|nii inj» lcj»islalors Id |j;ivc reasons loi icnunal hiil nol eminKMlin;', cansos Itial piopci l\ wai ranktl il.
riic delegates olojccl was nol lo liinil Ihc Kino\al powci, l)iil lo allow iIk* pioposul \icliin lo ilclciul
luinscir Sec Massacluisclls General C\Mirt, IS55 House Document S - I I
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critics probably found it too embarrassing, if not socially dangerous, to assert publicly (as
seemed necessary) that these distinguished jurists had lost their wits7^
Limited terms and regular elections seemed like more practicable remedies for
judicial usurpation. Rotation in office would prevent encrusted corruption on the bench,
hasten the reversal of mistaken rulings, and encourage the updating of outmoded, un-
American precedents. Even indirect elections by legislators, or periodic executive
reappointments, while short of true democracy, would likely check judicial arrogance
As well, elected officials could be held accountable for their judicial appointments,
insuring at least an indirect popular voice in the law-finding process.''*
Whiggery abhorred any limitation ofjudicial tenure or independence. What
learned, self-respecting man, Whigs asked, could serve on a bench subject to regularly
scheduled popular upheaval? Who but a partisan intriguer or a demagogue would wear
the judicial ermine? Under such a system, distorted by partisan, self-interested judges,
the law lost all resemblance to a rational, objective system. Life tenure allowed the
executive-appointed judge the security to pursue truth independent of partisan pressures.
Boston Daily Advertiser, 16 February 1843; Adams Diar>'. 28 January, .3, 4, 7 March 1843;
Post, 5 April 1849: Jean V. Matthew s. Riifus Choate: The Law and Civic Virtue. (Philadclpiiia: Temple
University Press. 1980). 181: OR. 2: 713. See below. Chapter 3, for John G. Palfrey's reference to
Dearborn s removal, which he opposed as a state Senator, as a warning for an indecisive Judge Loring
during the Burns trial. On the embarrassing aspects of removal by address, sec Judiciary System of
Massachusetts. 41: the process, according to the author, amounted to declaring before a judge's family,
friends, and peers, that he was a fool. The slanderous implications made removal by address
inexpedient, making judicial elections necessary.
Post. 20 July, 3 November 1853,
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The popularly-elected or otherwise short-termed judge, Whigs believed, cravenly and
selfishly prostituted the law to keep his office.''''
Most reformers deemed the Whiggish ideal ofjudicial independence both
impossible and undesirable. Critics considered the Whig doctrine a holdover from
seventeenth-century England. In 1688, life-tenure forjudges was a progressive
alternative to constant dependence on the royal whim. "But how," Democrats asked in
1853, "can such arguments as apply to a judiciary in a condition of monarchy, apply also
in a republican governmenf^" Whiggish analogies equating monarchy with popular
sovereignty met sharp rebukes from Coalitionists. Since the people as a whole were
inherently more trustworthy than any king, their sovereignty over the courts needed no
check; "what do we want to come between them and their government'^" the Free-Soiler
Amasa Walker asked. Judicial independence in a democratic republic only enabled
judges to distort the law in favor of the faction that appointed them. Here, reformers
contended, was Whiggery's blind spot. Most Whigs seemed never to consider that a
life-tenure judge might feel indebted to his executive patron. Democrats and
Coalitionists, convinced of the corrupting influence of excessive power, took the servility
of life-tenure judges almost for granted.*^"
Whigs and reformers alike sought confirmation of their opinions in the balefiil
figure of George Jeffieys (1648-89), the Restoration-era persecutor of English political
OR. 2: 707 - 8, 798: See Charles Francis Adams s speech in Advertiser. 1 November 1853,
and remarks of Samuel Hoar and John G. Palfrey in Curtis, cd.. Discussions. 180, 284.
80
Post, 9 July 1853; OR, 2: 81 1,818.
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(Iisscni. whom historians made ihc prololypical servile jiirisl A longslandini. villain in
republican lore. JellVeys's enormities were rorcefully restated lor mid-centiiry audiences
in Lord Macaulay^ llislory of Eii^hmii Lord (^ampheirs Lives of the ( lucj Juslices^
and other studies Americans avidly read these histories as mirrors of iheir own times.
Like their Revolutionary rorebears. antehellum liay Staters lived in the shadow ol'the
seventeenth cenlury.. drawinu analogies between theii own crises and their l-nulish
cousins' struggle with Stuad tyranny Their state motto came from the republican
martyr Algernon Sidney, whom Jellreys had condemned to deatlr Judge Loring, as an
abettor ofslavery, was identilied witii JcHieys Whigs and reformers vilified JenVeys
ecjually, but drew dilVerent conclusions from his example.^'
JenVeys lose rapidly Irom humble beginnings to become ( hicf Justice and Loid
diancellor of l-ngland, ^Miie second man in ihc kingdom," under Charles M i le owed his
success, biographers agreed, to a talent for making powerful friends combined with
un|)rinci|)led ambition With a large family to su|)port, he abandoned principles and
friends Ibr royal patronage In ollice, he was often diunkenly abusive towards
defendants marked Ibi death According to Benjamin f I lallett, Jellreys was the first
judge to compel jurors to accept the bench s inlcrprctalioii of the law lie disregarded
customary rules of evidence, using Algernon Sidney's unpublished manuscripts as
"witnesses" to his alleged sedition I hindreds died during JelVreys's "liloody Assizes,"
National . Infi-Slavcry Standard, 4 August IS55 l-oid Cainpl^clPs collective l")ioj»iaphv was
adapted lor American piihlicatioii in extensively annolalcd lorni l)y al)olitionisl l^iciiaid lliklicth as
Atrocious JU(l}ics: Lives oj Juds^cs Infamous as Tools of Tyrants and Instruments ojOppresstim. (New
York, IK56). On Sidney's motto sec Alan Craig 1 louston. . lli^enum Sidney and the Repuhlican
Heritable in lOii^land luul America. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, l*)9l), 14. On Sidney's
innuencc. see also Peter Kaislcn, Patriot Heroes in I' niiland and America: Political Symbolism luid
( liaiiiiinii I (lines Over Three ( 'enturies. (Madison; IJnivcrsily ol Wisconsin Press. I97S).
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often after he overturned jury acquittals. When the Stuarts fell in 1688. he was confined
in the Tower of London for his own safety after narrowly escaping a lynch-mob. He
died there one year later.**^
^The character of Lord Jeffreys;^ a Boston journalist wrote, "attracts us by a
singular fascination, and it is with a feeling, almost of pleasure, and hardly of pain, that
we linger over [his] record of rude and rough insolence/^ Herman Melville felt the same
fascination, he found the ^^hangman Judge Jeffreys" a model for English injustices
condemned in Whilc-Jackci in Massachusetts, Justice Shaw's enemies equated
Commoriweallh v. Por/er with the outrages of Jeffreys; some insinuated snidcly that he
had plagiarized the infamous judge Abolitionists regarded Jeffreys as the standard of
judicial evil, until Massachusetts judges, including Loring, surpassed him.**^
What was the political moral of Jeffreys's career? Reformers argued that
stronger juries might have checked him, but they ^^had not the independence to carry out
their legal rights, and interpret the law according to their own view of it, rather than
according to his ruling." Jeffreys appeared to belie the Whiggish pretense that executive
lifetime appointments created virtuous judges. ''Let us ask whether the mere fact of their
being appointed by the executive has at all times secured upright and independent men to
sit in judgment," an 1853 reformer advised; 'i only need mention one name in answer --
Lord Cnnipbcll's account was adapted by Hildrcdi in Atrocious Judges. 267 - 359. Sec also
/.aw Reporter 2 (March IS4()). Ml - 5. and Robcrl C Winlhrop. "Algernon Sidney: A Lcclure
Dchvered Before the lioslon Mcreanlile Library Association. December 21. 1S5"^/^ in Winlhrop.
.
\(/(/resse.s and Speeches on I arious Occasions l^'rom IH52 to IS67. (Boston. 1S()7). I()5 - (>. I lallett
noted JelTreys's inno\ation in i^mnuonwealth \\ Porter. 273.
Boston Atlas quoted in National Anti-Slavery Standard, 4 August 1855: Advertiser. 27
March 1S57; Liherator. 25 April 1851; OR, 3: 438. 459; Ilerinan Melville. White-Jacket^ (Evanslon;
Nortlnveslern University Press, 1970), 298; Hou^ion, Algernon Sidney, 274
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Jeffreys!" Under a life-tenure judiciary, intriguers like Jeffreys won office by toadying to
the executive and promising him good service. Coalitionist reformers believed that the
same conditions prevailed in Whiggish Massachusetts.^'*
Whiggery blamed Jeffreys' s crimes on the fact that he lacked life tenure. He did
evil because he had to please his king or lose his post. In Massachusetts, life tenure
liberated judges from the perpetual dependence on executive pleasure that had corrupted
Jeffreys. The Coalition, they charged, would reimpose that corrupting dependence by
forcing judges to please voters as Jeffreys had sought to please the King Worse yet,
elective judges would have to curry favor with party caucuses merely to get nominated.
Shaw and Merrick, Whigs boasted, were incapable of Jeffreys' s servility because they
enjoyed security in their posts.
Whiggery failed to convince judicial reformers that life tenure prevented the
emergence of a new Jeffreys. To the Whigs' dismay, charges ofjudicial corruption only
grew louder at mid-century. Labor conspiracy cases, liquor cases, and, finally, ftigitive
slave cases convinced many Bay Staters that the bench had succumbed to the great
centralizing and consolidating powers of the Boston mercantile elite and (according to
Free-Soilers) the national slave power. The Whig project, one Democrat summarized,
was ''to establish principles of a more recent date than [the rights ofjuries], which they
gild over with the attractive name of the results of advanced civilization." Beneath the
"UyR. 2: 698; 3: 502.
OR. 2: 707. 798. 802.
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gilt lay
-their love for centralization, this principle of modern civilization which has been
brought to perfection in all continental Europe since the time of Louis XIV of France."^^
Democrats alone, in their few moments of actual power, could not block judicial
consolidation. In 1 843 a Democratic senate approved a bill limiting judicial terms to
seven years, but the measure failed in the more evenly divided lower house. The
Democrats' one success, a judicial pay cut, provoked Whig judges to refuse their
salaries. When a Whig legislature repealed the pay cut the following year, the judges
received their back pay in full .**^ Many politicians remained uncertain of the true depth
of support for judicial reform Some blamed the defeat of the Coalition's 1851 call for a
constitutional convention on its explicit emphasis on judicial reform. In 1852, the
Coalition made little mention ofjudicial reform, and won their convention. Critics of
judicial reform found this significant. Many Whiggish or prohibitionist voters clearly
distrusted the motives ofjudicial reformers Given the evidence, few Coalitionists
agreed with an optimistic prediction that an elective judiciary "will be the most popular
... of any proposition" adopted at the Convention.^**
'"'Post, 8 November 1853.
^''Advertiser. 25 Febniarv. 14 March 1843; Law Reporter 6 (October 1843), 241 - 55; Reno,
Memoirs ofthe Judiciary. 1 : 73; Horace C. Gray, The Power ofthe Legislature to Create and Abolish
Courts ofJustice. (Boston. 1858). 11.
Commonwealth. 13 July 1853; Lowell Tri-Weekly American quoted in Northampton Courier,
1 March 1853; Fall River News. 14 April. 24 May 1853; OR. 2: 712. 811. 823 - 4; Chase. Lemuel Shaw,
181. Judicial reform was not mentioned in the calls themselves as presented to voters, but in Coalition
declarations of their conv ention agenda. These partisan documents were nonetheless accepted as
delimiting the convention agenda. Moderates opposed the discussion of radical judicial reform at the
1853 convention because that issue had not been included in the 1852 propaganda.
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After the enactment of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1850, however, a distinctly
antislavery constituency for radical judicial reform emerged within the Free-Soil party, t
the alarm of Whiggish party leaders like Richard Henry Dana and Charles Francis
Adams, Radical Free-Soilers thought that state sovereignty itself was at stake in the
struggle for jury rights and responsible judges. Many believed that Shaw's judicial
"usurpation" advanced not only the consolidation of local power in aristocratic hands,
but also the subjection of Massachusetts to the national Slave Power Their analysis of
the degeneracy ofBay State jurisprudence regarding slavery, as detailed in the followim
chapter, revealed how dangerous the politics of law seemed to many antebellum
observers. The radical Free-Soilers' struggle with Dana and Adams, in turn, revealed
how dangerous the issue was for antislavery political unity.
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CHAPTER 2
FUGITIVE SLAVERY AND THE POLITICS OF LAW
Within the antislavery movement, much of the conflict over Loring's removal
resulted from a confusion of motives. Patrician conservatives like Charles Francis
Adams and Richard Henry Dana identified the removal campaign with contemporary
agitation for wholesale judicial reform, which they thought subversive of the rule of law.
Loring's fiercest enemies, however, said little about judicial reform. Few proposed
making removal by address a regular practice None of the legislatures that endorsed
removal supported judicial elections. Most of Loring's opponents considered him a
unique case of moral infirmity whose removal was well within the bounds of existing
precedent.
A second series of events and judicial decisions point toward the real motives of
Loring's enemies. His decision against Anthony Burns was the last of a series ofjudicial
or quasi-judicial rulings which critics thought had drastically curtailed the rights of white
citizens in order to secure the re-enslavement of fijgitive blacks. These rulings inspired
an antislavery critique of the courts that complemented the complaints of Democratic
wets and provided new momentum for the campaign for judicial reform. Like the
Democrats, and like many labor reformers, antislavery radicals believed that Bay State
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judges had abandoned their traditional jiinspiudence in tlie interest ol^a centralizing
faction The antislavery camp particularly identilled this centrah/ing tendency with a
national government dominated by slaveholders. I'he Union itself, some charged,
encouraged judicial usurpation of liay Staters^ rights, and could only be thwarted
through measures that conservatives considered tantamount to nullification or secession
As a gioup. antislavery activists disagreed over the nature of law, the powers of judtics,
and the rights of jurors much as Whigs and Democrats did (\)nlVontations with the
Fugitive Slave Law brought this dispute to the lore during the 185:^ constitutional
convention, as antislavery politicians argued forcellilly on both sides of the judiciary
question. The ideological conflicts exposed there helped destroy the Free-Soil paity, and
colored conservative antislavery perceptions of the Loring issue A clearer
understanding of the stakes involved for both sides requires a review of slavery
jurisprudence in Massachusetts.
Ironies of Slavery Jurisprudence. 1780 - 1850
Slavery in Massachusetts was governed by a double standard Aller the Quock
Walker cases of I 780-83, Bay Statei s could not own slaves According to Chief Justice
William Cushing, enslavement violated Article One of the state's Declaration of Rights,
which guaranteed equal Ireedom to all residents. While Cushing is sometimes credited
with elTectively abolishing slavery, a Worcester County jury anticipated his decision by
convicting Walker's master of assault and battery after rejecting his claim of a
(>()
proprietary right to beat his charge.' Slaveholders from outside Massachusetts,
meanwhile, were initially presumed to retain their proprietary powers on the authority of
the federal constitution's comity clause, which required each state to grant "full faith
and credit" to the laws of sister states. According to the pro-slavery interpretation of
comity, a man authorized to hold slaves retained his power over them anywhere in the
United States.
Antislavery lawyers denied that comity obliged states to disregard moral scruples.
They cited the English Lord Mansfield's ruling in the 1772 Somerset case, which deemed
slavery so far at odds with natural law that it lacked legal standing wherever the coercive
rights on which it depended were not granted explicitly. In Massachusetts, theoretically,
a visiting slaveholder could not legally restrain or coerce his slaves. As amended by later
rulings, the Somerset doctrine did not automatically liberate slaves sojourning in free
states, but only suspended their master's coercive rights This left unclear the essential
question of whether the master could remove a slave who desired to stay.^
In Massachusetts, the decisive test of the competing claims Somerset and
comity was the 1836 case of Commonwealth v. Aves^ in which antislavery lawyers
sought to strip Thomas Aves, a Massachusetts man, of rights delegated to him by his
Louisianan son-in-law over a slave child brought North as a playmate for Aves's visiting
granddaughter. At stake, some thought, was not merely Aves's coercive powers over
' Co\cr. Justice Accused. 44 - 50; Nelson, Americanization, 102.
' For a discussion of the nuances of American intcrprctalions of Somerset sec Louis S. Gertcis,
Morality and I lilily in . Imerican Antislavery Reform. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
1987). 5 - 11. and William M. Wiccck, The Sources ofAntislavery Constitutionalism in America, 1760-
1H4H. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1977), 36 - 7.
67
young Med, but the state's prohibition of enslavement. If Aves could exercise a
slavedriver's powers, some feared, any Bay Stater could.
^
Aves's attorney, the youthful Boston lawyer Benjamin R. Curtis, argued that his
client claimed only those rights granted in the federal constitution and the 1 793 Fugitive
Slave Law, which together forbade free states from liberating fugitive slaves. "[I]t is
consistent with the public policy of Massachusetts," Curtis argued, "to protect his right
to that extent " IfMed sought freedom, he implied, Aves had the right to claim her as a
fugitive slave. The real issue in the case, he warned, was not that the court would grant
slaveholders' rights to Bay Staters, but that the court would violate Aves's constitutional
rights.'*
The counsel for the commonwealth, abolitionist Ellis Grey Loring, cited Somerset
to show that Bay Staters were bound by neither the comity nor the fugitive clause "to
enforce or hold valid
.
any contract or law, which offends their morals, or contravenes
their policy, or violates a public law, or offers a pernicious example." Curtis questioned
Somerset 's relevance to an American case. As an imperial ruling regulating traffic
between dependent colonies and a mother country, the English decision did not take into
account the comity required in relations among independent, confederated states.
Whether any ruling from Mansfield, an opponent ofjurors' rights, should bind an
American court remained a matter of hot debate To Democrats, Mansfield's decisions.
Leonard W. Levy, Low ofthe Commonwealth, 61-2; Commonweallh v. Aves, 35 Mass. 18
Pickering (1836), 196 -200.
Commonweallh v. Aves, 196-7. 217; Lev'y. Law ofthe Commonwealth. 69; Paul Finkclinan.
An Imperfect Union: Sla\'ery, Federalism, and Comity. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press. 1981). 101.
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Somersel included, typified an arbitrary approach to the common law that Whigs too
readily emulated. As a Whig, Curtis did not challenge Somersel on those grounds, but
he clearly invited the court to reject it as un-American.^
To the delight of the antislavery camp. Chief Justice Shaw endorsed Somerset,
liberating Med. Comity, he ruled, applied to relations between dependent territories and
an imperial center as well as to sovereign states, Somerset^ then, implicitly overruled the
comity clause. "Though by the laws of fone] state ... a person may acquire a property
m a slave," Shaw declared, "such acquisition, being contrary to natural right, and
effected by the local law [of that state], is dependent upon such local law for its existence
and efficacy " Despite comity, laws contrary to natural right were powerless beyond
their local borders. Slaves entering Massachusetts in their masters' custody were
effectively free from constraint and forcible removal. In the 1 844 case of
Commonweallh v. hilz^erald, Shaw extended the emancipatory force Aves to cover
slaves attending masters on naval vessels.
.
"When a slave is in Massachusetts casually,
not being a runaway," he ruled, "whether he is brought here voluntarily by his master or
not, there is no law here to authorize his restraint." Slaves hroiighl to Massachusetts,
then, could successfully sue for freedom. It was essential, however, that they arrive in
the custody of their masters.''
(\)mm()nwi'alth \'.li'('.v, 195 - 202; Fiiikclman. An Imperfect Union, 106 - 7; Gcrtcis. Morality
and Utility. 9 - 11. 28 - 30. For Dciiiocnitic crilicisiu of Mniisncld s ruling ngniiisl jurors" riglK to
inlcrprcl llic l;m. sec Post. IS April 1855. Ellis Grey Loriiig \v;is no( reliilcd to Judge I.oring.
Commonwealth v Aves. 196 - 7; Levy, Iaiw oJ the ( \mnionwealth. 70 - 1.
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Only a slave's willful escape from his master rendered him liable to extradition
from Massachusetts under the federal law. In colonial times, Massachusetts Bay and
Plymouth had acknowledged an obligation to return fugitive servants to their home
colonies. In 1707 unified Massachusetts explicitly forbade free blacks and mulattos from
harboring fugitives. During the Confederation period the General Court restored eight
South Carolina fugitives to slavery through special legislation. While ratifying the 1787
Constitution, the legislature forbade "tarrying" by blacks unable to prove their
citizenship In the nineteenth century, conservatives cited these precedents to deny
sanctuary to fugitive slaves.^
The federal fugitive clause confirmed the direction of earlier Bay State statutes
by forbidding states from making laws, or interpreting existing laws, to emancipate
runaway servants. The 1 793 Fugitive Slave Act authorized state judges and magistrates
to certify claims on runaways upon presentation of an affidavit from the master's state.
This authorization, however, did not compel anyone to perform these duties. For fifty
years lawyers questioned whether state officials had any role in enforcing a federal right.
Until a final decision, responsibility for verifying the master's claim and the fugitive's
debt of service lay exclusively with these officials, claimants did not have to face a jury
trial.'
' In 1851 an Amherst representative cited an array of colonial and subsequent legislation in
opposition to Dana s personal libert> bill. See his minority report in Massachusetts General Court, 1851
House Document 187. 3 - 8.
^ Cover. Justice Accused. 162 - 3; Thomas D. Morris, Free Men All: The Personal Liberty
Laws ofthe North, 1780-186L (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974). 10.
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Denying a jury trial to fugitive slaves went against Massachusetts sensibilities.
From the radical democratic perspective, the fugitive law denied the people their right to
determine whether one of their own should be extradited, and to determine for
themselves the meaning or the validity of the law. Whiggish critics, meanwhile,
contended that masters' claims required verification by established legal procedures lest
free blacks be kidnapped. In 1 785, in the wake of the Walker trials, the General Court
enacted an anti-kidnapping statute requiring that a claimant prove to a judge, in response
to a writ ofhabeus corpus, sufficient cause to detain and remove his alleged servant.
More stringent was the writ of de homine replegiando, or personal replevin, which
compelled the claimant to justify his seizure of human property to a jury. A 1787 statute
asserted a universal right to this writ. To many Bay Staters, a law that ignored these due
process requirements was unconstitutional They bristled whenever conservative judges
ruled that these requirements obstructed justice in fugitive cases.
^
Commotm'ealth v. Griffith {\S22) provided the Supreme Judicial Court an
opportunity to judge the constitutionality of the fugitive law. Like Quock Walker's
master, the Virginian Camillus Griflfith was accused of assault and battery. He claimed a
right to seize runaways forcibly according to the fugitive law, while the commonwealth
charged that the federal statute violated both the Fourth Amendment's ban on illegal
searches and seizures and the Seventh Amendment's requirement of a jury trial for all
large property claims. In Griffith's defense, Marcus Morton, a future high court justice
^ Morris. Free Men All. 9-12. The writ of replevin was issued on complaint against an
unlawful seizure of propert\ . While this seemed to classifS the presumpti\ c free black as a form of
propert> . the procedure w as justified as enabling him to claim self-ownership.
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:m(l Dcniocralic governor, jngiicd lhal slaves did nol share in the rights granted by tlie
Conslil.itioti Its Picamhle, he noted, "begins, We the l»eo|)le.' This does not inelude
slaves," In aa|iiitting (iiiirith, Chier Jusliee Isaac Parker agreed that "It is veiy obvious
that slaves arc not parlies to the Constitution, and the |l ouith| Aincndinent has relation
[onlyl io the parties
Moilon and Parker saw Ihc Bill of Rights less as a declaration of human or
natural rights than as a contractual benefit owed only \o the contractees, the citi/enry
whose representatives ratified Ihc ( 'onstilulion In Massachusetts those beneficiaries
included free blacks, among whom accused fugitives should have been included on a
presumption of iniu)cencc. histead, Paikei implied tiiat any alleged lunaway was, /vv/mA
A/c/c, a slave I'his biealhlaking |)ie|udice was ciitici/ed immediately in a dissenting
opinion, and later in an IS ?7 legislative report reasserting the rights of accused fugitives.
Critics noted that 'Mhe very matter to be triecf in a fugitive case was "mV/c/Z/c/ |the
pui|)orted runaway] is a slave, can that be iissiinicil in the t)utset," they asked, "in
order to give jui isdiction to the magistrate, and validity to his judgment?" Paikei
admitted lhal black Bay Slaters might be seized uniiisllv, and allowed foi due process in
such cases, bul he olleied no sure means to distinguish ihe aggrieved cili/en from the
piesumpt ive bondsman. '
'
III
( 'Dinmoiiwrnllli v. Cnffilh. l<) Mass, 2 i'ickciiii)' ( IS22). 12 - 20.
" Coinmonm-iillli v. (Irijfilh. 18 - 20; Morris, hrcc Men All, 7K. Charles V.. Slovens. Aiillioin
Ihirns ,1 llislorv. (Hosloii iXSr, rcpriiil Williainslowii. Ma,: CoriK-r lloiisi- Piiiilicalioiis. ^1
.
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Parker thought it more important to consider the claims of the Bay State's fellow
contractees, the slaveholding states. Massachusetts had committed itself to fulfill the
conditions of the federal compact, among them an obligation not to emancipate
runaways seeking reflige in the Bay State. That obligation was not liable to subjective
moral scruples; "Whether the statute is a harsh one," Parker stressed, "is not for us to
determine." A generation of Massachusetts jurists followed Parker's line. Justice Shaw
relied on Griffith during the Sims case in 1 85 1 Judge Loring cited Parker's opinion in
newspaper articles and in his Burns ruling. Later, Parker was cited in Loring' s own
defense.'^
Griffith seemed like an exception to the general trend of Bay State jurisprudence.
In the Walker trials and ih^Aves case, uncodified natural law was permitted to overrule
the rights of slaveowners. As Shaw broadened the emancipatory sweep oiAves, critics
found it increasingly anomalous that a master's right to a runaway should remain exempt
from a natural-law review. This anomaly was accentuated by the 1 842 case of George
Latimer, an accused fiigitive from Virginia, which attracted far greater scrutiny than
Commoin\>cdth v. Griffith because Latimer, unlike the slave-hunter Griffith, was actually
threatened with enslavement. His defense hinged on an 1837 statute that reaffirmed all
residents' right to the writ of personal replevin. In the anti-abolition environment of
1835, the year of Garrison's near-lynching, the 1787 replevin statute was not retained in
the Revised Statutes Two years later, opposition to slaveholders' expansionist
Commonwealth v. Griffith. 18 - 20; Advertiser. 2 November 1850; Commonwealth. 3 June
1854; [George T. Curtis]. "To the Board of CK ersecrs of Harvard College," manuscript copy. Parker -
Burns Scrapbook. Boston Public Library .
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anibilions in 'I exas led to (he staUitc's rcinslatcnionl Defying CV///////, legislators
deemed Ihe fugitive law iineonstitiitional if it denied due process. The court could not
exempt Latimer^ claimant, James IJ, Gray, from the replevin writ without contesting the
conslitutn)nality of the 18.57 statute
Justice Shaw maddened abolitionists by favoring Gray. Since Gray's documents
gave him sulTicient authority to hold l.atimer pending the hearing on his claim, Shaw
refused to grant the delense a luihcus corpus writ I le then granted Gray a delay in
proceedings, later extended by the federal circuit court, to procure fuither proof of his
claim on l.atimer Duiing the delay, Shaw allowed the defense to serve a writ of replevin
o\\ Latimer's jailer, the county sherilV, who ignored it I 'inally, Shaw issued a luihcus
corpus writ compelling the sherilVto explain his non-compliance In the end, however,
Shaw declared the 18.^7 replevin statute an unconstitutional interference with the rights
of slave-catchers.'"'
Shaw's ruling was inlluenced by the recent federal case of Pri^^ v. Pcnnsylvanui.
In that case, Joseph Sloiy had ruled that the federal constitution made fugitive slavery a
field of exclusive federal jurisdiction I ie found unconstitutional any state interference
with the prompt settlement of slaveholders' claims, including any law requiring a jury
trial Shaw reaffirmed Story's opinion While admitting that this was "disagreeable to
our own natural sympathies aiul views of duly," he ruled that "an appeal to naluial rights
Lifwralor. 2X OclotxM- 1X42; Morris, Free Men . \IL W) - 10; Slc\v;irl Oiiiiplicll. The Slave
Catchers: I'lnlbrcemenl (>[ Ihe I'Ufiitive Slave Law, (New Yorl<: Norton. I'>7()), I I- 14.
'^ Liberator, 4 November IS42; Morris, Lree Men :IIL 1 10; Campl^eli, Shive Catchers. 14.
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and to the paramount law of liberty was not pertinent" in fugitive cases. This reasoning
scandalized abolitionists. Many agreed with Shaw's view of constitutional duties, but
thought that moral men should resign from those duties. They condemned Shaw as an
atheist, and likened him to the infamous Jeffreys, because he seemed to value his post
over his scruples.
After threats of removal by legislative address compelled the Suffolk sheriff to
release Latimer into Gray's precarious custody, the Virginian sold Latimer into freedom
rather than face mob violence. Massachusetts was thus spared the disgrace of witnessing
a man's re-enslavement, but with no help from the courts, which in their solicitude
towards slave-catchers opposed public opinion, expressed in 65,000 signatures, against
returning fugitives to bondage. It galled Bay Staters that Shaw could readily seize a
slave from a master's clutches, as he did in Aves\ and would do again in Fitzgerald, but
would not help Latimer, who had effectively liberated himself To posterity this
inconsistency typifies an "instrumentalist" legalism that justified the fugitive laws on the
utilitarian ground of their necessity, first to the founding, and later to the maintenance of
the Union. Such an interpretation, however, would neglect the seriousness with which
both the courts and many abolitionists regarded contractual obligations.'^
Garrisonian abolitionists, especially, regarded contracts as ethically binding even
when morally objectionable. Following Wendell Phillips's scholarship, they read the
Liberator. 4. 11 November 1842; Morris. Free Men All, 110-11.
Liberator. 4. 11 November 1842; Morris. Free Men All. 117.
' William E. Nelson. "The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Centur>' America," Harvard Law Review 87 (January 1974): 540 - 4.
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Constitution as a guarantee of slaveholders' rights, that "enjoin[ed] obligations and
duties" to protect slavery upon every citizen. To the Garrisonians, secession was the
only ethical way to disavow the obligations imposed by the Union. Like the Whigs, the
Garrisonians were "legal formalists." They believed that contracts should be observed to
the last letter. To enjoy the benefits of Union, and to swear, as a judge, to uphold the
Constitution while ruling contrary to its laws for conscience's sake, as other abolitionists
suggested, was to sacrifice the moral authority Garrisonians coveted. They departed
from Whiggery only when they questioned the morality of the contract itself'^
Not all abolitionists agreed with either the Garrisonians' strict contractarianism
or their interpretation of the Constitution. Following Lysander Spooner, many
distinguished between the implicit antislavery essence of that document and the aberrant
proslavery provisions tacked on to it rudely for the sake of compromise. The
Constitution could not endorse slavery because the document's own authority depended
on natural-law principles that condemned bondage. Spooner' s followers disputed the
finality of both statutory and constitutional law. Only contracts consistent with natural
rights were binding, Spooner wrote, while contracts for immoral purposes were void.
1 8
Wendell Phillips. The Constitution A Pro-Slmery Compact: or, Extracts From the Madison
Papers, Etc.^ 3d ed.. (New York. 1856). 7 - 9. 148: Cover. Justice Accused. 151 - 4: Gerteis, Morality
and Utility. 43-8; Aileen S. Kraditor, Means and Ends in American Abolitionism: Garrison and His
Circle On Strategy and Tactics, 1834-1850, (New York: Pantheon, 1969), 198 - 213.
^^Massachusetts Quarterly Review 2 (June 1848). 283: such provisions as the "three-fifths
clause" did not indicate, according to this view, that the Constitution sanctioned slavery , but were
included only as acknowledgments of "external fact. ' If the Constitution sanctioned slavery. Spooner's
followers believ ed, it would have explicitly declared a right to enslave. Merely to guarantee the already-
acknowledged conventional rights of slaveholders for the sake of compromise and unity did not indicate
a natural right to enslave: otherwise. Northern states could not have abolished slaverv . Garrisonians
answered (Massachusetts Quarterly Review 2 (September 1848). 501) that any exception made to ^^a
general rule of law" amounted to a positive assertion of a novel right. Constitutional guarantees of the
decidedly exceptional right to enslave indicated that slaver>^ had a federal mandate.
76
Ambiguous contracts or laws must be interpreted in favor of "liberty, justice, and right."
The ftjgitive clause, Spooner's camp concluded, referred properly only to apprentices
and indentured servants. Not even the framers' original proslavery intent, exposed in
Madison's recently-published journal, could trump the natural-law requirement that the
constitution favor freedom. Spooner's adherents, had they the power, would intervene
judicially against slavery, not on judicial authority, but solely according to conscience.
Anyone, lawyer or layman, judge or common citizen, could nullify immoral laws. From
the Garrisonian perspective, this dissimulating, selective adherence to contracts
encouraged anarchy rather than justice.^^
Like the Whigs, many politically radical abolitionists assigned judges a duty to
scrutinize and refine the law.'' The moral judge, Theodore Parker wrote, "continually
modifies the laws of his country to the advantage of mankind," selectively applying
statutes and precedents according to "his own fresh instincts of humanity " Rather than
to the Whiggish standard of individual liberty, however, he should "look to the Purpose
Lysandcr Spooncr, A Defencefor Fiigilive Slcn'es, Against the Acts ofCongress ofPehrunry
12, 1793. and September IS. IS50. (Boston, 1850). 27 - 8: Co\'CT. Justice Accused. 151-4; Gcrtcis.
Morality and Utility. 43-51; Kradilor, Means and Ends. 191 - 5; Lew is Pcrr> . Radical Abolitionism:
Anarchy and the Government ofCiod in . Intislavery Thought. 2d. cd.. (Knoxvilie: Univcrsit>' of
Tennessee Press. 1995), 189, 195 - 7.
My usage of the term "radical abolitionist" differs somew hat from that of Lew is Perr\ . who
thus identifies the non-resistant Garrisonians. 1 label as radical abolitionists those antislaver\' cnisaders
w hose opinions on the relation between the law and democracy generalh concurred w ith the position 1
idcntif> with radical democracy or. in short, " radicalism " in Chapter 1 Perr\ "s radicals were proto-
anarchists. in his view, who denied legitimacy to goxernmcnts based on an> thing other than God s w ill
as explicith staled in. or inferred from, the Bible. They typically drew a sharper distinction between
God s will and the people s than democratic thinkers like Spooner. who did not nccessariU put the
people's will before the divine, but usualh assumed a closer affinity between the two than did the
Garrisonians. Radical Abolitioni.sm. 20.1 n. 39. suggests a distinction, similar to m> ow n. between
"evangelists " like the Garrisonians who assumed an existing national depravity requiring religious
reform, and a "more scintillating and scandalous" circle that included Spooner. John Pierpont. and
Richard Hildrcth. the last of w hom was one of Judge Lonng s more vehement persecutors.
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- which is the Eternal Justice of God, - as well as to each special statute." Bad
statutes should be ignored, or else the judge should "parr[y] their insidious thrusts at
humanity." "All this," Parker concluded, "his official function requires of him." The
radical preacher John Pierpont agreed that a judge was "bound to regulate his judicial
conscience, that is, his legal judgment,
. . . according to [his] belief [that slavery] is
contrary to the law of God, or of nature, or is sinful." Unlike Garrisonians, who
recommended the consensual dissolution of wicked contracts, radicals like Spooner,
Parker, and Pierpont hoped to alter the government, forcibly if necessary, to conform to
their view of its proper nature.^^
Politically radical abolitionists were more likely to support judicial reform than
the non-resistant, contractarian Garrisonians. Spooner' s followers believed that jurors
had a veto power over legislative statutes and judicial decisions. Garrisonians, including
many who later endorsed antislavery violence, objected that Spooner granted too much
discretion to unreliable authorities. "Trial by jury, indeed!" scoffed Henry C. Wright, "A
professedly civilized and Christian people passing a law to give to a man a jury trial on
the issue ~ Is he a man, or a brute?" Democracy alone, Wright thought, did not give
any man or group or men, however constituted, the right to rule, on any grounds, that a
man was a slave. ' Without universal moral reformation, Wendell Phillips believed,
judicial reform alone was pointless. Anything short of universal deference to a single
moral standard, preferably the revealed will of God, ^'would render law uncertain and
Theodore Parker, 77?^ Trial of Theodore Parker, (Boston, 1855), 67; Pierpont's sermon on
the Latimer case (see below) is singled out for attack in Law Reporter 5 (April 1843), 493 - 4.
Liberator, 1 September 1854.
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government impossible "'' Phillips and other Garrisonians endorsed Loring's removal
not as part of a democratic agenda, as may have been the case with Spooner's followers,
but as a prelude to secession from an immoral union.
Many abolitionists inferred a secessionist tendency from the 1843 Personal
Liberty Law, the handiwork of the Conscience Whig Charles Francis Adams. Adams
himself wanted to answer public outrage at the Latimer case without appearing to nullify
the fugitive law. Fortunately, the same Prigg decision that endangered Latimer
suggested ways to enforce judicial compliance with popular scruples against slave-
hunting. Story had ruled that, since fugitive slavery was exclusively a federal matter, the
fugitive law did not require state officials to assist in returning runaways. Judges and
other officials could assist slave-catchers at their own discretion, unless prohibited by
state law. That proviso, based on the premise that legislatures could define the
jurisdiction of state courts, became the basis of Adams's liberty bill and, by extension,
the removal of Judge Loring.'^
By prohibiting Massachusetts officeholders from participating in fiigitive cases,
Adams acted on Story's presumption that jurisdictions created by legislators could be
defined, broadened, or limited on legislative initiative. Since the state constitution did
not provide for extradition of fugitive slaves, legislators were free to assign the task to
whatever authorities they chose, or to bar anyone from performing it. From this, and
Gerteis. Morality and Utility. 43 - 51. Perr\\ Radical Abolitionism. 195 - 7. 231 - 67.
^' Norman L. Rosenberg. " Personal Liberty Laws and Sectional Crisis: 1850-1861." Civil War
History 17 (March 1971); 27; Jane H. Pease and William H. Pease. The Fugitive Slave Law and Anthony
Burns: A Problem in Law Enforcement, (Philadelphia; Lippmcott, 1975), 5; Morris, Free Men All, 96 -
106, 114.
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from a heritage ofjudicial mlings against slavery in Massachusetts, radical observers
inferred a moral incompatibility between free-state and slave-power offices, especially
after the 1 850 ftigitive law assigned federal jurisdiction to state officeholders.
Garrisonian abolitionists acknowledged this incompatibility by divesting themselves of all
offices requiring oaths to support the federal government. For them, secession was the
next logical step. Adams, however, never meant to imply this. While he occasionally
indulged in disunionist rhetoric, he probably never meant his bill to encourage secession
or sanction the removal of judges.
While his liberty bill forbade judges and all other state officials from participating
in fugitive cases, Adams pointedly refused to penalize offending judges. He may have
thought that fining them would violate their constitutional right to honorable salaries
which Democrats in 1 843 had already attacked by cutting their pay. Further, he most
likely thought that statutory penalties forjudges would endanger judicial independence.
Judges could not safely follow their consciences if it meant fines, prison, or removal from
office. He opposed radicals in his own Free-Soil party who took his bill as a precedent
for regulating the bench. When legislators tried to punish Judge Loring on the authority
of his liberty law, Adams opposed them. To Adams and his patrician friends, the judicial
reform issue was an unwelcome addition to the tme antislavery agenda.
Morris. Free Men All. 1 1.1 - 17; Campbell. S/nvc (\itchers. 14; Adams Diarv. I, 24 March
855, Adams Family Papers.
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Free-Soil Factions
Adams and the patrician Free-Soilers were concerned principally with halting
slavery's westward expansion As Conscience Whigs they continued to oppose the
annexation of Texas and the seizure of territory from conquered Mexico long after the
"Cotton" factions led by Daniel Webster and the manufacturer Abbot Lawrence had
muted their opposition for the sake of national party unity. Conscience Whigs judged
Webster and Lawrence too subservient to the national party apparatus to represent
authentic Bay State opinion in the territorial debates. Instead, Conscience leaders -
Adams, John Gorham Palfrey, Stephen C. Phillips, and Samuel Hoar - considered
themselves the rightfijl leaders of Bay State Whiggery. They joined the Free-Soil
movement in 1 848 to protest their subjection to pro-slavery Bostonian commercial
interests. They intended the party as a purified, antislavery Whig party, rather than as a
vehicle for social or political reform. Most patricians thought local matters too petty for
their notice.
" Bean. "Part\ Transformation in Massachusetts." 30; Brauer. Cotton versus Conscience. 41 -
8, 75. 94. 100. 128. 170 - 6. 21 1 - 13: Brauer suggests that many Conscience leaders turned against
Webster and Law rence out of resentment of the ascendancy of parvenu manufacturers in the social and
political spheres where their forefathers once ruled. This theme is taken up in Goodman. "Politics of
Industrialism.'' 188 - 9. which portrays the conflict as more of a class struggle than the conserv ative
Conscience men would allow. For the Cotton Whig perspective, see Robert F. Dalzell, Jr.. Enterprising
Elite: The Boston Associates and the World They Made. (Cambridge: Harvard Universit\' Press. 1987).
200. For a rehearsal of antipart\ arguments common, to an extent, to abolitionists and Conscience men,
see Daniel J. Mclnerney. 77?^ Eortunate Heirs ofEreedom: Abolition and Republican Thought.
(Lincoln: Universit\' of Nebraska Press. 1994). 94 - 106. For late hopes of a reconciliation with the
Whigs, occasioned by a common dread of state reform, see Adams Diar>\ 16 November 1852, Adams
Family Papers. Adams himself was skeptical towards such efforts.
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Not all Conscience Whigs shared the patricians' disdain for local politics.
Charles Sumner, a patrician himself, advised Free-Soilers to coalesce with Democrats
and endorse much of that party's reform agenda. Advocates of coalition believed that
the consolidation of power and influence in Cotton Whig Boston favored the Slave
Power. Bostonian Whiggery, they charged, oppressed urban workers, outlying farmers,
and antislavery dissidents alike, bulwarked constantly by its slaveholding trade partners.
Free-Soil coalitionists hoped to convince disgruntled urban workers and demoralized
farmers that they all shared a common enemy. Free-Soil's credibility, they thought,
depended on addressing popular anxieties over continuing economic and social upheaval.
Bay State Democrats seemed ready, in 1849, to meet Free-Soilers halfway. Disgusted
with Southern abandonment of their party in favor of a slaveholding Whig the year
before, local Democrats began to criticize slavery An antislavery reform Democracy,
Free-Soilers worried, might make their party irrelevant. The antislavery party had to
embrace reform.
The patricians abhorred competing with "Locofoco" radicals for working class
votes. While Adams demanded that Democrats endorse the Free-Soil line on the
territories as a prerequisite to coalition, he offered no comparable concession to
Democratic reformers. In 1 849 he kept reform planks off the Free-Soil state platform,
and forbade the state central committee from collaborating formally with Democrats. He
Dalzelk Enterprising Elite. 201 - 6; Richard H. Scvvcll. Ballotsfor Freedom: Antislavery
Politics in the United States, 1837-1860. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976). 220; Bulklcy.
"Robert Rantoul. Jr.." 355; Alan Dawley. Class and (\^mmunity: The Industrial Revolution in Lynn^
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1976). 65. 99; Bruce Laurie. The fair field^ of the ^middle
ground": Abolitionism. Labor Reform, and the Making of an Antislaver\ Bloc in Antebellum
Massachusetts." seminar paper. University of Massachusetts. 1995. 25. 29. 35.
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bowed to reformist pressures, however, by permitting town and county committees to
form coalition tickets, albeit without the state party's endorsement Further
accommodation was inevitable if Adams hoped to maintain his stewardship of the
movement. While he disavowed careerist ambitions for himself, he remained anxious
that the right sort of people lead the anti-extension crusade. As the Coalition advanced
to victory in the 1850 election, Adams worried that responsible gentlemen were losing
control of the cause.
Adams especially feared the growing influence of Henry Wilson, who with
Sumner led the movement for coalition with the Democracy. Wilson, a former cobbler
born Jeremiah Colbath, was a Conscience Whig, but no patrician. Adams considered
him an unprincipled political manipulator. His undoubted opposition to slavery counted
for less, with Adams, than his enthusiasm for electioneering and his readiness, in 1853, to
rig the electoral system in his favor. Wilson reciprocated Adams's disdain. He battled
patricians for control of the Free-Soil and Republican parties, and accused them of
hobbling the antislavery cause with their reactionary politics Adams and Dana, he later
charged, "had broken the back of every party with which they had ever been
connected."^"
Muikcrn. Know-Nolhinii Party. I - 2; Frederick J. Blue. The Free Sailers: Third Party
Politics, 1H4H-54. (LJrbami and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1973), 210 - 14; Sister Catherine
Mary Meade, CSJ. "Daniel Webster and the Decline of Ihc Wiiig Party in Massachusetts, 1848-52,"
(Ph D dissertation. Boston College). 1972, 242; Charles Francis Adams to Francis W. Bird. 9 October
18.51. Bird Papers, Houghton Library , Harvard University.
^" Blue. Free-Soilers. 214; Adams Diary . 1 1 February 1854. Adams Family Papers; Ernest
McKay, flenry Wilson, Practical Radical: Portrait of. I Polilician, (Port Washington. N.Y.: Kennikat
Press. 1971). 102.
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Wilson's demagoguery alarmed Adams because it worked. Simply put, the
patricians distrusted the Coalition's popularity. By associating Free-Soil principles with
state reform, Wilson seemed to cater to voters' self-interest rather than to their moral
sense. To Richard Henry Dana, the patricians' antislavery exemplified their disinterested
benevolence. "It is not our freedom that is at stake," he emphasized, 'if it were, the
Tammany Hall mob would be on our side, and beyond us." By contrast, Wilson's
demagoguery attracted voters who would "do nothing to resist the growth of slavery,
because that [would be] purely an act ofjustice to others." At the same time, patricians
assumed, Wilson's ilk exploited legitimate antislavery sentiments to get power for
themselves.''
Despite patricians' hysterical perceptions, Wilson was only a moderate reformer
More radical were the followers of the Walpole paper manufacturer Frank Bird.
Represented in print by the abrasive Lowell editor William S. "Warrington" Robinson,
Bird's friends were abolitionists as well as avid Coalitionists who aggressively supported
the secret ballot and (in many cases) the ten-hour day. Bird himself advocated direct
democratic sovereignty over all branches of government, including the judiciary. Only
justice, he thought, could emerge from the collective counsels of the whole people, while
individuals and factions were liable to self-interest Despite such sentiments, he
disapproved of the more blatantly partisan "reforms" at the 1853 reform constitution.
By 1854, he considered the Coalition agenda a "humbug" that had outlived its usefulness
Dana's 1848 speech. deli\ered as a political no\ice, is quoted in Adams, Jr.. Dana, 1: 125.
Dana considered the Coalition "an error of moral science." (1:210) and remained aloof from it. though
he agreed with its position on town representation. See also Shapiro. Dana. 56.
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for the antislavery movement. His followers, however, maintained their radical
commitment to democratic sovereignty by lobbying aggressively for Loring's removal.''
The judiciary question most clearly distinguished radicals, moderates, and
patrician conservatives within the Free-Soil party. Patricians like George Frisbie Hoar
might embrace other ostensibly radical issues, but judicial reform remained beyond the
pale. Hoar, the son of an old Federalist, was the first Massachusetts legislator to speak ii
favor of a ten-hour law. His speech, however, did not foreshadow flirther radicalism.
Instead, Hoar boasted that his family's opposition to the 1853 constitution was essential
to its defeat. They opposed it, George recalled decades later, chiefly out of hostility to
judicial reform.'" As prohibitionists, they "desired that the whole force of the State
should be brought to bear
'
against the liquor trade, and thus distrusted a judicial reform
movement associated with resistance to the liquor laws. As erstwhile Whigs, they
thought it "preposterous to suppose that so logical and reasonable a system as the
Common Law could ever have tolerated such an absurdity" as the jury's right to
interpret the law They opposed a constitutional convention in 1851 out of "special
dread of any change in the tenure of the judiciary," and in 1852 required a "distinct
assurance" from party leaders that "there should be no meddling with the judiciary."
Adams Diary, 3, 31 May 1854. Adams Family Papers; Bird to Charles Sumner, 15 April
1854, quoted in Baum. Civil War Party System. 21: OR. 2. 772. 818 - 19; Franklm Preston Stearns,
Cambridge Sketches. (Boston. 1905; reprint. Freeport: Books For Libraries Press, 1968), 163 - 6.
George Frisbie Hoar. Autobiography ofSeventy Years. 2 vols.. (New York. 1 903). 1 : 24 - 5,
163 -4.175 -6.
Hoar. Autobiography. 1: 38. 161, 164. In the interest of stability and finality. Hoar
recommended that court reporters refuse to print dissenting opinions except when controversy was
absolutely inescapable. Whoever did so. he promised, would hav e the gratitude of the courts.
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That guarantee alone, George Hoar concluded, made the 1853 convention possible.
When Coalitionists violated that understanding, the Hoars denounced the convention.''
Radical Free-Soilers thought judicial reform imperative because they believed the
rights of whites and blacks alike were endangered by the 1850 Fugitive Slave Law. That
law appeared to sanction the suppression of even passive resistance to slave-catching.
Active resistance, according to some vindictive Cotton Whigs, might warrant capital
punishment If any law required moral scrutiny, or a moral veto, this was it. Ifjudges
refused to exercise the proper moral vigilance against it, radicals argued, only systematic
judicial reform could save the state. At the 1853 convention, patrician Free-Soilers
found to their horror that many of the most radical judicial reformers were men of their
party who argued from an unambiguous antislavery position. To the reformers, the
patricians' dogged defense ofjudicial supremacy seemed almost like a capitulation to the
fugitive law Without consensus on this question, the Free-Soil party would die.
The Fugitive Law and the Rescue Trials
The 1850 Fugitive Slave Law compensated for omissions in the 1793 law
exposed by the Prigg decision and exploited by Northern states. From the existing corps
of commissioners of the federal court of claims. Congress created a class of "federal
slave commissioners ' with an express mandate to hear fugitive cases. Should anyone
threaten a violent rescue, commissioners could organize all citizens at the scene into a
Ho^x. Autohiography\ I: 172
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posse comUatus to deter the rescuers. Failure to respond - by inference, simply to
witness a rescue passively, - incurred a prison sentence and a maximum fine of one
thousand dollars. Federal marshals faced stiffer fines if they refiised to arrest fugitives,
and were liable for the cost of escaped slaves. On the opposite side of the ledger,
marshals could hire guards at federal expense to secure the delivery of runaways. Slave
commissioners were paid on a graduated scale allegedly based on the paperwork
required to process an extradition: five dollars for an acquittal, ten for a conviction.
Critics saw this as a monetary inducement to rule against fijgitives.'^^
Accused runaways had no right to due process, nor could they testify at the
commissioner's hearing. The commissioner had to accept slave state affidavits
describing the runaway and the escape (essential to distinguish a fugitive case from one
that might fall under the purview ofAves ) as legal proof of both the escape and the
prisoner's identity as the runaway. Having determined this after a summary hearing, he
issued a certificate of removal protecting the claimant from "molestation ... by any
process issued by any court, judge, magistrate, or other person whomsoever." Against
objections that the process enslaved a man without a trial, George T. Curtis explained
that commissioners only determined the prisoner's liability to extradition. The prisoner's
servitude would be determined by a trial in his home state. Curtis' s disclaimers
persuaded few dissidents of his moral innocence.
Campbell, Slave Catchers. 24 - 5: Morris. Free Men All, 142 - 7; Peases. Anthony Burns. 8.
Cotton Whigs answered complaints against an apparently biased pay scale by noting that the same scale
applied to all local justices of the peace, on the grounds that convictions involved more paperwork. See
remarks of Otis P. Lord at the 1853 convention. OR. 3: 461.
Spooner. Defencefor Fugitive Sla\>es, 20 - 26; Morris, Free Men All. 142-7; Campbell,
Slave Catchers. 32-6.
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The Curtis family, the most hated of Boston's aristocratic clans in antislavery
circles, were the chief apologists for the fugitive law. George T. Curtis, later a leading
polemicist against the reform constitution, was a leading acolyte of Daniel Webster's
personality cuh. Out of loyalty to Webster, Curtis shrugged off his private reservations
about the law, and urged his extended family to support it. The Xurtii" (as abolitionists
dubbed them) denied fugitive slaves any right to seek refuge in Massachusetts. If the
legislature could bar alien paupers from entering the state, Benjamin R. Curtis argued,
the same should be done with runaways. "Whatever natural rights [fugitives] have," he
continued, ''this is not the soil on which to vindicate them." According to Curtis, the
rights detailed in the Massachusetts constitution applied only to Bay Staters.'^^
The Curtii insisted anew that contractual commitments to the Union overrode
local moral scruples. 'T want to see somebody come up manfully to the point," Benjamin
wrote privately, "and attempt to show that the moral duty we owe the fugitive slave,
when in conflict with the moral duty we owe to our country, and its laws, is so plainly
superior thereto, that we may and ought to engage in a revolution on account of it ."
Only a fool or a naive idealist, he told a Faneuil Hall crowd, "expect[ed] to live in peace,
side by side with the slaveholding states, without some effectual stipulation as to the
restoration of fugitives," Organized disobedience to the law, he believed, "is rebellion,
and if force is used, insurrection or revolution according to the event. ... [A] great many
Curtis, ed.. Life and Writings. 1. 130-6.
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of the teachers ofpohiical morals ofthe present day do not seem to have taken [this]
into their minds at all "^'"^
In February 1 85 I George T Curtis witnessed an "insurrection" in his own
courtroom after the arrest, on his commissioner's warrant, of '^Shadrach," an accused
runaway While antislavery lawyers vainly appealed to Justice Shaw for either a haheus
corpus or a writ of replevin, Curtis convened the required summary hearing I le was
abruptly overwhelmed by an interracial band of rescuers who carried Shadrach away.
'"I hcre was strong reason to believe that the rescue was a premeditated act," the
commissioner later wrote, "by persons who had combined to prevent by force the
execution of this particular law in all cases " If Shadrach's rescue had been a conspiracy,
"the olVense amounted to treason against the United States, and the rescue itself was an
overt act in a capital crime " Although the fugitive law itself did not classify a slave
rescue as a capital ollense, (\irlis urged "the authorities in Washington" -- President
Fillmore and Daniel Webster, now Secretary of State, -- to treat the Shadrach incident as
one,'^"
Webster worked beliind the seenes to secure a vindication ofthe governnienl and
the fugitive law at the trials of Shadrach's accused rescuers." District court judge Peleg
Sprague screened jurors thoroughly, purging anyone who adniilled a bias against the
Cnnxs.cA.Jjfc andWritin^s, 1: 123. 135.
'^^^
Curtis's conmicnis nrc taken from liis memoir, published in Curtis, cd., Ijfe and Writin^^s^ I:
161. Sec also Meade. 'Daniel Wel')ster," 312. l*or Shaw s evasions when asked for a writ by Dana, sec
Levy. Law a/' flic ( ^tnimonwcalflL XX - 9!
" Gai*y Collison. I his I'lagilious OfTense:' Daniel Webster and the Shadrach Reseue Cases.
1X51 - 1X52," New I'.n^land (Juarterly i^)^ (DecemlxM 1*^95): 612 - 13.
X*)
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fugitive law. As in the liquor law trials, the bench saw this inquiry as a reasonable
to ensure objective deliberations. Again, however, dissidents disputed the assumption
that agreement with controversial laws was unbiased. Again, also, jurors concealed their
beliefs and produced hung juries at the first two trials.
In November 1851, Benjamin R. Curtis, now a justice of the Supreme Court,
took over the trials, screening jurors beforehand and re-examining them whenever he
discovered new evidence of bias. He forced a constitutional confrontation by forbidding
defense counsel John P Hale, a New Hampshire congressman, from informing jurors of
their traditional right to interpret the law. Curtis granted Hale a private hearing, and
then publicly ruled against jurors' law-finding rights. Following Commonwea/th v.
Porter, he denied jurors any moral right to interpret the law on their own To defy the
bench, he argued, was the same as ruling against the evidence. Judges, he asserted
predictably, were more reliable guardians of civil liberties than juries. Unlike jurors,
judges explained their decisions publicly, and stood liable to impeachment for arbitrary,
unjust rulings."*'
"To enforce popular law is easy," Curtis informed the court, "But when an
unpopular cause is a just cause, when a law unpopular in some locality is to be enforced
there, then comes the strain upon the administration ofjustice." "Few unprejudiced
men," he claimed, doubted that judges were best equipped to handle that strain. Having
''^ Charles H. Van Tyne. ed.. Writings and Speeches ofDaniel Webster. 18 vols.. (Boslon,
1903). 16: 603 - 6; Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal. 2: 430 - 2. Dana, a counsel for the defense in Robert
Morris's trial, was less inclined to dispute the court 's right to screen jurors, and his eyewitness account
is fairly free of outrage. One of Morris's jurors turned out to be a member of the antislavcry Boston
Vigilance Committee. Collison. "'This Flagitious Offense," 614 - 18. especially, n. 28.
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Curtis, ed.. Life and Writings. 1: 161 - 2. 2: 187 - 9.
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proven his courage, Curtis instructed the jurors in a manner that antislavery observers
found nakedly prejudicial Admitting that little evidence existed to implicate defendants
in events they appeared only to have witnessed, Curtis asserted that passivity in the face
of msurrection was criminal. "Even if it [does] not appear that [a defendant] aided in the
rescue," he charged jurors, "if he was present, and did nothing to prevent it, this would
render him guilty under the statute."'*'*
The rescue trials continued through 1852 without a single conviction. While
hung juries made further trials possible, prosecutors finally conceded that convictions
were nearly impossible in the prevailing political climate. Jury screening had proven
embarrassingly incapable of keeping deliberations free from "bias "^^ Despite their
victories, antislavery activists were convinced that their civil rights were in imminent
danger from a Cotton Whig bench. "[T]he judges of Massachusetts," the radical editor
Edward L. Keyes observed, "have taken the law into their own hands in a totally
unjustifiable manner." The bench had dropped the mask of disinterested objectivity,
revealing
,
according to Theodore Parker, "no more than a government attorney in
disguise
. . . expected to twist the law to the advantage of the hand that feeds him."'*^
By the time Shadrach's recuers came to trial, the surrender of Thomas Sims to
slavery in April 185 1 had already convinced Keyes and other infiiriated radicals that
Curtis, ed., Life and Writings. 2: 172-5; Shapiro. Dana. 61.
Collison. "This Flagitious Offense."" 622. A juror in the second trial of Elizur Wright
turned out to be a member of the "Underground Railroad " who had sheltered Shadrach after his escape
from Boston.
OR, 3; 443-5; Parker. Trial of Theodore Parker, 77 - 8.
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judges unchecked by juries would readily collaborate in the re-enslavement of a self-
liberated man. Sims's arrest two months after the Shadrach rescue gave George T.
Curtis and his friends in Washington another chance to prove the sovereignty of the
ftigitive law. This time, federal troops arrived in force to prevent another mass break-in.
The court house itself was ringed with a massive iron chain, under which both Curtis and
Chief Justice Shaw crouched daily to determine Sims's fate. For radicals and patrician
Free-Soilers alike, the image of Shaw humiliating himself presaged the thorough
abnegation of Massachusetts and its courts before the hated law. Only reluctantly, at the
urging of "gentlemen of high standing," did the old judge agree to hear arguments for a
haheus corpus on the ground that the 1850 law was unconstitutional.
Robert Rantoul, Jr., an antislavery Democrat and a longtime advocate of legal
codification, argued that the ftigitive-law assigned jurisdiction unconstitutionally to
federal commissioners, who as unsalaried, dependent creatures of the circuit courts were
unqualified to preside over what the federal Attorney General had called a judicial trial.
Rantoul dismissed the contention that the commissioner only conducted an
administrative extradition hearing. Common sense convinced him that the
commissioner's hearing was the de facto court of last resort for accused runaways. That
fact imposed a judicial responsibility on the hearing that federal commissioners couldn't
satisfy. As a result, Rantoul argued, the 1850 law was unconstitutional.'*^
Morris. Free Men All, 151-2. One of the gentlemen who persuaded Shaw was Judge
Loring's cousin. Charles G. Loring.
Sims Case. 61 Mass. 7 Gushing (1851). 288 - 91; Spooner. Defence for Fugitive Slax'es. 9 -
11.
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Shaw considered the 1850 law a revision of the 1793 law The hearing originally
mandated combined judicial and ministerial functions, he ruled, but was essentially
ministerial. The hearing mandated by the 1850 law, then, did not require a judge. Lest
Rantoul question the older law, Shaw cited Commonwealth v. Griffilh on three decisive
pomts. GriffHh declared the federal constitution a binding compact obliging the states to
return runaway slaves. Second, (mffiih confirmed Congressional jurisdiction over
fugitive cases, and with Pn^r^ conclusively rebuffed all demands for state interposition.
Fmally, as Justice Parker, "that most humane man and enlightened magistrate," had said,
"Whether the statute is a harsh one," remained irrelevant to a question of contractual
obligations Justified, Curtis returned Sims to his putative master.'*'^
Together, the Sims case and the Shadrach trials convinced many antislavery
observers that the judiciary was corrupt In Theodore Parker's opinion, the wicked
Jeffreys himself had been eclipsed by George T. Curtis. Edward L. Keyes believed that
judges' views on slavery had abruptly and suspiciously changed since 1 849, when no
Massachusetts judge (he believed) would have endorsed the new fugitive law. In 1851,
"under some influence or other," Justice Shaw did just that, convincing Keyes that
"there is an influence, coming from some source, which is brought to bear upon the
judges, as well as upon other men." The Sims and Shadrach hearings were clear proof of
this influence, radicals believed, and belied all pretensions ofjudicial independence. The
Curtii were creatures of federal patronage and Boston money. Now that the bench had
Sims Case. 302 - 5.
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usurped the rights of lawyers and juries, the Curtii and their aristocratic ilk had usurped
the bench itself.^"
Even the patrician Free-Soilers acknowledged a need for action in defense of
accused fugitives. In early 1851 Dana and Sumner prepared a revision of the 1843
liberty law to counter the revised fugitive law, Dana's chief concern was to guarantee
due process by requiring judges to presume the freedom of alleged runaways pending a
haheus corpus hearing or jury trial in which state attorneys would assist accused
runaways. Dana's concern for due process did not neglect the slave-catchers; he
rejected Sumner's suggestion that local lawyers be forbidden from representing them.
After the Sims trial, however, a special legislative committee amended the bill to bar
Justices of the Peace and other state officials from representing slave-catchers.^'
The senatorial committee rejected Shaw's indiscriminate contractarianism,
arguing that the fugitive law was "no more binding on the conscience of any man than a
law which should command the people to enslave all the tall men or all the short
men." Besides violating the federal Constitution, the law contradicted state law,
specifically an 1839 resolution asserting "the paramount duty of Massachusetts to
protect her citizens in the enjoyment and exercise of all the rights to which, by virtue of
their citizenship, they are entitled." Conservatives might employ Commonwealth v.
Griffith to deny the citizenship of alleged runaways, but the Coalition committee
believed that the people still had a voice in interpreting the constitution. They rejected
" Liberator, 25 April 1851: OR. 2: 773: 3: 455.
Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal. 2: 416: Liberator. 4 April 1851: Morris. Free Men All. 160.
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the fugitive law because its arbiter, the commissioner, "does not, like the jury, represent
the 'country,' the people with their human sympathy towards men, but ... is a mere
official agent of government, representing only the will of men in power, whose creature
he is, at whose caprice he may be removed.'' Rather than submit to the dictates of a
governing faction, antislavery Coalitionists demanded that judges obey the people's will
by surrendering their slave-law commissions or their local offices.
Popular opinion seemed to support some form of liberty legislation Outrage
over Sims helped break the legislative deadlock that had delayed Sumner's election to
the federal Senate Divisions within the Democratic party, however, ruined the
prospects for any effective liberty law. Democrats were torn between local antislavery
reformers, who wanted to blame the fugitive law on Webster's Whigs, and a state
leadership more concerned with federal patronage and power than local concerns.
Benjamin F. Hallett, as a leader of the Democratic National Committee, needed to
appease Southerners after his dalliance with antislavery in 1 849. Accordingly, he
commanded acquiescence to all the 1850 compromise measures, including the fugitive
law.^"'' Governor George S. Boutwell, a reform Democrat who owed his election to the
Massachusetts General Court, 7857 Senate Document 51, 7; Liberator, 18, 25 April 1851;
Morris, Free Men All, 160 - 1.
" Hozx, Autobiography. 1. 186: Fall River 7V^evf5, 17 April, 26 June. 10 July. 28 August 1851,
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infighting during the Coalition period. Theodore Parker cites Hallett s apparent show of true colors at
the Curtises" 1850 Fancuil Hall ralh in Parker. Trial of Theodore Parker. 150; there. Hallett considered







Free-Soilers, urged dissidents to obey the hated law while lobbying for its revision or
repeal. A Coalition against slave-hunting proved impossible.^''
Liberty legislation lacked the solid Coalition support that carried numerous state
reforms Of twenty senators who voted for the Coalition-backed secret ballot bill in
1851, for instance, five opposed the liberty bill, and seven abstained. These defections
killed the bill. In 1852 a modified liberty bill passed the senate, 18-16, but failed in the
lower house, 158-167 By comparison, that year's convention bill passed, 193-84. Of
the convention's supporters, twenty-one opposed the liberty bill, and thirty-two
abstained. Most defecting votes came from towns (many in western counties) where
Free-Soil had little support. While many disgruntled Free-Soilers, the conservatives
especially, blamed these setbacks on unfaithfiil Democrats, most opponents of the liberty
bill were the same Cotton Whigs who defeated a Free-Soil sponsored jury rights bill in
1 852 Democrats and Free-Soil reformers agreed that Whiggery remained the major
obstacle to more sweeping reform.
The 1853 constitutional convention offered the Coalition an opportunity to end
Whig hegemony by overhauling the electoral process. It also provided the Free-Soilers a
Liberator, 17, 24 Januar\ 1851.
"^"^
Massachusetts General Court. 1851 Senate Journal. 293 - 4. 643: 1852 Senate Journal. 407.
636; 1852 House Journal. 568. 642. Appendix 18. 31. manuscripts. Massachusetts State Archives. Party
strength in different tow ns is based on gubernatorial \'otes recorded in "Returns of Voters for Governor
and Lieutenant Governor." microfilm. Massachusetts State Archives. The Judiciary Committee
recommended passage of the jur\ bill, but opponents successfully tabled it. On the jur>' bill see also
Monthly Law Reporter, n.s.. 5 (May 1852). 1-3; Bean. "Part> Transformation." 117 - 19; Mulkern.
Know-Nothing Party, 38. 198 n. 38. Bean blames the jury bilFs defeat on a greater concentration of
"Hunkers" in the House than in the Senate, and asserts, questionably, that conservative Free-Soilers
supported it. Mulkern challenges Bean s characterization of the jur> bill as a "Locofoco" measure, if
only because a Free-Soiler. Samuel W. Sewall. sponsored it.
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singular chance to enshrine the principles of the liberty bill in the state's flindamental law.
Failing that, radical Free-Soilers were prepared to overhaul the judiciary in the hope of
securing reliable antislavery judges At the convention, Richard Henry Dana represented
antislavery conservatism virtually by himself after Adams was denied a seat through the
alleged machinations of Henry Wilson and Irish voters in Quincy. While Adams
floundered at home, and other conservatives stood aloof. Coalition managers found
Dana the safe town of Manchester, a Free-Soil bastion in Essex County, to represent. If
they thought Dana more reliable than other patricians, they were largely correct. Dana
supported town representation. While opposed to the secret ballot, he abstained when it
came to a roll-call vote. Even though he resisted every effort at judicial reform, he
assured his fellow conservatives that the reforms finally submitted to the people were no
real danger to the courts. He assigned himself the unenviable task of reconciling radicals
and conservatives in the common work of toppling the Whigs, and failed at it
miserably.
Adams attributed Irish hostilitv to f;ilsc reports that, as an 1843 representative. he"d opposed
indemnifying the victims of the 18.34 Ursuline Convent arson. Adams Diary, 7 March 1853. Adams
Family Papers. Manchester's antislax cry strength is demonstrated in "Returns of Voters for Gov ernor
and Lieutenant Governor." Massachusetts State Archives. Harriet D. Robinson, ed.. "Warrington " Pen
Portraits, (Boston. 1877), 465. notes Dana's opposition to the secret ballot; "Warrington" regarded
Dana as "a block in the way of the antislaverv political effort " Dana to John Gorham Palfrey. 2
November 1853. Palfrey Family Papers. Houghton Library . Harvard University, shows his late efforts to
calm conservative fears of the proposed constitution. If he could guarantee life tenure forjudges by
defeating the referendum. Dana told Palfrey, he would, but he thought such a stark choice unnecessary
\
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The Judiciary Question and the Collapse of the Free-Soil Party
At the convention, Dana was outnumbered by radical Free-Soil delegates.
Sumner was the presumptive radical leader, but Frank Bird, the Worcester judge Charles
Allen, and the Dedham editor Edward L Keyes became Dana's principal antagonists.
They combined explicit hostility to the fugitive law with a forceful doctrine of
democratic sovereignty over all branches of government. Bird believed that ''the whole
people are a wiser and safer depository of power than any portion of the people."
Popular self-government would remain an untested abstraction, he said, "until the people
are recognized as the sovereign source of power, judicial as well as executive and
legislative." Keyes agreed that the powers of government were merely delegated, not
surrendered, by the sovereign people Judicial power was no different from legislative
power; by no means could the people be ruled incompetent to elect and regulate the
bench. Keyes entered the convention determined to "make the judiciary dependent on
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE, with sufficient guards for its independence if
honest, and checks for its punishment if corrupt!""
While Dana tried to mute the fugitive issue, the radicals brought it to the
forefront, bluntly confronting their sometimes-ally Hallett and his fellow pro-slavery
Democrats. By 1853 even moderate Free-Soilers like Wilson had grown impatient with
the "Union-saving" rhetoric of Whig and Democratic Hunkers. "This extra anxiety
" OR. 2: 772. 818 - 19; Dedham Gazette. 2 November 1853.
The pejorative "Hunker" label indicated a "hunkerer" after patronage. A non-partisan term,




about the Union is the merest political cant," Wilson sneered at Hallett, "It is to be hoped
that this Union delusion will soon pass away." Keyes charged that the Democrat sought
"to save the Union by making the people negro-catchers - the miserable serfs of negro-
drivers." While Hallett could argue for jurors' rights without reference to fugiti
Keyes and Charles Allen could not. For Keyes, the great act ofjudicial usurpation
not Commonwealth v. Porter, but the rescue trials, which raised constitutional questions
that "the judges did not
.
pretend to decide according to law." "If a law is passed
which contravenes [the Bill of Rights]," Allen added, "I do not believe that it should be
left entirely to the court to determine what [that] law is." Such a case, Keyes concurred,
"was a proper time for the jury to give their opinion of the law, as well as the judges."
Instead, a New Bedford delegate noted, ^' a free citizen of Massachusetts [Sims] has
failed to be protected by the judiciary." When "certain influences" drove the courts to
support slavery, Allen insisted, juries had to intervene in the name of the fundamental
law.^^
Despite his own objections to the fugitive law, Dana vehemently opposed judicial
reform. He mocked the radicals' contention that the people retained absolute
sovereignty in a constitutional republic. "When gentlemen tell me they are not afraid to
trust the people," he told them, "and that is the favorite cry here; trust the people! trust
the people! — I must say to them, that is not the issue." "The people of Massachusetts
were not put here to carry out their will upon the earth," he insisted, "We were put here
charged that both rival parties consisted enlireh of Hunkers. Hunkers were considered both venal and
reactionarj.
OR, 2; 787. 3: 442 - 4. 475 - 8, 483.
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to do justice, to protect the weak, to resist the mighty, and to secure to each his right -
Constitutional government recognized that individuals and minorities had rights against
the state, the majority of the people, or all of them. It required a willing surrender of the
prerogatives of sheer numerical strength. "I have a right," Dana concluded, "to say that
the majority of the people, upon sudden popular impulse, shall not do just what they
choose to do, but only what the Constitution allows."^*^
What did Dana recommend, the radicals asked, when the opportunity arose to
change the constitution*^ Did not all sovereignty revert to the people at that liminal
moment Why shouldn't their representatives refashion the judiciary to better secure
freedom and morality*^ Dana rejected this idealistic view of the convention. Misguided
constitutional reform, he argued, would imperil liberty and property. More importantly,
in any constitutional government, judges were the necessary arbiters of conflicts between
individuals or groups. A constitution that did not guarantee a disinterested judiciary
independent of the people or the other branches of government had no reliable means of
support. The rescue trials did not change this unalterable truth.
The only judicial reform Dana supported would have obliged judges to issue a
habeus corpus writ on any resident's request. While Hallett protested that the
amendment might incite a sectional crisis, and Keyes insisted that it was "good for
nothing unless it applies to . . . the fugitive slave law," Dana tried to avoid the fiigitive
issue. "The great purpose of the writ is not to have a decision of a court as to whether a
man may be carried off," he assured Democrats, "but to prevent his being carried off
OR. 2: 761 - 764.
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until it is first determined whether he is in lawful custody." Dana's amendment would
have been irrelevant ifjudges deemed a slave-catcher's affidavit sufficient evidence of his
right to detain any purported runaway Dana also admitted that judges had no right,
according to /V/^x to hold discretionary hearings, as Shaw had in Sims, on whether to
grant the writ or not. It was important, nonetheless, to insist on the formality Dana
never meant to instruct judges, - patricians were uncomfortable with that idea, -- but
only to remind them of a constitutional individual right.'''
For radicals to move beyond simple procedural guarantees, Dana thought, was to
court chaos. Their attempt to reassert jurors' law-finding rights "either has no
significance at all, or else it introduces a new and dangerous principle." Against the
radicals and 1 lalletl's Democrats Dana reprised the familiar arguments for a separation of
powers in the courtroom, a necessary consistency of precedents, and against unexplained
rulings and the legal confusion born of local prejudices I le hoped to make a telling
point for many moralists: "The consequence of (allowing jurors to interpret law] would
be that in Boston the fugitive slave law would be constitutional, and in Worcester it
would be unconstitutional, and the [licjuorj law vice versa.''' His appeal to temperance
sentiments went largely unheeded While Keyes and Allen admitted that the jury
amendment would render any liquor law a dead letter in Boston, they also allowed that,
their own temperance sentiments notwithstanding, jurors in liquor cases often had "very
OR, 476 - 8.1, Bean, "Party Tr;insrorni;ilion." 41 - 4. notes Ih.'il several Free-Soil
legislators opposed an IS.SO bill iiislnicling Congressmen (o oppose sinvery-e.xlcnsion ou( of principled
opposition lo llie principle of inslniction. I'or sucli soloiis. argii;ibly. even llie negative instructions of
personal liberty legislation may h;ive seemed ;in excessive inlerlerence in (he exercise ol" delegated
powers.
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plausible reasons" for voting to acquit. Despite "fears and difficulties
. .
. introduced
here to affect the minds of temperance men that the jury will not be true to them," Allen
and the radicals reaffirmed the rights of dissident jurors.^^
The "radical difference" between Dana and the radicals, Allen charged, was
Dana's fear that the jury, "which our fathers regarded as the palladium of our liberties,
should prove to be [his] destruction, and that there is no safety for freedom to be found
but upon the bench." The patricians praised learning at the expense of virtue, according
to Anson Burlingame, but "one honest judge is as likely to be corrupted as twelve honest
jurymen." Indeed, "the pride of position, and the pride of learning" only inspired judges
to usurp jurors' rights. That succinctly encapsulated the radical critique of antebellum
legal theory. The Whiggish conviction that law was a science had blinded aspiring legal
scientists to the need for democratic participation in the legal process. The people
reminded the courts of first principles, basic morality, and common sense. "A man who
is not educated in the law," Keyes affirmed, "can tell very well what the law is, because
he can tell what it ought to be." Ignoring the people's moral sense had left
Massachusetts defenseless against the Curtii and the fugitive law. The convention gave
the radicals another chance, possibly the last, to change the course of legal history and
redeem their state.
Dana's haheus corpus amendment carried the convention with the eager support
of the radicals and most of the convention. Hallett rallied only thirty-seven votes against
^- OR. 3: 443, 453 -4.
OR, 3: 430 - 9, 443. 454. Compare Keyes's comment with Spooner. Trial By Jury, 135: "No
one can know what the written law is, until he knows what it ought to be.
"
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it. On the jury amendment, Dana departed from the majority and Hallett joined it. On
the great question ofjudicial tenure, Hallett assumed the middle ground, and found an
ample crowd. Moderate Coalitionists agreed that excessive tampering with the courts
might cost them the whole constitution. Pro-labor Democrats, led by Benjamin F.
Butler, joined radical Free-Soilers in demanding an elective judiciary. Dana's opposition
to the least curtailment of life tenure anticipated his fellow patricians' ultimate break,
despite his cajoling, with the Coalition.'^''
Most inferior courts were targeted for popular elections with only token
opposition from Dana and the Whigs. Democrat-led efforts to make the Supreme
Judicial Court elective, which Dana saw as a matter ''of more enduring interest, and
more universal concernment, than any that has been before us," met stiffer resistance.
Moderate Coalitionists, however readily they might admit the justice of an elective
bench, were concerned that the convention should not "too rudely shock the long
established usages of the people, or conflict too harshly with their darling prejudices,
however unreasonable those prejudices might be." Such reticence convinced Keyes that
"Political parties are always cowardly." The Dedham editor denied that the Free-Soilers'
cautious omission ofjudicial reform from the convention agenda obliged him not to
debate the issue. He denied Dana's assumption that the people did not desire a
democratization of the courts. To the contrary, the people's influence was needed
desperately, while the fugitive law prevailed, to counterbalance the oppressive influence
OR. 2: 712. 811. 823 - 4; Commonwealth, 13 July 1853; Lowell Tri-Weekly American,
quoted in Northampton Courier, 1 March 1853; Fall River jVew^. 14 April. 24 May 1853; McKay,
Henry Wilson. 83.
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of the "atmosphere" in which Whig jurists moved. A conscientious populace would
"elect judges who shall be near enough to the people, to remember
.
. that men have
inalienable rights." Judges fresh from the people "will never
. .
, crawl under chains to
reach their benches, or turn their backs upon an application for a writ of habeus corpus
in behalf of a poor colored man
. .
.
who shall be kidnapped in the streets of Boston."^^
The moderates proposed limiting judicial terms while leaving the power of
reappointment with the governor or the senate. This, they hoped, would balance the
stability valued by the Whigs with a measure of the accountability reformers demanded.
While some conservatives protested that this overpoliticized the courts, and radicals
feared that the executive power of reappointment imperiled the separation of powers,
most delegates trusted that political tides would favor their particular party, and secure
the bench for them. While the radical plan for an elective judiciary went down to a
decisive 101 -223 defeat, Dana could not thwart the moderate amendment. He
succeeded only in lengthening the high court term from seven to ten years, after which he
voted against final passage, which carried, 204 - 143. Thanks to the moderates' caution,
Dana convinced himself that the resulting constitutional initiative was largely innocuous.
His own rhetoric at the convention, however, convinced his fellow patricians that any
reform was disastrous.
OR, 2: 756. 759, 773, 787: 3: 193 - 4.
OR, 2: 828 - 30: 3: 238 - 9. Most delegates from towns identified from the "Returns of
Voters'' as strongly Free-Soil voted for the elective judiciar\ . Judiciar\ questions occasioned numerous
defections from the Coalition v oting bloc. Of 233 supporters of town representation, for instance. 108
opposed elections: of a like number w ho supported the secret ballot. 100 opposed elections. B>
comparison, only 3 1 delegates from either group opposed limited temis for high court judges, and only
41 from either group opposed what proved the realh unpopular initiative, the jur\ rights amendment.
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Dana believed that voters were fickle. He saw popular opposition to the fugitive
law as a temporary coincidence rather than as proof of an unerring instinct for right. He
believed that much of the great moral citizenry of Massachusetts had endorsed the
•ftigitive law in 1850. Leaving the appointment ofjudges with a fickle public would
inevitably disappoint those who assumed that everyone shared their morals. Leaving that
power in the hands of a governor, or his executive council, or the senate, was little
better Whoever had the power, ^'[their] votes will be given for principles and not for
men. 'Principles, and not men' will be the cry." Dana meant that voters' prejudices,
rather than judicial character, would prevail, and "the choice of the people will be
considered as an expression of the law." The radicals welcomed such an experiment.
The patricians regarded it with horror. ^'^
Dana realized that a clique dominated by the Curtii had already politicized the
courts by imposing informal political tests on aspiring jurists. He blamed this less on
flaws in the judicial branch than on the intellectual or moral failure of one clique.
Changing the system just to purge the Curtises was no less than proscription for
opinion's sake. They had, however, broken state law in many eyes, despite the persistent
argument that the liberty law had been void since 1 850. If asked how they might be
punished, Dana could only suggest removal by legislative address "Do gentlemen
Moderate reformers most likely feared that elections would turn on issues (liquor, fugitives, etc.) that
were more divisive for the Coalition than for the Whigs.
67
Cover, Justice Accused. 177-8: OR. 2: 764 - 6.
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recognize," he asked the convention, "that, at this moment, it requires no more power to
remove a judge of the supreme court, than it does to change a man's name['^]"^^
Dana's recommendation was naive if not disingenuous. Adjutant General
Dearborn had been removed in 1 843 only because the Whigs, narrowly the house
majority that year, failed to organize effective opposition in time. Because the removal
power had been identified with cases of infirmity, one writer noted, a removal address
meant ^^calling a good natured, inoffensive incumbent, afool, and so inflicting upon his
own, as well as the feelings of his family and friends, a severe wound." The shame
inflicted upon the victim and the embarrassment of his accusers, contemporaries thought,
made removal too brutal a matter for many gentlemen, "the community will not do it: but
will rather suffer and endure" an incompetent judge.*^^
Politically motivated removals had less chance yet of success. The removal party
had to convince conservatives that they did not propose proscription for opinion's sake.
Yet a removal address required no proof of any offense. If a judge had broken the law,
it was better to impeach him. A removal address based on political differences,
conservatives thought, was the least deserving of success. A judge threatened with
removal for political reasons, according to John G. Palfrey, was "a judge so confident of
the correctness of his course that he would stand by it to the last, defy the consequences,
and by giving the greatest possible solemnity and publicity to the issue made, throw
himself on the judgment of posterity," and "just the kind ofjudge that it concerns the
OR, 2: 765.
Judiciary System ofMassachusetts. 41.
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public not U) part with, on any Icmis," Attempts to idcntiiy nnpopulai rulings with a
mora/ inconipclcncc rcquiiino
.ciioval by address made little impression on men like
Pain-ey. By defending Judge 1 .oring, Dana signaled his agreement with Palfrey. By




Aller voters rejected the moderate reforms of the I8S3 constitution, reformers
were left only with the eslablislied options of impeachment and removal. Subjecting high
court justices to executive reappointments proved intolerable to Adams, Palfrey, and the
Hoars, all of whom publicly denounced the constitution Like the Whigs, they
emphasi/,ed the ineciuities of town representation and biased electoral rules, but they
insisted pointedly that "the pro|)osed changes m the Judiciary,
. , , exceeded |in
obnoxiousnessi even the ineciuality in the system ol' representation" "The chief fault
found with [the convention]," according to Adams's son, Dana's biographer, "was the
substitution of a
|
limited-term| judiciary, in place of the old traditional judiciary of
Massachusetts ajipointed during good behavior " Imoiii the biographer's perspective, the
representation question was secondary/"
The radical press answered patrician objections, as Dana feaied, with appeals to
"Principles, not Men," and warnings that "We mean to put down oppression at the North
as well as at the South, in Massachusetts factories, as well as CJeorgia plantatit)ns, and
Palfrey's iiillnonlial remarks aiviinsl llio coiisliliilioii arc reprinted in Curtis, cd.. Discussions.
261 - ^00 See especially 2X4 - > on (he renunal power.
Saiiinel Hoar. "Address (o llie Cili/ens olT'ilclibiiri',." in Cnrlis. ed . /lisciiwions. 17') - SO,
Adams. Ii
.
I kiiin. 1 : 2 U.
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the men who don't 'go the whole figure' with us had better join the enemy." Defeated,
the radicals charged that the patricians had indeed betrayed them. How decisive the
patricians' defection had been was debatable; one editor cited "Free-Soil" treachery
among "a score of other elements" contributing to the debacle, while another assigned
the patricians pride of place. Whatever the statistical truth, subjective attributions of
blame for the defeat influenced subsequent political movements. Just as a conviction that
Irish voters had opposed reform en b/oc steered many Free-Soilers towards Know-
Nothingism, the radical belief that the patricians had cost them the constitution led to a
schism within Bay State antislavery politics.
If the judiciary was the sticking point between conservative and radical Free-
Soilers, the removal power was its vestigial, symbolic remnant after 1853. The
constitution's defeat had a chilling effect on the judicial reform agenda, which went
largely without legislative support throughout the decade Only the right of removal
remained as idealized proof of the people's power to purge the courts ofjudges
disdainfiil towards public opinion or the higher law. Any exercise of that power
appeared to conservatives, in light of the bitter debates of 1853, as an unacceptable
assertion of popular sovereignty over judges. Although the patricians themselves had
unwittingly inspired Loring's removal by writing personal liberty bills, they saw it as a
radical assault on judicial independence and the rule of law. While Bay State antislavery
" Lowell Th-Week/y American, 11.15 November 1853; Northampton Courier, 22 November
1853. Adams curiously left himself inadequate time to address the judiciaiy question in depth during
his Quincy speech against the constitution. His decision to go over the same statistics condemning the
representation scheme repeated endlessly by the Whigs rather than emphasizing the courts was based,
probabh . on his intense hatred of partisan w ire-pullers like Wilson, whose handiwork he considered the
constitution to be.
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remained divided over the judiciary question, any attempted removal exacerbated the
division.
Judge Loring made himself a target for removal just as antislavery politicians
began groping towards reconciliation after the Free-Soil crack-up. Conservatives and
reformers disagreed on his proper fate. If Loring did not utterly sabotage the formation
of the Republican party, he certainly made its consolidation less than a comfortable
process. Had he resigned under public pressure at any point in his ordeal, he might have
spared the Republican founders considerable bitterness. Instead, he remained a thorn in
their sides for four years. His own responsibility for his own and the Republican ordeal
must now be considered.
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CHAPTER 3
"OUR RULER IS A JUDGE OF PROBATE"
EDWARD G. LORING AND THE CASE OF ANTHONY BURNS
Judge Loring was genteely clothed in a black suit, with black hat. white cravat, white kerchief
peeping from his pockets, and polished boots, as becometh a Harvard professor, who instills the
principles ofjurisprudence into the plastic minds of youth. Around his hat was a badge, with
Lohng on it: on the forehead J«(/as- Iscanot; across his breast. Ten Dollar Commissioner: on
his back, where the wicked rule, the people mourn; beneath his feet. Justice and Mankind. In
his right hand was placed a copy of the Stamp Act. which having been found on his person, he
had undoubtedly been using to fortify himself w ith precedents. Even the choking death-noose
under his left ear did not much distort the look of bland bene\ olence His Honor had been wont
to bestow on the widows and Orphans of Suffolk.'
For many Bay Staters, the crude, symbol-heavy craftsmanship of Essex County
protesters aptly described Edward Greeley Loring, the man who condemned Anthony
Burns to slavery. This Loring was the stereotype of the unjust judge exemplified by the
proverbial Jeffreys, but he sprang into being, flill-grown, only after the Burns hearings,
and his resemblance to the real, fifty-two year old veteran of bench, bar, and bureau was
necessarily superficial.
Ironically, considering reporters and historians' confusing him with other
Lorings, the judge was a Loring in name only, and then when family ties benefited him.
' Commonwealth, n.d. [June 1854]. Parker-Burns Scrapbook. This description of a Gloucester
effigy was dated 12 June.
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From infancy he was a member of the Curtis family, the Whiggish, self-appointed
upholders of the Fugitive Slave Law. Critics charged that the "Curtii" and their social
circle determined the course of Loring's career. For their sake, allegedly, the judge
abandoned a promising career as a humanitarian reformer, his friends in reform
movements, and his principles. Representing a clique of anti-jury, pro-slavery jurists, he
drew fire simultaneously from the populist advocates ofjurors' rights and judicial
elections, and from advocates of state resistance to the fugitive law His defenders, and
especially those familiar with Boston society, saw the campaign against Loring as a
vindictive, irresponsible swipe at the Curtii without regard for the rule of law. On both
sides of the removal question, personal factors were nearly as important as constitutional
and moral issues. The intensity of feeling against Loring cannot be understood fully
without some knowledge of his career before Anthony Burns.
A Young Whig, 1802 - 1847
Loring's forebears crossed the Atlantic in 1634. He traced his descent through
John Loring, a builder and the second son of Deacon Thomas Loringe. John's grandson,
Caleb Loring II (d, 1801), was a navigator by trade, and a business partner in Loring and
Snelling's distillery Caleb's son, Edward Loring, outlived his father by only a year,
marrying Frances Greeley of Marblehead in 1801 and siring one son, Edward Greeley,
who was bom on January 28, 1802. The young widow soon married a junior business
partner of the Lorings, the merchant Thomas Curtis. The marriage gave Edward two
step-brothers, Thomas Bailey Curtis, later a leading merchant and benefactor of Boston,
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and Charles Pelham Curtis, later one of the state's most prominent lawyers, and a
counsel for Harvard College during Josiah Quincy's presidency. Thomas and Charles
became the family leaders in the next generation, and allegedly maintained a strong
influence on Loring's politics throughout his public career.^
Benjamin Robbins and George Ticknor Curtis, conservative legal scholars and
enemies of abolitionists, were distant and relatively poor cousins of Loring's household.
As nephews of the proto-Brahmin critic and society leader George Ticknor, the brothers
did have useflil family ties, which they augmented by marrying into wealth and influence.
Benjamin became a law partner with Charles P. Curtis, whose daughter he married, while
George married one of Joseph Story's daughters. Benjamin's legal acumen and
George's productivity as a scholar and polemicist promised the brothers bright futures in
the law and in politics respectively. While both won elective offices, neither proved an
effective legislator George, especially, earned a reputation as an arrogant reactionary,
alienating Whigs and Democrats alike during three years in the lower house. "Some men
we hate for cause," Rufiis Choate supposedly said, "But George Ticknor Curtis we hate
preemptorily ." Benjamin, meanwhile, proved "destitute of genius" in political debates;
his main contribution to party politics was his insistence that the leaders of the 1850
Coalition be prosecuted for defrauding the electorate.
' Charles H. Pope. Lohng Genealogy. (Boston. 1917), 170-2; James S. Loring to Theodore
Parker. 30 May 1854, Theodore Parker Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society. On the Curtii's ties to
Harvard, see Franklin B. Sanborn. Table Talk: A Tramcendentalist's Opinions on American Life,
Literature, Art and People From the Mid-Nineteenth Century Through the First Decade ofthe
Twentieth, edited by Kenneth Walter Cameron. (Hartford: Transcendental Books. 1981), 184.
^ John Dickinson, "Benjamin Robbins Curtis," and Claude M. Fuess, "George Ticknor Curtis."
in Allen Johnsonn, ed.. Dictionary ofAmerican Biography, vol. 2, (New York, 1929), 609 -11.613 -
14; George S. Boutwell. Recollections ofSixty Years in Public Affairs. 1 vols.. (New York. 1902), 1: 75,
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The Curtii staked their political ambitions on the reputation of Daniel Webster.
The old orator relied on George T. Curtis, his future biographer, to ensure Whiggish
endorsement of the fugitive law. Almost alone, the Curtii believed that Webster's
sacrifice of local ^prejudice" (and local popularity) on the altar of Union could make him
President. Dutifully, the family rallied Boston's Cotton Whigs behind the hated
measures. Benjamin owed his promotion to the Supreme Court in 1851 to Webster's
influence as President Fillmore^s Secretary of State. Unionism made the younger
Curtises' careers, but also put them in bitter, personal, conflict with Boston's
abolitionists. After the 1851 Shadrach rescue, and again after the Burns trial, the Curtii
sought ways to punish their mocking antislavery critics. To abolitionists, the Curtis
family name symbolized wickedness.
COUNSELLOR, aiding and comforting slavery
Upper-court Judge, full of lower-court knaver\
Ruthless Commissioner, kidnapping darker men
Trader (except with the Music Hall Parker men)
In the whole sla\ eholding tribe of West India men
Show me four worse than Charles. Thomas, George. Benjamin!'^
The feud between the Curtii and Boston's abolitionists began in earnest in
November 1850, when Benjamin R. Curtis, an uncertain public speaker, was publicly
IIL 113; Meade. "Daniel Webster." 330 - 1; Mulkem, Know-Nothing Party, 34. Boutwell counts
Lemuel Shaw among the Curtii by marriage, but the tie must have been distant, because neither of
Shaw s wives bore the Curtis name. For Benjamin Curtis s diatribe against the Coalition, see Curtis,
ed.. Life and Writings. 1; 138 - 50. He argued that Democratic legislators had to vote for a Democratic
senator, and Free-Soilers for a Free-Soiler. and that anything else was a fraud on loyal part\ voters.
Liberator, 19 January 1855. In order, the lyrics identify Charles. Benjamin. George, and
Thomas Curtis. The ''Music Hall Parker Men" defended Theodore Parker s right to preach Sunday
sermons at the Boston Music Hall over the protests of a Curtis clique on the board of directors.
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embarrassed by the radical Unitarian preacher Theodore Parker at a pro-Compromise
rally at Faneuil Hall. When Curtis asked rhetorically how abolition clergymen like Parker
would answer charges of perjury or other offenses against the new law, the preacher
unexpectedly retorted, "Do you want an answer now"^^' To Curtis, a man so thin-skinned
politically that he considered Coalitionists criminals, such an affront was insufferable.
Parker was uniquely irksome because he preached at the Boston Music Hall, built in
large part with Curtis money, and considered by them a kind of proprietary trust. That
made Parker an ingrate as well as a slanderous demagogue, and the Curtii ached for an
opportunity to destroy him,^
Public disagreements over political questions, like the Curtis-Parker contretemps,
were taken very personally in antebellum Boston. Political conflicts, especially if they
involved questions of public morality, often evolved into social scandals that ruined
longstanding friendships. Reformers' readiness to impugn the moral character of
conservatives made them social pariahs in many circles.^ Richard Henry Dana, otherwise
a sound conservative, suffered ostracism for questioning the moral standing of Cotton
Whigs. The Whig schism of 1 848 exacerbated the growing schism in genteel society.
These conditions ultimately forced Loring to choose between the Curtii 's Cotton
' SiQXQns, Anthony Burns, 290.
^ The idea that political or philosophical disputes were an affront to genteel dignity went back
at least as far as the time of the Finneyite religious revivals, in w hich public questioning of prominent
people's faith and morals was a contro\ ersial strategy. Whiggish Boston Unitarians, meanwhile,
resented the Transccndentalist movement for its "dictatorial tone" and "a harsh, imperious, and
sometimes flippant manner to argumentative discussion." Francis Bowen is quoted in Ann C. Rose.
Transcendentalism As A Social Movement. 1830 - 1850. (New Haven: Yale Univeristy Press. 1981), 83.
Rose herself suggests that the upper classes resented dissent from within because it subverted a united
front against radical Democrats.
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Whiggciv, a.ul .u.nKMo,.s iVio.uls, sonic vcMy close, with who.u l,c had collaho.alcd since
llio slail ofhis public career in ihc cause oriunnanitarian rcfoini
I lis hesi friend, until the nnd-ccntury schism, was probably the educaloi and
I'elbrnKM
,
I lorace Mann I oring met hm. m 1 S22, al Tapping Keeve's law school ,n
l.itchlleld, ( onneclicut Ixlward had graduated liom Harvard m IS2I, allci gaming a
rowdy reputation among some classmales, Ralph Waldo i ineison among them, for
incilmg biawls with ( ambridge townspeople 1 le was often reprimanded for
disrespectful behavior throughout his Harvard stay, and seemed decidedly unpn>mising
before attending Litchfield and meeting Mann ' Abolitionists later regarded Loring as
Mann's failed protege, a man who once "learned humanity from a great teacher " in
Litchfield, however, Loring was Mann's mentor, the outsider's admission iickei to the
iippei echelons of iioslon society/^
I he two men enjoyed an emotional friendship It pixwed especially valuable
when Mann's first wife died Loring's fears for his friend's mental well-being were
coupled with a morbid sensibility typical of the time OlVeiing an admittedly inadequate
consolation to the bereaved Mann, he confided his own morbid fantasy of sharing a
common grave with his wife and small children Kalhci lhan surrender to this oft-felt
desire to abandon earthly cares, Loring recommended devoting himself to the political
' Hanaid University. F-aciiilv [Records. 9: 122, 1.12. 183. I'M, 244. 246, 250, 252 - 3, 260,
liar \ aid l)iii\crsi(y Archives; Ralph Waldo l£iuersoii \o William liiiiersoii. 21 July IX IS in Ralph L.
Rusk, cd., lA'lters oj Ralph llaldo lOnersoii, 10 vols,, (New York, I: 6H n 61 I'lncisoii icporlal
a liraul l^etwcen "the stiicleiils and townspeoiilc lo Ihe niiinlxM ol near scvenly." and lhal "li liisl arose
iVoni Ned I,oring as usual
"
'' Theodore Parker, Tlic RiiihlsnfMan in Ainciicn. (New York iS(>l ) .>SS; Jonathan Messerli,
I liinii c Mdiiii A lUayjiipliv. York Knopl i''72), 65.
I l>
world. Only in politics, and only in the city, Loring thought, could men of such
intellectual strength and moral quality as Mann and himself find real fulfillment. Political
engagement, for Loring, was the one viable alternative to dwelling abusively on one's
own troubles. Among a band of like-minded heroes, the political reformer feared neither
envy or slander in consequence of his noble work.'^
Loring often seemed more interested in encouraging Mann's political career than
in his own advancement. As late as 1848, buoyed by Mann's refusal to abandon the
Whigs for Free-Soil, he hoped to see his friend elected governor. Mann preceded
Loring in the political arena, joining the state legislature as a temperance man. Only with
the appearance of the Whig party did Loring himself take a notable role in politics. He
became a Whig stump-speaker in 1834, identifying with a faction of progressive "Young
Men of Boston." He was elected to three terms in the lower house beginning in 1836,
serving modestly on the Elections and Judiciary committees There he tinkered slightly
with technical aspects of the law while defending English common law against
Democratic detractors. He was generally undistinguished, but won re-election twice
without difficulty thanks to the general ticket system. His appointment as a master of
chancery after the 1838 session closed his legislative career. '°
Edward G. Loring to Horace Mann. November 1830. In.d ] 1832. 30 April 1833. Horace
Mann Papers. Massachusetts Historical Societ>: Messerli, Horace Mann. 96. 111. 121. 168 - 9; Louise
Hall Tharp. Until Victory: Horace Mann andMary Peahody (Boston: Little. Brown. 1953). 49; Bruce
A. Ronda. ed.. Letters ofElizabeth Palmer Peahody, American Renaissance Woman. (Middleton. Ct.:
Wesleyan University Press. 1984). 131 -2.
'° Messerli. Horace Mann, 192. 196; Boston Daily Ad\>ertiser and Patriot, 3 November 1834,
6. 12 November 1835. 10. 23 Januar>-. 16 November 1837; Post, 13 Januar>. 9 April 1836. While the
general ticket system allowed a voter to name an entire delegation, written ballots often omitted
candidates for different reasons. As a result, victorious Whig candidates would not have uniform vote
totals. In 1835 Loring received 3.810 out of 6.646 votes cast in Boston, finishing forty-seventh out of
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In his embrace of state patronage, Loring sacrificed his professional ambitions,
only to be sacrificed to party politics himself His new responsibilities as master of
chancery compelled him to abandon a promising partnership with Mann, launched in
1832 with his weahhy cousin Charles G. Loring's backing, in order to bone up on equity
law. Appointed by Governor Edward Everett as an officer of the Supreme Judicial
Court, Loring prepared insolvency cases for equity law hearings by collecting
mformation and intemewing litigants. His responsibilities were merely functionary until
the 1838 Insolvency Law gave masters special equity jurisdiction over competing claims
on bankrupt estates. He heard the majority of Suffolk County cases until the unpopular
law was repealed in 1842. His short-lived authority, which critics found dangerously
reminiscent of oppressive English chancery courts, may have prejudiced a Democratic
governor and executive council against renewing his appointment in 1843. As far as
Loring knew, he had been rejected simply for being a Whig. Whiggish protests
compelled the governor to throw the matter to the nine-man council, which dismissed
Loring by a single vote.''
The council's rejection crushed Loring. His resentment Hngered years afterward.
He thought that his sacrifice of a successful legal practice justified life tenure in his
chancery post. Never before, he complained in 1848, had the routine reappointment of a
judicial official been disrupted by party politics. He considered himself an unprecedented
seventy-two Whigs elected. In 1837. he received 5,153 out of 7.415 votes, finishing fort> -fourth out of
fifty-six Whigs elected. Whether these figures represent the relative popularity of candidates or a
tendency of written ballots to name only local or familiar men is uncertain.
" Edward G. Loring to J. Prescott Bigelow. 24 November 1848. J. Prescott Bigelow Papers,
Harvard Universit\. Houghton Library: Law Reporter 2 (Januar\ 1840). 282-5. 4 (April 1842). 462.
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political martyr. His certification as a justice of the peace was small solace and almost
worthless as a compensation. Once established in other offices, Loring retained a
nagging fear that unscrupulous partisans were out to ruin him. As a newly-appointed
probate judge, he heatedly asked a friend on the current council if anyone there had
opposed him. His suspicions determined his course after the Burns decision, when he
saw the removal campaign as a partisan plot rather than a moral complaint against him.
Rather than sulk self-piteously, or bow despairingly to such assaults, Loring's past
ordeals likely spurred him to cling determinedly to the offices he held.'^
By 1 843 Loring had a growing family to look after. He married Harriet Boott, a
granddaughter of the factory builder and agent Kirk Boott, in 1829 They would
continue having children until 1 850. Losing a sure salary after years of neglecting his
profession raised worries for their ftjture. He scraped by on earnings from his renewed
practice and from fees earned intermittently as both justice of the peace (a position
hundreds held) and as a commissioner of the federal Court of Claims, a patronage post
received from Justice Story in 1 84 1
.
He had not yet lived up to the promise vested in
him by his peers when, in the year of his marriage, they elected him commander of the
socially prestigious New England Guards He was well enough regarded as a public
speaker to be included among a committee welcoming Charles Dickens to Boston in
1842, but without an office or a prominent practice he faced a decline into obscurity. A
return to the urban political arena was imperative. His friend Horace Mann provided an
Loring lo J. Prcscoll Bigclow, 1 1 May, 24 November 1848, Bigelow Papers.
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opportunity through his controversial crusade for public school reform. Joining this
battle, Mann's erstwhile social mentor became, in reformers' eyes, his political protege.''
For years, the Lorings had followed Mann's various crusades with enthusiasm.
Harriet Loring, especially, was infatuated with his elegant, uplifting public lectures. She
corresponded frequently with Mann, and enjoyed being regarded as his '^sister." While
she ably traded literary allusions with the educator, she demurred when Mann invited her
to write for the Common SchoolJourrial Her protest that she was merely a letter writer
may have concealed a realistic suspicion that Edward would veto any public display of
her opinions. Loring hoped to assert his view of domestic relations in an unfinished
novel called "Husband and Wife." Its theme can be inferred from the author's adoption
of a motto from William Blackstone: "Husband and wife are one, and that one is the
husband." While Edward fought for school reform at Mann's side, Harriet stayed at
home.''*
Loring' s active career as a public school reformer lasted from the loss of his
chancery post to his appointment as a probate judge in 1 847. Stalwart Whigs like Loring
and George S. Hillard joined abolitionists like Theodore Parker and Samuel Gridley
Howe, as well as intermediary figures like Charies Sumner, in Mann's crusades for the
institution of a non-sectarian curriculum, an end to corporal punishment, and
professional standards for prospective teachers. At every point the reformers met bitter
1 ^
Pope. Loring Genealogy, 170 - 2; Lucid, ed., Dana Journal, 1: 59, oflFcrs Dana's review of
Loring's remarks at the Dickens dinner. Sharing the podium with Hillard. Palfrey. Josiah Quincy and
George Bancroft. Loring as a public speaker was "commonplace in a very respectable and elevated way."
Harriet Boott Loring to Horace Mann, [5 letters c. 1839 - March 1843]. Mann Papers;
Centennial History ofHar\>ard LoM^ Schooi 1817-I9I7. (Harvard Law School Association. 1918), 237.
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resistance from conservative educators who portrayed Mann as an infidel bent on
inflicting foreign ways on Massachusetts. To combat them, Mann encouraged his friends
to seek election to local school boards. Loring represented Boston's Seventh Ward in
the city's Public School Committee for two years, inspecting schools, quizzing students,
and contributing research for Mann's annual reports. Most prominently, he reported
critically on the distribution of school books and the practice of test-oriented rote
instruction. His major achievement was establishing a formal review procedure for all
teaching applicants, dismantling a perceived old-boy network of favoritism and bribery.
The Common School Jonrna/ applauded Loring' s advocacy of this reform as ''so cogent
and convincing, as to silence opposition." In these years, he may have again felt like a
vanguard figure as he had at the birth of the Whig party. His fellow reformers became
new friends; Howe and others addressed him familiarly as "Ned" or "Neddy" as Mann
did. Despite their friendship, he left activism abruptly at the end of 1 847 for the more
lucrative prospect ofjudicial office.'^
The Ties that Bound. 1847 - 1854
Loring' s years as a master of chancery under the Insolvency Law qualified him
for his new responsibilities as probate judge for Suffolk County While Loring's enemies
'
"^
Ach'ertiser. 17. 20. 23 December 1847; James Spear Loring to Theodore Parker. 30 May
1854, Parker Papers. ofTers more detail on Loring s career as a public scliool reformer than Pope
included in the Loring Chronology. Messcrli. Horace Mann, 401 - 24. details the major controversies
Mann engaged in during Loring s in\ol\emcnt in school reform. For Loring as a reform advocate, sec
Common School Journal 7 (2 March 1846). 67 - 8.
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belittled the office, many contemporaries acknowledged its importance. Probate judges
adjudicated disputes over wills and intestate estates, appointed trustees and guardians,
approved adoptions, and certified changes of names. Samuel Hoar estimated that "once
in twenty years the entire property of the Commonwealth passes under the inspection of
the Judges of Probate." "[E]ight or nine-tenths of all the business of the Judge of
Probate," Plichard Henry Dana added, '^consists in the administration of [trust funds],"
which required regular correspondence with trustees and beneficiaries, and travel beyond
county borders. Benjamin F. Hallett called the probate judge "the legal father of every
family in the county, whose persons or estates pass through his hands." To these men,
Loring's responsibilities were worthy of high esteem.'^
Loring's work was delicate and personal. He had to judge fairly between
impoverished heirs and influential creditors despite frequent and drastic imbalances of
power, influence, and legal acumen. As critics reminded him incessantly after 1854,
probate judges had to be sensitive to the moral rights of the helpless and friendless. Nor
could Loring ignore the legitimate claims of creditors and others who had fairly acquired
rights over estates to the exclusion of poor but deserving rivals. A probate judge,
ideally, had to exhibit the unimpeachable moral character of a proxy paterfamilias. At the
1853 constitutional convention. Coalition reformers hoped to insure morality in probate
judges through popular elections Conservatives, led by Dana, worried that judges
elected to three or six-year terms could never acquire the expertise needed to decide the
OR, 1: 709, 716; Monthly Law Reporter, n.s.. 4 (July 1851). 118; Samuel Hoar, "Address,"
in Curtis, ed.. Discussions, 182. Probate judges actually shared jurisdiction with masters of chancery
under the Insolvency Law.
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fates of helpless orphans or lawflil creditors. With the defeat of the reform constitution,
conservatives felt that the probate bench had been preserved from partisanship or
demagoguery, while reformers bemoaned the judges' continuing thralldom to
Whiggery.'^
Until 1851, probate judges were dispensers ofjournalistic patronage. After
Loring took office, he invariably assigned the printing of probate court notices to the
Boston Daily Advertiser
^
the organ of conservative Cotton Whiggery. Managed by
Nathan Hale and his son Charles, the Advertiser (known satirically as "the respectable
daily") supported Webster and the fligitive law, opposed state reform, and led a Whig
effort in early 1853 to abort the constitutional convention. As a Whig editor and a
Republican legislator, Charles Hale vehemently opposed Loring' s removal. The
Advertiser 's loyalty provoked speculation that Loring had a pecuniary stake in the paper,
which the Hales denied. Loring's exclusive arrangement with the Hales' expensive,
narrowly-circulated paper threatened to leave the poorer patrons of the penny press
Ignorant of important hearings in which they might be materially interested. To counter
such abuses, a Coalition legislature approved a law allowing persons with probate
business to publish notices wherever they chose, stripping judges of their exclusive
control over the "probate pap." Loring 's alliance with the Advertiser, however similar
1
7
OR. 2: 470-9: 3: 182 - 5. Particularly noteworthy is an exchange between Dana and
Benjamin F. Butler, who disputed Dana s accolades for the "beautiful system" then prevailing for the
appointment of probate judges by reading a newspaper article that unashamedly declared the principal
recommendation of a new Essex County judge to be that he was "a stirring, active young Whig." Dana
deemed this an isolated and unrepresentative editorial utterance, while Butler thought it betrayed the
partisan reality of the existing system.
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to patronage arrangements elsewhere, appeared all the worse, in retrospect, once both
judge and paper were identified with the Fugitive Slave Law. '**
By 1848 Loring had declared himself a Cotton Whig. He owed his new office to
conservative Whigs, and patronized a reactionary paper. His views on slavery itself are
uncertain, but contemporary gossip suggested that he was uncomfortable around blacks.
Mutual acquaintances reported that he visited Mann's home less often while Chloe Lee,
a black female student, stayed there Racial hierarchy, like the gender hierarchy he more
explicitly endorsed, may have made social relations with blacks abhorrent to him The
permanent break with Mann, however, came over questions of party discipline and, more
importantly to Loring, the conflict between politics and sociability.'^
Loring publicly criticized Mann, a congressman in 1 848, for opposing the Whigs'
nomination of slaveholder Zachary Taylor for the presidency, and for rhetorical excesses
m speeches against slavery's westward expansion. Mann remained a Whig until 1850,
but he had gravely violated party discipline by denouncing Taylor after the nomination
Party membership, Loring chided, obliged all Whigs to endorse the national nominee
without overt complaint. National Whiggery had to come before any imagined New
England interests. For stating this, Loring expected to be labeled a ''Cottonocrat."^"
Boston Evening Transcript, 16 August 1850; Fall Kwcv News, 26 June 1851; Commonwealth,
8 Fcbruar> \^5?>\ Advertiser, 23 Fcbruar> 1855.
Mcsscrii, Horace Mann, 447; Loring to Mann. 28 Januar\ 1852, Mann Papers.
20 An undated Idler in the Mann Papers has been dated spcciilali\cly to 1843, suggesting that
he and Loring had fallen out well before the Whig schism. From the context of this letter, and from
Loring's comments in 1852. 1 believe that 1848 is a more likely year for the earlier document. That
would date the falling-out from events discussed in Loring to Mann. 17 Februar\ 1 1848|. Mann Papers.
See also Loring to Mann. 4 July. 24 July 1848. 28 January 1852. Mann Papers.
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More troubling than Mann's opinions was the harshness with which he denounced
Cotton Whigs lii<e George T. Curtis, who uhimately sued the reformer. Mann and his
abolitionist friends too readily descended to slurs against the morality of their opponents
for Loring's taste Intemperate speeches, he warned, would cost them many friends. He
understood, or thought he did, that his friends' angry oratory did not express their true
feelings towards those they pilloried publicly. As yet, he saw no reason why political
disagreements should ruin friendships.^'
Loring mistook the temper of his time. Cotton Whigs considered those who
questioned their morality less than gentlemen Accordingly, social leaders like George
Ticknor insisted that the more offensive Conscience men and Free-Soilers be
"quarantined." Numerous friendships ended abruptly. Men like Dana, Sumner, and
Mann, who tried to straddle political and social lines, were barred from conservative
social circles. Like them, Loring had once moved easily among reformers and
reactionaries alike. Only reluctantly did he bow to the Ticknor-Curtis policy His last
letters to Mann betray a great disappointment that they couldn't be the friends and allies
of old. One of the very last was a request, partly practical, partly nostalgic, for Mann's
notebooks from Litchfield days, which he wanted to consult, his own being lost, in
preparation for his new duties at the Harvard Law School.
Loring to M.inn, 24 .luly 1848. 28 Januar\ 1852. Mann Papers.
" Loring lo Mann. 16. 28 January' 1852. Mann Papers, For George Ticknor's direclive lo
ostraci/.e Conscience Whigs, sec David B. Tyack. (icor^c Ticknor ami the liosUm Brahmins,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1967). 229. Mary Peabody Mann. Life of Horace Mann,
(Boston. 1888). .3 19-20. shows Mann sulTcring under (he effects of ostracism. David Herbert Donald.
( 'harles Sumner and the ( 'imnng oj the ( 'ivil li ar. (New York: Knopf, 1960), 128 - 9. 146, 169 - 72,
shows lhal ostracism for political opinion predated the Free-Soil question, and was based on the
ostraci/.crs' sense of ha\ ing suffered defamation.
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Loring grew more estranged from Mann the more he reHed on his family for
career advancement. He owed both his judgeship and his Harvard appointment to his
relatives. He gratefully acknowledged the Curtises' role in securing his appointment to
the probate court; without his asking, they had solicited an impressive array of
recommendations for the governor's perusal. His paternal ties also proved helpful.
Charles G. Loring, long a Fellow of the Harvard Corporation, used his clout to further
his cousin's career. When an associate lecturer resigned from the Harvard Law School
in 1852, the Fellows received numerous letters, doubtlessly instigated by both Charies
and the Curtii, recommending Loring as a replacement. The Law School, then boasting
a faculty of only two, accepted Loring with alacrity.^^
Loring had maintained ties to Harvard since his graduation. As a rising young
Whig, he was twice invited during the 1830s to sit on prize committees to honor
outstanding students. His relations with the school remained amicable, and in 1852 the
Board of Overseers confirmed his appointment to the Law School by an 18-7 vote. The
judge devoted Fridays to Harvard duties, which included weekly two-hour lectures and
moot courts ten times a semester. His subjects, including "Wills and Administrations,"
"Devises and Sales," "Arbitration," and "Titles By Deed," were areas in which he could
draw on professional experience. He quickly proved a popular lecturer.
Joel Parker and Theophilus Parsons to President and Fellows of the Har\ ard Corporation, 30
Januar\ 1852. Harvard Universit\, Harvard College Papers. 18; 339. Harvard University Archives.
Harvard Universitv'. Corporation Records. 7: 412. 8: 95. Harvard Universitv' Archives;
Harvard Univ ersitv. Ov erseers Records. 9: 152. Harv ard Universitv Archives: "Justice." in Advertiser,
n.d. 11855], Parker-Burns Scrapbook: Charles Warren, History ofthe Har\>ard Law School and ofEarly
Legal Conditions in America. 2 vols.. (Boston. 1908). 2: 182. 196 - 7.
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I larvaid was known as a bastion ofconscrvativc ( Inionisni While slill foi nially a
public college, I laivard was increasingly eslranged from the coninionweallh by a
doclrinally liberal but politically conservative Unitarianisni, and by an aggressive
coi^iniitincnt to national stature by an exclusive cohort ol" near-aristocratic benefactors.
The Unitarians' rational religion seemed to complement Joseph Story's ideal of a
rational system of law, and under his inlluence the Law School endowed by Nathan Dane
became a school of 'instrumentalist" jurisprudence. Story's reputation drew students
from all regions, making conservatism on sectional questions a pragmatic policy The
Story Association, an alumni society, became a Cotton Whig pulpit for vindications of
the Fugitive Slave Law. Whatever the inherent sympathies of Harvard administrators
and faculty towards the Union or slavery, a mandate to attract students from all sections
imposed an institutional damper on what disgruntled locals considered authentic liay
State opinion Liven patricians like Richard I lenry Dana complained that the I,aw School
and the Story Association were being abused for partisan. Unionist purposes fhe
university at Cambridge no longer seemed representative of its parent state.
Democrats and Coalitionists hoped to reclaim I lai vard for the commonwealth by
giving elected olllcials a greater role in governing the school I radilionally, legislators
elected only a fraction of ihe IJoard of Overseers; appointed clergymen made up most of
the rest Mid-century reformers proposed legislative elections for the entire Harvard
hierarchy, including the then life-tenured Corporation Resenting such intrusions, the
" Story. I'oriiiiii!, on . Inslix nicy. 7X; K. Kent Ncwmaycr, "Harvard Law Scliool. New l lnglaiid
Legal ('iiiliirc. and llic Anicliclliim Origins of American .\mis\mKicncc" Journal of . Uncncmi llislory
74 (December I9K7). SI.S. X27; Warren. I lorvord l.tiw School. 1: 172 - ^. 175.
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Harvard lobby in the legislature proposed privatizing the college entirely. An uneasy
compromise in 1851 kept the Corporation inviolate, but gave the election of the Board
of Overseers, which ratified the Fellows' nominations for professorships, entirely to a
reform-minded legislature.^^
Harvard's new balance of power pleased nobody. The Overseers could not fill
vacancies in the faculty on their own. The Fellows could not appoint anybody offensive
to the Overseers. Even before the Coalition changed the composition of the Board,
Overseers had rejected conservative writer Francis Bowen's nomination to a history
chair to protest his criticism of the European revolutions of 1848. In 1853, however, a
Board boasting a fresh infiision of Whig Overseers confirmed Bowen's appointment to a
moral philosophy chair. The Fellows themselves occasionally rejected talented men on
political grounds. In 1852 they offered the still-vacant history post to John Gorham
Palfrey, an Overseer and a leader of the patrician Free-Soilers, on the condition that he
no longer publicly discuss sectional issues. Palfrey rejected their terms, but discreetly
kept the matter private. If the public learned of it, he later told Loring, the college he
loved would be shaken to its foundations.^^
Abolitionists, especially, were eager for a bout with Harvard, which attracted to
the Boston area bands of Southern and Western students vocally hostile to the
Slor\. Forging ofAn Aristocracy. 140 - 2: Seymour M. Lipscl and Da\id Ricsman.
Education and Politics at Hansard. (New York: McGraw-Hill. 1975), 83.
^' Lipscl and Ricsman. Education and Politics, 79; Stor>. F^orging ofan Aristocracy, 141 - 2;
Frank O. GalelL John Gorham Palfrey and the New England Conscience. (Cambridge: Har\^ard
University Press. 1963). 218; Daniel Walker Howe. The Unitarian Conscience: Harvard Moral
Philosophy, IH05-1H6L (Middlclown. Cl.: Wesleyan University Press. 1988), 267; John Gorham Palfrey
to Edward G. Loring. 28 May 1854. Palfcry Family Papers.
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antislavery cause. Apart from the inevitable town-gown conflicts, slave-state students
regularly harassed antislavery speakers and Free-Soil orators. Hai-vard's boosters
boasted that the school taught moderation, devotion to Union, and understanding across
sectional lines to southerner and northerner alike. Further, southern enrollments were
essential to Harvard's prosperity and national reputation. Abolitionists called the
Southrons "Cockatrices in the Egg," a boorish lot whom Harvard, Cambridge, and
Massachusetts alike would be better off without The university's increasingly
cosmopolitan and Unionist complexion, added to its oppressively Unitarian character,
made it seem all the more alien to radical Bay Staters.^**
Judge Loring tit in well at Harvard. He and the Curtii were staunch Unitarians,
liberal in religious doctrine and conservative in politics. They were parishioners in the
congregations of the "Lower Law" clergy, best represented in Boston by Ezra Stiles
Gannett, who denied any right to resist existing laws in the name of a "Higher Law."
These Unitarians remained largely untouched by the revivalist perfectionism, social
salvationism, and plain emotionalism of the Second Great Awakening. While Loring was
never criticized for his Unitarianism after the Burns case, critics blamed the denomination
as a whole, or at least its Lower Law ministers, for a general abdication of moral
responsibility to the oppressed.
^'"^
Charles Francis Adams Diar\\ 29 Oclobcr 1852. Adams Family Papers; Fall River yVewA', 29
Ma>, ."^0 October 1851; Cenleimial History ofHarvard Law School, 239; National Anti-Slavery
Standard. 24 Febniar> 1855.
" Douglas C. Stangc, Patterns ofAntislavery amoni^ American Unitarians, IS3 1-1860.
(Rutherford. N.J.,: Fairlcigh Dickinson Univcrsily Press, 1977), 176, 212; A Gannell sermon inspired
by Ihc Burns case appears in ( 'hristian Inquirer. 12 August 1854: James Freeman Clarke, 'I'he
Rendition ofAnthony Hums, Its (Onuses and ( ^msequences: A Discourse I'pon ( liristian Politics.
(Boston. 1854), 17 - 18. "Out of the Unitarian Churches of Boston," Clarke conunented. "have come
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Harvard did not require absolute submission to the 1850 compromises. Charles
G. Loring opposed the fugitive law on constitutional grounds, and participated in
Thomas Sims's defense, but did so inoffensively by avoiding electoral politics and
inflammatory rhetoric. Edward, meanwhile, had endorsed the law in articles written for
thQAcJverfiser. He relied on Commonweallh v. Gnffilh and an 1819 Pennsylvania case to
prove the constitutionality of both the 1793 and 1850 laws. Apparently undisturbed by
Griffith 's implicit denial of black citizenship, Loring complacently reiterated its weak
promise of habeus corpus to kidnapped freemen Beyond that, he would not weigh the
fugitive laws against a common-law standard, as Dexter urged; slavery was a field of
jurisprudence governed exclusively by the federal constitution. Subsequently, he added
his signature to a roll of Websterites, welcoming their hero to Faneuil Hall in a
vindication of the compromises. From Harvard's perspective, he was a safe man.'"
Loring understood that the 1850 law imposed new duties on him as a federal
commissioner. He was originally commissioned "to inquire into violations of the laws of
the United States, to hear complaints, issue warrants, hold examinations, and bind over
or commit persons for trial for offenses." He had jurisdiction over extradition hearings
those who have done the most in this conuiiunity to lower its moral sense on this subject" of fugitive
slaves. Clarke did nol consider ihis a peculiar failing of Unilarianism however, since he remembered
the counler-e.xainplc of Ihc great moralisl William Ellerv Channing. but characlcrislic generally of the
"Commercial Christianity" of rich churches of all denominations. To other observers, however,
Unilarianism was a mark of aristocracy. See Paul Goodman, Towards a Chrisiian Republic:
Antimasoivy and the (ireat Tradition in New England, 1826-1836, (New York: Oxford University Press,
1988). 72-4.
^'^ Advertiser. 2. 9 November 1850; Mcsserli, Horace Mann, 447. The Pennsylvania case cited
by Loring, and by Benjamin Curtis (Advertiser, 19 November 1850), was Wright alias Hall v. Deacon,
in which a judge denied Wright s request for a replevin w rit against Deacon, his jailer, on the grounds
that the surrender of runaways was a precondition of Union, and that the fugitive clause mandated a
summarv hearing without any delaying recourse to a common-law trial. See Helen T. Calcrall. ed..
Judicial Cases Concernimi American Slavery and the Negro. 5 vols.. (Washington. D.C., 19.36), 4: 277.
129
on Ihe petition of foreign governments, the examination of accused mutineers, and trials
of crimes committed at sea. In Boston alone, Loring shared these duties with several
commissioners, including George T and Charles P Curtis, and (Miarles Sumner All
Were paid by the case, and none expected to make a living olT the olVice. A lederal
commission was simply a form of patronage dispensed by Supreme Coun justices in their
circuits. In 1851 the patronage power fell into the hands of Benjamin R Curtis, raising
fears that the (\irtii might use it to empower supporters of the fugitive law like Loring.^'
As written, the new fugitive law mandated the creation of a new class of
"fugitive slave'^ commissioners explicitly empowered to hear claims on runaways. In
practice, commissioners already in olTice were assumed competent to act under the new
law. To some observers, however, the statute appeared to require a formal commission
or, in Loring's case, a re-commission During the iiurns trial, antislavery lawyers
exploited this ambiguity to challenge Loring's right to preside While the judge himself
considered his original commission suHicient, officials' failure to identify him as a "slave"
commissioner under the law of 1850 led to the quashing of indictments against Theodore
Parker and Wendell Phillips in 1855. While the laull probably lay with bureaucrats, and
not with Loring, the outcome further undermined his legitimacy when his career was in
peril."
Sims Case, .10.1; Williaiii V I);i\is. Ilistory ofthe Judiciory ofMassachusetts. (Bosloii,
ISX5). 2X1; Pcnscs. Anthony Hums. 1 1 For an example ofaiixicty ovcrllic Ciirtiscs" patronage power,
see Riehaid lleiny Dana. Sr (o Charles .1 Henry, .11 Mateli IX.S.s, Dana hainih i'apers. Massaehusells
I lisloneal Soeiety.
For Charles F.llis's ehallengc lo Loring's eoininission. sec var ions Boslon newspapers for 2')
and 10 May 1X.'S4. Curlis, / //c and liriliiiiis. 1: 177 - S, tepiinis Benjamin R Cmlis s finding lhal Ihe
iiidielmeni againsi Ihe Faneiiii Hall ineendiaiies oinilled " a snrileieni legal a\eiineiiC lhal l.onng had
lieen aiilhoii/ed lo issue an arrest wariani under Ihe IX.^0 law.
1.10
Before Burns, in any event, Loring was unconcerned with the ambiguities of his
slave-law commission. Harvard and the probate court shared his attentions. At
Cambridge, he performed well enough to be reappointed, without formal confirmation,
f6r the 1852-3 academic year. The Overseers balked, however, when the Law School
proposed making him a full professor. The two-man faculty wanted Loring to share
administrative burdens that had grown more onerous with a doubling of enrollments
since Story's death in 1 845 They convinced the Corporation to nominate Loring for
Story's old post as University Professor at $2,000 a year.^^ The Overseers, led by
Coalition appointee Francis Bassett, questioned the imposition of additional duties on a
doubtlessly overtaxed judge. The probate court alone, Bassett argued, required so much
time for contemplating questions of both property and ^'personal liberty" that the
assumption of a full professorship by Loring was unrealistic. Since Bassett's report
augured Loring's rejection, the Law School withdrew the judge's nomination.^"*
An angry Charles G. Loring believed that Bassett's report was politically
motivated by the Coalition's hatred for the Corporation. A historian of the Law School
suggests that Edward was opposed for supporting the fugitive law. The Overseers,
however, rarely broached that topic even after the Burns ruling. Patrician opponents of
slavery were loath to practice proscription for opinion's sake. Charles Loring supported
his cousin despite opposing the fugitive law, and John G. Palfrey, a Free-Soil Overseer,
Parker and Parsons to President and Fellows. 23 December 1853, Harvard College Papers,
20: 273
Harvard University. Overseer's Records 9: 218 - 27, Harvard University Archives; Warren.
Ilon'ani I,ow School. 2: 188.
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was "instrumental" (according to his biographer) in I.oring's nomination for the
professorship As a patrician, however. Palfrey did not represent all antislavery opinion
on the Board l.oring's paper trail of support for the fugitive law, and his status as a
federal commissioner, probably incited some antislavery Overseers against him. Since he
had not yet done anything under the hated law, however, his rejection was probably
meant chielly as a rebuke to his aristocratic cousin and to the Corporation.^^
The aborted nomination embarrassed the Law School faculty, since they had
already arranged to share teaching and administrative duties equally with Loring The
judge had already taken on these tasks before the Fellows withdrew his nomination. He
now expected a substantial raise from his $500 lecturer's stipend. When Harvard
reappointed him, again informally, to lecture for the 1854 academic year, he balked at
resuming his old duties until he was compensated for his extra work In May 1 854
President James Walker promised him a raise, but not until the end of the Spring
semester I le finally received $ 1 ,500 for his labors that year.^^'
Loring was busier than normal, then, when Col. Charles F. Suttlc of Virginia
appeared at his Boston otl'ice on Wednesday, 24 May 1854. Suttle carried an allldavit
certifying his right to Loring' s assistance, as a federal commissioner, in the capture of
^- Charles G. Loring lo James Walker. 28 July 1X54. Harvard College Papers. 21: 230 - 1;
Warren. /larvani Law School 2: 1X9; Galcll. I'nifrey. 219. In IX.S.S. Bassell simply quoted from his
1X.54 report against I.orings promotion to justify his vote against l.oring's reappointment. Sec
Advertiser, 24 February 1X55.
James Walker lo Charles G. Loring. 12 April. 1 May 1X54. Harvard University, President's
Papers 4: 68. 72 - 3. Harvard University Arehives. New York Trihune, 19 February 1X55. elaims that
Loring earned $1,750 in 1X54. but given that $1,500 was the high figure proposed by President Walker
for the judges 1X55 salary (Walker to Loring, IX September 1X54, Presidents Papers), Fm inelined to
dispute the figure quoted in a hostile newspaper article
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Anthony Burns, a fugitive from Suttle's service known to dwell in Boston. Three years
had passed since the Sims case. No slaves had been captured or claimed in Boston since
then. Loring's responsibility at that moment was inescapable, unless he meant to resign
his commission on the spot. He drew up a warrant authorizing Watson Freeman, the
United States Marshal, to arrest Burns. By day's end the alleged fugitive was
imprisoned, ironically, in the jury chambers on the third floor of the state courthouse.
Soon, Loring would feel somewhat like a prisoner himself '^
The Pentecostal Season: 24 May - 2 June 1854
Colonel Suttle arrived in Boston at an inauspicious moment. The Kansas-
Nebraska Act had been approved by Congress the week before, annulling the Missouri
Compromise and shattering the uneasy sectional peace of 1850. Massachusetts was
virtually unanimous in denouncing the replacement of a permanent border between free
and slave states with the Nebraska bill's provision for the introduction of slavery in any
territory where voters desired it. Even Cotton Whigs, the Curtii excepted, joined in
deploring the betrayal of their and Webster's sacrifice of local popularity. By claiming
Burns at this moment Suttle added insult to the injuries felt by many Bay Staters In
Boston, the last week of May was Anniversary Week, during which clergymen and
Stevens. Anthony Burns, 15 - 17. 247 - 8. Burns"s confinement in the court house violated
the 1843 personal libert\ law . which forbade the use of state property for any slave-hunting purposes.
Loring s hearing was also held there illegalh . but the danger invohed in mo\ ing Burns to another
venue made the offense inescapable. Whether the liberty law applied to actions taken under the
authority of the 1850 fugitive law w as open to question.
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religious philanthropists flowed into the city for the annual meetings of denominational
organizations and benevolent societies. No previous ftigitive cases had as many
influential eyewitnesses as the Burns trial. According to one religious journal. May 1854
was a "Pentecostal Season," a vivid proof of Slave-Power tyranny over the North.'^
Understanding that he trod on hostile ground, Suttle and his advisors urged
Loring to hurry through a summary hearing. Since Bums had been captured only on the
evening of the 24th, no action was taken until the morning of the 25th, by which time
word of the arrest had spread among Boston's blacks and in antislavery circles. That
morning, while waiting for Loring' s arrival, Theodore Parker and Richard Henry Dana
advised a fearful Burns to request counsel. Suttle's claim could well be dismissed, Dana
assured him, if his documentation proved technically inadequate. When Dana, as an
amicus curiae, reminded Loring to ask ifBums wanted counsel, the judge agreed to do
so after Suttle's attorneys made their opening statement When Loring then let the
claimants immediately present evidence against Bums, Dana again urged him to call
Burns to the bench Finally he did so, but Burns' s answer to Loring' s inquiry was barely
audible. Fearing a failure of the prisoner's courage, Dana credited Loring for favorably
interpreting Burns' s mumbled wishes. "I understand you to say that you would" desire
counsel, Loring said. Bums agreed. "Then you shall have it," Loring concluded,
adjourning the hearing until Saturday, 27 May."*^
Independent, 8 June 1854: Christian Inquirer, 8 July 1854.
This paragraph is based on the eyewitness accounts of Bums, as told to Robert B. Hall and
Charles E. Stevens, of Stevens himself, who regularly attended the hearings, and of Dana, in his journal
and in his 1855 testimony against Loring's removal. Stevens. Anthony Burns, 22 - 6; Lucid, ed.. Dana
Journal, 2: 626; Richard Henr\ Dana. Remarks ofRichard Henry Dana Jr., Esq., on the Proposed
Removal ofJudge Loringfrom the Office ofJudge ofProbate, March 6, 1855, (Boston, 1855), 16;
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While radical observers, in hindsight, criticized Loring's "indecent haste" at the
first hearing, Dana thought the judge had been "considerate and humane." He initially
expected Loring to follow "the rigid construction the Courts have put upon" the fUgitive
law, but he had also heard that the judge "professe[d] to detest the law " Clearly, Loring
didn't share Suttle's insistence on the speediest possible hearing. He did not have to ask
if Burns wanted a defense. A conservative reading of the fugitive law would have
obliged Loring not to ask the question or accept Burns' s request. Even abolitionists
admitted grudgingly that Loring far exceeded his Curtis cousins in his concern for
Burns'
s procedural rights. Still, his mere willingness to hear Suttle's claim made him
dirty in many eyes. Loring, however, presided reluctantly. He postponed proceedings
several times more over the next eight days, often in the hope that he might be spared the
obnoxious duty of "re-enslaving" Burns.^"
Practical considerations also weighed on Loring. On Friday, 26 May, he had to
teach at Harvard. Entering his classroom that morning, he was hissed briefly by a
handflil of students, but Southern and Unionist students replied with vigorous applause.
That afternoon, as Boston policemen arrested Col. Suttle for kidnapping on a warrant
obtained by abolitionists, Wendell Phillips visited Loring in Cambridge to complain that
Marshal Freeman's deputies would not let lawyers visit Burns. Loring gave Phillips a
note ordering Freeman to allow free access to the prisoner, but warned the abolitionist
Robert B. Hall. Removal ofJudge Loring: A Speech Delivered before the Massachusetts Senate, April
24. 1855, (Boston. 1855), 19. Burns"s initial reluctance to challenge Suttle was motivated both by his
belief that he had already incriminated himself before Suttle while confined, and by a w idespread belief
that Thomas Sims had been beaten to death for forcing a similar hearing. Actually, Sims survived to
become a federal employee after the war.
40
Hall. Removal. 19: Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal, 2: 626.
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that an elaborate defense might not be in Burns's best interest. If Burns was shipped
South,
- "as he probably will;' Loring supposedly added, - he might suffer for
challenging Suttle in court.
While Phillips later cited the judge' s offhand comment on Burns' s likely
extradition as a damning admission of prejudice, he never mentioned it during the
hearings, when Dana might have used it to force Loring to recuse himself Loring'
s
friends cited this discrepancy to suggest that Phillips had made up the quote, but the
judge himself never denied saying it Following the Curtii, he did not consider his
hearing a trial of Burns's servitude He had only to determine the prisoner's Hability to
extradition, which depended simply on the prisoner's matching the description offered by
Suttle of the fugitive Anthony Burns. Loring probably thought it unlikely that Suttle'
s
agents would seize the wrong man. He may have heard, outside of chambers, that Bums
had identified Suttle as his master on the night of his capture. In all likelihood, barring
some technicality. Burns would be remanded to Suttle. Loring saw no reason not to tell
this to Phillips. As a result, Phillips never shared Theodore Parker's flashes of optimism,
or Dana's confidence that Loring would spare Burns. He kept quiet about Loring'
remarks when he returned to Boston that night, but at a Faneuil Hall rally he made the
first call for the judge's removal from the probate bench.
Commonwealth, 11 May 1854; Springfield /?c'/7w/)//cfl/7, 29 May 1854: Liberator. 2 March
1855.
^-Liberator. 2 . 9 June 1854.
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A solar eclipse that same afternoon, though obscured by clouds and rain, made
the atmosphere more ominous. At Faneuil Hall, Phillips, Parker, Howe, Frank Bird and
others tore into the slave-power and its local minions. Howe pointedly invoked the
state's patron martyr, Algernon Sidney, in the face of a modern equivalent of Jeffreys's
persecutions. That same night, an interracial gang attacked the court house, trapping a
jury, the Attorney General, and judges of the Supreme Judicial Court inside. The
attackers withdrew in confusion after killing a deputy marshal, but Theodore Parker later
laid the blame for this disaster squarely on Loring,"^^
Edward Grccly Loring Fugili\ e Slave Bill Commissioner of the United Stales, before these
cili/cns of Boston, on Ascension Sunday I charge you with the death of that man who was
killed on last Friday night. He was your fellow servant in kidnappmg. He dies at your hand.
You fired that shot |.v/c: the man was stabbed| which makes his wife a widow, his child an
orphan. I charge you with the peril of twelve men. arrested for murder, on trial for their lives.
I charge you with filling the courthouse with 184 hired rufTians of the United Stales and
alarming not onl> this cil> for her liberties that arc m peril, but stirring up the whole
Commonwealth of Massachusetts w ith indignation, which no man knows how to stop. You
have done it all!
By Saturday morning, 27 May, local militia and federal troops had seized control
of the court house and the adjacent streets. Marshal Freeman, working from a rented
office in the court house, now commandeered the entire building, dictating who could or
couldn't enter. The scene promised a replay of the Sims spectacle ofjudges crawling
under chains. Armed guards bullied respected lawyers and clergymen while reportedly
Stevens. Anthony Bums, 29 - 47; John H. Clifford Diar\. 26 May 1854. John H Clifford
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society: Boston l^jilv Journal. 27 May 1854.
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Parker. Rights ofMan in America. 255.
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allowing Southerners free access to Loring's courtroom. Bostonians looked to Loring
for some assurance of peace or justice.
To the lawyer William Winthrop, Loring seemed "a resolute gentleman ... a man
of fearless justice and integrity," when he arrived in the courtroom. An antislavery
reporter thought that the ''classical and refined" commissioner ''seem[ed] to regard the
occasion as a most disagreeable one." For the moment, however, all depended on
Burns, who now had to declare whether he'd risk a trial. He decided to contest the
claim, and chose Dana and Charles Ellis as his counsels. They promptly asked Loring for
a further delay to prepare arguments and procure witnesses. Over the objections of
Suttle's lawyers, the judge again adjourned the hearing, this time until Monday, 29 May.
This was warranted, he said, "in view of the comparatively little inconvenience to the
claimants, but of the great hazards and personal risks to the respondent [Burns]." Even
though Loring agreed with Suttle that his was merely a preliminary hearing, and that
Burns' s slavery was not at issue, he was determined, as he told Freeman earlier, to "give
[Burns] all reasonable delays." These "liberal remarks" gave "great satisfaction to
crowds in and out of the courtroom." Whatever Wendell Phillips suspected, Loring
declared that, for now. Burns was "to be regarded as a freeman." For many observers,
the wavering judge was the hero of the day."*^
Loring's day was far fi-om over. That afternoon, he learned that men of his own
class, and his own political persuasion, were trying to defuse the crisis and avert a trial.
Lucid. Dana Journal. 2: 626; Dana. "A recollected journal of the Anthony Burns case." Dana
Famih Papers; Commonwealth, 27 May 1854; New York Times. 29 May 1854; Samuel H. Shapiro.
"The Rendition of Anthony Bums." .Journal ofNegro History 44 (January 1959): 4-1 n. 34.
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Whether they were Cotton Whigs or patrician Free-Soilers, their first concern seemed to
be not for Burns, but for the stability of local institutions. John G. Palfrey's visit with
Loring that afternoon demonstrated patrician concerns. A Free-Soil leader and former
gubernatorial candidate. Palfrey was also an editor of the North American Review and,
as a Harvard Overseer, a supporter of Loring' s bid to become a fbll professor. He had
initiated the final schism between the patrician and reform Free-Soilers by publishing an
attack on the 1853 constitution, and had been singled out, with Adams, for political
ostracism by Henry Wilson's Coalitionists. Ahhough years earlier he had insisted that
accused fijgitives receive jury trials at their point of capture, Palfrey's concerns on 27
May were political rather than moral. He did not discuss moral obligations with the
judge; gentlemen, after all, did not talk so condescendingly to one another. He seemed
less concerned with Burns' s fate than with Harvard's, and feared less for the prisoner's
freedom than for the independence of the Massachusetts courts."^^
Palfrey advised Loring to withdraw from the case and resign his commission.
The judge's first duty, he urged, was to those institutions he represented: the university
and the judiciary. Both had survived 1853 intact by only a hair's breadth. Whatever
Judge Loring did now would reflect on these imperiled bastions of culture and order;
presiding over the Burns case would only expose them to renewed radical assauhs.
What if the public learned that Harvard had denied Palfrey a professorship because he
opposed slavery, and then saw Loring, a Harvard lecturer, condemn a man to bondage?
John G. Palfrey to Edward G. Loring. 28 May 1854. Palfrey Family Papers; Gatell. Palfrey,
219 - 20; Mcadc. -Daniel Webster." 37.
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What It It was a Massachusetts judge, even a probate judge, who did this-^ Palfrey raised
the spectre of removal by address, which had been used in 1843, over his senatorial
objections, against Henry Dearborn. He denied any intention of threatening Loring
individually, but warned him against provoking a wholesale purge of the courts.
Antislavery radicalism, if provoked, might pull down the whole judicial hierarchy,
burying forever the sacred ideal ofjudicial independence. Would Loring leave the state a
legacy ofjudges made by, and at the mercy of town meetings and wire-pullers? Could
Loring bear to take the blame for bringing this about*^ The judge was courteous but
noncommittal in response.'*^
Only after the trial did Loring inform Palfrey that he had resolved, if only
momentarily, to take his advice. After Palfrey left him, Loring decided to turn the case
over to another judge. He asked Peleg Sprague, the judge who had presided over the
first Shadrach rescue trials, to take over the case. Sprague was already involved in the
case to a limited extent, having reftised Dana a writ of replevin for Burns, He was
unmoved, however, by Loring' s appeals to his superior competence, and flatly rejected
the judge's request. This was the substance behind rumors floated later that Loring had
been dissuaded from resigning his commission. Whether antislavery writers knew of
Loring' s meeting with Sprague or not, they inevitably attributed Loring' s decision to
continue to the influence of the Curtii. On 27 May, however, the Curtii were striving
Palfrey to Loring. 28 May 1854. Palferv Famih Papers.
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urgently to abort the trial by legal means By day's end, they and Loring learned how
little real power they had over the situation/***
Nearly every chronicler of "Burns Week" noted how the erstwhile apologists
arid volunteer enforcers of the fugitive law, most likely still fuming over Kansas-
Nebraska, had told surprised neighbors and old rivals how violently they hated the law
and the Slave Power. Most of these reporters were too overwhelmed by this great
reversal to note the most obvious difference in circumstances between 1854 and previous
years when the Curtii and their friends had hotly pursued runaways and their defenders.
A New England Democrat now held the White House. A Massachusetts Democrat,
Attorney General Caleb Gushing, was the President's principal adviser. Federal power
now moved at the beck of these men and their local hirelings, not at the will of the Curtii
or the late Webster Yet the Curtii had so successfijlly cemented their reputations as
Boston's arch slave-catchers that they would be blamed, especially if cousin Loring
presided at the trial, for all the outrages of a federal occupation of the city. Out of plain
self-interest, the Curtii and the Cotton Whigs embraced any opportunity to stop the trial
by lawful means.'*''
On the morning of 27 May, Suttle announced that he would sell Burns to any
Bostonians who wanted to free him. He hoped to leave Boston as soon as possible.
Edward G Loring to John G. Palfrc> . 5 June 1854. Palfrey Family Papers; New York Times,
29 May 1854; Boston Doily Bee, 20 April 1855 George T. Curtis wrote to the New Bedford Mercury
(reprinted in Liberator, 2.1 June 1854) that he had publicly repudiated mmors that he had recused
himself from all future fugitive cases as a sign of solidarity with Loring in the face of "ever> effort ... to
drive him from the discharge of his duty, by exciting against him the worst passions of the community."
''''
Transcript, 27 May 1854; National Era. 15 February 1855; Shapiro. Dana. 93; O'Connor,
Lords of the Loom. 100 - 1.
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either with Burns or a fair monetai7 equivalent in tow. He had already paid $5,000 to
bail himself out ofjail, only to find himself shadowed by local blacks and the Boston
Vigilance Committee. The violence of 26 May left him understandably fearful for his
safety. He resented Loring for repeatedly delaying the hearings. Southern law students
at Harvard echoed his frustration. Loring' s perceived lack of 'Tirmness" augured poorly
for the trial to come, at which Southerners expected the defense to rely on ^'rank negro
perjury ." A speedy sale of Burns would mollify Bostonians while confirming Suttle's
property rights over the prisoner That afternoon, as his lawyers negotiated with the
black minister Leonard A Grimes and the white banker Hamilton Willis, Suttle agreed to
sell Burns before the trial resumed.
Grimes and Willis dashed through respectable Boston as the day waned, focusing
their fiind-raising efforts on the State Street homes of the mercantile and professional
Whig elite. From such staunch Unionists as the Curtii, the Lawrences, and Samuel A.
Eliot (the sole Massachusetts vote for the fugitive law in 1850) they collected checks and
pledges totaling Suttle's asking price of $1,200. Suttle was ready to finalize the sale, but
Burns had first to be released from federal custody, and Marshal Freeman would not free
the prisoner without Loring's authorization. That evening, the judge gladly met Suttle,
Grimes, and Willis at his old law office to draft the necessary papers.'
'
Alexandria Gazette, quoted in Liberator. 14 July 1854. Suttle believed that Loring was
finally brought to heel by "the respectable portion of the community." whom the Colonel supposed had
"censured him for his course" and blamed him for the \ iolence of 26 May. In fact, that violence had
mov ed both Loring and his "respectable" peers to pursue Burns s purchase until Democratic officials
cracked dow n on Suttle and Loring alike. The eyew itness commentary' of Georgian law student Charles
C. Jones is preserved in Robert Manson Myers, ed.. The Children oj Pride: A True Story ofGeorgia and
the Civil War. (New Haven: Yale University Press. 1972), .37, 44 - 5.
''^
StQxcns, Anthony Burns, 61 - 8; Dana, Remarks, 19.
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When Loring summoned Freeman to witness the sale, the marshal reftised to
meet with him. Impatient with this new problem, Loring marched with the others to
confront Freeman at the courthouse. Arriving at 1 1 ;30 p.m., they found Freeman
consulting with the federal district attorney, Benjamin F. Hallett. Hallett, the foremost
defender ofjurors' rights in past years, was obliged by his current office, and inclined by
his hostility to higher-law doctrine, to uphold what many Bostonians now considered the
most egregious violation possible ofjury prerogatives. He had been in constant contact
with Caleb Gushing and President Pierce since Burns' s arrest. They wanted to prove
that Massachusetts Democrats could enforce the fugitive law on hostile ground. They
were determined to prove Suttle's rights at a trial, whether he wanted it or not."
Hallett knew that dissuading Suttle from selling Burns would be difficult with
Grimes, Willis, and Loring hovering around him with documents in hand. He instead
exploited Freeman's fear of being held liable, according to the fugitive law, for losing
custody ofBums without a trial When Loring reassured Freeman that he faced no
penahy as long as Suttle was compensated, Hallett, watching the clock, protested that
selling a man was illegal in Massachusetts. Loring corrected him, Bay Staters were
forbidden only from selling men into slavery. Arguments exhausted, Hallett finally
appealed to the clock. It was past midnight, and the Sabbath had begun. Burns could
not be sold until Monday at the earliest Annoyed at Hallett's sophistry, Loring told
^" Stevens, Anthony Burns. 68 - 9.
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Grimes to meet him Monday morning to finalize the purchase Neither man knew that
their last chance to avert a trial had vanished."
Loring's activities on Sunday, 28 May, are unknown. He wasn't home when two
Harvard students called to urge him to withdraw from the case. Later that day. Grimes
caught up with him to vent his fears that the federal government would prevent the
promised sale. Loring assured him that the sale would go as planned.^'' By Monday
morning, Loring knew that Burns would not be sold, yet never bothered to tell Grimes
the bad news. That day's Advcrliser reported his formal denial of any involvement in the
aborted sale Grimes and Willis finally learned from Suttle and 1 lallctt that the trial
would be Boston's punishment for the death of the deputy marshal, 'That blood," Willis
heard Hallett say, "must be avenged." Men had already been arrested for the murder,
and the Curtii planned to cast a wide net to drag down Parker and Phillips with the
killers, but Hallett revealed his government's true motives. Boslon would be taught
another object lesson like that meted out during the Sims trial, only with a far greater
display of federal might. Thousands of soldiers poured into the city, augmented by Irish-
American volunteer militia. Freeman used a blank federal check to hire local bruisers for
a special guard unit The Democrats thus proved their power over Boston, but now.
" Grimes. Willis, mid Hallett left aceounts of the aborted sale Bciijainiii F Hallett to Richard
Henry Dana, Jr., 31 March 1S.S5, Dana Fannly Papers; Massachnsctis General Court, IH55 House
Docunn-nl 205. 11-12, has testimony from Grimes and Willis, who also contributed to Stevens.
Anthony Hums. 69 - 70.
^'^ Sanborn, 'lahlc Talk. 264 - 5. Remembering his adventure in 1911, Franklin B Sanborn
admitted that " l was not sanguine that what we might say would influence the probate judge; but jhis
friend Cliarlesj Lowell thougiu we ought to make the eflbrt." Grimes recounted his Sunday encounter
with Loring in IS55 House Poc iiuiciif JO.'i. 11-14.
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after the charades of the weekend, power over Burns, if not perfect control over events,
reverted to Loring. "Our ruler," Theodore Parker remarked, "is a Judge of Probate."''
Unfortunately, Loring had little control over Monday's proceedings. As the
manacled Burns was delivered to a heavily guarded courtroom, Dana's colleague Charles
Ellis objected to the intimidating presence of Freeman's lackeys. He was interrupted by
the loud arrival at Court House Square of several hundred antislavery marchers from
Worcester, which provoked Hallett, who had no real business in the chamber, into a
tirade against antislavery agitators. Despite Loring' s protest that "No explanation was
needed," Hallett blustered that armed force was necessary to protect the court from the
likes of the Worcester fanatics, whom Ellis and his ilk had whipped into a violent frenzy.
Freeman's guards were merely doing their duty to the Union on the order of President
Pierce. "This must stop," Loring urged. Hallett ignored him and finished his speech.
Ellis started a speech of his own. He was scandalized that Hallett, an officer of the
federal government, should so contemptuously disobey a presiding judge. "That matter
is my concern," Loring answered, "Let the hearings proceed." Hallett had scored his
points with the national press, and made no further disruptions, but Ellis protested the
guards' selective admission of spectators and questioned Loring' s credentials as a
^-'^ 1855 House Document 205. 13-U: Ach'ertiser, 29 May 1854; Commonwealth. 29 May 1854;
Liberator. 2 June 1854: Transcript. 27 May. 1854; S^xmgfiQ\d Republican, 30 May 1854. The judge can
be absolved of charges of lying to the Ach'ertiser if we accept the premise that Grimes and Willis were
offenng Suttle compensation for Burns s manumission rather than buying the prisoner outright.
Pragmatically, he may have realized that his participation in a sale of Burns would be seen as a
prejudicial acknow ledgment of his servitude. This point was made against him in the majority report of
1855 Federal Relations Committee. 1855 House Document 93, 31 - 2.
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commissioner. The judge bmshed these comments aside and called for Suttle's
testimony.
Suttle's counsel immediately made a major blunder On the morning of 25 May
counsel had presented Suttle's affidavit from Virginia in their opening statement.
According to the tenth section of the ftigitive law, that should have sufficed to prove
Suttle's claim on Burns and the facts of Burns' s escape. On Monday, however, Suttle's
agent, William Brent, took the stand to restate those facts Brent explained that Suttle
frequently hired out the skilled Burns for specific jobs or periods of time. At the time of
his purported escape from Virginia, Burns had been hired out to a man named
Millspaugh. By the terms of such a contract. Burns legally owed service to Millspaugh,
and could be claimed only by Millspaugh or his agent. Yet the Virginia affidavit stated
that Burns owed service to Suttle. The claimants had contradicted themselves. Worse,
while the affidavit asserted that Burns had willllilly escaped. Brent testified that Burns
had fallen asleep on a northbound boat. This meant that Burns had entered free territory
involuntarily, and could conceivably fall under the protection of Conmiomvealth v. Aves.
Worse yet. Brent had given the defense a timeline to attack. Witnesses lined up to assert
that they had seen Burns in Boston well before 24 March, the date, according to Brent,
of his escape. To antislavery observers, as well as more neutral reporters. Brent's
testimony exposed enough technicalities to justify releasing Burns."
^^Wch'ertiser, 30 May 1854. New York Times, 30 May 1854; Springfield /^c/jwA/zco/?, 30 May
1854; S){Q\Qm. Anthony Burns, 83 -4.
Lucid, cd.. Dana.Journal, 2: 631; New York Times, 31 May 1854; Stc\cns, Anthony Burns,
85 - 95.
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Loring appeared more interested in the question of Burns's identity. Brent
testified that Burns had identified Suttle and himself by name when they confronted him
on 24 May, and had acknowledged Suttle' s occasional kindness as a master. One of
Burns's guards corroborated this testimony. Burns later denied parts of Brent's
testimony, but could not contest it himself during the trial, which led Dana and Ellis to
object to Brent's account. The fugitive law's ban on testimony from the accused, they
argued, should also guarantee Burns against even second-hand self-incrimination.
Accepting Brent's account as Burns's confession would violate the law in either case.
Loring answered that the account was Brent's testimony, not Burns's, and could be
taken as evidence of the prisoner's identity and in rebuttal of the defense He would not,
however, consider it decisive evidence of Burns's servitude. Since Loring considered the
question of servitude irrelevant to the hearing, however, his disclaimer counted for
little.''
Both sides made closing arguments on Wednesday, 3 1 May. Dana seemed to
win the day with an impressive four-hour effort that eschewed attacks on the fugitive law
in favor of meticulously exposing every blunder of Brent and Suttle' s attorneys. The
claimants answered that they had proven all that needed to be proven, while the defense
relied on testimony that was inconsistent and eminently impeachable. Dana nonetheless
expected to win the case He had heard in confidence that Loring believed that no
actionable escape had taken place. Many observers shared Dana's optimism, but all
were forced to wait two days for the decision. Loring delayed proceedings one final
Lucid, cd., Dana Journal, 2: b^l-?,: Advertiser, 30, 31 May 1854.
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time after the closing statements, since ''he could not render a decision, in a case
burdened like this, with weighty questions of law, and a serious conflict of the testimony,
without a careful review of the whole. He regretted that the excitement could not be
immediately allayed, but he could not give a hurried decision."^^
"It is the general opinion," according to an antislavery newspaper, "that Judge
Loring will feel compelled to discharge the prisoner " Other observers were less certain.
"I cannot think that when so wide a door is opened before the commissioner, he will not
walk out," the future removal advocate Anne Warren Weston wrote, ''but he may noC
Charles Francis Adams expected Loring to defy the popular expectation, despite
Palfrey's lobbying. Loring' s willingness to preside over the case proved him a slave-
power sympathizer, Adams thought, and that made his verdict predictable.^*^
Dana believed that the case would hinge on the question of identity. If Loring
accepted the Virginia affidavit as evidence of servitude and escape. Burns' s identity
would be the only point left in question. Yet Suttle's proof of Burns' s identity was
Brent's testimony, as corroborated by a guard. If Loring accepted Brent's testimony on
this point, however, he had also to accept Brent's contradiction of the affidavit's
assertion of Suttle's claim to Burns's service. Further, Dana believed that the fugitive
law obliged Loring to accept either the affidavit or Brent's testimony, but not both. If
Brent's narrative was all Suttle could use, the claimants were left with no authoritative
Lucid, ed.. Dano Journol, 2: 631; Commonwealth, 1 June 1854.
Commonwealth, 1 June 1854; Anne Warren Weston to "Dear Folks." .31 May 1854. in "Trial
of Anthony Burns. 1854." Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society (Januar>' 1911): 334;
Charles Francis Adams Diar\'. 29 May. 1 June 1854. Adams Family Papers.
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proof of Burns's servitude or his escape, and Brent's identification of Burns could be
counterbalanced with the defense testimony, or impeached on the grounds of the
intimidation felt by the captive Burns Plain logic, Dana thought, would compel Loring
to release the prisoner/''
Loring thought differently The question of identity, he believed, ''is the only
question I have a right to consider," since the Virginia affidavit sufficiently proved the
debt of service and the escape according to the tenth section of the Rjgitive law. Brent's
testimony was irrelevant to the issues addressed by the affidavit, and could not contradict
it. Brent was relevant only to the question of the prisoner's identity as the fugitive
Anthony Burns. Loring admitted that Brent had to be weighed against the defense
witnesses The Virginian was more biased, but also more knowledgeable than any of the
defense witnesses, to whom Loring generously ascribed undoubted integrity. Between
these, then, there was "a conflict, complete and irreconcilable." Here Dana expected
Loring to apply the standard of reasonable doubt in Burns's favor.*^^
Loring instead ruled that the testimony of Brent and the guard outweighed the
defense testimony because both reported Burns responding to his name and
acknowledging Suttle. This lefi only the question of the conditions under which Burns
"The Decision Judge Loring Might Have Given. " published in the Boston Daily Atlas, and
reprinted in Stevens. . Inthony Bums. 254 - 61. was Dana 's hindsighted analysis of the concerns tliat
determined Loring's niling. but it reflected his reah/ation during the hearing that Loring would base his
ruling on the question of identity. On the question of acceptable testimony. Dana held that the fugitive
law gave claimants two options for establishing their claim, according to its fourth and tenth articles,
which were, he charged, mutually exclusive Once Suttle and Brent presented an affidavit. Dana
bcliexcd. they could not then attempt to restate the facts asserted in the aflldax it through courtroom
testimony. Once they did so, Loring should hav e mlcd out one set of evidence.
Stevens, Anthony Burns, 120 - 1.
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confessed, which Dana believed could impeach any testimony based on the confession.
Loring found no intimidation or cajoling of the prisoner. Burns had not incriminated
himself because his words had not been used to prove anything other than his identity.
Nor, as second-hand testimony, had the presentation of his confession violated the
fugitive law. Loring had to be persuaded only that the prisoner was a man named
Anthony Burns who matched a written physical description. Brent's testimony had done
this. The rest was for Virginia to decide.'' Identity alone was relevant in Loring' s court
because, despite Dana's cavils, the commissioner's hearing remained "a ministerial and
not a judicial act ." Loring did not find Burns guilty of escaping service because he had
no authority to do so. In effect, he denied that he had re-enslaved Burns.'^''
Despite his disclaimers, Loring' s subsequent behavior suggested that he
understood the practical consequences of his decision. Theodore Parker saw his refusal
to accept the commissioner's fee as the sign of a guilty conscience. To the Woburn
women who sent him thirty pieces of silver Loring wrote that he "does not need such a
memorial to keep fresh his regrets at having incurred the censure of those who sent it."
This fell short of an apology for his ruling, ~ he seemed mainly to regret having hurt the
women's feelings, — but did not deny the justice of their outrage. Loring knew that he
could have ruled differently. He never attempted to refijte criticisms of his ruling.
Stevens. Anthonv Burns, Ml -3
64
Stevens, Anthonv Bums, 1 14 - 16
National Anti-Sla\>ery Standard, 24 June 1854; Theodore Parker to Charles M. Ellis. 18
February 1855, Parker Papers.
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He did try to deflect objections to iiis having taken the case. ''It is said," he
noted, "that the [ftigitive law] is so cruel and wicked that it should not be executed by
good men." Yet the law's cruelty, according to Commonwealth v. Griffifh, was "not for
us to determine." If good judges refused to execute the law, "what is to be the
protection of the unfortunate men who are brought within its operation*^ Will those who
call the statute merciless, commit it to a merciless judge-^" Did Massachusetts desire that
this onerous process be left in the hands of men far less likely than Edward G. Loring to
show every consideration to the rights of the accused"^ "If any men wish this, they are
more cruel and wicked than the statute, for they would strip from the lligitive the best
security and every alleviation the statute leaves him." Here the judge reiterated
Whiggery's principled concern that judges take responsibility for guaranteeing prisoners
their fiill procedural rights. Nonetheless, antislavery critics regarded these comments as
the most morally contemptible passage in Loring' s ruling.'^'^
Loring, "haggard and care-worn," in one writer's eyes, thus tried to tell his
stunned audience of 2 June that he had given Burns every chance, and had granted him
every appropriate right. He expected critics to cry that there had not been a jury trial;
Ellis had raised the point in an attempt to prove the fugitive law unconstitutional.
Loring, "his port and bearing . . . not those of a judge clear in his great office," according
to another account, explained again that "there is no provision in the Constitution
requiring, that the idenlily of the person to be arrested should be determined by a jury."
Stevens.
.
\nthony Burns, 1 19. Stevens's own annotation is representative; he regarded
boring's reasoning as "one of the most remarkable instances of moral obliquity on record." Consumed
with moral hatred of the fugitive law. he could only think that Loring meant that "good men |should|
engage deliberately, and under oath, in promoting a wicked design!"
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The hearing, he insisted, was not a trial of Burns's freedom or slavery. The fugitive law
was not what Boston wanted it to be, or what abolitionists insisted it was, but only what
was written down. It was necessary to create the Union, as Justice Shaw had said in
1851
.
Accordingly, Loring declared, "I think the statute constitutional," He had gone
beyond the call of duty for Burns's sake, but was convinced that, as the man named in
Suttle's affidavit, the prisoner was liable to extradition at the Colonel's request/'^
It remained to explain to John G. Palfrey why he had not quit the case. On
Monday, 5 June, Loring wrote Palfrey of his fruitless visit to Judge Sprague; other
details of that weekend had already become public record. He did not fear for the
institutions he represented, he explained, because he expected all anger to be directed,
not at Harvard, not at the judiciary, but at him alone. Against one unpopular man,
Loring thought, the radicals and abolitionists would think themselves surer of success.
While he didn't invoke his lingering anger at the loss of his chancery post eleven years
before, that ordeal certainly conditioned Loring' s expectations of what was to come.
Already, since the decision, he had suffered numerous personal affronts. Painful as they
were, he told Palfrey, they had to be borne as the consequence of persistence in his duty.
He knew perfectly well that he could have spared himself all that was to come over the
next four years had he ruled differently, or, as Palfrey had urged, had he resigned. A
more popular ruling, he concluded, would have spared him everything except his self-
respect.'^''
Stcxcns, . Uilhoiiv Hums. 1 14. 1 17 - 18, 123; Boston Sumiay News. 28 May |4 Jiincj 1854.
Loring to Palfrcx . 5 June 1854. Palfrey Family Papers.
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Loring's self-respect was based on a sense of duty to his own potential. He
could not live up to that potential outside of professional or political life He had to do
all that he was capable of doing while quietly damning all critics and slanderers. Duty
was his alternative to the slough of self-pity. Duty to his family also mattered; his
youngest son was only four years old, and his eldest was in college. To bow to public
opinion, to let a consensus whipped into shape by demagogues tell him he was wrong,
was unthinkable. To be told in harsh language that he was a moral monster was
unacceptable to a gentleman; flight from such insults would give the fanatics undeserved
satisfaction. Engaging them in debate would lower Loring to their level. He would
suffer in silence, then, except for the most formal remonstrances, but he would suffer
standing his ground. He was braced for the ordeal to come.
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CHAPTER 4
LORING'S ORDEAL AND THE MOVEMENT OF 1854
(JUNE 1854 - FEBRUARY 1855)
In consideration of the base, treacherous, and w icked acts that I have this day committed; and
knowing the sting of conscience, and the public scorn that w ill be sure to follow me, I have
determined to rid society' of my hateful presence.
-"Suicide note" found on a South Reading effigy.'
One morning in September 1854, Samuel Gridley Howe chanced upon his old
friend and onetime fellow reformer "Ned" Loring in a Boston office. Three months
earlier, Loring had ordered Anthony Burns extradited to Virginia on the claim of a
slaveholder "He looked much changed," Howe wrote their mutual friend Horace Mann,
"He seemed to me to have lost all interest in life." "But for children," Loring told him,
"one would be glad to go." So troubled was Howe by Loring's manner, ~ what did the
judge mean by "going," anyway*^ ~ that he couldn't bear to "touch the sore point"
between them.
Conimomrealth, 7 June 1854.
^ Samuel Gridley Howe to Horace Mann. 21 September 1854. in Laura E. Richards, ed.. Letters
and Journals ofSamuel Gridley Howe. 2 vols., (Boston, 1909), 2: 401.
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Howe had been less reticent in the immediate wake of the Bums decision. ^^One
thing I want done^ he wrote Theodore Parker, ^Draw up a brief, terse, strong address
to Edward Greely Loring, stating that the Community had lost confidence in him, - that
we cannot trust our orphans to the charge of such a man. Put it round at once for
signatures of a great majority of the people/^ Not without regret or nostalgia, but with
unshakable moral conviction, Howe demanded I.oring^s ostracism from public life."*
As for Loring, old Ned 1-oring. whom you loved |he wrote Maiui. who had moved lo ()hio|, and
whom for a while you boosted up ou your shoulders into a moral aluiospherc, he has suuk
down, and will die in Ihe darkness of despotie surroundings. 1 wrote to him. and talked lo him
before the |[5urns| decision: 1 have had a leller from him since, but it is a hard and hearllcss
one. 1 have liked him much; and am loth lo lose (he last of my associates in that circle. h\\\ if!
musl. ... I have sel going Ihe enclosed address to him. Would il were belter! I3ul it is honest,
and has cost me a pang and a tear. Good-bye my pleasant friend: if you are going /.//?. 1 go
down, and vice versa.
'
Critics outside Loring's social circle showed none of Howe's remorse. During
the trial, the abolitionist Henry C Wright publicly imagined ^^the Commissioner laid dead
on the beach by a dagger in the hand of Burns."*' ^^A New York Merchant" wrote
Frederick Poni^/ass's Paper that nothing short of Loring's lynching was worthy of
Boston's Founding ancestors: "They would have erected a gallows on State Street, in
front of the old State House, and there hung Commissioner Loring in person (not in
^ Howe to Theodore Parker, June 1854, in Richards, ed., IIowc\ 2: 267.
Howe lo Mann. IS June 1854, in Richards, cd., Howe, 2: 270 - I Howe's correspondence
with Loring has not surv ived.
^ New York 7imes, 31 May 1854.
effigy) until he was dead; after which, his head would have been erected on a pole, as a
warning to others not to follow his example."'^
"He should be driven fi-om city to city," "W" wrote to the same paper, "a pilgrim
and a stranger. Let him be pointed out to the little children, as he passes through the
streets, as the KIDNAPPER of men, the manufacturer of widows and orphans." For a
month after the ruling, however, Loring's critics were satisfied to punish him
symbolically by burning him in effigy across the stated These disorganized outbursts
were soon supplanted by a petition campaign organized largely by abolitionist women.
In 1 855, legislators of the Know-Nothing party seized the anti-Loring initiative. The
judge's many enemies shared no single motive. Not all were disunionist, nor did all
desire wholesale judicial reform. While fearful patricians in the Free-Soil camp were
certain of the movement's motives, scholars cannot draw conclusions without relating
Loring's ordeal to larger political developments during the tumult of 1854.
Effigies: Lorinu as Representative Villain
Effigies were less a threat of violent punishment than a crude form of political
indictment insinuating wholesale public condemnation of an enemy Whiggery despised
anonymous effigy raisings as political cowardice, much like the deposit of a secret ballot.
^ Frederick Doufilass 's Paper, 9 June 1854. By comparison, the "Merchant" would only have
tarred-and -feathered Hallett. while Freeman would merely be compelled to resign his Marshal's post.
^ Frederick Douglass 's Paper, 16 June 1854.
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The true way in this free counlr> of expressing dissatisfaction and contempt is by public
meetings and resolutions. Any individual with moral perceptions sulTicientlv obtuse can hang
an obnoxious ofTicial in efngy. although the v ictim of his malice may be as an officer and
citi/.cn above reproach. Of all the officials who have recently been honored bv the kind notice
of the midnight mob. ... we doubt whether there is one who would not much rather be the
victim of such a demonstration, than be the subject of a battery of resolutions, discharged by a
public meeting of respectable citizens.**
To Whiggei7, effigies were slanders unworthy of the public sphere. Whoever
made them probably feared that public meetings would draw few sympathizers; better,
then, to leave an effigy hinting at universal agreement. The Loring effigies, in many
cases, followed this stereotype, as citizens discovered the midnight handiwork of
unknown parties hanging at dawn from public places. In some towns, however,
protesters flaunted effigies in elaborate public performances that involved spectators in
Loring's condemnation. In Gloucester, proxies of Loring and Ben Hallett were tried,
hanged, and dismembered tor the attempted kidnapping of "Human Rights," a free black
man. In Montague, Independence Day was celebrated with a mock slave-rescue which
ended with effigies of Loring and other culprits carted through town to be hanged while
church bells sounded "a merry peal."^
Loring shared his scaffolds with a variety of local and national villains. Protesters
included Hallett and Marshal Freernan, President Pierce, Caleb Gushing, and Stephen
Douglas with Loring in a conspiracy to humiliate Massachusetts.'" As the sole Whig
Journal, 14 June 1854. in Parker-Burns Scrapbook.
Commonweallh, 14 June. 1.1 July 1854.
Commonwealth, 5, 6 June, 7 July 1854; Lihcralor, 9 June 1854; National Era, 8 June 1854;
Northampton ( 'owner, 1.1 June 1854.
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conspirator, Loring hampered Whiggery's efforts to blame the Burns scandal on
Democrats Antislavery Whigs complained that Loring had been chosen by outsiders to
humiliate their party. "Instead of going to Hallett, or [George T ] Curtis, or some of the
tired tools of the slaveholders on whom they could depend," one Whig surmised, "they
mquired out a fresh hand and some one whose social and professional position were
unequivocal. And they hit upon one too, belonging to the Whig party, [still] smarting
under the sting of the Nebraska Swindle, so that the humiliation might be the more
complete in all parts," Conspiracy theories abounded during 1854. Simultaneous
reports of slave-catching activities in Boston, New York, and Syracuse "on the very day
of the final passage of the Nebraska iniquity" seemed to prove "a concerted agreement
. . .
in order to give the North an extra dose [of humiliation], stimulating enough to keep
the other down " Burns's extradition only magnified the catastrophic impact of the
Nebraska bill on New England opinion.''
While most Bay Staters took Democratic subservience to slavery almost for
granted, Loring seemed an unexpected traitor to his state. Accordingly, he appeared
more frequently in effigy, and aroused more fijry, than Democrats like Hallett or
Cushing. "The mask had fallen from Loring' s face," in a Worcester effigy, "and
displayed him as the hollow sycophant that he is: 'Forma Viris et proeterea nihil; ' the
form of a man and nothing else." A New Bedford effigy labeled Loring "A dutifiil son
National Anti-Slcn-en Standard, 3 June \S54: Independent, 1 June 1854; Bane Patriot, 9
June. 1854. Shapiro. "Rendition of Burns." 49. suggests that the Burns trial had a greater impact on
Bay Staters than the Nebraska Bill, to which many people, according to pessimistic antislaver> reports,
were basically indifferent.
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who obeys his father in all things;" a crude drawing explained that his father was the
devil. Despite his reported rejection of the commissioner's fee, Weymouth labeled him
"A Northern bloodhound, bought for $10." In Gloucester he was the "Ten Dollar
Commissioner," in Pepperell, 'The Ten Dollar Judge." Watertown called him the
"$10.00 agent of Suttle, Brent, & Co." Like Judas Iscariot, he had greedily abandoned
morality "to do acts fit only to be performed by fiends." Women's groups in Woburn
and in Milford, New Hampshire, sent Loring mocking payments of thirty silver dollars in
imitation of the gospel traitor's reward. Approving writers advised that the payments
"should be counterfeit, as illustrative of his own character " If Loring seemed guilty as
much of moral abdication as of treason, an analogy with Pontius Pilate, the original
"unjust judge," was apt. More bluntly, Gloucester protesters deemed Loring a moral
coward. Their autopsy of his effigy revealed that he lacked a spine.''
At first, many critics charged that Loring' s treason was representative of
statewide capitulation to the Slave-Power. Editorials and sermons initially indicted all
Massachusetts for Burns's re-enslavement. "Slavery says to Massachusetts and Boston,
I command you to catch my slave and return him to me," reported the radical Boston
Daily ConmiomveaJth. Slavery "calls on you, or your sons, to put on epaulets and
plume, to arm yourself," according to a West Roxbury preacher, "and to make all ready
and convenient, that the tyrant and oppressor may drag his human prey through the
Commonwealth, 3, 6, 14 June 1854.
Commonwealth, 5. 7, 10 June. 7 July 1854; Liberator, 9, 23 June 1854; Transcript, 6 June
1854.
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streets and to his doom, without fear of molestation and hindrance "'' These sermons
followed the Garrisonian line that Union itself implicated all Bay Staters in enslavement.
Redemption, then, could come only from the state cutting its federal ties.
Antislavery activists who rejected the Garrisonians' absolute disunionism
believed that Massachusetts needed, for now, only to purge its government of officers
corrupted by Slave-Power ties. In time, they projected the commonwealth's collective
guilt onto Loring alone He was seen, not as the representative of a guilty people, but as
their oppressor. He was identified with the archetypical "unjust judge," of Anglo-
American history, George Jeffieys. An effigy found on Boston Common labeled Loring
"the $10 Jeffries of 1854." Theodore Parker sounded this theme in his first sermon after
the Burns decision. The antislavery press readily took it up
Loring' s cousin George T. Curtis had been tarred with the Jeffreys brush since
condemning Thomas Sims in 1851, but in Loring' s own case the analogy seemed even
more compelling. Like the Englishman, Loring had abandoned liberal friends for the
sake of patronage. His handling of the Burns case reminded abolitionists of the trial of
Algernon Sidney, during which Jeffreys admitted the prisoner's manuscripts as witnesses
against him. Similarly, Loring condoned Burns' s de facto self-incrimination despite the
fiigitive law's provisions against prisoners' testimony. In both instances, critics charged,
conventional rules of evidence were bent hideously to serve the ends of power.
Edward B Willison. The Bad Friday: A Sermon preached in the First Church, West Roxhury,
June 4, 1854. (Boston. 1854). 8; Clarke, Rendition ofAnthony Burns, 7-8.
Commonwealth, 5 June 1854: Independent, 8 June 1854; Liberator, 9 June 1854.
^^Independent. 8 June 1854: Liberator. 9 June 1854.
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Public commentary on Jeffreys' s era often had contemporary significance. Lord
Macaulay's History ofEngland, a best-seller upon its American publication in 1849,
inspired readers to draw parallels between Slave-Power oppression and the tyranny of
the Stuart Restoration. Bostonians read the moderate Cotton Whig Robert C.
Winthrop's December 1853 oration on Algernon Sidney as a veiled critique of
Websterite hegemony. Charles Francis Adams praised Winthrop, the former Speaker of
the federal House of Representatives, for equating Sidney's struggles with John Quincy
Adams's campaign against Congressional suppression of antislavery petitions in the
1840s. It was the first time in several years, Adams wrote, that his father's name had
been mentioned favorably in a Boston forum. Both Adams and Edmund Quincy, a
leading abolition journalist, saw the Sidney lecture as an act of defiance against the
Webster clique and the Curtii. Winthrop, himself weary of the more strident
Websterites, did not reject this interpretation of his speech. Any equation of Loring with
Sidney's nemesis, then, resonated strongly with literate, politically conscious Bay
Staters.'^
Jeffreys' s defeats were instructive to Loring' s enemies. In 1681, two years
before he became Chief Justice, Parliament submitted a removal address to Charles II
demanding Jeffreys's ouster from all royal posts for publicly opposing that body's
" Robert C. Winthrop. "Algernon Sidney." in Addresses and Speeches. 140 - 74; Charles F.
Adams lo Winthrop. 6 April 1854; Edmund Quincy to Winthrop. 10 April 1854. Winthrop Family
Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society; Winthrop to John H. Clifford. 14 October 185.>. Winthrop
Papers, is representativ e of Winthrop s growing hostility to the Webster Whigs, some of whom he found
worse than abolitionists. On Macaulay's popularity, see Andrew Hook. "Macaulay in America,"
Journal ofAmerican Studies 9 (December 1975): 335 - 46, which stresses perceived parallels between
the Glorious and American Revolutions, but misses the often forcefiilly asserted parallels drawn between
English events and the antislavery struggle in the North.
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convening. Jeffreys resigned in disgrace after being ^^reprimanded on his knees [before]
the bar;^ while Londoners burned him in effigy. In 1688, during his confinement in the
Tower, a ^widows and orphans" petition demanded his trial for otTenses committed
during the "bloody assizes" in the western shires. In Jeffreys' s case, petitioners
demanded justice because he had widowed and orphaned them. In Loring^s case,
widows and orphans were encouraged, as the chief constituents of a probate judge, to
demand his removal from an office responsible for their welfare. His symbolic equation
with JetTreys encouraged perceptions that his planned removal might serve a larger
political agenda.^**
The Petitioners
Loring's enemies initially disagreed over how to punish him Wendell Phillips
and the radical editor William S Robinson (a.k.a. "Warrington") immediately demanded
that Loring be stripped of his probate office. Howe and Parker, Loring's onetime
colleagues in public school reform, hoped to compel his resignation without the
humiliation of a removal address. Even as the 1855 legislature debated his removal,
some petitioners left him the option of a dignified resignation, but most knew early that
Loring wouldn't resign. Within a week of the Burns decision, the Garrisonian
Campbell (cd Hildrcth). Atrocious Judges, 287, 357. While Loring went unnamed in
Hildreth s notes (unlike Ihe Curtii). Ihe editor's known opposition lo Loring. his role in Ihe
hearings, and his angr> critique of Dnna's defense of Ihe judge, mnke il unlikely that Hildrelh did not
h;ue him in nund while adapling Campbell for American pulMicalion in !S5().
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Massacluisclls Anti-Slavery Society dralled a petition reciuesting that legislators vote to
remove Loring. The Ciarrisonian petition was printed and circulated with Hinds from the
Boston Vigilance (\)niniittee. an interracial organization (including I lowe and Parker)
Ibrnied in 1850 to stop slave-catchers by all necessary means/^
By May 18S5, 127 separate petition sheets were delivered to the Boston oHices
ofthe Anti-Slavery Society or to the legislature Of these, eighty-six Ibllowed the
standard form drafted by the (larrisonians.
WIII'IRI'IAS, I'ldward (iicciv l orin^v Jiicl;;c orProl)a(c iii and lor llic ( oniUy ofSnlTolk. has
caused an Mihal)itanl ol llns ( oinmonwcallh lo l)c seal inio Sla\cry, \vc do pray your honoral)lc
lH)dics lo lake proper steps lor ihe removal ol tlie said Lornij; Ironi his olllce of Judge of
IMol)ale, and as duly lx)und will ever pray.'"
Several manuscript petitions explained at length why Loring deserved removal.
Seventy-seven Marlborough petitioners were ^^mortified and indignant^^ that a man
responsible for widows and orphans had descended to such degrading work." Thirty
Bostonians complained that Loiing had ^\leslroy|ed | the confidence and respect which
ought to be deserved" by a probate judge Torty-two from Mcthuen found him
''deficient in that integrity which is the glory of a judge." A Springlleld petition declared
that Loring "ha|dj by his oillcial conduct in connection with the I'ugitive Slave l-aw
Liberator. 11 July Nattomil Anfi Slavcry Slandanl, 29 July X'^'SA. Journal, 21 hel)niary
IXSS; Vigilance Coiunutlee ol Boston (I 'laneis Jackson, rieasurcr), Account Hook, faesiinile edilioiu
(lioslonian Society, 1924), 30, 32.
1855 Loring Petitions and Reinoiisliances, Legislative Papers, Massaehusetis Slate Archives.
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violated the moral sense of the people." A Greenfield petition decried the fact ^'that a
man of Massachusetts should be lost to all the better feelings of humanity."^^
Every county submitted petitions, as Table 1 shows below, except sparsely-
populated Dukes and Nantucket on the southeast coast. Worcester County, the
antislavery "heart of the commonwealth," predictably sent the most petitions and signed
the most names. In proportion to population, eastern Plymouth and Norfolk followed
Worcester as the leading anti-Loring counties, while the southeast and the west showed
comparatively little interest in removal. Boston petition rolls, meanwhile, were
augmented by outsiders. A visiting journalist exposed the practice after being invited to
add his name to a Bostonian petition. "If the truth were known," he wrote, "there would
be no doubt that more than half the names appended to these [Boston] petitions are
obtained in this dishonorable manner." Conservative Bostonians, led by the Suffolk bar,
denounced the statewide campaign as outside interference in a purely local matter. They
cited the paucity of Suffolk signatures, even when augmented by strangers, as proof that
Loring's immediate constituents did not desire his removal.
1855 Loring Petitions.
^' Fitchburg Reveille. 10 March 1855. The editor opposed Loring's removal on the grounds
"so ably presented" by Dana, as discussed in Chapter 5.
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Table 1: 1855 Petitions by County'
L^ounty 1855 Population Petitions
DdrnSlaDIc 4 114 0.3%
jjci Ksnirc ->Z. /VI J 82 0,2%
Rrictr^l O 486 0,5%
151,018 1
J
1,JO / 1 AO/1.0%
1 lalllVllll 11 6^9 1/1114 1 0.4%
Hampden 54,849 g 532 0.95%
Hampshire 35,485 3 120 0.3%
Middlesex 194.023 22 1.617 0.8%
Norfolk 94.367 12 1,313 1.4%
Plymouth 61.495 12 1.137 1.8%
Suffolk 171,841 17 2,439 1.4%
Worcester 149.516 31 2.861 1.9%
The second most popular form of petition was a women's petition drafted by
Anne Warren Weston. While her activist sisters sojourned in Europe, Anne Weston
assumed many of their antislavery responsibilities, including the publication of the annual
Liberty Bell and the organization of flindraising fairs. Of all the Westons, Anne was
considered the most radical feminist, but all the sisters shared a concern for the plight of
children. That concern led the Boston Female Anti-Slavery Society to take a leading
role in bringing Thomas Aves successflilly to trial in 1836, but the Westons' insistence
on a distinctly female role in public antislavery agitation contributed to the society's
Boston Evening Telegraph, 6 April 1855. While some of these figures differ from the count I
made of the existing petitions at the Massachusetts State Archives, 1 choose to present the earhcr count
in consideration of the possibiHty that some petitions were lost. Population statistics are taken from
Secretary of the Commonwealth. Abstract ofthe Census ofthe Commonwealth ofMassachusetts.
(Boston. 1857). 239 -40.
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dissolution four years later.''* While male petitioners considered Loring unfit for any
office, Weston, who never fUlly trusted his probity during Burns Week, considered him
particularly disqualified from any responsibility for children and mothers. "Had [he] been
a man suitable for the office of Judge of Probate," she wrote, "he [would] have refused
to sit as a Slave Law Commissioner."^^
The undersigned, women of Massachusetts, respectfully pray your honorable bodies to take
proper steps for the removal of Edward Greely Loring from his office of Judge of Probate, in
and for the County of Suffolk. They ask this action on the ground of his infamous decision of
the 2d of June last, under the Fugitive Slave Act. -- a decision which points him out as wholly
unfit for the duties of an office, which, taking cognizance of the rights of widows and orphans,
requires that its incumbent should be alike just and merciful. ^'^
"Every woman in Massachusetts owes it to outraged humanity," Weston wrote in
October, "that her name be found to the above or similar petition."'^ More than one-
fifth of all petitioners signed Weston's form Women, whichever form they signed, made
up between thirty-five and fifty per cent of all petitioners. Conventional petitions,
including the Garrisonian form, were segregated into columns for "Legal Voters" and
"Non-Voters," identifying women with children and unnaturalized aliens as political
nonpersons. In contrast, Weston's petition asserted that women and children had a
Clare Taylor, Women ofthe Anti-Slavery Movement: The Weston Sisters. (New York: St.
Martins. 1995), 10, 27 - 4.3, 99 - 107.
Liberator. 13 October 1854.
A Newburyport petition following this form had a note attached asking that the petition be
filled and delivered to Anne Warren Weston before Thanksgiving. 1855 Loring Petitions.
Liberator. 13 October 1854.
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distinct right to denounce public officials for moral failings. Inevitably, however,
Loring's defenders suggested that a petition campaign influenced so strongly by women
had no real claim on legislators' attention.
Petitioning was long recognized as a particularly feminine form of political
activity. Its pedigree dated back to the Book of Esther, which provided a model of
humble supplication before patriarchal rulers. According to one historian, "Petitions, by
their very nature, acknowledged the power of the rulers and the dependence of the
aggrieved." While male petitioners abandoned the humiliating posture of supplicants
soon after the Revolution, women continued to address their representatives as "Fathers
and Rulers" well into the nineteenth century. Despite this appearance of deference,
petitioning implied that representative government should respond to the will of the
governed, regardless of petitioners' sex. As elections focused more on moral questions
during the antebellum generation, many women asserted a right to advise government in
a field of universally-conceded female expertise. To deny that right, the abolitionist
Angelina Grimke warned, was to rule that women "are mere slaves, known only through
their masters."
In a conservative count, I identified at least 3.465 women's names on all 1855 petitions. Of
these. 2.837 signed women's petitions. On the other petitions. I identified as adult women only those
names in "Non-Voter" columns who had female first names or a "Miss'' or ' Mrs." attached to them.
This likely diminishes the actual total, since many names among non-voters gave only a first initial that
could indicate either gender. While 1 thought this conservatism compulsor\\ given the likelihood of
child, alien, and fugitive slave signatures. 1 believe that many more signers were adult women. Sec also
Telef^raph, 6 April 1855. for an analysis of the petitions by count>' and sex.
Jean Fagan Ycllin, Women and Sisters: The Anfis/avery F^eniinists in American Culture^
(New Haven: Yale University Press. 1989). 38 - 9: Ruth Bogin. "Petitioning and the New Moral
Economy of Post-Rcvolutionar\ America." William and Mary Quarterly. 3d ser.. 45 (July 1988); 420 -3;
Deborah Bingham Van Broekhoven. "Xet Your Names Be Enrolled:' Method and Ideology in Women's
Antislaverv Petitioning." in Jean F. Yellin and John C. Van Home. eds.. The Abolitionist Sisterhood:
Women \s Political Culture in Antebellum America. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1994). 179 - 99;
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The circulation of an exclusive women's petition in 1854 would be retrogressive
if, as one historian claims, women had largely abandoned gender-specific petitioning as
redolent of a supplicant posture no longer worthy of them. By 1 850, in most cases,
women simply added their names to men's petitions, albeit in the second-class "Non-
Voters" column.^" The Loring petitions, however, represented a more assertive political
attitude based on women's growing impatience with the old tactics of moral suasion. On
many fronts, efforts to educate citizens out of moral turpitude had proven inadequate to
the daunting task of wholesale cultural reform. As a result, women began advocating
coercive state action, and encouraged a private policy of ostracizing immoral men. They
demanded more freedom to divorce and ostracize wicked husbands from their children,
and encouraged the public shaming of drunkards and patrons of prostitutes."' Having
failed to shame Loring into resigning, Bay State women lobbied against him aggressively,
going from door to door, into workplaces, and, if given the chance, into the legislature."''^
Women's role in the anti-Loring campaign disturbed both antislavery
conservatives and die-hard Whigs. Female activism, from the Whiggish perspective,
introduced a dangerous emotional element into the properly dispassionate deliberations
John L, Haniniond. I'he Politics ofBenevolence: Revival Religion andAmerican Voting Behavior,
(Norwood: Ablc.x, 1979), 89.
^" Van Brockhoven. "'Let Your Names Be Enrolled,'" 188 - 96.
^' For women's embrace of the polilics of ostracism, sec Carroll Smith-Rosenberg. Disorderly
Conduct: Visions ofdender in I'ictorian America. (New York: Knopf, 1985), 115 - 18. Women's
demand for a right to divorce intemperate husbands, as discussed in Blanche Glassman Hersh. The
Slavery ofSex: Feminists and Abolitionists in America. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois
Press, 1978), 49, 67, endorsed a similar concept of ostracism for the good of women and the race.
^" Lori B. Gin/burg, 'Moral Suasion is Moral Balderdash:" Women, Politics, and Social
Activism in the 185()s," Journal ofAmerican History 73 (December 1986): 601 - 22; Jane H. Pease and
William H. Pease, "Confrontation and Abolition in the 1850s," Journal ofAmerican History 58 (March
1971): 927; Stangc. Patterns ofAntislavery, 141.
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of representative goveriiineiit Objeclioiis to excessive feiiiiiiiiie emotion had been pari
ofthe briefagainst abolitionism since the l8.U)s. liy bombarding homes with mass-
produced, sensational propaganda, and by insisting that sympathy with sulVering slaves
justtfied lemale activism, abolitionists seemed, to conservative men, to subvert the
domestic patriarch^ authority as the political representative ofhis family Within the
abolition movement itseli; religious conservatives condemned public collaboration
between the sexes as dangerously promiscuous, linally forcing a schism over the issue in
the 1840s. Just as hostile to female activism were patrician I'ree-Soilers like Richard
Henry Dana, Loring\s later champion, Whiggish Know-Nothings interpreted female
petitions agamst Loring as puiely iriational opinion, ^^with no special knowledge ofthe
subject, no careful examination, no weighing ofthe pros and cons, hearing only a one-
sided argument on an exciting and dillicull subject;^ l-rom this piejudiced perspective,
all female petitions were suspect/"^
Earlier anxieties over tlie mainpuLiUon of female eniolions arc examined in l,eon;nd K.
Rieh.'uds. "(IcfUlcmcn oj l^ropcrty ninl Standing: " Anti-Abolition Mobs in Jacksonian
. Imcrica, (New
York: Oxford IJnixcrsily Press. 1970). SX - (>1, ;uul Yellin, Women and Sisters, ^ - 3. llcrsh. Slavery of
Sex, 69. discusses the concepi of virtual re|)resen!a(ion of women In (heir luisbaiuls Kelij^ious
objections to leuKile aclu ism are discussed in Yellin. W omen and Sisters, 4S. and Jane 11 Pease and
William 1 1. Pease. Ladies, \\ ives, and W enches: ( Iwice and ( \>nstraint in Antebellum ( 'harleston and
Hoston. (( hapel Kill University ofNorlh (^uolina Press. P)92). 129. On the olhei hand, Paula Baker.
" I'he Domeslicalion ol Polilics, 17S0 - 1920." in Vieki L. Ruiz and IMlen C aiol DuUors, eds . / neijual
Sisters: A Multi ( ^tdtund Reader in United States WOmen's History, 2d. ed,. (Nev\ York Ronllcdi'e,
1994), 9.1, and Jane! /ollinger (iiele. Two Paths to II omen \s lujuality: 'temperance, Sullra\ie. and the
()n\iins ofModern b'emnnsm. (New York; rvvayne. I99.S). 55. emphasize alx)lilionisnrs role for women
as an allernaluc to male clerical supeiA ision Dana's distaste for lemale reformers is asserted in
Shapiro. Dana, 29 - 10. Traveller, 1 ^ April 1X55. lias Salem Repiesenlali\e Devereaux's refusal lo
"accept these petilions as the niu|nes(ioned voice of Massachusells " The role of sympaihy in feiniiiisl
and anlislaveiy activism is considered in Yellin. W omen and Sisters, 12 - M. and l .li/ahelh H (Mark.
The Sacred Rights ofthe Weak:' Pain. S\mpa!li>, and Ihe ( ullure of indi\ idnal Rii'jKs in An(el>elhiin
America." J<mrnal oj American History X2 (Sepleml)er 1995): 4(>3 - 9.1. especially 172 - 4, 4X2 - 1.
I(>9
By comparison, African-American petitioners attracted far less criticism from
conservatives. In Massachusetts, adult black males were citizens and voters. In the
cities, blacks were highly organized and actively involved in assisting ftigitive slaves.
Strong organizational networks among blacks and between the races made it certain that
petitions were circulated in black churches and neighborhoods. While no petition
explicitly addressed black people's particular objections to a proslavery probate judge, it
is likely that several petitions were circulated and signed exclusively by blacks Racism
may have been implicit in some complaints against the ignorance of the petitioners, but
sexism was more explicit among Loring's Whiggish defenders.^"*
At the end of 1854, however, it became clear that the inherently hostile Whigs
would never see the removal petitions. As activists solicited signatures into the autumn,
the Know-Nothing party, known formally as the American party, surged to an
unexpected landslide victory in its first statewide campaign, winning 63% of the
gubernatorial vote while securing the entire state senate and, according to conservative
estimates, 98% of the lower house. The 1855 legislature boasted one Democrat, one
member of the nascent Republican party, six Whigs, and 41 1 Know-Nothings. '^ Most
observers knew little more about the new party, or its elected representatives, than that it
See James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton. "The AfTirmation of Manhood: Black
Garrisonians in Antebellum Boston." and Roy E. Finkenbine. "Boston s Black Churches: Institutional
Centers of the Antisla\er\ Mo\ ement." in Donald M. Jacobs, ed.. Courage and Conscience: Black and
White Abolitionists in Boston. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 199.1). 127 - 54. 169 -
90.
While most histories protest uncertainty about the identities of the few opposition
representativ es, contemporan newspapers consistently singled out Hiram C. Brow n of Tolland.
Hampden County, as the lone Democrat, and D. B. Sisson of Westporl. Bristol County, as the lone
Republican Tra\>eller, 14 November 1854. and Fall River .V£'vi'.v, 16 November 1854. are representative.
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opposed the political influence of Irish Catholics. Modern historians of Know-
Nothingism often seem just as uncertain about what the movement stood for; whether it
was even nativist at heart has been questioned Since Loring's enemies gathered
signatures in the midst of this political tidal wave, it is fair to ask whether the petition
campaign was representative of the sentiments that suddenly thrust Know-Nothings into
power.
Know-Nothindsm and Local Political Culture
Historians continue to debate the Know-Nothings' position on slavery While
Tyler Anbinder's prize-winning monograph on Nativism and Slavery (]992) credited
Know-Nothing success to popular antislavery feeling, and credited northern Know-
Nothingism with an antislavery ideology, two local studies. Dale Baum's Civil War
Party System (1984) and John R. Mulkern's Know-Nothing Party ofMassachusetts
(1990) question the linkage between antislavery opinion and the secret party's fortunes.
Baum finds no significant role for antislavery opinion in the 1854 landslide Instead, he
finds that antislavery voters, defined as past supporters of the Free-Soil party, avoided
the polls, Mulkern, meanwhile, finds little proof of mass antislavery sentiment even
after 1854. Both authors supplement their statistics with random quotes that
Baum, Civil-War Party System. 32 - 7. William E. Gicnapp. Origins ofthe Republican
Party, IS52-I857. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987). 138. challenges Baum's purported
segregation of antislavery and nativism.
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demonstrate individual Know-Nothings' disregard for the slavery issue.'' Of the two,
Baum is more interested in distinguishing between nativist and antislavery electorates,
while Mulkern argues that working-class desires for an interventionist government were
the real basis of Know-Nothingism Both, however, base their analyses of Know-
Nothingism on oversimplified interpretations of local party politics.
Mulkern bases his low estimate of Bay State voters' antislavery enthusiasm on
the poor performance of the Free-Soil party in 1853 and the Republican party's
disappointing showing in 1855 To use the electoral strength of the Free-Soilers as a
measure of antislavery opinion depends on the premise that every antislavery voter
automatically voted Free-Soil. Not to vote Free-Soil, according to this logic, was to
show indifference, at best, to slavery. This ignores the fact that the Free-Soil vote in
local elections was decided by other factors besides the slavery issue The party was
split between Coalition reformers and conservative patricians, and sent decidedly mixed
signals to the electorate. In 1853, the reformer Henry Wilson headed the state ticket in
support of the new constitution, while party elders like Adams, Palfrey, and the Hoars
publicly denounced it. Rather than endorse Wilson, Adams wrote in Palfrey's name for
governor on his ballot. Other patricians simply left the gubernatorial line blank. Their
opposition to reformers within their party helped Whiggery defeat the reform
constitution. In 1855, the Republican party was similarly compromised by its rejection
A hardy perennial in the historiography of Know-Nothingism is the nativist mayor of
Worcester's complaint about too much "talk about rum and niggers." This has been handed down from
generation to generation as proof of the order's general indifference to the slavcr> question, and appears
latel> in Baum. ( '/\ // li ar Party System, 31-2. Given the voting behavior of that city's 1855
representatives, however, the prominence given the mayor" s complaint seems to ignore the forest for a
tree.
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of local issues in favor of a single-issue free-soil platform. That year, many antislavery
voters stuck with Know-Nothingism rather than embrace a party demonstrably
indifferent, if not implicitly opposed to local reform. Party voting, then, is an inaccurate
barometer of antislavery opinion in Massachusetts.^*
The Know-Nothings should be judged by their acts in power In 1 855 their
representatives passed the north's strictest personal liberty law, albeit over a fellow
partisan's veto. The same legislature voted overwhelmingly to remove Loring from his
probate court, but was thwarted by another veto. Almost one-third of the lower house,
122 members, wanted Theodore Parker for their chaplain, a far larger bloc than
supported Parker when the legislature was more clearly Republican and therefore,
purportedly, more decidedly antislavery
.
"^ These manifestations of a radical antislavery
position rarely add honor to the Know-Nothing record, because historians often echo
contemporary suspicions that antislavery Know-Nothings joined the secret lodges solely
to convert them into an exclusively antislavery movement. From this perspective, any
Charles Francis Adams Diary, 7 November 1853, Adams Papers; Mulkern. Know-Nothing
Party, 81-2: 'To argue lhal Know-Nolhingism in Massachusells was a manifeslalion of anli-slavcrj
conviclions is lo say thai (hose convictions could produce a landslide vole in 1854 bul nol enough (o
allracl as much as a third of the turnout before, or the year after." Mulkern writes. His statement
implies a minimal estimate of the impact of the Burns trial as well as a simplistic identincation of
antislavery parties with antislavery opinion. Few of Mulkern s colleagues, in any event, would argue
that antislaver> opinion alone produced the 1854 landslide.
Post, 5 January 1855: Marblehead People 's Advocate, 6 January 1855; Springrield
Repuhlican, 5 Januar\ 1855; James W. Stone to Charles Sumner, 13 January 1855, Sunmer Papers,
microfilm. Houghton Librar\ . Harv ard University. The absence of a roll-call vote for the chaplainate,
w hich was decided by a secret ballot, deprives historians of a convenient hst of presumably hard-core
antislaverv' men in the 1855 legislature.
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Know-Nothing opposed to slavery was a proto-Republican, and thus unrepresentative of
authentic nativism/***
Some antislavery activists did join Know-Nothing lodges in the hope of steering
the surging movement against the Slave Power.'*^ Some found nativism regrettable, if
only because it was politically inexpedient in a region with a burgeoning immigrant
population, but few voters felt compelled to choose between antislavery and anti-
Catholicism. Know-Nothingism exploited widespread frustration with existing parties
and shared anxieties over the influence of slavery, the Catholic clergy, and local elites in
state politics. Loring's abolitionist enemies differed subtly from Know-Nothings on
issues of racial, religious, and political doctrine, but shared concerns over the political
crisis in Massachusetts led to considerable agreement between abolitionists and nativists
on the steps necessary to redeem their state.
Both sides agreed, for instance, that Irish immigrants played an important role in
the crisis. Know-Nothings and abolitionists can not easily be pigeonholed into
diametrically opposed positions on questions of race or ethnicity While abolitionists and
Free-Soilers denounced prejudice against color, many shared the era's pervasive anti-
Irish bias. The secret order itself rarely dabbled in racial theory, and proposed no
An example ofthc attribulion oranlislavcry legislation to Ihe burrowing of Frcc-Soilers from
within is Siracusa, A Mechanical People, 171; "There is no other explanation," Siracusa writes.
Mulkern. Kno\v-Nothin}i Party, 92. argues paradoxically that, while voters were unmotivated by
antislavery concerns, they elected clever Free-Soilcrs who manipulated "unsophisticated'^ and "inept"
lodge members. A contcmporar\ example of this view is Edward Everett, Diar\', S December 1854,
Edward Everett Papers. Massachusetts Historical Society.
^' Daniel W. Alvord to Frank Bird. 8 November 1854, Bird Papers; James W. Slonc to Charles
Sumner, 13. 31 Januar> 1855, Sumner Papers.
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hierarchy of racial virtues. Negrophobia was absent from most Know-Nothing
propaganda, and black Bay Staters benefited from Know-Nothing legislation integrating
public transportation and education/' Most Know-Nothings opposed the Irish or (less
commonly) the Germans on sectarian or political grounds rather than out of pure racial
hate. Deference to Pope and priesthood, they believed, inclined Catholic immigrants to
vote en bloc on the command of the local clergy, ill-suiting them to American politics.
At the same time, a smaller group of Catholic dissidents against tyrannical regimes in
Ireland and Europe seemed dangerously radical/*' In either case, however, most nativists
thought that Catholics could be redeemed. Although Know-Nothings debated the time
required, most assumed that foreigners could eventually be taught republican conduct/*"*
Abolitionists often were more pessimistic about racial character. Theodore
Parker expounded a romanticized notion of racial struggle that pitted the virile, creative
Anglo-Saxons against Southerners debased by a torpid climate, dependence on slavery,
'^'^ Anbinder. ;V^7//v7A7// a/7^/.S7m'erv, 120, 136; Hersh. .SVm^erv o/&x 128. African-Americans,
for their part, endorsed Know-Nothingism with cautious enthusiasm. Worcester journalist William J.
Watkins claimed that most Bay State blacks voted for the secret party in 1854. Worcester Know-
Nothings welcomed Watkins to a victory rally that November, applauding his inclusion of blacks among
"native Americans
' and his mockerv of an Irish heckler who complained that his people were treated
worse than blacks despite their hard work in building the Bay State economy. Watkins replied that
"those who build our railroads [the Irish] and those who fill our alms-houses are intimately related.'''' At
the same time. Watkins warned his white audience against compromising "doughface'" tendencies
within their movement. See two articles by Watkins in Frederick Douglass's Paper. 1 December 1854.
'^^ Know-Nothing governor Henry J. Gardner saw the oppressed, undereducated Irish as both
too radical and too naive to have the vote after the normal naturalization period. While immigrants
were rightly "enthusiastic for the regeneration of |their| impoverished island." Gardner noted ironically
that Irish voters were drav\ n b\ "laws of the human mind as inevitable as they are constant" to the party
bearing the "magical and irresistible" label Democracy without realizing that American Democrats were
bulwarks of slavery. Henr>' J. Gardner, 1857 Innaugural Address in Massachusetts, 1857 Acts and
Resolves\ (Boston. 1857), 707 - 8,
'^^
Dale T. Knobel. Paddy and the Republic: Ethnicity and Nationality in Antebellum America,
(Middleton, Ct.; Weslcyan University Press. 1986), 69. 130.
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and racial intermixing. Wendell Phillips attributed American prosperity to "the genius
and energy of the Yankee race" rather than to continental markets made possible by the
Union. Harriet Beecher Stowe asserted that "the Anglo-Saxon race has been intrusted
[with] the destinies of the world, during its pioneer period of struggle and conflict, [to
which] its stern, inflexible, energetic elements were well adapted " Other antislavery
women frequently expressed "Yankee chauvinism" that belittled Irish immigrants, who
were often their servants. Protestant chauvinism also colored anti-Irish attitudes, as it
did among nativists, and especially among those perfectionists and disunionists most
likely to see themselves as saved and others almost irredeemably corrupt. Abolitionists
often seemed more ready than the Know-Nothings to identify themselves, and their New
England community, as a culture distinct from and inherently superior to all others.
Nativists were certainly chauvinist themselves, but tended to identify more with an
idealized Protestant nation than with a romanticized Anglo-Saxon heritage."*^
If abolitionists were more racist, in the modern sense, than Know-Nothings, they
nonetheless opposed nativist plans to limit immigrants' voting rights. Likely influenced
Richard Slolkin. The Fatal Environment: The Myth of the Frontier in the A}ie of
Industrialization. (Middlcton. Ct.: Wcslcyan University Press, 1985), 231 - 2: Michael Fellman,
"Theodore Parker and Ihe Abolilionist Role in the 185()s/' Journal ofAmerican History 61 (December
1974): 676 -7, 680: Paul Teed. 'Racial Nalionalism and its Challengers: Theodore Parker. John Rock,
and Ihe Antislaverv Movement." Ov/7 War History A\ (June 1995): 142- 60. Phillips s speech at the
1857 Disunion Convention appears in Liberator, 30 January 1857; "Who shall say that the same
[Yankcel blood, with only New England for its anchorage," he contended, 'could not drag the wealth of
the West into its harbors?" Harriet Beecher Stowe. Uncle Tom \s Cabin, quoted in Ernest Lee Tuveson,
Redeemer Nation: The Idea ofAmerica s Millennial Role. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1968). 152. Stephen E. Mai/.lish. "The Meaning of Nativism and Ihe Crisis of the Union: The Know-
Nothing Movement in the Antebellum North," in John J. Kushma and Stephen E Mai/lish. eds.. Fssays
on American Antebellum Politics, IH4() - IS6(K (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1982), 166 - 98.
offers ample evidence of Ihe anti-Celtism of many antislavery activists. Hersh, Slavery ofSex, 125-8,
discusses nativism among feminists.
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by Lysander Spooner and like-minded radicals, they believed that government required
the consent of everyone it governed. For the same reason, many abolitionists demanded
women's suffrage during the 1850s, most notably through a petition addressed to the
1853 constitutional convention. That issue aside, nativists and abolitionists agreed that
unassimilated immigrants presented a threat to American or New England civilization.
Whether nurture or nature made Irishmen a threat, the answer, in 1854, was a call to
Protestant nationalism.
Know-Nothingism blossomed at a moment identified by historians of
humanitarian reform as a transition from a policy of apolitical moral suasion to more
aggressive lobbying of government, and a greater readiness to employ coercion for moral
ends. Temperance advocates, for instance, now demanded state suppression of the liquor
trade. Erstwhile non-resistants in the abolition movement called more frequently for
forceful resistance to slavery in the South and slave-hunting in the North. Know-
Nothingism, in turn, was the next recourse of home missionary and tract societies in the
face of apparent Irish intractability and a new aggressiveness on the part of Catholic
proselytizers."*^
The secret party's object, defined most broadly, was a Protestant state. How
Protestantism might regulate economic and social relations was open to dispute. Labor
activists and radical democrats often used Christian idiom to suggest an inherent
Christian critique of increasing inequality and class conflict within antebellum society. A
Ray Allen Billinglon. The Protestant Crusade, 1800-1860: A Study ofthe Origins of
American Nativism. (New York: Macmillan, 1938; reprint. New York; Rinchart. 1952), 291 - 5.
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more Christian society, they thought, would be led by virtuous, unselfish workingmen/^
While Coalitionists embraced much of this position, some Protestant thinkers distrusted
the politici/ation of religion Too great an emphasis on sectarian politics, they feared,
might distract voters from the greater imperative of achieving individual salvation, ^"fo
hold forth [on J the importance of religion to the temporal well-being of men, or the
tendency of religion of Christ to uphold republican institutions,
. . . may or may not be
well,'^ wrote the Baptist educator Francis Wayland, with unintended irony, in 1853, "but
to do either or all of them certainly falls short of the idea of the Apostle [Paul], when he
determined to know nothing [emphasis added] among men but Jesus Christ and him
crucified A Worcester preacher, addressing the Massachusetts I lome Missionaiy
Society during ^"^liurns Week," struck a similarly ambiguous chord.
Wc hear much of popular sovereignly iu (he Icrrilorics. bul the sovcrcigulv which is needed is
divine sov ereignly nnd popiilar obedience We hear much of (he "Know Nolhings" bu( (he
Know Nollnngs lha( we should send ror(h are (hose who are de(ernuned (o know nollnng bul
Jesus Chrisl and him crucified.
^ La/crow. Religion and the Working-class, 11. 52, 175 - 7, 180, 185, 191 - 2.
Mark Y. Hanley, Beyond A (Ivistian (\)mmonwealth: The Protestant Quarrel with the
American Republic, IH3()-IS6(K (diapel llill: University ofNorlh Carohna Press. 1994), 32 - 57, 89 -
124. Wayland is quoled on page 38. Given llanlcy's concern wi(h Ihe tension belween political and
religious imperatives, his failure to discuss Protestani criticisms ofKnow-Nothingism is surprising.
^^Independent, 8 June 1854 Protestant skepticism about reform is discussed in Richard A.
Carwardine, l(van\ielicals and I'ohtics m Antebellum America. (New Haven: Yale University l^ress,
1993). 124, and Ilanley. Iiey(md a ( 'hristian ( \mimon\\ ealth. 32 - 57. Daniel Walker Howe. ^The
Evangelical Movement and Political (^uKure in Ihe North during the Second Party Systcm;\A>///77^// of
American llistorv 77 (March 1991); 1227, describes a more optimistic perspective.
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Many Protestants who may have otherwise distrusted politics nonetheless
considered New England, if not all America, a rare haven of true religion in a fallen
world, and a safe platform for evangelism. The threat to this haven presented by
Catholic immigration or Slave-Power hegemony galvanized a self-consciously Protestant
resistance. Politicized Protestantism, however, divided, like the faith itself, into
reforming and separatist tendencies. While some Know-Nothings sought to redeem the
whole Union through a political revival, others sympathized, to a limited extent, with the
"Come-Outer" spirit of the disunionist Garrisonians. The antislavery, states-rights
nativists, best exemplified by the "Know-Somethings" of 1855, mostly rejected the
abolitionists' secessionist agenda, but insisted, with the Garrisonians, that Massachusetts
possessed a distinct and inalienable moral sovereignty regardless of the Union For
them, Massachusetts was the true vessel of Protestant culture, and the first object of
their loyalty, even against federal authority.^"
Against the antislavery nativists, a faction of Protestant nationalists revered the
entire Union as the vessel of true religion. To them, the slavery question was pointlessly
divisive. The youthfiil Edward W. Hinks, publisher of the weekly Boston Know-
No/hing and American Crusader, opposed all efforts to combine nativism and free-soil
' Kraditor. Means and Ends. 81. 102 - 3: Hersh, Slavery ofSex, 25: Perry. Radical
Abolitionism. 92 - 128; CliflFord S. Griffin. Their Brother 's Keepers: Moral Stewardship in the United
States, ISOO - 1865, (Rutgers. 1960; reprint. Westport. Ct.: Greenwood Press. 1983). 154 - 60: John R.
McKivigan. The War Against Pro-Slavery Religion: Abolitionists and the Northern Churches. 1S30-
1865. ( Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1984), 66 - 7. 93 - 1 10: Mark Voss-Hubbard. "The Political
Culture of Emancipation: Morality. Politics, and the State in Garrisonian Abolitionism, 1854 - 1863,"
Journal ofAmerican Studies 29 (August 1995); 161 - 3, 168 - 9.
^' BiWingXon. Protestant Crusade, 279-80; Christian Inquirer. 29 July 1854. Tuveson,
Redeemer Nation, is a detailed discussion of America's status as a chosen nation.
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politics. Although he personally opposed the Nebraska bill, Hinks believed that
antislavery agitation only undermined national Protestant solidarity against the real.
Catholic enemy. 'The American [i.e., Know-Nothing] cause is a great, a good, a
glorious, a national cause," according to the Know-Nothing, "Let alone the slavery
question. We have no business with it, nor it with us. It is an outside issue." The
Know-Nothing, however, was aimed at a national rather than a local audience. As an
1855 legislator, Hmks found that the Fugitive Slave Law could not be dismissed as an
outside issue. Although he voted with a minority of Know-Nothings against a personal
liberty bill, the nationalist editor supported Loring's removal.
The fugitive issue compelled nativists to choose between masters; the state or the
Union The Loring question especially compelled them to define the threat that all saw
confronting both state and Union. Nationalist and states-rights nativists agreed that
Massachusetts and the Union alike were imperiled by a combination of dangerous
influences from within and without. On the hierarchy of the conspiracy, however, and
the keys to its defeat, Know-Nothings again did not agree.
^" Boston Know-Nothing andAmerican Crusader. 12 September, 16 December 1854. Copies of
the Know-Nothing exist at the Massachusetts Historical Society and the Waltham Public Library , but no
complete run is available. Troy Northern Budget, 24 May 1854. reports that Hinks boasted of a national
circulation of over 100.000. but the Troy paper's Boston correspondent thought that. "As Izeros] are
sometimes understood to mean nothing." two or three zeros should be cut from the Know Nothing 's
estimate. See also Liberator. 17 November 1854. for excerpts from the Know-Nothing under the
"Refuge of Oppression" heading. Hinks's voting behav ior is recorded in Massachusetts General Court.
1855 House Journal. 1721 - 6. Appendix 14. manuscript. Massachusetts State Archives. He also
supported a failed amendment giving Loring a grace period in which to resign. Hinks otherwise
supported the ten-hour bill and representation by districts, and opposed the "Maine Law" and jurors"
right to interpret the la«
. He missed the vote on the 21 -year naturalization bill. Hinks"s Unionist ardor
led him to volunteer his serv ices to fight secessionism in December 1860. He ended his military career
as a brigadier general.
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In many ways, Loring was an ideal target for the conspiracy theorists among
Know-Nothings and aboHtionists aUke. As Burns's judge, he had presided over an
unholy coalition of forces that had humiliated Massachusetts. On the orders of the
federal slave-power, local Democrats captured Burns by dubious means and turned him
over to a Whig judicial establishment that had served slavery long and eagerly under the
Curtii. Worst of all, these spoilsmen and aristocrats relied on armed Irishmen to enforce
their will on a hostile population.
During the 1850s, critics noticed new Whiggish efforts to appeal to Irish voters.
In fact, Whiggery had never entirely given up on the Irish. During the Jacksonian period,
Whigs tried ineffectually to win Irish support for protective tariffs by arguing that free
trade only benefited the hated English. Winfield Scott's clumsy avowals of love for the
Irish brogue did little to help his 1852 Presidential campaign, but the 1853 constitutional
referendum showed Bay Staters distressing signs of an Irish alliance with Whiggery.
That year, Whigs appealed directly to Irish voters against a proposed ban on state
funding for parochial schools. Urban-oriented Whigs and immigrants both opposed the
reform constitution's expansion of rural towns' power in the legislature. Whig papers
had warned "every foreigner" that the Coalition plan would degrade immigrants "below
the Slaves of the South. Ambitious Catholics now saw benefits in corporate
representation and the general ticket system. The convert Orestes A. Brownson told
Lowell's immigrants to stick with the existing system and eventually claim all the city's
seats in the legislature rather than accept the districting of cities proposed by the
Banc Patriot, 11 November 1853.
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Coalition, and with it a minimization of their political potential. The radical Free-Soil
editor William S. Robinson was as alarmed by Brownson's comments as any Know-
Nothing. With the nativists, Robinson worried that Catholic voters mobilized by
Whiggery might soon seize power for their own ends. For the moment, however, their
alliance only strengthened the third perceived enemy of Massachusetts: the Slave
Power.''
During the Burns trial, as abolition broadsides angrily emphasized, Irish militia
companies conspicuously volunteered to secure the execution of the fugitive law. Celts
also made up much of Marshal Freeman's emergency bodyguard, a unit that routinely
intimidated and humiliated Bostonians during the trial. Rumors abounded that Irish
gangs had vowed to avenge blows suffered in the failed rescue by mobbing or killing
Theodore Parker and Wendell Phillips. These reports, factual or not, seemed to confirm
abolitionist and nativist convictions that the Boston Irish were willing, mercenary agents
of the federal Slave Power To one Know-Nothing journalist, this was inevitable, since
"African slavery ... is the offspring ofRome." "Roman Catholicism and slavery [are]
alike founded and supported on the basis of ignorance and tyranny," Norfolk County
nativists declared, "and [are] therefore, natural allies in every warfare against liberty and
enlightenment." In sharp contrast to Edward Hinks's Protestant nationalism, these
antislavery Know-Nothings concluded that ''there can exist no real hostility to Roman
Particular troubling to one Coalitionist (and eventual Republican) was the alleged boast of
Bishop Fitzpatrick of Boston that he had rallied his diocese against the constitution and its promised
division of the cities because he didn t want his charges to engage in "active, personal politics
"
Boutwell. Recollections. 1: 220. See also Thomas H. O'Connor. "Irish Votes and Yankee Cotton: The
Constitution of 1853," Proceedings ofthe Massachusetts Historical Society 95 (1983): 88 - 99.
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Catholicism which does not embrace slavery, its natural co-worker m opposition to
freedom and republican institutions."^^
While anti-Irish feeling long predated the Bums case, the events of the
"Pentecostal Season" clearly contributed to a consolidation of nativist and antislavery
opinion. For many observers. Burns Week provided concrete proof that Irish Catholics
acted in exactly the brutishly servile manner that nativists had long expected. Many of
the more nationalist Know-Nothings, however, had mixed feelings about Burns's role in
their electoral coup. Honest observers, their Unionist scruples aside, acknowledged the
trial's significance. When Know-Nothings proposed forbidding the use of militia for
police purposes, and the abolition of Irish companies, their spokesman insisted that their
demands "had nothing to do with the Burns affair," but acknowledged that "the facts of
that case did undoubtedly revive and increase the objections long felt against the
system." The Burns case probably had the same relation to the Know-Nothing triumph
in general.
Radical Free-Soilers, too, noted a conjunction of Whiggery, Catholicism, and
slave-hunting during Burns Week. Robinson observed that "The Irish people, under the
55
Troy Northern Budget, 31 May 1854: Bee, 1 1 August 1855: Billington, Protestant Crusade,
425; Anbinder, Nativism and Sla\>er\\ 45: James Tracy. 'The Rise and Fall of the Know-Nothings in
Quincy/^ HistoricalJoumal of Western Massachusetts 16 (June 1988): 18 n. 58.
G. C. Beckvvith, "Militia Reform;" in William S. Robinson. Political Scrapbook. 8: 53.
Boston Public Library
.
Beckwith's article denied charges that petitions demanding militia reform were
motivated primarily by the Burns case. i.e.. that it was an abolition scheme. While insisting that the
reform agenda predated Burns. Beckwith noted that many abolitionists refused to sign the reform
petitions because, as pacifists, they weren't content with anything less than the total abolition of all
militia. While Beckwith claimed that reaction to Bums "might all be entirely ignored" when legislators
considered the petitions, he himself referred to the case repeatedly. Compare his weighing of Burns's




lead of Brownson and the [Boston Catholic weekly! PHoL have shown themsel
every occasion willing to do the base work of the slave-holders.
. , [TJhey have always
been the subservient tools of a despotism meaner and more cruel than the one from
which they made their escape " Robinson's rhetoric echoed the Nortblk Know-Nothing
platform; whoever opposed Catholic influence in Massachusetts must attack the national,
slavery-driven two-party system that pandered to immigrants in return tbr votes.
Antislavery writers, however, warned that a national. Unionist party could not
accomplish this Only a Northern or a Massachusetts party, they admonished, could
effectively rally the free states against the Slave Power."
Among Know-Nothings, a crucial disagreement arose over the best strategy for
defending Massachusetts. While the regular Know-Nothings and the '^Know-
Something" faction that emerged in 1855 agreed that slavery and Catholicism together
menaced the commonwealth, they differed over which was the weaker link in the chain
of oppression. The regular Know-Nothings believed that denying immigrants the
franchise during a period of acculturalization would undercut slavery's political power by
stripping the Democratic party of a large bloc of voters, while limiting Catholicism's
political inlluence. The Know-Somethings argued nearly the reverse position: Catholic
political power depended on a system of national parties that inevitably encouraged
compromises with slavery. Whether Whigs or Democrats ruled, the Slave Power used
federal patronage to make immigrants loyal to the Union first rather than to their state or
Commonwealth, ?>(). .31 May, 23 August 1X54; M;ii/,lish. "Mc.ining of Nalivisiu," 173 -80;
Tildcn G. Edclslciii, Sirange Knllmsiasm: A Lijc oj 'ihomas W ciitworlh I li^iiiinson. (New Haven: Yale
Uiiiversity Press. 1%S), 163.
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es in
community Only through the victory of a ^'Northern ' party with antislavery pnncpl
a national election would the federal patronage ties binding immigrants to slavery be
broken.^^ Nativists' first priority, the Know-Somethings believed, was to fight the Slave
Power and its local minions, and to end Bay State subservience to a corrupted federal
regime. Their insistence that the Slave Power fall first led some regular Know-Nothings,
and the Protestant nationalists especially, to charge that the antislavery faction
underestimated Catholic influence as a menace unto itself
Crucial to nativists' strategic disagreements was their ftindamental conftision
over what community commanded their primaiy loyahies. Protestant nationalists
believed that Catholicism threatened the entire nation; some concluded from this that
sectional conflicts had to be set aside for the sake of a united front against Romanism.
They may have deplored the fugitive law, but they also probably considered it a
secondary matter during the current cultural struggle. Antislavery nativists, led by the
Know-Somethings, shared with abolitionists and radical Free-Soilers a stronger
identification with Massachusetts and with New England culture, and a greater tendency
to see the Southerner as well as the Irishman as a dangerous alien. For Loring's
persecutors, the honor and moral sovereignty of Massachusetts was the main
consideration. Many embraced Know-Nothingism with the hope that the new party
would provide an authentic voice for Bay State sentiments where Democrats and Whigs
James W. Stone to Charles Sumner, 3 Februar\ 1855. Sumner Papers, describes the
emergence of Know-Somethingism as the faction of"the three planks." opposition to slavery;
committment to Protestant values; and temperance. A hostile description appears in the Democratic
Post, 10 May 1855.
Bee. 19 June. 20. 21 July, 7 - 9 August 1855.
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had failed. The Know-NotWngs, however, were not the only party claiming to represent
the aggrieved state m 1 854. Regardless of whether voters believed that Massachusetts
needed representation against Catholic incursions, Slave-Power tyranny, or its own
oppressive elites, this search for authenticity dominated state politics in 1854.
Finding A Politiral Vnir^
Fresh from their 1853 triumphs, Massachusetts Whiggery still presumed to speak
for the state's best interests during the crises of 1 854, After opposing the Nebraska bill
in Congress, the Whigs anointed themselves the sole reliable representative ofNorthern
opinion. Even as they spoke, however, the Boston Websterites lashed out at the men
who had resisted Burns's extradition and vilified Loring. The Curtii tried to evict
Theodore Parker from his pulpit at the Boston Music Hall, which they partially
subsidized. When the directors refused their demand, the clan withdrew their
patronage.''' In his judicial capacity, Benjamin Curtis instructed a grand jury to indict
Parker and Wendell Phillips for obstructing a federal law, even though neither had
attacked the Court House. In effect, Curtis construed their speeches at Faneuil Hall as
incitements to riot Benjamin F. Hallett, the Democratic federal attorney and erstwhile
enemy of domineering judges, would argue the government's case before Curtis. As
Parker saw it, "The Boston Bens" meant "to shut up the meeting house" by jailing
Independent. 13 July 1854; Liberator, 23 June. 7 Julv 1854; National Anti-S/avery Standard
24 June 1854.
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abolition agitators. To Parker's statewide following, Know-Nothings included, the
impending trial exposed an alliance of Whigs and Democrats against antislavery
opinion.^'
While Know-Nothings predictably denounced an alliance of Catholicism and
slavei7, Edward L. Keyes, a leading Free-Soil Coalitionist, tellingly related the Catholic
menace to the stalled campaign for local reform. Keyes considered Whiggery as much a
natural ally of Catholicism as the Slave-Power.
ITjhc last State election in Massachusetts. - when the Whig party sold itself to Romanism for
the purpose of defeating a new constitution. - is itself sufficient ev idence |of| the centralizing
tendency of Catholicism,
j italics addcd| Such a tendency is dangerous to a republic
dangerous to liberty Individuality of thought is necessary to the preservation of liberty and
liberal government. Catholics are forbidden to think, or to read, or to learn, unless it be done in
accordance with priestly views.*^'
In 1853, Keyes considered judicial reform a necessary restraint on a Whig
oligarchy that had already betrayed Massachusetts to the Slave Power by surrendering
Thomas Sims. He believed that Whiggery aspired to the same perfect control over the
working class that priests allegedly enjoyed over parishioners, and Southerners held over
slaves. This went entirely against Whiggery's declared aspiration to liberate individuals
from mindless group loyalty. Their latter-day catering to Irish Catholics and Southern
slaveholders fatally belied Whiggish pretensions both as defenders of individual liberty
Theodore Parker to Francis Jackson. 18 November 1854, and Edmund Quincy to Richard
Webb. 24 October 1854. in William Lloyd Garrison, 1805-1879: The Story ofHis Life Told By His
Children. 4 v ols., (New York, 1885). .1: 410 n. \ : Monthly Law Reporter, n.s.. 7 (August 1854), 211 -16.
" Dedham Gazette, 19 August 1854.
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and as tiilnnies oflhc co.n.nonwcalih and Ihc North Ray Slalc voles would seek
polilical salvation Irom another source.
•Ii.sl before ils llnal defeai, Whigi,ery was on Ihe verge of realizing ils own reform
agenda the ehnii.ialion of lown represenlalio.i fhey pushed a conslilulional
aniendnienl niaiuhiling dislrici repiesenlation through Ihe ISM legislature over heavy
opposition, and needed the next legislature s approval lo bring the issue lo voters If
Bay Slaters saw Whiggish reform as pari of an agenda to consolidate power in lioslon,
and, with Keyes, saw it contributing to the consolidation of Slave Power domination,
local issues would still matter in the ISS4 election.
Continuing disagreements over local issues hindered Ihc creation of a new
aniislavery party I he patrician I'ree-Soileis wanted a single-issue parly lice from
llcnry Wilson's inlluencc, while Wilson tried lo shut Ihem out oflhc anti-Nebraska
movement When frank Bird olfcred lo abandon the ''humbug" of state reform in Ihe
interesi of antislavery unity, the patricians dismissed him as Wilson's stalking horse.
Ultnnalely, the I8.S4 "Kepublicaif' parly was silent on all local issues except prohibili
Although some Rc|)ublican propagandists courted anli-lrish opinion, their pialform
eschewed nativism Party leaders hoped lo attract voters on both sides of local
questions, but only seemed indilTerenl lo reform Wilson realized this weakness, and
abandoned Ihe Republicans for Know-Nolhingism '"'
ion
A rclrospeclivc acconiil ol liic Wliij's" (iilTiciillics on llic rcpicsciilalioii (iiicslioii appears in
Nor(iiam|)loii I /(iin/is/iiir (lii::rllc. ?.{) I ehriiar\ IS5S
liamn. ( 'ivil II <ir I'arly Sy.slcin. 2'>. A biased accoiiiil ol'slriiggles wilhiii (he aiilislavcry
niovcnicnl is Ihc Adams Diary. 4. 1 1. M I'ebiuary, 1 1 March. ^. ^1 May. I ^ liiiie. 7 .Inly. ?l AiijmisI. 1,
7, I S ,Se|)lemher IX.S4, Adams hamily Papers I he iXS.| Rc|)iihlicaii plallorm appears in most p.ipers,
including l all Rwcr News, 14 Scplcmhcr 1X.S4. Sec Daniel W. Alvoid lo Koherl Carter, ^0 Seplemher
IS8
The Know-Nothing platform, like many nativist candidates, was known only to
local lodge members. While secrecy made the lodges' true priorities nebulous to
outsiders, it proved less alienating than the Republicans' disinterest in state reform If
secrecy alienated some voters on principle, especially veterans of Antimasonry, it struck
others as a reasonable, necessary defense against Whiggery's ability to fire, blackball, or
sic Irishmen on publicly-known dissidents. To disappointed advocates of a secret ballot,
a secret party seemed like a viable alternative. Interestingly, the Know-Nothings showed
little interest, once in power, in restoring the secret ballot; their fraternal ethos may have
discouraged them from concealing votes from each other. One contemporary observer,
noting correctly that nativism was nothing new politically, deemed secrecy a greater
factor than nativism in the Know-Nothing appeal Whether or not that was so, secrecy
was certainly a major source of the new party's strength.'^^
Secrecy itself cost the Know-Nothings few antislavery voters. After the Burns
trial, abolitionists created their own secret societies, despite Garrison's abhorrence of
"skulking" tactics. When he argued that '^What we do should be done in the presence of
Israel and the sun," rank-and-file abolitionists like Jonathan Prince answered that a secret
organization could have freed Burns when the public Vigilance Committee had failed.
Men like Prince, who joined the Know-Nothings and represented the town of Essex in
the 1855 legislature, formed a secret ^'Boston Anti-Manhunting League" in June 1854.
1854. Robert Carter Papers. Houghton Library. Harvard University, for a radical's apprehension that the
Republicans were really warnied-ovcr Whigs.
Banc Falriol, 6 October 1854: Mulkern. Know-Nothing Party, 64; Carwardine. Evangelicals
and Politics, 2.^0-1.
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The league invented initiation rituals and oaths, secret codes and passwords, and other
paraphernalia of fraternity in emulation of both the Know-Nothings and older fraternal
societies/'^' Secrecy seemed especially necessary in Boston, the city of Hallett, the Curtii,
thousands of Irishmen, and the concentrated wealth of the state. Against that menace.
Garrison's scruples against secrecy seemed hopelessly Utopian.
As Whiggery crumbled at the first rumblings of the Know-Nothing earthquake,
and Wilson's Republicans sputtered
,
Boston loomed figuratively as the remaining major
antagonist of the secret order Rural nativists remained concerned through the campaign
season that Bostonian influences might subtly seize control of the secret party. Political
gossips knew that disaffected Whigs and socially conservative Know-Nothings had sent
feelers towards each other during the summer. Nativists courted Robert C. Winthrop,
the former Congressional leader, and John H Clifford, Governor the previous year
Both supported the sitting Whig governor, Emory Washburn, but all three were
estranged from the domineering Websterites. Like Charles Francis Adams, Winthrop
and Clifford rejected Know-Nothing overtures out of an aversion to secrecy or distrust
of their reform intentions. It was questionable, however, whether the lodges would defer
to established Whig leaders like these. Rural delegates to the October state convention
rejected an early favorite for the gubernatorial nomination, the philanthropist Marshall P.
Wilder, because of his ties to many aristocratic Boston institutions More promising for
' Commonwealth. ?< \ May 1X54; Boston Anli-Manhunling League, Constitution. Boston
League Collection. Massachusetts Historical Society. While the Minutes of ihc short-lived society
referred to members only by numbers, its records indicate that Coalition radicals like Frank Bird and
John A. Andrew joined the league, were nominated for membership, or attended meetings. Some of the
league s activities are described in Edelstcin, Strange Enthusiasm, 166.
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the nativists were lower-echelon Whigs like their eventual nominee, the thirty-six year
old dry-goods merchant Henry J. Gardner.^''
While both Gardner and Wilder were Bostonians, the former, a veteran of the
legislature and the Boston Common Council who'd joined a lodge in the spring, seemed
less threatening to many delegates than the patrician Wilder, who was twenty years
Gardner's elder. Usually labeled a Websterite, Gardner had briefly supported the old
orator's Presidential ambitions in 1851
.
In that same year, according to disgruntled
Whigs, he had volunteered his assistance to the captors of Thomas Sims. In the
legislature, he opposed the Coalition's reforms and the Free-Soilers' liberty bills. As a
frequently-absent delegate to the 1853 constitutional convention, he seemed interested
mainly in opposing town representation as an affront to democracy and individual liberty.
While this position eventually put him at odds with the 1855 legislature, no one appears
to have raised it against him in 1854.*^^
The crises of 1 854 turned Gardner into an anti-Nebraska activist. As a leading
protest organizer, he declared an opposition to territorial slavery that remained
^' New York Times, reprinted in Northampton Hampshire Gazette, 24 October 1854; Anbinder.
Nativism and Slavery, 90. While Anbinder follows most secondary accounts in portraying the Know-
Nothing convention as a thwarted grab for power by Henry Wilson, the Tmies's account doesn't include
Wilson as a factor. On divisions within Whiggery
. see the correspondence of Winthrop and Clifford,
including Winthrop to Clifford. 14 October 1853 and 16 September 1854, and Clifford to Winthrop. 21
Fcbmary
.
27 August 1854. Winthrop Family Papers.
Northampton Hampshire Gazette, 24 October. 7 November 1854; OR, 3: 560, 591 - 2; Fall
River iVeu'.v. 9 November 1854; Anbinder. Nativism and Slavery, 90-1, In 1856. Gardner considered it
"a source of great regret" that the 1855 legislature had defeated the district representation amendment,
which he favored for economic and democratic reasons: "The present basis of representation
. . . causes
much complaint of inequality and injustice among portions of our citizens; while an equal district
system, where every man has a direct vote every year for his immediate representative, is certainly as
fair and impartial as can be practicably devised." Massachusetts, 1856 Acts and Resolves, (Boston,
1856), 297 - 316.
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consistent throughout his political career. While Whigs and Republicans harped on his
past Hunkerism, Bay State voters overlooked his pro-slavery record. The twin blows of
Nebraska and the Burns trial shocked so many Bay Staters that few doubted any
individual's repentance of Cotton Whig sentiments. As a Know-Nothing, Gardner
refined his newfound talent for leadership. He displayed unexpected skill at grass-roots
politicking, winning support among disaffected, marginal men whom others slandered as
"the knave-power and the donkey-power of the Commonwealth." At the state
convention, he initially sought a seat in Congress, but lost the Know-Nothing nomination
for the Fifth Congressional District to erstwhile Free-Soiler Anson Burlingame.
Gardner's disappointed followers "threatened to produce a schism," according to one
report, until their hero received the gubernatorial nomination.^^
In rejecting one Bostonian for another, the Know-Nothings displayed mixed
feelings about the role of regional loyalties in their movement. At the town or county
level, lodge members likely identified with their local community before the state.
Know-Nothingism never suppressed a festering regional conflict pitting promoters of a
proposed railroad tunnel through the Hoosac Mountains, linking the Troy & Greenfield
Railroad with the northern tier of the state, against investors in the established Western
Railroad that linked Boston, Worcester, and Springfield. The railroad issue loomed over
the 1853 constitutional convention, which some delegates considered as much a stmggle
Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 7 No\ cinbcr 1854 Of Gardner's talents as a can\ asscr, the
Frcc-Soilcr George F Hoar w rote. He understood belter than an\ other man I c\er knew the value of
getting the support of men who were w ithout speeial influence, even the men who were odious or
ridiculous among their ow n neighbors. " Hoar, . h/to/j/o^'/vj/j/n', 1: 189.
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hctwcen the railroads as a parly ba.,lc7" The tunnel qucst.on plagued (iardner
thrcn.oliout his tenine as governor, and ren.uned controversial unfl the ''great bore" was
Imished many years later liay State Know-Nothing.sni was never a nu>noiith,c, singlo-
minded
.nove.nent Local interests a.ul local prejudices were always inlluenlial
Whether the issue was railroad subsidies or fugitive slavery, statewide opinion
cannot be inlened from one coniniunily's voting behavior Muikern jusnnes his
dismissal ofthe Burns trial as a factor in Know-Notlnng success by noting that J, V. C.
Smith, the independent mayor of Boston in 1854, was re-elected as a Kncnv-Nolhnig
despite abolitionist criticism of his decision to call out the militia during Burns Week
Had the trial really scandali/ed Boston, Muikern argues. Smith should have been
defeated I lowever. Smith's supporters did not dismiss the Burns issue, but argued
pointedly that Smith had summoned the militia, not to assist the slave-catchers, but to
guarantee Bostonians' safety Implicit in their defense was a denial of complicity in the
extradition, which should not have been necessary had Burns not mattered lo Boston,
However they felt, lioston lodges didn't represent Bay State Know-Noihingism as a
whole, and the legislative record shows that many Massachusetts nativists took the
Burns trial, and l .oring's role in it, very seriously/^'
Wlulc Uic ( oalilioii as a wliolc was idciinncd willi llic lloosac i'lmiicl, wcslcni Coalilionists
disaj',rccd on llic lilscix mipaci ol llic rise ol'llic I lov iV: (ircciilicid as a dommaiU iiikicsl in (lie icj-ioii
On ( oalilioii supporl lor the TnnMcl sec Dal/cll, hiilcrprising KliU\ 209. On llic purporlcd inlliicncc ol
liic railroad lol)hics din ing 1853, sec OR, 2: 647 - 52.
" Muikern. Know-Nothini> Parly, XI
-6; Peases, Aiillioiiv Hums, 4.1 -4; /)Vc. qiioled in
Traveller. ') Deceinher IS,^4 Ma\or Sniilli was ne\er a model nalivisi, l ie inainlained |)rorilahle
contacts willi ininiiniaiils and ( alliolics lliioiij'lioiil Ins Kiiow-Nollniig career, as was a|)pic)priale lor a
piihlished world lia\eler
In 1855, Know-Nothings seized the anti-Loring initiative from the abolitionists.
By the autumn of 1854, the Garrisonians had grown frustrated with the progress of their
poorly-circulated petition campaign. While forms had been available since July,
editorialists at the Liberator^ including Anne Warren Weston, expressed concern in
October that many likely supporters had not yet seen the petitions. While editors
wondered, "Can there be any hesitation'^" in demanding Loring's ouster, activists
complained that public anger aroused by Loring had largely dissipated. "Many
[mimsters] made the Burns case a text for one discourse and one prayer," according to
Henry C. Wright, "then shut their lips, as if sealed in death."'' The final count of
petitions amounted only to one-fifth of the signatures collected in 1 843 in support of
personal liberty legislation. Despite their disappointment, abolitionists characterized the
petitions as the true voice of the people. In 1855, the Know-Nothing legislature
translated the demands of one per cent of the population into the will of a decisive
legislative majority.
Know-Nothingism, of course, encompassed a wider range of concerns than
Garrisonian abolitionism, but both movements shared a concern for the honor and
sovereignty of Massachusetts. Patrician antislavery shared that concern ~ as Adams's
authorship of the 1843 liberty law indicated - but the Whiggish Free-Soilers feared both
Garrisonian disunionism and Know-Nothings' alleged designs for social upheaval.
Loring's rejection by the Harvard Board of Overseers in February 1855 seemed to be the
first fiilfillment of John G Palfrey's prophecy that radicals would use Loring to attack
^ Liberator, 13, 27 October 1854, 5 Januaty 1855.
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the conservative judicial and collegiate institutions that he symbolized. The rejection, in
which Know-Nothings played prominent roles, fostered optimism among antislavery
radicals that legislative nativists, and Governor Gardner, would completely purge Loring
from state institutions. Despite the radicals' self-congratulation, however, conservatives
were nearly as complicit in Loring's fall from Harvard as the Know-Nothings. This, in
turn, fostered expectations that Whiggery would give him up as a sacrifice on every
front.
Harvard Removes Loring
During the summer of 1854, Loring moved to Cambridge to escape the
numerous petty humiliations inflicted on him by angi^ Bostonians. In one much-
publicized case, the family butcher had refused to sell him meat. Boycotts tiom other
businesses may have spurred him to quit the city. His relocation relieved his Harvard
patrons of charges that they had bent the mles requiring residency in Cambridge just to
please Charles G Loring or the Curtises. In September, Joel Parker and Theophilus
Parsons, his Law School colleagues, recommended that he be rehired tor 1855 and ^iven
a healthy raise to compensate for his continuing administrative duties. Since his original
one-year appointment in 1852, Loring had been retained intbrmally, without consent or
protest from the Overseers. Strangely, then, the Corporation formally renominated him
as Law Lecturer. This made his continued tenure subject to the approval of the
Overseers at their Febmary 1855 meeting. The Fellows' decision had political
significance as a public avowal of Harvard's continuing support for Loring during his
ordeal. It may also have been intended as a gesture of defiance to the surviving
Coalitionists on the Board of Overseers. Many reformers saw it precisely that way.^-^
Since the Burns decision, the radical antislavery press had demanded Loring's
expulsion from the state college. "Let Harvard College be required to repudiate his
teachings," William S. Robinson urged. Antislavery law students hissed Loring when he
resumed his lectures, but Southern classmates rallied to his defense. "Old Dane Hall
shook to the very center," one Southron remembered, "with the thunders of welcome
and shouts of approval to him who had in such trying times sustained the honor of his
school, his city, his state, his country." Loring's critics carped that the judge should
resign simply to prevent such unbecoming scenes. Southerners' applause only goaded to
further attacks.^"*
As the Overseers' meeting approached, the antislavery press lambasted Loring
with renewed vehemence. They now added Coalition-style attacks on cliquish nepotism
at Harvard. "On the matter of Judge Loring's lack of ability, we take it there is no
difference of opinion," a radical critic wrote, "Yet for the sake of favoritism, if not for
the worse motive of defying the public opinion of the State, able men are passed over,
and this third-rate lawyer selected. "^^ The national anti-slavery press concurred.
Charles G Loring (o President Wali<cr. 28 July 1854; Parker and Parsons to Walker and
Fellows, Scplembcr 1854; Edward G Loring to Walker, 28 September 1854, Harvard College Papers,
21: 2.10 - I, 264, .>I7; President's Papers, 4: 92; Warren, IlarvanI Low School, 2: 190-6.
Commonwealth, .1 June 1854; Independent, 8, 22 June 1854; Myers, Children oj Pride, 45;
Warren. Ilan'ard Law School, 2: 195.
Telegraph. 7 Fcbniary 1855, in Parker-Burns Scrapbook.
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[Lonng] has always been esteemed among his contemporaries and acquaintances as a wellmeaning, good-natured man. of moderate abilities, but excessive self-este^ H s personarconnections have been such as to push him to a certain point in his profession bevond v"^ hecouW have attained by his own merit.
.
[HJis appointments gave no little sat"sfaa^^^^^^^^profession and to the public [s.c ?]. both of which looked upon them, if not asJot at l a t as
t:^::z -- - --p— by we^M o?is^.
From this perspective, the Harvard Corporation was ^a self-perpetuating body,
... a little, narrow, personal clique" that now "attempt[ed] to give to the infamous
fugitive slave law and to its mercenaiy executors, the indorsement of Massachusetts
through her highest seminary of learning." Loring's renomination was a blatant challenge
to the honor and moral integrity of the state. So long as Harvard remained a public
college, reformers wanted it to represent authentic Bay State opinion. They considered
Loring as much a state official as Law Lecturer as he was as a probate judge. To accept
him at Harvard was to endorse the Corporation's usurpation of state and popular
sovereignty, and to concede the Slave-Power's dominance of a leading state institution.
This line of argument appealed both to abolitionists' moral fervor and to Know-
Nothings' local loyalties.^^
Harvard's Whiggish supporters had mixed feelings about Loring's prospects.
Robert C. Winthrop, an Overseer since 1852, thought that the judge deserved a raise,
but bemoaned the Corporation's timing. While he could not fault Loring for acting on
his constitutional convictions, Winthrop wished that the judge had sat out the Burns case
National Anti-SIa\>ery Standard, 10 June 1854.
National Anti-Slavery Standard. 10 February 1855; New York Tribune, 1 February 1855.
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or resigned his commission. Well aware that antislavery elements and radical reformers
saw Loring's renomination as an insult, Winthrop deemed it a dangerous provocation at
a time when the radicals, bolstered by Know-Nothingism, could do great harm. Despite
his reservations, he planned to vote for Loring. Wmthrop and other moderate Whigs
agreed with George T. Curtis's anonymous warmng that rejecting Lonng would cost
Harvard dearly m Southern enrollments. The question weighing on Whiggish minds was
whether to risk a Southern boycott or radical legislative upheaval.''
The Curtii and their friends, meanwhile, damned all opposition to Loring. "The
Board of Overseers," sneered the Hale family's ^tA^er/z^er, "must needs prove to the
world that it is a body whose action is to be feared, and whose influence is to be
courted," Against the upstart Overseers, the Websterites appealed to the authority of the
state's leading jurists. Charles P. Curtis and George Ticknor persuaded Chief Justice
Shaw to write a public letter commending Loring, and urged him to repudiate unfounded
rumors that he had criticized the Burns decision. With men like these supporting Loring,
the Advertiser predicted that "The fanatics are putting the loaded pistol into the hands of
the angry man, but he will not find it." Even consei^ative Overseers bristled at the
Curtii 's aggressive lobbying, which "caused [Loring's] nomination to be pressed upon
the board with pertinacity beyond any intrinsic merit which any candid person could
assign to him." How different, really, was dictation by the Curtii from dictation by
Know-Nothing radicals or abolitionists'^ Among both their Whiggish and Unionist
Robert C. Winthrop to John H. Clifford. 25 January' 1855. Winthrop Family Papers; Everett
Diary
.
12 February 1855. Everett Papers; Curtis. "To the Overseers." 5, 10.
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constituencies, the Curtii had lost most of their credibility as dispassionate defenders of
the rule of law. At Harvard, as in the legislature, Lonng probably lost otherwise likely
ideological supporters because of his Curtis ties.^^
The Board of Overseers that met on 15 February was a politically diverse body.
The Coalition's 1851 reforms provided for the election often Overseers annually
through 1 854, and five annually afterwards, who served for four years each. Five
political leaders,
- the governor and lieutenant governor, the lower house Speaker, the
senate president, and the secretary of the board of education, - were ex officio members
of the Board, as were Harvard's president and treasurer Religion often counted as
much as party ties in the process, as sectarian lobbyists demanded denominational
diversity on the Board. Of the thirty Overseers who attended the February 1 855
meeting, at least twelve, reportedly, had joined Know-Nothing lodges,**"
Loring was rejected, 10-19. George N. Briggs, the former Whig Governor who
had made him a probate judge, was the lone abstainer among the attending members,
although he was initially reported to have voted against Loring. As Table 2 shows
Charles P. Curtis to Lemuel Shaw, 7, 27 Januar> 1855. Lemuel Shaw Papers, nucrofilm.
Massachusetts Historical Society
: Advertiser, 15 February 1855; Telegraph, n. d. |Februar> 1855] in
Robinson Political Scrapbook 8: 159; Samuel Dexter Bradford. "A Vindication of the CK erscers of
Harvard College." in IVorks ofSamuel Dexter Bradford, LL. A, (Boston. 1858). .395 -6.
Overseers" Records. 9: 264. The Coalilion^s reforms are reported in Massachusells General
Court. IH51 Senate Document 102. In OR. 2: 763. Richard Henr> Dana complained that, as soon as the
Whigs regained control of the legislature, they stacked the Board with CK erseers approved by a party
caucus, but among the Overseers elected in 1853 was the outgoing Coalition Governor Boutwell.
Similarly, the Know-Nothing legislature of 1855 elected outgoing Whig Governor Emor> Washburn to
the Board. Sec Boutwell. Recollections, 1: 95 - 6. and Stor>. Forging ofan Aristocracy. 140 - 2.
James W. Stone. Removal ofJudge Loring: Remarks . . . in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, April 13, 1855. (Boston. 1855). asserts that Know-Nothings accounted for twelve votes
against Loring. indicating that several veteran Ov erseers had joined the secret party.
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below, only among the Whig appointees of 1854 did a majority of any cohort suppon the
judge.










Ex Officio- Govt. 0
E.\ Officio- Harvard 2
A majority of Whiggish Overseers, appointed by the 1853-54 Whig legislatures,
proved unsympathetic to Curtis lobbying. One 1853 appointee, the patrician Free-Soiler
Samuel Hoar, had been a leading opponent of the 1851 Harvard reforms, but voted
against Loring. His vote was representative of many conservatives' willingness to
sacrifice Loring to preserve Harvard itself from wholesale upheaval. This fulfilled
Loring's prediction to John G Palfrey that radicals would focus their fury on the easy,
individual target - himself- rather than using him, as Palfrey feared, to attack those
institutions he allegedly embodied. It was a cruel fulfillment, however, since men he
would have expected to defend him had helped bring it about.
Naturally, no Overseer admitted political motives for rejecting Loring, nor did
any boast of punishing the enslaver of Bums. Francis Bassett, the Coalitionist opponent
81
Overseers" Records. 9. 264; Transcript, 16. 23 Februarv' 1855
" On Hoar's opinions on Harvard, see Boutwell. Recollections, 1 : 95 - 6. which identifies the
old Free-Soiler as the principal opponent of the proposed reform of the Board of CK erseers.
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of Loring's promotion in 1854, insisted that the same arguments made then applied
again. Before the Burns trial, he and Hoar had agreed that Loring's three jobs - probate
judge, commissioner, and lecturer, - were too much for anyone lacking the energy and
concentration of Joseph Story. If the Fellows assumed that the Board, while
recommending against Loring's promotion, had conceded his competence as a lecturer,
they were mistaken. Samuel Dexter Bradford, a consen^ative
-Hunker" Democrat
appointed in 1853, went the llirthest to deny any antislavery motives behind his negative
vote. In the spring of 1856, he published a "Vindication of the Overseers of Harvard
College," to praise Loring's "fearless, upright, and independent" conduct during the
Burns trial. In Bradford's opinion, the judge's merits had been overshadowed by the
Websterites' "unusual, and I must call it unwarrantable" contention that any vote against
Loring was a vote for disunion or abolition. The Democrat thought it perfectly
reasonable to admit, while holding Loring in high regard, that Bassett and Hoar were
correct. He went further than either of his colleagues, however, in acknowledging,
however obliquely, that Loring's fall was meant as a rebuke to the Curtii.^'
The most prominent vote against Loring was Governor Gardner's. As the state's
first Know-Nothing governor, his every act was intensively scrutinized. He had little
hope of persuading critics that his motives had been as innocuous as those avowed by
Bassett and Bradford. The surviving Websterites saw him as an apostate upstart.
83
^ [Francis Bassett] in Ach^ertiser, 24, 28 Februar\' 1855: Bradford. "Vindication of the
Overseers;^ 396 - 7. See also "Byles" in New York Tribune. 28 April 1856, which asserts, on the basis
of hearsay evidence, that Bradford considered Loring an incompetent lecturer who benefited from the
Fellows^ practice of making Harv ard posts "gift provisions for poor relations and needy friends." These
comments, even as a paraphrase of Bradford's sentiments, reflect tellingly on Loring's perceived social
position.
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Antislavery activists questioned his determination to resist tiie slave-power. Ambitious
to serve in Washington, Gardner watched national opinion careflilly while cautiously
appraising his local mandate. Removing Loring from Harvard seemed to displease only
those Whigs whom he had already repudiated. At the same time, it created an
expectation that Gardner would remove Loring from his probate post if addressed by
legislators.'' Tampering with the courts, however, was different from tweaking an
unpopular elitist university At the 1853 constitutional convention Gardner had been
conservative on judiciary questions, opposing limited judicial terms and the jurors' rights
amendment. To him, Loring's removal would be more than an anti-slavepower show. A
show, however, was precisely what antislavery radicals in the Know-Nothing legislature
wanted. As Gardner cast his Overseer's vote, his part in the spectacle had practically
been written for him. Loring, freshly humbled in Cambridge, soon faced what amounted
to a show trial intended to demonstrate the doom awaiting collaborators with slavery.
Unfortunately for the antislavery faction, not all the performers in the coming drama
agreed on the script.
Particularly pleased with Gardner s vote, and accordingly optimistic for the future, was
Henry Wilson. Wilson to Robert Carter, 20 February 1855, Carter Papers.
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CHAPTER 5
VOXPOPULI OR RULE OF LAW^
LORING'S SHOW TRIAL AND THE 1855 LEGISLATURE
Such a tainted wether as Lonng must infect the whole flock of Massachusetts judges one such
rnildevved car must blast its wholesome brothers. It may help to disenchant that Judge-bound
Commonwealth, by the contagious odor of an infamous Judge. For ourselves, we confess it w e
never meet a Massachusetts judge, which we sometimes do, without fancying that he smells of
Judge Loring.
Anonymous. National Anti-Slax'ery Standard}
In February 1855 the Federal Relations Committee of the Massachusetts General
Court took up the matter of Edward G. Loring in response to petitions demanding his
removal from the Suffolk probate court. The committee's four days of hearings proved to
be a kind of show trial. While the radical antislavery leaders of the committee could not
guarantee the judge's removal, and could not compel him either to confess his guilt or
even to appear before them, they nonetheless constructed the hearings as a spectacle for
public edification. The Loring hearings were intended not so much to determine Loring's
culpability in the extradition of Anthony Burns, of which a majority on the committee was
already convinced, as to inform the public of the nature of his offense, and of their right, as
petitioners, to punish him. More significantly, in thus trying Loring in a political forum.
'
"Judge Worship." in National Anti-Slavery Standard. 1 March 1856.
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the committee leaders hoped to show politically uncertain Bay Staters the face of their true
enemy, local aristocratic minions of the federal Slave Power
When the Loring hearings began, most politically conscious Bay Staters feh that
their autonomy as a Northern Protestant community had been endangered, but few were
certain of the ultimate source of the danger. Cathohcs, slave-hunters, and their local
minions all menaced Massachusetts, but which was the real enemy-^ Protestant
nationalists like the editor Edward Hinks called Catholicism the principal menace, while
antislavei7 publicists targeted the Slave Power's minions in the federal government. These
rival factions accused each other of complicity, witting or not, in the subversion of
Massachusetts and the Union In the midst of this confusion, the Federal Relations
Committee, with Loring as Exhibit A, argued that the Slave Power was the real enemy.
Antislavery conservatives, meanwhile, denounced the planned removal as an
arbitrary act lacking any constitutional or statutory justification. Against the conservative
spokesman Richard Henry Dana, antislavery radicals in and out ofKnow-Nothingism
argued that the will of the people, as expressed in petitions, was sufficient authority upon
which to depose Loring. At this level, the removal debate revived not only the lingering
question ofjudicial independence, but a more fundamental dispute over the basis of
political authority in a democratic republic. On several levels, then, the removal campaign
exposed ideological conflicts that contributed to the quick breakup of the 1854 consensus
and hindered its reassemblage for the next four years.
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The Know-Sompthinu Challenge
The 1855 legislature defies any retrospective division into strictly nativist and
strictly antislavery factions. Many Know-Nothings went to Boston with entirely
parochial or idiosyncratic concerns. The Bristol legislator Job Terry, for instance,
resolutely opposed every major enactment of 1855, whether anti-immigrant, antislavery,
or anti-liquor.^ Men like Terry had individual agendas that never fit conveniently either
their peers' ambitions or historians' categories. Many other legislators, however, chose
sides and leaders in hopes of defining and controlling the movement of 1854.
The Know-Nothing landslide created three clear contenders for statewide
leadership, each with national ambitions. Henry J. Gardner became governor after being
denied a nomination for Congress, and immediately became a perceived contender for a
spot on the Know-Nothing national ticket for 1856 Henry Wilson threw the support of
his antislavery followers behind Gardner in return for a seat in the United States Senate.
Nathaniel P Banks, an erstwhile Coalition Democrat, became Speaker of the federal
House of Representatives with the help of Southern Know-Nothings. He and Gardner
were more attentive to opinion outside Massachusetts than Wilson, who saw his Senate
seat as an antislavery pulpit. Gardner and Banks were also more comfortable with
nativism than Wilson, who soon found it a hindrance to Northern unity against territorial
' The best explanation of Terr\'"s record lies in the voting history of Freetown. In gubernatorial
elections from 1850 through 185.1. the town gave majorities to Democratic candidates. A community
with a small electorate. Freetow n voted 64 - 57 against the 185.1 constitution, despite being a likely
beneficiary of the proposed enhancement of town representation. Know-Nolhingism in Freetown
benefited from a Democratic insurgency, rather than wholesale Democratic defections; the older party
finished second in 1854 and 1855. OR. 3: 765.
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slaveo^. Gardner and Banks differed, however, over local issues, particularly over the
representation question and state support for railroads.^ Banks and Wilson's duties in
Washington left Gardner effectively in charge in Massachusetts, but all three had
followers in the lodges and the legislature.
Personal loyalties aside, Know-Nothings disagreed ideologically over the nature
of the mid-century political crisis. The antislavery Know-Something faction insisted that
an explicit ami-Slave-Power policy was essential to the survival of Protestant liberties in
Massachusetts and the territories. The Gardnerite Know-Nothings never hid their own
opposition to slavery Attacking the Republican party later in 1855, one editor boasted:
"Could they hope to establish a governmem more true to Northern sentiment than that
which now exists in Massachusetts'^" Gardnerites believed, however, that Know-
Somethings obsessively stressed sectional issues at the expense of the larger Protestant
cause. Gardner himself believed that Protestamism alone had inured the North against
slave culture, and that Catholicism or foreign atheism should be attacked as the greatest
threats to Northern moral resilience.'*
Gardner was not a doctrinaire Unionist, and rejected Edward Hinks's advice to
keep silent on slavery questions. Unionist Know-Nothings, including Hinks himself
^ As presiding officer of the 1853 convention. Banks rarely spoke ni debate, but he took the
floor to assert that "the towns have an absolute right of representation jthat isl. in some degree,
coextensive with their existence as part of the gov ernment, and necessary to the maintenance of their
full powers." OR. 3: 598. For ties between the Hoosac Tunnel lobb> and Banks, see Daniel W. Alvord
to Frank Bird. 4 June 1857. Bird Papers, and Fall River News. 5 November 1857. which described
Governor-elect Banks as "sweeping dow n that runner to victory. By contrast, see Fitchburg Reveille.
30 May 1857. for an angr\ response to Gardner s v etoes of loan guarantees to "the noblest enterprise of
the age."
Bee, 19 June, 20, 21 July, 7. 9 August 1855; Massachusetts, 1857 Acts and Re.sohes. (Boston
1857), 707 -8.
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often personally opposed western slavery, but insisted that the territorial question had no
place on any national party platform. They considered the aggressively antislavery
Know-Somethings as a menace to national unity, and in some cases tried to purge
antislavery opimon from the party and the lodges. In Suffolk County especially, where
Cotton Whiggery and economic ties to the South often discouraged antislavery opinion,
nationalist lodges instructed legislators to reject Gardner's deal with Henry Wilson and
vote against the latter's election to the Senate. In protest, antislavery freshman
representative Charles W. Slack, who had boosted Theodore Parker for the House
chaplainate, resigned from his Boston lodge. Unionists in the Boston central committee
purged Slack's colleague John L. Swift, an erstwhile Coalition orator and avid Gardner
supporter who supported Wilson, only to see him reinstated days later at a meeting
packed with "radicals." When Swift moved to another ward, the local lodge refused to
admit him Both men became Know-Somethings. Slack was the movement's state
secretary and, in a sign of its strength, was elected speaker pro tempore of the lower
house in May 1855. Swift gave the first legislative speech in favor of Loring's removal.
Arguably, the nationalists' attempts to intimidate or purge antislavery nativists created
Know-Somethingism as a dangerous rival movement.^
Slack, as Know-Something state sccretarv. signed a circular announcing travel arrangements
for the movement s national convention in Cleveland in June 1855. included in the Robert Carter
Papers. He was elected Speaker /jrr; lem with 150 votes on a second ballot, while over 100
representatives were absent. For more on Slack, seeJounial, 9 Ma\ 1855; Posi, 10 May 1855;
Fitchburg Reveille, 17 January 1855; Liberator. 12 Januaiy 1855. On Swift, who was also a member of
the Boston Anti-Manhunting League, see Liberator, 24 November 1854. 9 Fcbniarv 1855. and
Transcript. 19 April 1855. Henry Wilson, ironically, joined a Boston lodge after Know-Nothings in his
native Natick rejected him; see Gienapp. Origins oft/ie Republican Parly, 135 - 7. Northampton
Hampshire Gazette, 17 July 1855. lists delegates for a meeting of Know-Something leaders, including
Slack but not Swift.
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The Know-Somethings angrily warned the Gardnerites and the nationalists of the
Hkely consequences of opposing antislavery agitation. Wilson, their hero if not their
leader, set the threatening tone. "[T]he day any party - be it Whig, Democratic, or
American
- raises a finger to arrest the Anti-Slavery sentiment, or proscribe Anti-
Slavery men," the Senator warned in April 1855, ^IT SHALL SURELY BEGIN TO
DIE!" Ifso, Slack added, "IT DESERVES TO DIE!" For the moment. Slack
acknowledged, Know-Nothingism "has got the anti-slavery sentiment " The Know-
Somethings insisted, however, that Gardner and his legislators earn that sentiment
through concrete action against the Slave Power, including Loring's removal, which thus
became a crucial test issue for antislavery activists.^
Two Know-Something leaders, Obadiah W. Albee, a Middlesex County senator,
and James W. Stone, a Boston representative, orchestrated Loring's legislative ordeal as
leaders of the Federal Relations Committee. Stone, senior member of the house
delegation, was part of Frank Bird's circle, and shared Bird's political rigidity. He
considered J Q. A. Griffin, a veteran Free-Soil Coalitionist, unfit to serve on the
committee because he had supported Democratic men and measures. Elected as a
Know-Nothing, Stone remained a member of a moribund Free-Soil state committee
hostile to the secret party
.
^ Albee, the committee chair, had himself been a Coalition
^ Slack quoted Wilson in his speech for Loring s removal. pubHshed in Liberator 20 April
1855.
^ James W. Stone to Charles Sumner. 13 January 1855. Sumner Papers; Martin B. Duberman.
Charles Francis Adams. (Boston. Houghton - Mifflin. 1961). 199 - 200. During the first month of the
session, several appointees to the Federal Relations Committee excused themselves from ser\ ing. Some
may have been reluctant to take on the controversial work planned by Albee and Stone; others may have
clashed temperamentally with the two chairmen, as was probably the case with Griffin. Sec also
Dedham Gazette, 3 February 1855. for the rapid turnover in the committee.
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Free-Soiler in the 1851 legislature. A mtnor figure previously, the chairman wrote the
majority report favoring Loring's removal." Neither man pretended to judge Loring
objectively.
The Commmee have no opposition to Judge Loring as an individual. Their object is simply toprcvcnt^.n future as far as possible, the extradition of alleged fog.t.ve slaves f om the s7l ofMassachusetts, and part.eularly that U shall never be done .n disregard of the r.ght of tna bvjury
,
and of the privileges secured by the writs of habeus corpus and personal replevin Theybelieve that this object can be more thoroughly accomplished bv the removal of Judge Lorinethan by pursuing any other cause.^ ' ^ ^
More bluntly. Stone told Richard Henry Dana that the hearings were meant to
recount "the transformation of a man into a chattel^ and not to debate whether or not it
was done constitutionally. They meant simply to use Loring as a symbol of the Slave
Power and a warning to transgressors against the moral sense of Massachusetts Albee,
Stone, and their invited guests made the Loring hearings into political theater designed to
convince legislators and voters that Know-Somethingism was the best answer to the
crisis facing the commonwealth.'*'
William S. Robinson, the Bird Club publicist, praised Albee as the author of the majority
report, the rcmo\al address, and a speech that "Warrington" deemed. "A masterly production,
thorough, patriotic, logical, spirited, convincing, and truly eloquent," Nantucket Gazelle |c. April 18.S5]
in Robinson Political Scrapbook 8: 8.
James W. Stone to Richard Henry Dana, Jr., 3 April 1855, in J855 House Doc. 205, 9.





Invited by the committee to defend himself in person, Loring sent his regrets. He
offered only a letter rejecting the petitioners' assertion that a "Slave Law'
was incompatible with service in a probate court. Neither the petitioners nor the
legislature, he contended, could act on an incompatibility not defined explicitly in the
constitution or the general statutes. Nor could they redefine the rules retroactively.
Loring's federal commission, after all, had not been considered incompatible with his
probate responsibilities in 1847, nor had his entitlement to the bench been questioned
when he was empowered to hear ftigitive cases by the law of 1850.
I make these latter remarks only for the purpose of bringing respectfiillv to the notice and clear
apprehension of your honorable bodies, the extreme injustice and warn of equity that would be
involved in the removal of a Judge from office, for the past discharge of other official duties
not by law made incompatible with his duties as a Judge, against his exercise of which no
official objections had ever been raised, and which were created and imposed upon him by that
law of the land which is the supreme law of Massachusetts. '
'
Loring did not see any wrong in obeying a law deemed constitutional by the
state's highest tribunal Justice Shaw's Sims ruling, he noted, had imposed an obligation
on judges to "expound and apply" every provision of the fugitive law. Accordingly,
when presented with Col. Suttle's affidavit, Loring had found it his "painful duty ... to
'
'
Loring to "the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives, in General Court
Assembled." 9 Februarv 1853. in Liberator, 16 Febniar\ 1855. An incompatibilit\ of the Probate Court
with federal offices had been asserted in the rejected 1853 constitution, which would ha\c denied all
federal posts except postmasterships to several classes of state officers. OR. 3: 748.
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perform the official act for which my removal from the office of Judge of Probate is now
sought by the petitioners." Concealing his brief attempt to abandon the Burns case, he
now argued that ^'An application made pursuant to law, to any one Commissioner, fixes
that duty on him, and after such application, he can neither decline it or evade it." Had
he done so, "all others might, and then not only the statute, but the Constitution of the
United States would be violated, and the public faith, pledged to it, and the oaths taken
to support it, would be broken." In a statement that later came back to haunt him,
Loring charged that moral qualms could not override legal duties.
Magistrates do not make the laws, and it is not for them to usurp or infringe upon that high
power; therefore, if thev are honest, they administer the laus as thev are committed to themOn this depends the security of everything the law protects: and that security will be lost when
magistrates shall shape their official action by their own and the popular feeling, instead of
"standing laws.
'
Loring warned legislators not to corrupt the rule of law. "[W]hen the petitioners
ask you to punish a judicial officer for an act not prohibited by any statute of
Massachusetts, but lawful under those statutes and imposed by the law of the land which
is the law of Massachusetts," he wrote, "they ask of you an abuse of power for which the
legislative history of Massachusetts furnishes no precedent."'' He subsequently refined
this point into an attack on the petitioners' implicit states-rights position: "conformity to
the Constitution and laws of the United States is not a reason for withdrawing from a
'"Loring Remonstrance in Liberator, 16 February 1855.
Loring Remonstrance in Liberator. 16 February 1855.
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judicial officer that security which Massachusetts assures him ^during good
behavior.'"^^
The Suffolk bar echoed Loring's apprehensions. Rallied by the Curtis family,
174 Boston lawyers warned that "the removal of a judicial officer in the manner prayed
for, for the reasons assigned by the petitioners, would be not only a novel measure,
contrary to sound policy, and a dangerous precedent, but also in violation of the spirit of
the Constitution." Moreover, Loring's judgeship was challenged "by reason of matters
unconnected with the discharge of the duties of that office." Remonstrants outside
SuffiDlk agreed that Loring's removal "will remove whatever of stability there is in
constitutions and the laws, by changing the tenure ofjudicial office from that ofgood
behavior to that of compliance with an ever-varying public sentiment." Loring's Boston
friends, however, insisted that Suffolk County alone should decide his fate.'^
Besides lawyers, 941 Bostonians signed a printed remonstrance, and 309 men
from four other towns opposed removal Together, the protesters found the proposed
removal "highly indecorous and unprecedented," "a stain to the fair fame of the whole
Commonwealth," and "an infringement upon the independence of the Judiciary
. O.
W. Albee was unimpressed by their seemingly selective insistence on judicial
independence.
Edward G Loring to Committee on Federal Relations. 19 Februar> 1855, in Liberator 21
Februar\' 1855.
Liberator, 16 Februar\' 1855; Bee, 16 April IS55: Journal, 22 February' 1855; Telegraph, 6
April 1855; SpringTidd Republican. 24 February 1855.
The anti-removal petitions are included with the 1855 remo\al petitions m the Legislative
Papers, Massachusetts State Archives. Besides two Boston petitions, remonstrances were submitted by
North Chelsea (Suffolk County). Brighton (Middlesex). Danvers and Marblehead (Esse.x).
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Many of [the remonstrants] undoubtedly are men of great power and
.nnuence and whosejudgment on many subjects should be entitled to the highest weight. 1 am to d however hatmany of these names are the same that appeared on the list of the 1,500 w^o volunte^^^^^^^^ to ctas the body guard for the Slave Power m the rendition of Sims. Sir. on that sadlT whenMassachusetts saw the Slave Power sitting triumphant in her halls ofjustice wtenMassachusetts judges were trailing their enmne in the dust. ... 1 do not remember to haveheard that these gentlemen were anxious lest the Judiciar> should have lost thTreslt of thepeople of Massachusetts.' " uie espect t
Other antislavei7 observers found the contrast between petitioners and
remonstrants equally telling. ^All of the [remonstrants] were men," one writer noted,
"and generally were men belonging to the circle in which Mr. Loring more immediately
moved." While Loring relied only on his clique, ^the petitioners were from the broad
mass of the people; and many of them were women, who, as being a class of persons
deeply interested in the character of Probate Judges, very properly exercised their right
of petition on this occasion."'** The petitioners assumed that only the Curtis set and a
few patrician Free-Soilers dared defend Loring. They knew that the Curtii and their
allies were preparing to try Theodore Parker, Wendell Phillips, and Burns's failed
rescuers, and likely saw the Loring hearings as a shadow trial, a counter-indictment of
the Curtis clique. Legislators certainly followed the riot indictments closely. Many
erupted in celebration during the Loring debates when Charles W. Slack announced that
Benjamin Curtis had abashedly dismissed the charges against the abolitionists on a
technicality. Their blatant sympathy for the defendants boded ill for Lorino.
' ' O. W. Albee. Speech. 27 April 1855, in Liberator, 11 May 1855.
Stevens, Anthony Burns, 224.
'"^ On Loring as a Curtis lapdog. see George Pillsbur\ 's speech in Liberator. 27 April 1855 and
Robert B. Hall. Removal ofJudge Loring. Speech . . . before the Massachusetts Senate, April 24, 1855,
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Since moral sentiment, rather than legal theory, motivated most petitioners, they
considered women flilly qualified to judge Lonng. More than any later effort, the 1855
removal campaign reflected the influence of women's activism. Conservative
commentators denounced the campaign as an irrational outburst of ''twelve thousand
fanatical women," provoking a pomted defense of female activism from Wendell
Phillips.''
Some persons have sneered at these petitions, because women are found among the signers
Neither you. gentlemen, or this legislature will maintain that women, that is just one half of
the Commonwealth, have no right to petition. A civil right that no one denies even to
foreigners, will certainly not be denied to the vx omen of Massachusetts. And is there anvone
thoughtless enough to affirm, that this is not a proper occasion for women to exercise their
right?
... He chooses an exceedingly bad occasion to laugh, who laughs when the women of
the Commonwealth ask you to remov e a Judge of Probate who has shown that he is neither ahumane man nor a good lawyer."'
Surprisingly, then, women formed only "a small portion of the audience" that
thronged Representatives Hall on 20 February, the first day of the Loring hearings.
Many were probably crowded out by legislators and reporters. Interest was so great that
the committee convened in the great hall of the statehouse, built to accommodate
hundreds of legislators, rather than in the usual chambers. Still, the hall and galleries
were ''crowded to their utmost capacity," "running over with a multitude, both male and
(Boston. 1855). 22 - 3. For the legislative celebration of the end of the Burns riot trial see Liberator 20
April 1855.
Boston Daily Chronicle, quoted in Liberator. 27 April 1855.
Liberator, 2 March 1855. For one condescending disparagement ofwomen petitioners, see
the speech of Henr>^ Devereux in Tra\>eller. 1 1 April 1855.
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female." Hundreds more filled the streets outside the hall.^^ Given the proximity of the
statehouse to Boston's black neighborhoods, many onlookers in the hall and on the
street may have been fugitive slaves.^^^ The crowds appalled consewatives. It was
obvious, the Daily Advertiser sneered, that the hearings "[were] not intended by the
committee as an occasion for deliberation or for the presentation of evidence, but rather
for passionate declamation." Nothing that came later changed conservative minds.
First Hearing: Wendell Phillip s;
Seth Webb, an antislavery lawyer, opened the hearings by urging the state to
cleanse itself of the stain of subservience to the Slave Power. He equated Loring's
removal with the "days of purification" in biblical Israel, and to the lusu ations of
republican Rome. By enslaving Burns, who had "achieved" his liberty while most
were merely born free, the judge "outraged the just and solemn convictions of the people
of Massachusetts," and "trampled under foot" the state's honor. The sin was both the
state's and Loring's, but the man must suffer to redeem the state's shame. "We say that
men
" A(h>ertiser, 21 Fcbruar,:.Journal, 21 Fcbruar\ 1855; Boston //fra/J, 21 Fcbruao 1855;
Northampton //rt//;/7.v/7/>^'f7^7zc'//c^ 27 February 1855.
Adelaide M. Cromwell. "The Black Presence in the West End of Boston. 1800 - 1864: A
Demographic Map." in Jacobs, ed.. Courage and Conscience. 165. has a map showmg the proximity of
black neighborhoods to Beacon Hill and the statehouse. Ne\\spaper accounts didn't note an\ black
presence in the galleries; whether reporters would deem a black presence notable is debatable. Henry
Devcreaux's speech in Traveller. 1 1 April 1855. and the comments of J. M. Williams of Cambridge,
answered by Slack (Liberator. 20 April 1855). suggest that some legislators regarded the removal effort
as a black issue. See also a disparaging reference to "negro barbers" in Chronicle, quoted in Liberator,
11 April 1855.
Ach'ertiser. 21 Febniary 1855.
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it IS not fit that the man on whom rests the Judicial ermine of the Massachusetts Judiciaiy
should bow down to false gods, and go into the house of the Southern strange woman,"
Webb declaimed. Had Loring resigned the hateful commission, the petitioners would
gladly have withdrawn, but his remonstrances proved him "defiant," "impudent," and
"unfit longer to be a Massachusetts judge "^^
The day's chief attraction was Wendell Phillips. Still in legal peril himself, the
abolitionist drew a crowd expecting a preview of his defense before Benjamin Curtis. He
gave them an elaborate vindication of the right to remove state officials on moral
grounds. His legal argument, however, was weak. Loring, he asserted, was governed by
the 1843 personal liberty law, which the remonstrants considered obsolete and irrelevant.
Since Chief Justice Shaw, according to Phillips, had based the 1850 fugitive law's
constitutionality on its precise similarity to the 1 793 law, the liberty law must apply to
both. But if Loring had violated a law, why not impeach and try him^ Phillips dismissed
the question. "You are not acting as nisi prisiis lawyers, bound by quibbling
technicalities," he reminded the committee, "you are statesmen, looking with plain,
manly eyes at the essence of things." He had cited the liberty law chiefly to prove that
state sentiment opposed slave hunting. "Have you any doubt," he asked, "what
Massachusetts intended when she enacted that statute?"^^
Herald. 21 Februar\ \S55: Journal. 21 Februar\ 1855; Liberator, 23 February 1855.
My source for Phillips^s speech is the revised, annotated text published in Liberator, 2 March
1855. In a footnote. Phillips admitted that he had neglected the strongest argument for his claim that
the libert\ law applied to the law of 1850: the Fugitive Slave Law was identified explicitly by its authors
as an amendment to the law of 1793. Phillips believed that the libert\ law should naturally extend to
co\ er the unique provisions of the 1850 law
.
but conserv atives thought that the Massachusetts law had to
be formally amended first. Efforts to do this in 1851 and 1852. legal experts claimed, apparently proved
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Loring need not be found guilty of a crime, Phillips argued, to be removed by
address. Delegates to the 1820 constitutional convention, he showed, acknowledged
that legislators could seek a removal for any reason, or none. Phillips, anticipating
conservative objections, readily admitted that many 1820 delegates wanted to limit the
removal power. Since they failed, however, the unamended clause remained as they
described it, whether they liked it or not. Did Webster complain that the removal power
was "against common right, as well as repugnant to the general principles of the
government-" No matter: "the Constitution stands, in 1855, just as it stood when
Webster was speaking." Did Joseph Story warn that influential men might lobby or bribe
legislators into removing judges who might rule against them in civil suits'^ He also said,
"I have no fear of the voice of the people." That satisfied Phillips.^'
Despite his reading of the constitution, Phillips could not realistically advocate a
controversial removal without justifying the petitioners' request. In doing so, curiously,
he abandoned his typical disunionist rhetoric. Instead of arguing that the federal
constitution condoned slavery, as he might from an abolition pulpit, he cited the revered
Unitarian moralist William Ellery Channing's opinion that it did not. This served to repel
the remonstrants' argument that Loring had only done what the federal Constitution
commanded Similarly, instead of arguing more characteristically that a federal
commission itself disqualified Loring from probate duties, Phillips emphasized the
that Free-Soilers acknowledged the inadequacy of the old law. Since these efiforts failed. Loring had not
violated state law
. ^qq Monthly Law Reporter, n.s., 8 (May 1855), 5 - 6.
Liberator, 1 March 1855; 1855 House Document 93. 8 - 13; Ach'ertiser, 26 February 1855;
Monthly Law Reporter, n.s. 8 (May 1855). 1 - 20; Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal, 2: 674. Dana called
Albee's report "a wretched affair -- perhaps the worst state document I ever saw."
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judge's morally incompetent conduct of the Burns trial.^« Loring would have denied
Burns a defense had Dana not intervened. He had left Burns shackled for lengthy
periods. He had let Burns's supposed confession, extracted under intimidatmg
conditions, outweigh all the contrary evidence of eyewitnesses. Worst of all, he had
prejudged the case a week before the verdict. As evidence, Phillips finally recounted his
"interview" with Loring in Cambridge on 26 May.
at
On Friday morning
.1 went to Mr. Loring at Cambridge, where he was Law Lecturer <Harv ard College, and asked him for an order directing the Marshal to allow me to see the
prisoner. He sits down and wntes a letter, authorizing me to cross that barrier and see Burns-
and as he hands it to me. he says - "Mr. PhilHps. the case is so clear, that I do not think vou
"
PROBABLY W '"^ """^ ''''' ™
'
"What right had he to think Burns would go back"^" Phillips raged. After hearing
only the claimants' opening statement, Loring
-had so far made up his mind, that he
could warn me from attempting to do any thing to save the man from the doom to which
he was devoted, on the ground of the probability of his being given up." His prejudice
Channing wrote. The Constitution was not established to send back slaves to chains. The
article requiring this act of the Free States was forced on them b\ the circumstances of the times, and
submitted to as a hard necessity
.
It did not enter into the essence of the instrument." Liberator. 2
March 1855. Cover. Justice Accused, 179 - 82. states that Phillips s main argument before the
committee was that merely holding the commission disqualified Loring. The committee itself. Cover
writes, took this position. While the position Cover assigns to Phillips is consistent with the
abolitionist's known opinion on the "pro-slaver>'" constitution. Phillips elected not to argue that point at
length during his speech, "l ha\e not enlarged, as I might have done," he said, "on the general principle
that, w ithout alleging special misconduct, the mere fact of Mr. Loring s consenting to act at all as a
Slave Commissioner, is sufficient cause for his removal from the office of a Massachusetts Judge."
Phillips thus raised and disposed of the point in one paragraph.
Liberator, 2 March 1855.
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against the prisoner's freedom was apparent in his readiness to sell Bums into freedom.
To Phillips, this only proved that Loring saw Burns as a shv^''
Scandalized conservatives later wondered why Phillips had not reported this
encounter during the trial, when he might have made Loring recuse himselP Since he
hadn't, one legislator assumed that "h should be taken for granted that he considered
[Loring] unprejudiced and impartial" during the trial. Others questioned Phillips's
memory or his interpretation of the exchange. Some thought he had "violated
confidence by reporting 'private conversations ^ Phillips scoffed: "I have no private
conversations with slave commissioners. My interview with Mr. Loring was an official
one." Like many abolitionists, he denied conservatives a private sphere in which political
questions might be discussed without rancor or publicity. Despite their ostracism from
most genteel society, men like Phillips continued to denounce immorality wherever they
found it.~^'
Phillips's weakest charge was that Loring had informed the claimants and the
military of his verdict before announcing it publicly, so that Burns could be removed as
quickly as possible without organized interference. The fact that 'T cannot state it on
anything but rumor," did not deter Phillips. "Where can you find, in the whole catalog of
judicial enormities, an instance when a Judge revealed his decision to one party, and
Liberator. 2 March 1855.
^' Liberator, 2 March 1855; Phillips to Post, 1 1 April 1855: Post, 12 April 1855. One
petitioner. Charles Grafton, gave the committee a wntten statement averring that Phillips had met him
at the Law School on the afternoon of 26 May and told him of Loring s remarks, but since neither man
publicized the controversial statement until months later, this corroboration did not impress the
remonstrants. Charles Slack referred to Grafton's statement in a speech printed in Liberator 20 April
1855.
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concealed it from the other^' he asked. Real or not, it was but one of many offenses,
any of which proved Loring unfit for his post .'^
Loring had done none of these things as a probate judge, but the broad language
of the removal clause permitted behavior out of office as grounds for removal. Phillips
thought it unreasonable to retain a proven sinner in a position of public responsibility.
Would anyone confirm or retam a judge suspected of "gross misconduct in Railroad or
Banking Companies, [who had] yet avoided legal conviction^" Betraying a free man into
the hands of slave-drivers, Phillips argued, was as awflil a betrayal of the public trust as
any such mismanagement. As a collaborator in slave-catching, Loring was unfit for any
public office.
''^^
Phillips finally addressed conservative fears for judicial independence. He
thought it insulting that "the petitioners are asked whether they do not know the value
and importance of an independent Judiciary" when subservience to the Slave Power, and
partisan cliquishness at home, had already subverted the courts. Phillips defined judicial
independence as disinterested conformity with the higher law. Agreement with an
enlightened people was not the terrified dependence on arbitrary power that Whiggery
feared, but an equal dependence of people and judges on moral right. Judicial
independence was best secured by purging the bench of a corrupt judge and regaining
"the confidence of the people." The petitioners valued independence, but valued most
^Liberator, 2 March 1855
33
Liberator, 2 March 1855. See also "One of the Petitioners." in Telegraph. 12 February 1855,
Parker-Burns Scrapbook. in which an analog> is drawn with a theoretical habitual liar, who ' would be
deemed, and ver\ justly, to have a character unfit for the proper performance of the duties of a Judge of
Probate: how ever closely he might stick to the letter of the law."
220
highly a judge "whom neither fear, favor, offices^ nor hopes of reward
course.
can turn from his
m34
Phillips expected the remonstrants to defend Loring on constitutional grounds
rather than even indirectly endorse the Burns verdict. Phillips had to prove that the
judge could be removed before arguing that he should be removed. In so doing, he
challenged a decades-old consensus that reserved removals by address for the mentally
infirm Dana had seemed to do likewise when he told the 1853 constitutional convention
that judges could be removed as easily as a man changed his name. Dana, however,
probably never expected to see a judge seriously challenged through the removal power;
he had only meant to convince reformers that the removal clause made their proposed
judicial elections superfluous By emphasizing the unlimited scope of the removal
clause, Phillips shifted the focus of the removal question from its disumonist implications
to the constitutional question of the people's right to regulate the courts Accordingly,
his chief antagonist was not a Curtis minion, but Dana, for whom antislavery ends could
not justify the petitioners' radical challenge to judicial independence.
The committee announced that Loring' s defenders would follow Phillips
immediately, but none appeared The committee thus reserved the next hearing,
scheduled for 28 February, for the remonstrants, but the Curtii remained reluctant to
appear in such a hostile environment. Dana was also expected to appear for Loring, but
had not yet prepared a speech.'^ The patrician Free-Soiler believed it essential that
Liberator, 2 March 1855.
Ach'ertiser, 20 February 1855.
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someone from his party speak for the judge. If only the Websterites defended Loring,
legislators might be further prejudiced against judicial independence. Only someone
entirely independem of the Curtii, Dana believed, could effectually uphold that pnncipl.
It seemed to me that no man in the state was in a situation to act with as much effect as I
seeing that I was counsel for Burns, known to be an opponent of the Fugitive Slave Law andhostile to Judge Loring and his set. It seemed to me therefore that it was my dun to comeforward, not in his defence, but in defence of the principle, and to save the anti-slaven causefrom doing something it might regret.^* ^
Dana tried to enlist amislavery patricians to join him, but apart from Samuel E.
Sewall, who defended Loring in the Boston F.vening Telegraph, none cooperated.
Palfrey and Adams deplored the removal campaign, but would not speak for Loring.
Octogenarian Josiah Quincy, formerly mayor of Boston and president of Harvard, told
Dana frankly that "he wished to [see] Loring punished, and his set, the clique of the
Curtises, put down." No one would take a removal by the Know-Nothing legislature as
a serious precedent, Quincy said, because ''an irresponsible hand [would have] struck the
blow." Franklin Dexter, an antislavery lawyer who exchanged polemics with Loring in
1 850, would have helped Dana "were it not for his extreme dislike [for] the Curtis
faction." Dana was dismayed. Had the Curtii so thoroughly ruined the reputation of
judicial independence that conservatives would risk losing it just to spite them? This
Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal. 2: 671.
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made it even more necessary to defend the principle in sp.te of Loring and his clan, alone
if necessary."
Dana may not have realized that Loring had become a dangerous subject in
respectable society. Any comment on him reflected on his set. To sympathize with the
petitioners was to slander an entire class of eminent jurists. The threat of ostracism, one
young woman discovered, hung over anyone who supported removal.
We all know how. in the heart of many families, this subject is "tabooed - hou in general
society, young people are afraid to say what they think about the removal of Loring or any
other exciting topic, lest they should be classed as fanatics and other "pestilent people " and so
change into wallHowers before their time.
Hatred of the Curtii warred with fear of their social influence among many
respectable antislavery men who still had places in genteel society. Some may have
thought themselves unable to defend Loring in the abstract without denouncing the
clique and endangering their social position. Dana, however, was already ostracized
from the Curtis orbit (unUke Charles Francis Adams'^), and had nothing to lose by
speaking his mind.
Dana was still unprepared to speak on 28 February. With no other remonstrants
present, the committee permitted a bizarre parody of a remonstrance from a dubious
^' Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal 2: 671.
"C. H. D." ICaroline Dall?] in National Anti-Slavery Standard, 12 May 1855.
On March 3. 1855. Adams attended a music party thrown by Thomas B. Curtis This
suggests that Adams. Dana s superior in the Free-Soil part\
. had not been cut by the Curtii. Adams
Diar\
. 3 March 1855. Adams Family Papers.
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representative of the Slave Power In what was probably a rehearsed performance,
previewed weeks earlier, one group of petitioners decided to show the committee and
the crowds thronging Representatives Hall the true face of the forces supporting Lonng.
However well planned the display may have been, it proved the most embarrassing
episode of the hearings.
Second Hearing: Gitchell Havden ^ Cn
John W Gitchell claimed to own a plantation and fifty slaves in the town of
Jacksonville, in Beaton County, Alabama. His Pennsylvama birth and Ohio upbringing
made him a veritable Simon Legree, a Northerner corrupted by slave society. Reporters
called him ^a thin, swarthy man, of perhaps thirty-five or forty years of age," "an inferior
looking man of dark complexion,
... very much resembling an Indian" in his implicit
racial debasement Stopping in Boston on his way home from a business trip, he took
an interest in the committee's activhies, and eventually requested a chance to speak for
the South."
Most information about Gitchell came from Richard Hildreth, the famed historian
and antislavery novelist who wrote for the radical Boston Evening Telegraph and the
New York Tribune. Hildreth was later accused of orchestrating Gitchell's public
^" Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 20 Februar\' 1855; New York Post, quoted in Liberator. 2
March 1855; New York Tribune. 1 March 1855.
Herald. 1 March IS55: Journal. 1 March 1855; Worcester .S/7v, quoted in Frederick
Doug/ass 's Paper. 2 March 1855.
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appearances, if not of fabricating his identity entirely. Hildreth, if he wrote all the
Tnhmie 's Boston articles, was not above printing provocative falsehoods; the paper had
wrongly reported that Boston's Irish would march against Loring's removal. At the
hearing, Hildreth defended Gitchell's right to speak while other petitioners squirmed with
embarrassment.^ Nothing more substantive links him with Gitchell, and nothing definite
can be said about the latter's real motives. The evidence of his two appearances before
the Federal Relations Committee suggests, however, that he was performing a pre-
arranged role.
Gitchell first addressed the committee on 13 February, during hearings on the
need for a new personal liberty law After speeches by Phillips and other abolition
leaders, Chairman Albee announced that "a slaveholder from Alabama, who happened to
be present," wanted to address the committee in the absence of local Unionists. On
Albee'
s consent, "all eyes turned eagerly" to Gitchell, who admitted that he was
"kind o' skeered" of addressing so august a body. Reporters contemptuously transcribed
his comments in dialect, identifying his rhetoric as "peculiariy that of the illiterate
Southerner -- he seemed to repudiate the grammar and the dictionary altogether." His
fears overcome, Gitchell "immediately began upon the old story of the happy condition
of the slaves as compared with the poorer classes of the North." While he sympathized
with the Northerners' concern for runaways, the Alabamian thought legislators' energies
were better spent 'Mn providing a way to keeping out [sic] the foreign emigrants." Bay
Journal, 1 March 1855. For Hildreth's intimacy with Gitchell, see New York Tribune. 7
March 1855. for a report of the Alabamian's departure from Boston.
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man.
Staters' view of slavery, he said, was distorted by disgruntled runaways, who were "the
worst of the lot.'' He challenged his hearers to rebut him.''
As if on cue, Albee announced that Lewis Hayden, "an uneducated colored
a fugitive slave," wanted to answer the slaveholder. Hayden was well known to his
friendly audience as a dealer in second-hand clothing, a member of the Boston Vigilance
Committee, and a leader of Boston's black community. In contrast to the decrepit
Gitchell, Hayden "was neatly and simply dressed. He had a fine head, inside and out,"
and impeccable, unaccented grammar.^' He easily turned Gitchell's comments against
him, arguing that, if Frederick Douglass and other famous tligitives represented the
worst of the slave class, "then you need have no fear of letting loose those now in
bondage!" Reporters appreciated the contrast between the debaters. "To look and listen
to the product of slavery on a white freeman, and of freedom on a colored slave, in the
persons of these two men," one wrote, ^'was such a sermon as neither Whitefield or
Parker could have preached.'"*^ A Northampton writer agreed on the encounter's
propaganda value.
Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 20 Februar\ 1855; New York Post, quoted in Liberator. 2
March 1855; Worcester Spy. quoted in Frederick Douglass 's Paper. 2 March 1855. Of these, only the
Spy identified Gitchell by name, albeit inaccurately as "Githell." The Spy. while mocking his apparent
illiteracy, reported his speech in greater detail than other papers, including his insistence on religious
instruction for his slaves and his willingness to accept compensated emancipation. While these
comments make Gitchell seem less cartoonish. the Spy emphasized his essentially obtuse amorality,
especially his contention that slaver\ was wrong "in some cases." but not in America, and his insistence
on receiving 40% of the market value of his slaves from the government in any emancipation scheme.
'^'^ Northampton Hamp.shire Gazette, 20 Februar\ 1855; New York Post, quoted in Liberator, 2
March 1855.
New York Po.^t. quoted in Liberator, 2 March 1855; Worcester Spy. quoted in Frederick-
Douglass 's Paper, 2 March 1855.
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The scene was worth a dozen good anti-slaver> lectures, in the way of enhphtening
2n rV ^""""V^ ^"'^ ^^^^ f^^^ lookers-on who did not resolvethen. If they had never done so before, that the hunting of such men back into bondage v




While Gitchell's first performance attracted relatively few spectators, a far larger
crowd, more than had heard Phillips on the 20th, came to see someone defend Loring on
28 February. Since many more legislators claimed reserved seats, most people had to
scramble for standing room until the hall was "densely packed in every part."'' When
no remonstrants appeared, Albee heard more petitioners, including black lawyer Robert
Morris and Theodore Parker, who flourished Loring's draft of Burns's bill of sale as
proof of the judge's prejudice. After Phillips repeated the tale of his Cambridge
"interview" with Loring, Albee announced that a Southerner wanted to speak, and
introduced Gitchell."***
While Gitchell admitted that he was "no lawyer, as Mr. Phillips is.
. . . but a poor
clodhopper down in my country," circumstances compelled him "to defend one of his
countrymen -- Judge Loring -- whom there was no one to defend." He admitted some
jealousy, as a Southerner, at seeing Massachusetts affirm the states-rights doctrine first
propounded in his section, but he warned that Loring' s removal would exacerbate
Northampton Hampshire Gazette, 20 February 1855.
Advertiser, 1 March 1855; Herald, 1 March IS55: Journal, 1 March 1855.
Newspapers identified the Alabamian inconsistently as Gitchell. Getchell. Gethell, and
Ketchell. See previous note for newspaper sources, and add New York Tribune, 1 March 1855. which
gives Gitchell's town and county. Only the Liberator identified Gitchell as the same man who had
appeared during the liberty law hearings.
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sectional tensions. He chided emotional women, ^the fair sex of our country
. .
. the
very band [sic?] of Union," for ignoring the serious political implications of removal.
Anyway, what had Loring done wrong^ Drafting a bill of sale for Burns was "a
charitable act." Laughter punctuated his remarks throughout, but conservative observers
were unamused."*^
Gitchell's antics embarrassed some petitioners. Theodore Parker interrupted him
to note that Loring had not requested Gitchell's assistance. The Alabamian's testimony,
Parker said, "[should] not prejudice the minds of the committee or the public against the
Judge." To his likely surprise, hisses and catcalls mingled with the respectful applause of
the galleries; Parker seemed not to be in on the joke. Hildreth, identifying himself
implausibly as Loring's friend, gently chided Parker and affirmed Gitchell's right to
speak. Since the removal question had national implications, Hildreth argued, opinions
from all quarters should be welcome.
After more interruptions, Gitchell continued until Albee called on Lewis Hayden.
By now, Hayden was either in on the jest, or at least highly skeptical of his recurring
antagonist. "Slaveholders are shrewd men," he obsei^ed, "and this man is not." Still,
Hayden thought it wise to hear Gitchell; "If there was nothing else to compel the
committee to listen to the prayer of the petitioners, the exhibition of the man from
Alabama was enough." Gitchell tried to rebut Hayden, but his warning that
Boston Da//v CoM/7>r, 1 March 1855; Herald, 1 March IS55: Journal, 1. 5 March 1855:
New York Tribune. 1 March 1855.
Herald, 1 March IS55: Journal, 1 March 1855.
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Massachusetts should not pass a liberty law incited a cacophony of protest. 'The dignity
of a legislative hearing was sunk beneath a scene of disorder and indecorum which would
have disgraced a political caucus," sneered one Whig reporter. Finally, Abby Kelly
Foster, a feminist abolitionist, sought recognition as a representative of female
petitioners. Just as she started to speak, however, Albee adjourned the hearings until 6
March. Foster's aborted testimony was a little-noticed but poignant demonstration of
the limits yet imposed on women's participation in political debates.^'
The Whiggish press deplored the day's spectacle. "The whole proceeding seems
to us to be a ridiculous farce, an improper exhibition," one writer frowned." Few could
take Gitchell or the Committee seriously afterwards.
If members of the Legislature wish to give public "exhibitions" for the amusement of a
pronuscuous assemblage, it would be ucll for them to continue such "hearings" as the one that
was held yestcrda> afternoon; but if they wish to preserve in the public nund any respect for
IhemseKes or their deliberations. the> owe it to themsehes and to the people they represent, to
take ej'fcciual measures to prevent a repetition of such proceedings.''
The Loring hearings, like the scandals surrounding Joseph Hiss's investigation of
Catholic nunneries, thus contributed to the Know-Nothing legislature's dismal
reputation. To critics, Albee's committee seemed, like the larger body, a conclave of
incompetents and monomaniacs. Albee and Stone, however, were unembarrassed They
Advertiser, 1 March Journal, 1 March 1855. The was the only paper to
notice Foster s appearance at day s end.
Herald, 1 March 1855.
' Journal, 1 March 1855.
229
had readily exploited Gitchell and Hayden for their symbolic value. However ineptly,
Gitchell embodied the Slave Power in lieu of its reticent Northern defenders. More
pointedly, he seemed to show that conservatives like Dana, who meant to defend Lonng
in the name ofjudicial independence, were only serving slavery's cause. Hildreth made
the point most sharply.
It may be proper to mention that Mr. Gitchell. the Alabama gentleman who. at the previousheanng. was Judge Lonng s only champion, has been compelled to leave for the South - nothowever, until assured that Mr. Dana would throw himself into the breach and supply the
"
place of the Teal Southern chivaln " of which he took occasion to speak in exalted terms
Third Hearing: Richard Henry Dana
,
.Tr
As Dana prepared to argue against removal, the Curtii tried to mollify local
sentiment by helping to liberate Anthony Burns. Since returning to captivity. Burns had
been sold to an owner who realized that Bostonians would pay more than Southerners
for a notorious runaway. After he sold Burns into freedom, the Curtii 's large share of
the final purchase price aroused suspicions that they had Loring's interest more in mind
than Burns's. The freedman's return to Boston raised hopes that he might testify before
the committee, -- perhaps even in Loring's behalf, - but Burns quickly moved to
Amherst to pursue his education. Burns's liberation only reminded critics of the moral
corruption in Massachusetts courts. ^Tt is a sad thing to reflect," said John L. Swift,
New York Tribune, 7 March 1855.
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"that the gold of Massachusetts can do what its laws cannot - give a man his
freedom. "^^
Dana, meanwhile, prepared to refote Wendell Phillips on two points. He would
first contend that the abolitionist's broad interpretation of the removal clause went
beyond anything Dana had meant to suggest in 1853. The removal power, Dana
believed, was implicitly limited by the principle ofjudicial independence. He would
depart dangerously from the constitutional high ground, however, to argue that Loring's
conduct of the Burns trial did not warrant removal On this point, he risked rebuttal
from eyewitness testimony.
The dramatic irony of Burns's defender defending Loring made Dana the main
attraction of the hearings, and the crowd on 6 March was the largest yet. Theodore
Parker opened with a veiled apology for the previous week's travesty. Believing that
Hildreth and other petitioners were driven by personal hatred for Loring, Parker
reminded his audience that the judge "had many qualifications that adapted him to the
business of Judge of Probate." As a private citizen, the judge was a decent man who
"had not a personal enemy in the world." As a probate judge, however, Loring owed it
to his constituents, many ofwhom were fiigitive slaves or free blacks susceptible to
kidnapping, to resign his slave-law commission. Failing that, he had to be removed.
New York Tribune, 1. 3 March 1855; John L. Swift, Remarks ofJohn L. Swift, Esq., of
Boston, on the Removal ofEdward Greeley Loring
. . . Delivered in the Massachusetts Hou.se of
Representatives, Tuesday, April 10, 1855, (Boston. 1855). 21.
Advertiser. 1 March 1855; Journal, 1 March 1855. Parker thought that Loring's honor
might have been saved simply by reftising the Bums case while retaining his commission. No less
ardent a slave-hunter than Ben Hallett had excused himself from hearing the 1850 case of William and
Ellen Craft, who were ultimately rescued. Having taken the Burns case, however, Loring could redeem
himself only by surrendering his commission.
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Dana then spoke for over three hours. As a representative of conservative
antislavery opinion, he reminded the committee that "the Constitution places all the
judges on the same tenure, and what may be done to one may be done to all." The
Loring question, he argued, transcended antislavery politics.
If this were a question between Mr. Edward G. Lonng and the Probate judgeship if it were aquestion between Mr. Lonng and the Legislature, we tthe anti-slaven remonstrants] should nothave intervened. But
.
. .
this is a matter of public concemmem. touching the rights and
interests of a 1 the citizens. If we thought you could justly and safelv grant the praver of thepetitioners, if we thought it consistem with the dignity of Massachusetts, we should not
remonstrate.
Years of demagoguery, Dana complained, had created an irrational distrust of the
courts. "Some gentlemen reason as if the Legislature were the people, and the Judges
something else," he scolded, "as if every limitation on the power of the Legislature were
a limitation on the power of the people." Judges also represented the people, Dana
noted, but specifically represented their ancestors' original commitment to constitutional
government. In ratifying a constitution, the people had subsumed their sovereignty into
delegated instruments -- the branches of government - that were themselves governed,
not by majority will, but by constitutional mandates The people regained their absolute
sovereignty only when revising the constitution. Otherwise, "It is to the Constitution




Unlimited removals by address would disrupt the balance of powers achieved by
the Founders, and with it all safeguards for individual liberty. Legislators ^'have only to
remove from office by address, the judges who differ from you," Dana warned, "and you
make yourselves the supreme judicature, and the final interpreters of the Constitution,"
effectively makmg the will of a momentary majority the law of the land. This would
leave all minorities and individuals whose rights depended on disinterested judges at the
mercy of majority prejudice disguised as pnnciple.^^ Dana irritated radical legislators like
John L. Swift, who '^could never sanction his views of religion, or government, without
... in a great measure, abandoning their own," by rejecting their assumption that the
people's will was always just.
More obnoxious yet to the radicals was Dana's "studied and labored eulogium"
of Loring's conduct of the Burns trial. From Dana's own standpoint, and from Loring's,
his narrative was hardly flattering." Loring's decision, Dana charged, had been
influenced, but not dictated, by the Curtis circle. It came from years spent in reactionary
company rather than a cynical conspiracy against freedom. The Curtii, Dana thought,
honestly believed that they were right. Despite their influence, however, Dana
considered Loring's treatment of Burns to be both fair and liberal.
According to Dana, not he, but Loring had played the crucial part in asking
Burns to seek counsel when both Dana and Phillips doubted the viability of a defense.
Dana, Remarks, 5-6.
*° Swift. Remarks, 3-4.
Telegraph. 8 March 1855; Richard Henrv Dana, Sr. to Mrs. Arnold. 18 March 1855, Dana
Family Papers.
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Loring had interpreted Burns's frightened mumbling positively when he could have easily
ruled otherwise. On his own, Loring had insisted that Burns's defense be granted all
reasonable delays. He had never let Burns sit shackled in the courtroom, Dana claimed
never to have admonished him during the trial except to insist on his own right to cross-
examine the claimant's witnesses. The petitioners' account of the aborted sale, he
continued, was equally distorted. Since neither Dana nor Phillips had witnessed the
negotiations, the committee should have called an eyewitness, preferably Leonard
Grimes, to substantiate the remonstrants' portrait of a disinterested but conscientious
Loring. When Albee and Stone later assured him that Loring' s courtroom conduct
would not influence the committee's decision, Dana believed he had won a significant
point."
Dana emphasized Loring' s conscientious conduct in order to prove that the
petitioners sought the removal solely on the basis of the Burns verdict. That, he thought,
reduced the issue to a difference of opinion, rather than a question of Loring' s moral or
intellectual competence. Removal for opinion's sake, Dana argued, violated the '^spirit"
of the removal clause, which precedent reserved for cases of infirmity. He hinted,
however, that Loring need not be exempted entirely from punishment. Dana still
believed that Bay State judges should not conduct fligitive-law hearings without
admitting habeus corpus challenges to claimants. Before penalizing Loring, however,
"Massachusetts [should] first ... put herself right upon the record, [and] pass a law"
prohibiting state officers from hearing fijgitive cases under the 1850 law. Loring might
^~ Dana, Remarks, 19; Liberator, 9 March 1855,
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then be made to resign his commission on pain of removal or, preferably, impeachment.
"This is more dignified in the state," Dana argued, ''and safer as a precedent as regards
the independence of the judges." Applying a new law to Loring, however, might prove
an unconstitutional application oi ex postfacto law. If so, Dana's suggestion of a liberty
law as an alternative to removing Loring may have been made, like his 1853
endorsement of the removal power, in bad faith. It proved, however, to be one of his
most effective points.
The petitioners assumed dismissively that Dana simply wanted to protect all
judges from popular scrutiny. "[T]he main gist of his argument," Edmund Quincy
wrote, "rests on the Bar-bred notion of the especial sanctity of certain men because they
are called Judges!" Black lawyer John S Rock accused Dana of "superstitious reverence
for the judiciary." Hildreth wrote that Dana "views the whole transaction with the eyes,
not of a man, but of a lawyer." The Boston Evening Telegraph condemned Dana's
doctrine as fundamentally anti-American. "[0]n this matter of the judiciary, Dana thinks
and feels like an Englishman,
. . .
The fiandamental theory of the English government is
that the Crown is not absolute. The fundamental theory of our government ... is that
the people are absolute." So profound was Dana's "dread of popular intermeddling
that branch of the government" that it would inevitably "overmaster his anti-slavery
sympathies," This was a portentous warning. The radicals at the Telegraph thought
judicial elections necessary to secure Massachusetts against the Slave Power. If the
in
Lucid, ed.. Dana Journal, 2: 671.
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patrician Free-Soilers disagreed, attempts at antislavery unity might founder on the
shoals of the judiciary question.^'^
While antislavery radicals dismissed Dana as a special pleader for judicial
aristocrats, his patrician friends applauded him. Palfrey had long touted Dana's as the
last word on the removal question, and judged it a masterful defense ofjudicial
independence. He worried, however, that Dana might save Loring only to lose the entire
judiciary to a revived reform movement. Hatred of the Curtii remained so great, even
among patricians, that Dana's father had to reassure friends that his son intended no
rapprochement with that clan. Nevertheless, many patricians now trusted him to steer
the antislavery movement away from radicalism. A note from Loring himself testified to
Dana's standing in conservative circles. That Dana defended him, the judge wrote, was
probably more significant for many observers than the truths he told.'' The old Cotton
Whig Edward Everett took a bleaker view. Dana had brought this crisis upon himself,
Everett wrote privately, by defying established Whiggery as a Free-Soiler and a
Coalitionist. Having sown the wind of radicalism, Dana now railed against the
whiriwind.^^
Atlas, 17 Februarv 1855; Telegraph, quoted in Liberator, 23 March 1855: Frederick
Douglass's Paper, 16 March U55\ National Anti-Slavery Standard, 7 April 1855.
Edward G. Loring to Richard Hcim Dana. Jr., 7 March 1855: Charies SedgAvick to Dana. 7
March 1855: John G. Palfrey to Dana. 23 March 1855: Tyler Bigelow to Dana. 25 March 1855: Richard
Henr> Dana. Sr. to Mrs. Arnold. 18 March 1855: Dana, Sr. to C. J. Henn
. 31 March 1855. Dana
Family Papers.
Edward E\erett Diary. 6 March 1855. Everett Papers. Everett can be considered a Curtii
sympathizer. Meade. 'Daniel Webster." 330 - 1. relates that E\ crett encouraged Benjamin R. Curtis to
call for indictments against the 1851 Coalitionists, and sought to have Curtis's address distributed in the
United States Senate to incite the impeachment of Charles Sumner.
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Most petitioners found Dana's speech almost irrelevant. Phillips told the
committee that Dana had failed to refote or even answer his arguments for removal.
Many legislators agreed that Dana had missed the petitioners' point He had not
disproven the broad sweep of the removal power, nor that a judge could be removed for
moral incompetence. He described limits on popular sovereignty that the petitioners did
not accept. By defending Loring's conduct he appeared small-minded in the face of an
enormous crime.^^ John S. Rock considered Dana's strategy "an egregious blunder."
Edmund Quincy, however, acknowledged the potential influence of Dana's oration on a
malleable legislature. One week after the speech, he wrote a friend that he still expected
to see Loring removed, but now felt less certain about it.'^^
Committee Reports and Dana's Protest
A bare majority of the seven-man committee recommended Loring's removal.
Albee published his majority report at the end of March, along with two minority
reports. Salem's Henry Devereux opposed removal as a nullification of federal law and
an abuse of powers applicable only in cases of "clear, unquestionable, self-evident
deficiency or incompatibility, either physical, moral, or intellectual." Merely to differ on
a question of constitutional law, as Loring did, did not prove intellectual incompetence.
See Swift. Remarks, 22 - 5. and pro-removal speeches and articles in Frederick Doug/ass 's
Paper, 16 March 1855. and Liberator, 16 March, 20. 27 April. 1 1 May 1855.
68
Frederick Douglass s Paper. 16 March 1855: Edmund Quincv to George F. Talbot, 13
March 1855. Quincy-Wendell-Holmes-Upham Collection, microfilm. Massachusells Historical Society.
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Removing him would ^'compromise or destroy the best and most eflfective security for an
honest and impartial administration of the laws, upon which all private rights and public
order depend."^'' Two legislators opposed the removal without endorsing the fugitive
law. They agreed with Dana and Devereux that defiance of public opinion didn't justify
removal. They believed a revised liberty law necessary, as Dana advised, before Loring
could be justly deposed. Judicial independence, they concluded, should not be sacrificed
by making Loring, if not the emire judiciary, a scapegoat for the very existence of the
fugitive law.^"
Albee believed that federal law should defer to natural law. Blackstone was his
authority: "[The] law of nature, being coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself,
is of course superior in obligation to any other, no human laws are of any viability if
contrary to this." It could never be mandatory to execute or enforce a wicked statute
like the fugitive law Prigg v. Pennsylvania, af^er all, made its enforcement by state
officers a matter for legislators to decide On this point, the 1843 liberty law needed no
revision. The liberty bills of 1851 and 1852 had failed, Albee claimed disingenuously,
because Free-Soil legislators like himself thought them unnecessary. If the 1851
legislators had thought it unnecessary to revise the 1843 law, however, why was Dana's
revision introduced'^ Why had Free-Soil senators voted against tabling it? Why did so
''^ J855 House Doc. 93. 40-2.
]855 House Doc. 93. 36-8: Dedham Gazette, 31 March 1855. Erasmus Gould, of Falmouth.
Barnstable Countv (a strong Whig town until 1854). voted agamst both Loring's removal and the
personal liberty bill. Gould opposed the jur\ bill, while his committee colleague Benjamin K. Pierce, a
Norfolk senator, voted for the personal liberty and jur\ rights bills. Both men supported district
representation over the town s>stem.
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many representatives vote for it in 1852^ While Dana still thought a new bill necessa^^,
Albee now claimed that an 1850 declaratory resolution sufficed to prove that Bay Staters
assumed ih^X the old liberty law remained binding. For Albee, that assumption was as
binding as the letter of the law, if not more so 7'
Like Phillips, AJbee assigned more moral weight to the spirit than to the letter of
the law. Against Loring's strict construction of the compatibility of offices, Albee asked:
"Are there not certain proprieties which no public officer can disregard, and retain the
confidence of the people'^ Are there no moral incompatibilities?" If there were, removal
by address was the quickest way to eliminate judges who
-from gross or rash measures,
or loathsomeness of person, or general offensiveness to the community, [had lost] the
public confidence " Offensiveness, rather than any statutory offense, was the proper
criterion for removal by address. "It is precisely the cases in which the people see that
the man, in person, mind, or morals, is such as they do not wish to retain in service,"
Albee wrote, "that this reserved constitutional right was meant to reach."^^
To impose conditions on the exercise of the removal power, Albee warned, was
to nullify democratic sovereignty. As Phillips had noted, delegates to the 1820
constitutional convention recognized unconditional removal by address as an existing
right. "To omit to exercise it, from the fact that it might be abused," was a more
dangerous precedent than anything Dana feared, "for it would be a practical recognition
7
1
J855 House Doc. 93, 1-8. Albee quoted from Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of
England, 1: 41.
^- 1855 House Doc. 93. 8 - 9.
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ofa UmnaUon to a nght of the people:^ The right to demand removals, moreover, was
essential to responsible government. ''A servant is not beyond the reach of the people,
merely by keeping clear of criminal misconduct," Albee wrote. Until judges were
elected, only the removal power held them accountable to the people. Albee did not
identify the "sovereign people" with the state constitution, as Dana did, but with the
existing citizenry. The constitution was but one expression of the popular will Any
subsequent expression of that will, in the form of legislation or petition, had equal
weight, and could not be overridden automatically by reference to the constitution. The
"rule of law" could never be abstracted into something separate from, or superior to, the
people's will, unless by that rule one meant the will of God. Laws and constitutions
made by fallible, compromised men fell far short of the divine standard, and were rightly
subject to constant popular revision.
Albee believed that Loring had violated the known popular will merely by
participating in the Burns case, but he followed Phillips in cataloguing the judge's evil
conduct towards Burns While Dana argued that Loring's ruling was erroneous but not
corrupt, Albee deemed it so contrary to law, reason, and morality that, "if.
. . not a
proof of corruption, [it] must be a proof of incapacity." In recounting Burns's treatment
during the trial, Albee followed Phillips's account and ignored Dana's, apart from his
critique of the final verdict
.
"It is sufficient," the chairman closed, "for the Committee
'^^ 1855 House Doc. 93. 8. Albee's analysis of the 1820 convention followed Phillips's, and
was attacked extensively in A/onth/y Law Reporter, n.s.. 8 (May 1855), 1 -21.
1855 House Doc. 93, IS- 32.
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to know that Judge Loring has sinned against the moral sentiments of Massachusetts;
that under a law which the conscience of Massachusetts abhors, which her Christianity
repudiates, which her reason pronounces unconstitutional, and 'against law and
evidence,' he has made a man a slave. "^^
The majority report infliriated Dana. Albee and Stone's assurance that Loring's
conduct would not influence their report had proven a lie; half the majority report was a
catalogue of alleged abuses. 'The committee," Dana wrote privately, "has behaved
shabbily." He protested to the chairman that Leonard Grimes had been excluded
purposefully from the hearings to hide proof of Loring's fairness. Albee and Stone
replied waspishly that Dana should have demanded Grimes's testimony more forcefblly,
since his had been the last scheduled day of hearings. Stone added that Loring's
treatment of Burns remained a secondary matter, the main point always being that the
judge had enslaved a man. In deference to Dana's influence, however, the committee
agreed to reconvene on 3 April. Since the majority report had already been published
and submitted for legislative consideration, this was a remarkable concession, betraying
some concern on the majority's part that their handling of the hearings might justly be
criticized.
While the initial hearings resembled an extended oratorical debate, or
occasionally a vaudeville show, the supplemental hearing was a businesslike interrogation
J855 House Doc. 93, 35.
Lucid, ed., Dana Journal, 2: 674; O. W. Albee to Dana. 3 April 1855: James W. Stone to
Dana. 2 April 1855. Dana Family Papers; J855 House Doc. 205, 9.
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of witnesses. Information, not advocacy, was the object, and committee members
actually interrogated witnesses. Attention focused on Grimes's account of the aborted
sale, but the mimster emphasized Loring's broken promise to help him complete the
transaction.^^ Asked to assess Loring's behavior. Grimes concluded that the judge had
deceived him In retrospect, he added, Loring's promise to give Burns the benefit of the
doubt was equally deceptive. Dana's hopes for Grimes's testimony had blown up in his
78
face. He could only reiterate that Loring's environment was to blame for his faults.
Judge Lonng was not the man for the occasion. He failed (that is. in our [the remonstrants "l
vieu of It) parth from want of those high instincts and that self-moving power which the case
required, and partly from the insensible effect of the unfortunate influences which hav e been
e.xerted over him and many others, during the last few vears. in this region
Dana did not accuse Loring or the Curtii of conspiring against Burns or Northern
sentiment. Despite their Cotton Whig bias, he noted, they had tried to buy Burns's
freedom. All of "State Street and Beacon Street" had favored Burns's release, and were
Some reporters misinterpreted the purpose of the new hearing, stating that Stone had
requested permission from the House to hold another hearing on the ground that Dana himself not
Grimes, had new testimony. When Dana stated at the onset that he had nothing new to say. and the
committee turned to Grimes, ihc Journal's correspondent assumed that Stone had lied to the House in
order to set up an e.xtra day of anti-Lonng propaganda to shore up Albee's heavily criticized majority'
report. To counter such conclusions. Albee and Stone published their correspondence with Dana in the
pnnted record of the extra hearing. Bee. 4 Apnl 1855: Journal, quoted in Liberator. 1.1 Apnl 1855
(which characterized the Journal s charges as "base and false."). There was some evidence that Stone
wanted to delay House consideration of the address. On 1 April {Bee. 2 April) he mo\ cd unsucccssftilly
for a delay on the ground that know n opponents of the removal were inescapably absent, and should
have a chance to be heard on the subject.
1855 Hou.se Doc. 205. 11 - 14.
1855 House Doc. 205, 28.
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unlikely, Dana concluded, to coerce Loring into ordering his extradition. ^^We are not so
sure of that." Phillips interjected. Did the petitioners think that Justice Curtis would strip
Loring of his commission for freeing Burns^ Dana asked. ^'We fear he would," Hildreth
replied. Dana insisted that Curtis had proven himself an impartial judge during the
Shadrach rescue trials, but the petitioners remembered the judge's exclusion of
antislavery jurors, his reflisal to let lawyers challenge the ftigitive law, and his more
recent biased instructions to the Burns riot grand jury. Dana's high regard for the Curtii
made no sense to them except as proof of class loyalty in defiance of higher laws.*"'
To the petitioners, Dana had only forther proven Loring's moral incompetence.
He had argued, in effect, that Loring lacked a mind of his own Could such a man be fit
for a judicial office"^ Dana himself, Theodore Parker testified, had labeled Loring's
conduct "atrocious" at a point when many abolitionists still publicly deemed him "a
Commissioner perhaps the very best you could select." Even Charles M. Ellis, Dana's
partner in Burns's defense, joined in contradicting his account of the trial. Only Dana's
ideological obstinence, it seemed, kept him from admitting the truth about Loring." The
committee saw no need to amend their report.
Days later, an affidavit arrived from Amherst, signed by Anthony Burns. He
reported being shackled all day on 25 May. On 27 May, he recalled, his irons were only
removed in the afternoon. If Loring had ordered this, Burns would probably not have
known to credit him. For the rest of the trial, he remembered, he wore irons only in
' J855 House Doc. 205, 2.3.
' 1855 House Doc. 205, 34 - 6.
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transit between his cell and the courtroom. Little of this was new, but it seemed
appropriate for Burns to have the last word before the Loring case went to the
legislature.^^
The Larger Debate: Democracy versus Legality
"Not only the eyes of the people of this state, but the eyes of the whole union are
this day directed towards this capital," a Salem legislator said during the Loring
debates. He exaggerated slightly. Most papers outside Massachusetts found the issue
notable only when it could be used against Know-Nothingism. In Virginia, Democratic
governor Henry Wise used Loring's plight to label his Know-Nothing challengers as
disguised abolitionists. A Washington sheet called the removal campaign "a legitimate
and direct consequence of the new secret movement['s] war upon the constitutional
rights of the citizen
.
.
and it is an easy transition from such a proscription to assail the
rights of the states [i.e., slavery]," affirmed in the constitution. Southern Democrats'
ready equation of Know-Nothingism with abolitionism alarmed many Bay State nativists
who hoped to make Henry J. Gardner the next vice-president. Gardner himself, most
assumed, was worried over how the removal vote might effect his chances in 1856.**"*
82
National Anti-Slavery Standard, 2?, AiphX 1855. Burns "s affidavit was dated 7 April. Burns
subsequently pursued a religious career, took up a niinistr\ in Canada, and died in 1862
83
84
Bee, 17 April 1855.
The Richmond Enquirer (cited in Bee, 4 April 1855) reported erroneously that Loring had
w ritten to Wise, warning him of Know -Nothings' true intentions. The Bee exposed the Virginians"
error; George B. Loring. a Democratic physician, and no relation to the judge, had written to Wise. See
also Washington Daily Union, 2 May 1855.
244
Antislavery conservatives were less troubled by Southern opinion than by the
removal's implications for judicial independence. Samuel E. Sewall, who in 1852 had
authored a jury-nghts bill to obstruct the fugitive law, opposed the removal in the
Boston Evening Telegraph. ''No person acting in a judical or quasi-judicial capacity,"
he wrote, "ought to be subject to any penalty for a mere error ofjudgment." The
removal power, Sewall warned, could as easily be used against antislaveiy activists as by
them, "[until] the power became as odious and corrupting an engine of party
despotism as the power of removing officers has proved in the hands of the President of
the United States." In Dana's words, "this game of removal is a game at which two may
play"''
Judicial reform remained a volatile issue after the defeat of the 1 853 constitution.
Despite voters' explicit repudiation of expanded jury rights that year, the 1855
legislature approved a similar bill granting jurors the same law-finding rights. In a body
where most successful measures met only minimal, often single-digit opposition, the 198-
102 House vote on the jury bill, while still a landslide, exposed the divisive potential of
judiciary questions. The issue threatened the solidarity of both nativist and antislavery
opinion An antislavery legislator warned that "many strong friends of [our] cause in all
Telegraph, n. d., in Parker-Burns Scrapbook. Dana cited Sewall s article in Remarks, 12.
22- 3. The Telegraph \s editor unhappily ascribed to Sewall ^ a superstitious reverence forjudges as an
order of men too sacred to be approached by the legislature or the people."
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1855 House Journal. Appendix 3. The Journal reports a 202 - 103 vote, but my count, based
on its roll call, produced the figure given above. Curioush
. a prohibitory liquor law passed the same
body by a 294 - 50 vote. A legislature so committed to prohibition should have opposed jur\ rights, but
the jur\^ bill prevailed on the strength of antislaverv' sentiment. Swift. Remarks. 23. equates opposition
to Loring^s removal and opposition to thejur\ bill.
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parts of the State" opposed the removal. ''If the anti-slavery tree, they will say, is to
produce fruit like this, we will neither water its roots, or sh under its branches."^^ As
for Know-Nothingism in general, the hostile Boston Daily Advertiser predicted smugly
that 'The American Party, strong as it thinks itself, cannot bear the intolerable burden in
Massachusetts of an assauh on the independence of the judiciary. It was such an
assault," editor Charles Hale warned, "that worked the destruction of the whole fabric so
cleverly raised by the constitutional reformers of 1853."^^
Friends of the petitioners scoffed at conservative scruples. "Every old fogy
newspaper is ringing the changes upon the sacredness of the judiciary," a Northampton
paper complained. 'The utter subversion of the social order, the community of goods,
the disorders, irreligion, immorality which will flow from
. . . exercising a clear power
. .
will be tricked out to frighten" legislators and voters, Edmund Quincy sneered. "But
we trtist the legislature will remember that though the Judges should be independent^
there is one thing more vital yet, and that is that they be respectable:' Nationally,
antislavery radicals saw the courts as the "last stronghold" of slavery; there, according to
an Albany paper, "backed by old Form and Precedent and rooted Prejudice, it is
preparing for a last determined resistance." Remonstrants' appeals to judicial
independence only intensified hostility towards the courts.
Advertiser, 12 April 1855: Bee. 16. 19 April 1855.
Advertiser, 14 April 1855.
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Albany Evening JournaL 26 Februarys 1855: National Anti-Slmery Standard. 3 March 1855;
New York Tribune, 28 February 1855; Northampton Courier, 22 May 1855.
246
Albee, meanwhile, cleverly invited conservatives to forestall wholesale upheaval
by removing Loring. He warned Whiggish remonstrants that their seeming allies in the
pro-slavery Democratic press secretly hoped that Loring's survival would provoke
radical reforms.^ An authemic old Whig, the Springfield editor Samuel Bowles, also
recommended removing Loring as a sop to radicals. An opponent of the 1853
constitution, Bowles now played the moderate reformer.
Wc do not share in (he fc.r thm the independence of ihc judiciary is to be damaged bv (he
rcnov al of Judge Lonng We vv .il trust the good sense of Massachusclls to lal<c care of thaiAnd vv/e ih.nk we would run the risk of hav ing our judges a lilllc less independent rather thanhave them descend to the dirty work of slave-catching That is altogether too independent for
this commonvveallh. She ceases to be Massachusetts when her ludiciarv is to be upheld in such
business. ' - r-
Privately, Bowles characterized the removal more candidly as '^a decided piece of
conservative legislation/' If it failed, "the advocates of an elective judiciary for short
terms will be double instanter in Massachusetts, and our judiciary will be placed where
every popular breeze can reach them, which I would deprecate as much as [anyone] "
Judges were, nevertheless, accountable to a higher standard than their own learning.
Law and morality, Bowles thought, "possess [an] intimate connection and dependency;
[any] law, in a country like ours, can really be no law
. . . unless grounded in the moral
Albcc himself considered an elective Judiciar> inevilablc if not desirnble; see his speech in
Liberator, 11 May 1855.
Springfield Rcpublicmu 20 Fcbruarv 1X55. Bowies went so far as to advocate indirect
election of judges by legislators, which was Ben Hallctt s position in IX5.v On Bowles s role in 1855
politics, see Foner. Free Soil. Free Labor. 210. where he is identified as a radicalized moderate. While
some erstwhile Free-Soilers mocked Bowies as a latecomer to their movement, Charles W. Slack
welcomed him as a convert to the cause. Liberator, 20 April 1855.
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conv,ct,ons of ,he people. The laws of the county are the mere exponents of .he vinue
and morahty of the people " By that standard, Loring's removal was morally legitimate
regardless of its conservative utility/^^
Bowles also considered the removal a safe alternative to direct nullification of the
fligitive law. Democrats had charged consistently that the petitioners meant to nullify the
law, since "Judge Loring's only crime is obedience to the supreme law of the land/' and
"abolitionism seeks [his] removal because he sustained the supremacy of law."'^^ Most
petitioners denied any nullifying intentions. Nullification, they argued, meant using state
power to resist slave-hunting, while they wanted only to deny slave-catchers the
^
assistance of state officers. Slaves could still be hunted and captured in Massachusetts,
theoretically, and commissioners could still hear claims, but claimants would have to rely
exclusively on federal power. On this point, as on the judiciary question, Loring's
removal was advocated as a moderate gesture.^'*
For many legislators, as for many petitioners, moderation mattered less than the
requirements of state honor. The Loring question thus exposed the latent conflict
between states-rights and nationalist Know-Nothings. Pro-removal legislators reflised
obedience to an unjust national will. They believed that "the State Government is
Samuel Bowles to Charles Allen. 22 Febniar\ 1855. quoted in George S. Mcrriani. The Life
amlTimes ofSamuel Bowles, l\o\s.. (Hqv, york. 1885). 1: 164.
Post, 27 March. 7 May 1855; Greenfield Franklin Democrat. 25 May 1855.
Springfield /^<'/'»/)//rf7/7. 20 Fcbniar\ 1855; National Era, 12 May 1855; Cover. Justice
Accused. 182 An exception to the general disavowal of nullifying motives was Senator Benjamin F.
White of Norfolk, who said, "1 go for Nullification; right out and forever, and go for nullifying
everything wrong." Courier. 20 April 1855.
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primitive, original
- the Federal, derivative," and that ^The citizen of Massachusetts,
though he owed allegiance to the United States, owed a higher allegiance to his own
state.'"'^ "No man who properly regards the honor of the State," according to Know-
Somethmg John L. Swift, would have condemned Burns or even heard the case. Loring
had violated "the known will" of Massachusetts, and had not "administered the law as a
Massachusetts Judge should administer it."
The Know-Somethings rejected Dana's argument that state honor could be
redeemed only after passage of a new liberty bill. They did not think that Massachusetts
had to clear its own collective conscience, but that it had only to purge itself of corrupt
counselors. The Federal Relations Committee was responsible for reporting the new
liberty bill, but AJbee kept it in limbo during the Loring debates. Since he considered
Loring guilty according to popular opinion, he saw no need to advance the bill ahead of
the removal address. Indeed, he may have advanced the address first to test whether the
removal clause made some provisions of the forthcoming liberty bill unnecessary, or if
failure made them essential.'^'^
Many moderate legislators were troubled by Dana's suggestion that the
commonwealth was not yet fit to judge Loring "Massachusetts has no right to exact or
demand fi-om her officers a higher code of morals as to the ftigitive slave act than that
which at the same time governed her own counsels," one solon argued. "[T]he people
Swift, Remarks, 28; Stevens, Anthony Burns, 236.
Swift. Remarks. II. 19-20, See also Telegraph. 7 Februar>. 2 March 18.^5; Tra\'eller. 24
April 1855; Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 20 March 1855. Mulkern. Know-Nothing Party. 104 - 5,
makes a common chronological error in ha\ ing the legislature appro\ c the liberty bill, over Gardner's
veto, before considering Loring s removal.
249
virtually acquiesced in the execution of the fbgitive slave law," another added, ''and
therefore were as much at fault as [Loring] was." Since "Judge Loring was no more
guilty in this matter of returning ftigitive slaves than the people of the whole
Commonwealth," a senator urged that he ''should not therefore be made a scapegoat for
the sins of others " They were especially alarmed by Albee's decision to submit a
removal address that gave no reason for demanding Loring's ouster. Albee's contention
in his report that the outdated 1 843 liberty law and a toothless 1 850 resolution proved
Loring immoral failed to satisfy moderates who wanted an authoritative statement that
made clear to the public why the judge deserved removal. With the liberty bill m limbo,
moderate legislators proposed amendments to Albee's address that would inform Loring
of his offense and, importantly, give him a fmal opportunity to resign his commission or
his judgeship. Approval of such an amendment, moderates advised, would reconcile
many uncertain legislators to an ultimate removal.
Debates over these warning amendments exposed an ideological conflict over the
sources of political and legal authority. Legislative remonstrants contended that removal
would not be legitimate without a formal legislative or judicial statement that Loring's
actions were contrary to Massachusetts law. "[BJefore Mr. Loring should be expelled
from office," a Salem solon urged, "he ought to have some tangible expression of the
people of this State" that he acted incompatibly with state law. Declaratory resolutions
and angry petitions alone could not justify removal. "The people can only act through
their agents" through the enactment of laws. No matter how many citizens signed
petitions, the judge "has never been properly notified" of the public will. An amendment
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declaring an incompatibility between state office and a federal commission would simply
"declare the principle for which we are contending ' in an authoritative way, and
"attaches to the address a clause which sheds over its harsh features a gleam of
magmficent light " "With an amendment of this kind," a senator argued, "we are laying
the foundation for an act upon which we can justify ourselves/'"'
Advocates of removal considered the distinction between popular and legislative
will an invidious one. Swift referred to the state Declaration of Rights:
-All power
residing originally in the people, and being derived from them," he read, judges "are their
substitutes and their agents^ and are at all times accountable to them " From the same
document's mandate for "A frequent recurrence to the ftindamental principles of the
Constitution, and a constant adherence to those piety [and] justice^ the petitioners
inferred that the people could refer to authorities prior to the state constitution, and thus
superior to court and legislator alike. The "right to remove their officers when the public
good demanded it" was an inherent popular power. "If there was nothing in the
constitution to grant this right," a Middlesex senator argued, "the right lay back of the
constitution " Most petitioners agreed with Wendell Phillips that the motivating spirit
behind a law was as important in defining its scope as its explicit provisions. The 1843
liberty law and the 1850 resolution bound Loring not because legislators said so, but
because they expressed the people's will that their "agents" should not hunt slaves. To
Most quotations in this paragraph come from a speech by Eben Kimball of Salem, printed in
the Bee, 17 April 1855. Kimball abstained from the final removal vote. The senate speech of Samuel




hold Loring accountable only ,o statute law, the petitioners thought, meant that popular
opinion counted for nothing."**
To the petitioners, the remonstrants' legalism obscured the real issue at stake in
the removal effort. "[T]here is a law higher than Judicial decisions, to which Supreme
Courts and Judges thereof are amenable;' a Bristol senator declared, '^and that is/.///,/,c
opimon - The law of public opinion, from this vamage, was sufficient authority for
Loring's removal. Dana's insistence that legislation come first was irrelevant to Stone
and his allies because they did not consider the removal debate a trial, but rather
confidence vote Any amendment ordering Loring to resign for holding incompatible
offices perniciously replaced the people's will with legislative fiat, making the removal
useless as either a moral lesson or a warning against future extraditions it was essential
that everyone know that Loring was removed for ^the loss of public confidence in
consequence of his defiance of the moral sentiment of Massachusetts."'-"^
Legislators debated Loring's fate just after the exposure of their colleague Joseph
Hiss's scandalous conduct while investigating nunneries. Many Know-Nothings
considered the publicity given the Hiss affair a Whig plot, led by the Hale family's
Advcr/iscr, to destroy the secret party. Others were honestly disgusted by Hiss and
condemned him. As lodge members turned on each other, the divisive Loring issue
seemed like the last thing the party needed. One representative warned that removal on
OS Sw ifl. Remarks. 7. 22. quotes Articles 5 and 18 of llic Declaration of Rights; Dedham
Gazette. 5 Mav 1855.
Stone. RenwvoL 3 - 6.
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Albee's terms (or lack of them) could fatally divide Know-Nothingism at a time when
"evils are attacking our country
. . . more dangerous than Southern slavery." At the
same time, however, legislators angry at the Hales may have been more inclined, in light
of the Hiss controversy, to target Lormg, their alleged crony, for retaliation. By tight
votes, all efforts to amend Albee's address were thwarted.
The lower house approved the removal address on 14 April, 206 - 1 11. Among
the major questions of 1855, only the votes for the jury bill and against district
representation, both of which reflected a similar distrust of political elites, were even
nearly comparably divisive. Legislators' votes, as shown in Table 3 below, revealed a
strong affinity between sympathy for jurors' rights and an insistence on Loring's
removal; supporters of the jury bill were three times more likely than opponents to vote
against the judge.
In the House, two resolutions amending the removal address to allow Loring a chance to
resign were defeated by margins that were extremely tight by 1855 standards. On successive days (13-
14 April) the amendments lost. 153 - 184 and 145-171. J. M. S. Williams of Cambridge, who
introduced the first amendment, abstained from the final removal vote, w hile Thomas Ellis of Rochester,
author of the second amendment, voted against the address. 1855 House Journal. Appendices 13. 15. In
the senate, an amendment assigning reasons for the address failed. 8 - 20. Bee. 26 April 1855. See
Eben Kimbalfs speech in the Bee, 17 April 1855. for the quotation and for his close association of the
Hiss scandal with the Advertiser and the Hales: "'the reign of the Whigs has passed away; and their
whole exertions are spent to Ha/e a little on the members of the Convent Committee."
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Table 3: 1855 Removal and Jury Votes Compared'"'
^:^.egi.sl.ators Pro-Removal AntrR^SiS^S^lJ^T^^
Pro-jury (n=198) 72% 16% i^o^
Anti-jury (n= 102) 24% 55% 9io/„
29% 22°/c
Similarly, legislators favoring town representation, the pillar of the Coalition and
the 1853 constitution, were far more likely to vote for removal than advocates of a
district system. As shown in Table 4, pro-district voters themselves split evenly on the
removal, suggesting that the representation question had less ideological influence on the
Loring question than the conflict over the courts.
Table 4: 1855 Removal and Representation Votes Compared 102
LeBislators
.Pro-R.empya| .Ant|-Removal Not Yoting
Pro-Town legislators 66% 18% 16%
Pro-District (n= 143) 41% 41% 18%
Not Voting (n=45) 49% 40% 11%
mrrtrtfWw*-.- """""" -uLjLj^^Lj^^^.-
'»»'f*>""'vvvvvvvvvw«virvvvvvv>v»vvvw
IS55 House Journal, Appendix 3 (Juia Bill). 14 (Removal).
" 1855 House Journal. Appendix 2 (Reprcsen(alion), 14. Finy-cighl represenlalivcs voled for
both the removal and (he dislriel system. Most eamc from Ihe eastern counties, while only one each
from rural Berkshire and Franklin, and two from Hampshire, voted for both measures. Radical
Worcester County was decidedly undcrrcprescnted, contributing only three votes to the total.
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As Table 5 shows below, Worcester County's delegation led the assault on
Loring, voting overwhelmingly to depose him. Traditionally Whiggish Barnstable and
regularly Democratic Hampden County were nearly as hostile to the judge. No county
produced a majority against removal, and only northwestern Franklin County and
conservative Suflfolk produced pluralities against it. While Suffolk was the Whig center,
Democrats and Whigs were nearly equal in Franklin before the 1854 upheaval. The
intensity of past partisanship, then, didn't necessarily predict attitudes toward Loring or
the issues that lay behind the removal campaign.
Table 5: 1855 Removal Votes by County 103
, ™™™iWUUlftAAAX«AAAAMAAAJUOU«.il«
County % Yes %No
Worcester (n = 59) 80% 7%
Barnstable (n = 14) 71% 29%
Hampden (n = 20) 67% 11%
Nantucket (n = 3) 67% 0%
Plymouth (n = 21) 67% 33%
Hampshire (n = 18) 61% 22%
Norfolk (n =27) 52% 30%
Bristol (n = 30) 50% 30%
Dukes (n = 2) 50% 0%
Middlesex (n = 58) 50% 41%
Essex (n = 46) 45% 35%
Berkshire (n = 23) 43% 39%
Suffolk (n = 46) 39% 41%
Franklin (n = 13) 25% 46%
1855 House Journal. Appendix 14.
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Overall, the petitioners claimed a statewide mandate for Loring's removal.
Capping their vindication was the senate's invitation to William Lloyd Garrison to sit
beside its president and witness the final vote for removal. As the abolitionist watched
approvingly, the upper house approved the address, 27 - 1 1 . Since a removal address
was no more than a request to the governor, Loring was at Gardner's mercy. The
governor's decision would be final, unlike a regular bill, a vetoed address could not be
overridden. As a Harvard Overseer, Gardner had already cast a vote against Loring. At
that time, however, neither a constitutional principle nor the reputation of the American
party had been at stake. As a partisan governor, he took the embattled judge more
seriously than he did the unworthy lecturer.
Gardner's Verdict and the Libertv Law
Since his inauguration, Gardner had sent mixed signals to antislaveiy activists and
states-rights nativists. He trod a thin line between "the common duties evoked by the
articles of confederation [i.e., the federal constitution]" and "the State Rights retained for
each sovereign member of that confederacy." In Massachusetts, state rights included
habeus corpus and jury trials for its citizens. "With fraternal feelings to all her [sic?]
sister States, and filial devotion to their common parent, yet with acknowledged rights
and determination that they shall be maintained," Gardner vowed, "there stands
Massachusetts." He did not, however, explicitly declare that the fugitive law violated the
Liberator, quoted in National Anti-Slavery Standard. 12 May 1855.
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state constitution. He left that question to the legislature, ofl-ering only some confasing
advice: "Scrapulously avoid such action as asserts or looks to the maintenance of any
rights not clearly and constitutionally ours, but weave evety safeguard you justly may
round the primal binhnghts, older than our national birthday, and dear as its continued
existence.
Gardner's attempt to appeal simultaneously to Whiggish constitutionalism and to
a vague blend of Anglo-Saxon romanticism and higher-law doctrine (the
-primal
birthrights") betrayed his con&sion over the ideological aspects of the ftigitive issue. It
was easy to oppose territorial slavery, as Gardner did throughout his tenure, but fighting
slavery at home posed more problems than could be resolved simply by avowing free-soil
sentiments. Since January, he had sought the courts' advice on the fligitive question.
Were there any means, he asked Justice Shaw, by which the state could extract accused
fugitives from federal custody to secure for them the processes guaranteed by state law?
Shaw's answer is unknown, but it probably helped persuade the governor that Loring
had done no wrong.
Despite his defection from Whiggery, Gardner often deferred to Whiggish
advisors. His closest Whig associate was his attorney general, the former governor John
H. Clifford. Clifford was a political survivor who served Whigs, Coalitionists, and
Know-Nothings while retaining the confidence of the electorate. Originally appointed as
attorney general by a Whig governor in 1849, Clifford was retained by the Coalitionist
Gardner's Inaugural Address is e.xcerpted in Liberator. 12 January 1855.
Henr\' J. Gardner to Lemuel Shaw. Januar\ 1855. Shaw Papers; John H. Clifford Diarv. 1
1
January' 1855. Clifford Papers.
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one
Boutwell, who found his apparent self-effacing objectivity useful Boutwell recalled that
Clifford
-lacked the quality which enables a man to reach conclusions. He would
investigate a subject, give me the authorities and precedents, and leave the conclusions to
me." His unobtrusive temperament may helped Clifford become governor in 1852, but
his reputed indecisiveness disappointed many Whigs. Retiring after one term, Clifford
became attorney general again after a Websterite nominee refused to serve under his
successor, Emory Washburn His late appointment extended past Washburn's term and
left him in Gardner's service. The 1856 legislature ratified another reappointment
Finally, after a constitutional amendment made his office elective, Clifford served
more year as the voters' choice. Boutwell' s assessment of Clifford as "a good officer
and an upright man" was widely shared, but the Whig veteran was not always as
indecisive as Boutwell recalled. In 1855, surrounded by Know-Nothings, Clifford
became a rear guard defender of Whiggish constitutionalism.'"'
As a moderate Cotton Whig governor, Clifford had grown increasingly annoyed
at the domineering ways of the Websterites and the Curtii. He refused to participate in
the prosecution of the Burns rioters despite being trapped in the Court House on the
night of the attack. His hostility to the Curtii, however, did not bias him against Loring.
Before the removal hearings began, Clifford told Gardner that the petitioners argued
On Clifford, sec Robert C Winlhrop. •Memoirs of Governor Clifford." Proceedings ofthe
Mnssachusclls llislorical Sncicly \ > (October 1877): .>68 - 79. ;ind Bontvvell. Recollections, \ : 124.
Interestingly. Boutwell thought Clifford preferable as Attorney General to his fellow Democrat Ben
Hallett. whom he considered the only alternative. Fugitive slavery , probably, was the sticking point
between the two Democrats. Hallett was consistently Unionist, while Boutwell became a Republican.
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from a perverted interpretation of the removal clause. After the removal address passed
both houses, he undoubtedly repeated this advice.
Gardner's veto message reflected Clifford's research into constitutional questions
raised by Phillips' interpretation of the removal clause. Since no records survived of any
1780 debates over the clause, Clifford and Gardner inferred the framers' intentions from
their near-unanimous affirmation of judicial independence, and from a consensus opinion
that "good behavior" tenure made any popular accountability forjudges unconstitutional.
Since misbehavior in office was pumshed by impeachment, the removal power applied
only to circumstances unrelated to conduct in office Only one judge, the palsied
Theophilus Bradbury, had been correctly removed by address. The other two cases,
dealing with financial malfeasance, should have been tried after the judges were
impeached. Delegates to the 1820 convention, contra Phillips, did distinguish between
moral and physical disqualifications, one being subject to impeachment, the other to
removal. When taken in context with the whole constitution, the removal clause applied
only to cases of physiological incapacity. ^^^^
Once Gardner concluded that Loring was mentally fit, he had effectively decided
against the removal. He nevertheless felt obliged to address constitutional issues raised
by the hearings and debates. Albee's unsubstantiated address, he argued, violated Article
12 of the Declaration of Rights, which granted anyone "held to answer for any crimes or
108
109
Clifford Dian. 12 February. 2 April 1855, Clifford Papers,
1856 Acts and Resolves, 325 - 9. Gardner's 1855 veto message appeared here because ihe
Secretarv' of State had ordered it excluded from the 1855 \ olume in a decision later "deemed improper.
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offense" the right to hear the charges against him. AJbee's allies had claimed that they
weren't prosecutmg Loring, but Gardner thought them obliged to accuse the judge
explicitly. To refuse made the removal entirely arbitrary and thoroughly repugnant to
Gardner's Whiggish sensibility.^ It was sadly reminiscent of the spoils system, 'which
corrupts public morals, and prevents the best men from taking offices of emolument."
The petitioners now asked him to introduce that practice in the courts on which liberty
and property depended. ^Is it strange," Gardner asked, "that I recoil from the task with
distrust and alarm?"
For argument's sake Gardner addressed the petitioners' case against Loring.
Had he shocked public sentiment^ "When the time arrives [when] a judge so violates his
oath of office as to shape his decisions according to the fluctuations of popular feeling,"
Gardner warned, the rule of law was finished. Had Loring erred"^ Whoever heard of
removing an otherwise respected and unquestioned judge for one mistake? "Such an
impracticable and dangerous policy would lead to a daily removal among judicial officers
of our inferior courts," Gardner predicted, "so of^en are their decisions overruled by
higher tribunals." Was Loring harsh"^ Dana, "perhaps as impartial a witness as the
nature of the case permits," had testified to the judge's considerate humanity towards
Burns. Had he violated the law of 1843'^ That law was null and void, because the 1850
fugitive law, rather than amending the 1793 law, had abrogated it and the liberty law.
No subsequent state law had restricted co-operation with slave-hunters. Were Loring'
s
J856 Acts and Resolves. 332 - 3.
'
" 7856 A cts and Resolves. 332.
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state and federal responsibilities incompatible? Prove it, Gardner challenged, through the
passage of proper legislation, and Loring might be removed 'Mn a way unquestionably
constitutional" that was not "pregnant with evil." He clearly meant, however, that
Loring might then be impeached, not removed by address.
Finally, Gardner argued that removing Loring over a political opinion was a
dangerous precedent to set in a time of rapid political upheaval. If Know-Nothings
endorsed the principle behind the address, he asked, "are we not digging a pitfall into
which the most salutary enactments passed by the Legislature this winter may at some
future time be hurled with all who cling to their constitutionality and expediency'^"
II can hardly be denied that snch is a fair and just illustration of the tendency of this policy for
11 must be remembered that but five years ago the votes and voice of Massachusetts in both
houses of Congress, uere given to the passage of the very statute under which Judge Loring
acted |.v/r; one Bay State congressman supported it.j Would it be more strange if within a few
years, alien hands should control our Stale government, and bring this precedent for removing
those from judicial office, w ho. in obedience to a law which has but just now received your
sanction, should refuse to aid in naturali/.ing a foreigner in the courts in Massachusetts?'"
Gardner's veto, he admitted, was hastily drafted because he had expected
legislators to impeach Loring rather than ask for his removal.""^ His rambling message
led many confused petitioners to infer that he might yet remove Loring. Had he actually
approved of Loring's conduct, after all, he would probably have voted to retain hitn at
1836 Acts ami Resolves, 333 -4.
'"
IS56 Acts and Resolves, 335.
" ^ 1S56 Acts and Resolves. 326, 335.
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Harvard. Now, despite firm assertions that removal for opinion's sake was
unconstitutional, Gardner's superfluous attention to the petitioners' arguments seemed
to imply that, if certain conditions were met, Loring would fall. For the next two years,
after passage of a liberty bill that appeared to meet Gardner's theoretical conditions,
petitioners reminded the governor of the promise they thought he had made.
Know-Something legislators challenged the veto immediately after publication.
Unable to override Gardner, Charles W. Slack instead charged that he had violated
constitutional procedure by failing to submit the address to his executive council before
vetoing it John W Foster, a council member allied to Henry Wilson and sometimes
called a "Grand Mogul" of Know-Nothingism, protested that he had not been
consulted."- An angry Gardner ordered Cliftbrd to shut up Foster by explaining that
the council's confirmation was necessary only for positive enactments, not for a simple
refijsal of a legislative request. Foster answered that the council was an inseparable
component of the executive branch. Any ofticial executive act required the will of both
governor and council Foster's was not the majority view, and Slack's demand for a
report from the council failed, 71 - 150.'"^
More to Gardner's liking was a thirty-one gun salute to the veto on Boston
Common. The Boston Daily Bet\ a Gardnerite paper previously neutral on the Loring
question, applauded the veto and reported endorsements from Dana and Nathaniel P.
Northaniplon Hampshire (lazel)e. 10 July 1855.
Gardner to ClifTord. 12 May 1855; John W Foster lo ClifTord. 12 May 1855. ClilTord
Papers; lice, 12 May 1855
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Banks, "[T]he desire to maintain the independence of the Judiciary,
.
. which is
manifested by the Governor," opined an independent editor, 'Vill do much towards
reconcihng the people to his refusal to accede to the wishes of
.
.
. the Legislature in
Judge Loring's case." Editorials outside Massachusetts generally lauded the veto."^
An incipient Know-Something press, meanwhile, denounced it A North Adams nativist
deplored the defeat of "one of the most righteous measures which ever passed a
Massachusetts Legislature " A Springfield compatriot moaned that Gardner had
"ftilfilled our worst fears." A Free-Soil writer, while admitting some soundness in the
veto, wrote that Gardner had "justly forfeited the confidence of that large portion of our
citizens, who in voting for him last fall, felt confident that they were electing a man who
would not hesitate to give the anti-slavery sentiment of the Commonwealth its one
expression in his official acts."'"'
Nor were Southern Democrats impressed. They assumed, with many Bay
Staters, that the veto was plainly calculated to relieve Virginia nativists of charges of
abolitionism That Gardner had cast Loring out of Harvard made his partisan hypocrisy
clear enough. Democratic papers labeled the veto an act of cynical opportunism They
saw the radical Massachusetts legislature, not the governor, as the true face of Know-
Nothingism. In any event, the veto had little real impact on the Virginia election, which
the Democrats won handily.
Bee, n. 12 May 1855; Fall River News, 17 May 1855.
1 1
8
North Adams Sentinel and Springfield Independent American, quoted in Telegraph. 21 May
1855; Northampton Hampshire (lazette. 16 May 1855.
119
National Anti-Slavery Standard, 1 June 1855; Washington Dady Union. 15 May 1855.
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Abolitionists naturally denounced Gardner, but announced a paradoxical
satisfaction with his action. "I rejoice at the veto," announced Thomas W. Higginson, an
erstwhile Burns rioter, "because if Judge Loring had been removed at first, it would have
been a triumph indeed, but after such long argument, for Governor Gardner to have
removed him, would have been a triumph on Governor Gardner's side - and the
Governor needed one. He needed one, and we needed a check." To some extent,
Higginson made sense. Removing Loring might have cinched Gardner's reputation as
the leader of local antislavery opinion, while leaving single-issue antislavery men
subordinate to the Know-Nothings. Trusting that the people hated slaveholders more
than foreigners, activists like Higginson were glad to find an issue on which they and
Gardner diverged. Higginson's happiness at Loring's survival was utilitarian; antislavery
forces had grown overconfident after 1854, and the judge served as a goading reminder
that "Massachusetts is still pro-slavery, and you have yet a work before you to do " A
scapegoat like Loring served as a focus for antislavery organization and activism. While
he remained as an embodiment of the Slave Power, antislavery leaders could urge their
followers to greater effort to seize entire control of the state. '^^
Edmund Quincy thought that Loring had already well served the antislavery
cause. "[CJonsidering how slow justice usually is in overtaking her prey," he wrote on
the anniversary of Burns's extradition, "I think she has done pretty well for the time.
Loring, to be sure, was not kicked off^ the Bench; but he was well kicked for all that, and
National Anti-Slavery Stondani 9 June 1855; Jeffrey Rossbach. Ambivalent i\)nspirators:




will bear the marks the longest day he lives "^^' Indeed, Loring suffered
personally, and endured more heated attacks, m the year after the extradition than he
would over the next three years.
The judge's remaining ordeal was largely determined by the passage of a new
personal liberty law days after Gardner vetoed the removal address. Albee's committee
finally reported a liberty bill late in April, urging a stronger successor to the 1843 law as
an expression of the state's acknowledged police power. The bill passed the senate on
14 May, four days after the veto, and passed the lower house, with amendments, five
days later. After speedy reconciliation, the finished bill reached Gardner's desk on May
20. He vetoed it the next day. Hours later, both houses overrode the veto by crushing
margins, 229 - 76 in the house, 31 - 3 in the senate. This victory, following closely the
strong majority for removal, indicated that states-rights nativists, if not outright Know-
Somethings, controlled the legislature. The facts hinted menacingly that the
equivocating Gardner was a minority figure in his own party.
The new liberty law applied all provisions of the earlier act to the 1850 ftigitive
law, while new provisions made legal slave-hunting virtually impossible. Judges now had
to order a jury trial upon receipt of a haheus corpus in ftigitive cases. Claimants under
the fugitive law could not testify at the jury trial, and could only submit a written account
of any alleged escape, on which rested the entire burden of proof Slave state affidavits
National Anti-Slavery Standard. 1 June 1855.
Morris. Free Men AIL 168 - 9: North Adams Transcript. 31 May 1855, suggests that the
new law^s stricter provisions reflected vindictiveness towards Loring and Gardner. The wider support
shown for the libert\ bill, compared with the removal address, reflects many legislators^ anxieties about
punishing Loring on indisputable authority, rather than merely at the petitioners^ dictation.
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could not be accepted as evidence All claims required corroboration from two credible
witnesses who had no material interest in the accused's service. Failure to prove a claim
put slave-hunters in peril of fines and imprisomnent.'- Massachusetts lawyers who
represented claimants could be disbarred. Volunteer militiamen faced thousand-dollar
fines even for defending claimants from physical assauh. Claimants with prisoners in
custody were barred from state property, but pnvate citizens, surprisingly, could yet
shelter claimants and their prisoners. ^^"^
Four sections were written with Loring in mind. Section 9 barred Massachusetts
officeholders from issuing warrants for fugitives or granting removal certificates.
Section 10 permanently disqualified violators of Section 9 from their offices and honors.
Section 12 deemed any reftisal to resign a slave commission ''a violation of good
behavior, as well as a reason for loss of public confidence,
. . furnishing sufficient
ground either for impeachment or for removal by address." Section 14, as amended
during the reconciliation process, gave Loring a final warning.
Any person, holding an\ judicial office under the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth,
w ho shall continue, for ten days after the passage of this act. to hold the office of United States
Commissioner, or any office under the laws of the United States which qualifies him to issue
any warrant or other process, or grant any certificate under the Acts of Congress named in the
ninth section of this act. shall be deemed to have violated good behavior, to have given reason
for loss of public confidence, and furnished sufficient ground either for impeachment or for
removal bv address.'"'
''^ National Anti-Slavery Standard. 26 May 1855; Morris. Free Men All. 168-9.
National Anti-Slax'ery Standard. 26 May 1855.
'^^ National Anti-Sla\>ery Standard. 26 May 1855.
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Gardner, Clifford, and Shaw vehemently opposed the liberty bill. Writing at the
governor's request, Shaw declared that the federal government's primary jurisdiction
over accused fugitives could not be blocked by state law until after the commissioner's
summary hearing, Clifford found the bill's mandating of removals by address a
legislative usurpation of reserved judicial and executive powers. As a 'virtual denial of
the constitutional obligation which rests upon the Commonwealth, its officers and
citizens, to recognize the Constitution of the United States, and all laws made in
pursuance thereof, as the supreme law of the land," the liberty bill was an incitement to
sectional conflict. ''Unconstitutional enactments tending to an armed conflict between
our State and national systems of government," Gardner advised, "should be equally
shunned by judicious statesmanship, as well as by patriotic duty." Despite these protests,
the liberty bill became law on 21 May. On 31 May, 1855, at the expiration often days'
grace, Edward G. Loring became an outlaw in the eyes of the Massachusetts General
Court.
In light of the liberty law, the removal campaign took a legalistic turn. Loring
now defied not only popular opinion and moral sentiment, but a duly enacted law. As
Know-Something legislators had feared, the vox popu/i became less important to
Loring' s fate than legislative authority. Subsequent removal debates pitted advocates of
legislative superiority against a defiant judge and governor. Widows and orphans were
heard from, or mentioned, less frequently. Women's petitioning went by the wayside.
Removal seemed less dependent on an aroused public than on a contested interpretation
''^ Bee, 22 May 1855; Liberator, 25 May 1855; Morris, Free Men AU, 170 - 1.
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of the law and the constitution. As well, the removal movement became less a pan of a
broader movement for political democratization than a special agenda for antislavery
radicals and abolitionists.
Not until 1858 did abolitionists again succeed in rallying public opinion to a level
comparable to, though nowhere near, the intensity of the first campaign. In 1858,
political conditions approximated those of 1855; a new party had taken power, albeit
after a rise more belated than the Know-Nothing surge. The Republican party claimed
with even more vehemence than the Know-Nothings to represent the moral sovereignty
of Massachusetts As the Know-Nothings had, the Republicans demanded the support
of skeptical antislavery activists. As they had with the nativist party, the activists
demanded proof of the Republicans' credentials. The test remained the same: remove




LORING AND REPUBLICAN AMBITIONS, 1855
The rest of the Loring story seems straightfonvard. He held his otfice as long as
Gardner survived, and fell when the Republicans took over. His removal appears to
mark the aseendancy of antislavety pol.tics in Massachusetts. The stoty becomes more
complex on closer examination In 1858 an overwhelmingly Republican legislature
approved his removal, but by only twenty-six votes, the smallest margin in three tries.
The Republican editor Samuel Bowles, who endorsed the removal in 1855, opposed it in
1858. Republican governor Nathaniel P. Banks removed Loring only after failing to
eliminate the judge by quieter, less controversial means. The triumphant Republicans
then immediately gutted the more draconian provisions of the past radical triumph, the
Personal Liberty Law of 1 855. After all this, Charles Francis Adams, erstwhile patrician
foe of removal, applauded Loring's fall.
The Republican party's rise to power did not resolve the ideological conflicts
over democracy and the rule of law that had plagued antislave^^ politicians since 1848.
Like the Know-Nothings, Republicans disagreed over first loyalties and strategic
priorities. Moderate Republicans were concerned chiefly with fighting territorial slavery,
while radicals preferred to fight Slave-Power incursions at home. Beyond this difference
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m pnont.es, the judiciary question continued to complicate the Loring debate. Many
former Whigs withm the Republican party still considered Lonng's removal too
dangerous an action to advocate. As they neared victory, however. Republicans could
not avoid the Loring issue. Moderate Republicans found themselves pressured, like
Gardner's Know-Nothmgs, by radical colleagues determined that Loring's removal
would prove their leadership of a nsing popular party.
Building an Antislavery Party
In Massachusetts, most Know-Nothings opposed slavery. Nationalist
denunciations of sectional politics from the likes of Edward Hinks represented a minority
view both in the legislature and in the lodges. From Gardner down, party leaders
denounced the Kansas-Nebraska Act Most wanted Congress to restore the pre- 1854
border that confined human bondage to the nation's southwest. When Southern nativists
endorsed Kansas-Nebraska, Gardner and Henry Wilson led a Bay State bolt from the
national American party, sacrificing the governor's vice-presidential ambitions The
Massachusetts Know-Nothings effectively became an antislavery party.'
Gardner's defiance of the South, however, did not satisfy veteran antislavery
politicians. Wilson urged him to cut all ties with Know-Nothingism and join a new
Anbinder. Nativism and SIcn'ery. 166 - 69. Gardner actually wanted the American platform lo
say nothing about the territorial issue in an informal agreement to disagree, but his refusal to endorse
that platform s twelfth section, which implicitly endorsed the Nebraska bill, exemplifies the difference
between a compromiser and a capitulationist. a distinction usually lost on Republicans.
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"Northern- party, but was warned sternly against "abolitionizing" the governor or his
supporters^^ Wilson had decided that nativism h.ndered Nonhern unity by alienating
antislavety Gerntans in the western states. Locally, the Know-Nothings had proven a
nationwide embarrassment due to their reputed parliamenta,^ ineptitude, the scandals
surrounding Joseph Hiss's nunnety committee, and their perceived persecution of
Loring. Gardner's vetoes of the removal address and the liberty bill raised new doubts
about the governor's commitment against the Slave Power. To Wilson and many others,
a fresh start seemed necessary.
Any successftil "Northern" party had to appeal to New Englanders and
Westerners aHke. Both regions opposed slavery expansion, but few antislavery
Westerners shared New Englanders' fierce hostility to the fugitive law. Many were
racists with little interest in creating havens for runaway Negroes.^ Bay Staters seeking
Northern unity had to restrain their radical brethren from measures that westerners might
deem dangerously negrophilic.^ At the same time, these measures seemed necessary to
convince local voters that the Republicans opposed slavery more strongly than the
Know-Nothings. By toning down their rhetoric and minimizing their platform to satisfy
^ Anbinder. Nativism and Sla\>ery, 169; Mulkem. Know-Nothing Party, 122-3.
W..,.m ?r7" 7"' - 7. 282 - 90. The latter passage emphasizes that manyestern party leaders were pnncipled antiracists but were at odds, to different extents with their
constituents, many of whom immigrated from slave states.
^
Foner. Free Soil. Free Labor. 134 - 5, 180 - 1. 201 - 2. shows that one Northwestern state
Wisconsin, vigorously opposed the fugitive law on states-rights grounds as a manifestation of Whiggish
centralization, but Foner considers Wisconsin an exceptionally radical state, and reports that local
conservatives, like their Bay State counterparts, regarded anti-ftigitive law agitation as a ploy designed
to drive them out of the party. Massachusetts radicals disparaged the party 's sensitivity to Western
biases, sometimes questioning Westerners- fitness for alliance in the amislavery cause." See Robinson
ed., Harrington " Pen-Portraits, 2?>3.
Ill
the West (and local conservatives). Republicans risked losing votes at home. As long as
they had to compete for antislavety laurels with the lodges, they risked alienatmg the
West While Republicans struggled to define themselves, the Loring question seemed
too dangerous to approach.
The patrician Free-Soilers, led by Charles Francis Adams and Richard Henry
Dana, wanted a ^'Northern" party free of both the nativist taint and Wilson's demagogic
influence. They urged all antislaveo' leaders to unite in one party devoted exclusively to
blocking territorial slavery. In effect, they demanded an end to all electioneering based
on nativism or appeals for state reform. During the first half of 1855, however, the
Know-Somethings threatened to seize the antislaveiy initiative away from the patricians
by catering to all the current interests - antislavery, nativism, prohibition, and reform.
The possibility of Know-Something reconciliation with Gardner after his bolt of the
national convention threatened patricians with the prospect of a strongly antislavery
nativist party in which they would be marginal figures at best.
In August 1855, the patricians persuaded leaders from all parties, including
antislavery Democrats, to call a fusion convention in Worcester devoted exclusively to
free soil in the West. The wary Gardner avowed himself bound by an earlier Know-
Nothing convention to insist on a nativist platform, and reftised to endorse the ftision
platform sight unseen.' Nonetheless, he won a majority of votes on an informal first
ballot. His nearest rival was the anti-Nebraska Whig Julius Rockwell, the patricians'
- Adams Diarv. 16, 20. 22 August 1855; Boutwell. Recollections, 1: 247 - 8; Anbinder,
Nativism and Slaverv. 188-9.
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choice, whose main selhng point was his promised unconditional endorsement of the
fusion platform and candidate.^ Fusion leaders then undermined Gardner by declaring
themselves a new Republican party, effectively forcing the governor to obey the
convention or remam outside. While Richard Heniy Dana attacked Gardner's bad faith
on the convention floor, J. Q. A. Gnffin, a veteran Coalitiomst and Know-Nothing
legislator, fiercely denounced the governor's vetoes of Loring's removal and the liberty
bill at an outdoor mass meeting. The combined attack inspired delegates to nominate
Rockwell on the next ballot.^ When Gardner defiantly ran as a Know-Nothing with the
endorsement of most lodges, Henry Wilson and his followers abandoned nativism
altogether.^
The Gardnerites considered Dana the "master spirit" of the new party. They
thought him hypocritical for condoning Griffin's tirade on the Loring issue. How dare
the patrician affect "shame and mortification" over the state's alleged backwardness on
slavery questions, they asked, when he had defended Loring himself to "universal
'Bee. 21 September 1855; Anbinder. Nativism and Slavery. 189; Gienapp. Origins ofthe
?- " ^'''^"-^^^'^-^ 127; Virginia C. Purdv PoLt ofa
^9mml ^^^^^^^^husetts General Court of 1855, (Westport. Ct. : Greenwood Press
' Bee. 21. 22 September 1855; Anbinder. Nativism and Slaverv. 189 - 90; Gienapp Orisins ofthe Republican Party. 218-19; Mulkern, Kno^.-Noth,ng Party. 126 - 8. The bias of the Gardnente 5..
must be acknowledged, but that paper provides a detailed account of Griffin s movements at the
convcnuon. including his invocation of Loring. The Bee received Gardner's patronage but did not defer
to his ever> decision. For instance, the 1 May 1855 issue criticized his veto of a railroad loan and
recommended an override. That a railroad question could divide even the governor and his client paper
further recommends a deeper investigation of the influence of railroads on antebellum Bay State politics.
' Wilson made his final break public in a letter to State Council member Elihu C. Baker which
was printed in most newspapers, including the Berkshire Eagle. 12 October 1855; The resignation letter
of Wilson s lieutenant and State Council president John W. Foster appeared in Piitsfield Berkshire
Eagle. 5 October 1855.
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disgust throughout the entire north-' Worse, Know-Nothings argued, Dana's
remonstrance proved his fundamental distrust of democracy. Gardner ran as much
against ^^Richard the Aristocrat" as against Rockwell, both, a loyal editor wrote, 'Teared
lest the people should again rule." Others less loyal to Gardner also saw the patncian-
dominated Republicans as a reactionary party.'
The RepubUcan platform reflected a patrician distrust of local politics,
committing the party only to opposing frontier slavery. Despite Griffin's speech, the
platform was silem on both Loring and the fligitive law. Republicans called this a sign of
tolerance. "It is proposed to require no professions of opinion on other questions of
State and National policy, or of social reforms, or on other possible questions which may
arise, or may have arisen, out of our relations with Slavery," a Pittsfield editor wrote,
"The evil of this day [i.e., the territorial question] is sufficient for the labor of this day."
This open-mindedness, a Northampton editor hinted, was necessary to mollify Whigs.''
Shall we refiise the aid of a man because we see fit to call him an old hunker ^ Shall we declare
mat we will have no communion with another because he honestly believes the Fugitive SlaveLaw to be a constitutional enactment ^ Shall we refuse to admit anv person to the ftision part>'because he is opposed to the removal of Judge Loring^ Can no man show his enmm to the
encroachments of slaven
.
or be permitted to vote in the Republican ranks unless he endorses





Bee, 20 August 1855; Weekly Bee, 24 November 1855. quoted in Shapiro. Dana. 102.
Pittsfield Berkshire Eagle, 7 September 1855. See also Purdy, Portrait, 100.
See the correspondence of partv organizer Robert Carter: Charles W Upham to Carter 19
September 1855; William L. Greene to Carter. 18 October 1855. Carter Papers. See also Gatell
Palfrey. 225. For Republican cnticism of excessive catering to Whiggerv , see Erastus Hopkins s speech
in Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 17 October 1855.
1
~*
- Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 1 August 1855. On September 1 1. the Gazette urged that
such "subsidiary questions" as the libertv' law and Loring not be made party tests Rather "A
Republican" wrote. "NON-EXTENSION OF SLAVERY" should be the sole basis of part> membership.
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While Republican moderates boasted of inclusiveness, Know-Nothings accused
them ofimposing a loyalty test on antislaver^ voters. Republicans deemed themselves
the sole representatives of antislaveiy opinion To oppose them, they warned, was
virtually to endorse slavery. "[I]f the Republican party is defeated, it will be hailed at
Washington, and throughout the whole South, as a condemnation of the anti-slavery
issue in Massachusetts" one editor wrote. Another agreed that defeat at home would
hurt the Republicans' national chances in 1856.'^ As a Gardnerite paper angrily charged,
"the Republicans make it appear that it is necessaiy to vote their ticket in order that the
voice of the state may be heard with the emphasis of union upon the Nebraska infamy."
Know-Nothings found Republican pretensions especially insulting because nativist
legislators had enacted the liberty law, and their governor had defied the South, before
the new party was born. They had battled the Slave Power at a national forum, defied
the ambitions of Popery, and challenged aristocrats at home, while Republicans promised
nothing to reformers, and were backed by reactionary Free-Soilers. "The men who
controlled the [Republican] organization," an editor concluded, "had not, and never can
have, the confidence of the people of this Commonwealth."'^
Barrc Patriot. 26 October. 2 November 1 855; Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 2 October
1 o5 J.
" Mulkcrn. Know-Nothiiiii Party. 1.11. notes the Americans' "unparalleled record of
democratic and working-class reforms" and the •gulf |that| lav between the two major contenders "
While Mulkem refers to urban issues, his comment applies equallv to sectional issues See also
Anbindcr. Nativism and Slavery, 191.
Bee. 6 November 1855; Traveller. 7 November 1855
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While Republican appeals to Northern solidarity attracted many antislavery
voters, the patrician-led. Whig-fronted party lost to Gardner by 1 5,000 votes. Rockwell
barely outpolled a resurgent Democratic party, while a moribund Cotton Whig ticket
trailed the field. Voters had repudiated the patncian Free-Soilers once and for all.
Humiliated, Adams and Dana retreated from politics. Three years later, Adams accepted
the honor of a nomination and election to Congress. Dana, attacked more bitterly in
1 855, remained aloof from politics for the rest of the decade. Leadership passed by
default to Henry Wilson, who continued to court the old Whigs despite his anger at
patrician conservatism.'^
While Wilson had wanted Republicans to denounce nativism in 1855, he proved
reluctant to challenge Know-Nothingism directly in 1856, lest he deter nativists from
voting for a Republican president. Gardner, meanwhile, would not endorse the
American national ticket, but feared that the territorial question would split the nativist
vote and cost him the statehouse. Alarmed by a short-lived antislavery ^North
American" ticket headed by Nathaniel P. Banks, Gardner offered to endorse Republican
presidential candidate John C. Fremont in return for his own re-election. While the
Republicans did not endorse him outright, they agreed not to challenge him, and Gardner
won a third term with his largest majority yet.'^
" Anbindcr. /Vativism and Slavery. 191 - 2: Mulkcrn, Know-.\othiiig Partv. Anbiiidcr
claims lhal Gardner ran against radicalism, but while a single-issue anlislavcr> party might
automaticall> be considered radical, the Republicans" patrician element must be considered as a
handicap readily exploited b> Gardnerites. For the subsequent careers of the patrician leaders, sec
Duberman.
.
h/ams. 207 - 1?^. and Shapiro. Dana. 101 - 12.
Anbindcr. Nativism and Slavery. !?>?> - 5. The sore point betw een Republicans and




While Gardner seemed stronger than ever as 1 857 dawned. Banks was
developing into a formidable foture rival. Like Gardner, he appealed to both nativist and
antislavery voters. His supporters had begun to build an ^American Republican
'
organization within the Massachusetts lodges.'^ Banks careftilly played Republicans and
Gardnerites off one another, opposing the governor in 1855 while defending Know-
Nothingism in Congress."^ In 1856 he helped convince state Republicans not to oppose
Gardner. If Banks challenged the governor, Gardner could not claim to be the sole
of Massachusetts nativism. That prospect compelled Gardner to find issues that would
clearly distinguish him from Banks.
Like Wilson, Gardner still sought Whiggish support. By 1857, however, the
remaining Cotton Whigs had split. While many endorsed the Fillmore ticket, a sizable
faction, led by the Hale family and the Boston Daily AJvcrliser,]omQd the Republicans
Charles Hale, who had embarrassed the Know-Nothings by publicizing the nunnery
scandal, became a Republican legislator to steer the "Northern" party away from
radicalism. Many of his former colleagues, however, considered Republican radicalism
irrepressible. With the failure of the National Americans, they decided to support
Gardner as the lesser of two evils.
nalivist Vice-President. In rclurn for Republican acquiescence in his re-cleclion. he promised to endorse
the straight Republican ticket.
Fall River A/ew.v. 1 May 1856, has an early mention of the American Republicans, who
changed their name for a time to the "People's Union." Fred Harvey Harringlon. /ifihfin^ Po/ilician:
Major C,ciu>rol Nathaniel P. Hanks. (Westporl. Ct.: Greenwood Press, 1948). 42, identifies some old
Whigs, most prominently Charles Hale of the Advertiser, among ihc 1857 founders of a Banks Club.
Billinglon, Protestant Crusade, 408, cilcs Coniiressional (dohe. 33 Cong. 2d. sess.,
Appendi.x, 48 - 53; Robinson, cd., "Warrington " Pen Portraits. 436.
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At the opposite ideological extreme, a radical Republican faction guided by Frank
Bird had refused to concede Gardner's re-election in 18.S6. Blocked from running a
Republican challenger by Wilson and Banks, both ofwhom Bird distrusted, his allies
nominated octogenarian Josiah Quincy to head an "Honest Man's Ticket "^" While
Quincy performed feebly statewide, he carried several towns in the western counties. In
one Congressional district, a candidate supported by the B.rd taction beat an incumbent
favored by Gardner and Banks.^' Many westerners hated Gardner for opposing the
Hoosac Tunnel and town representation. By expressing their protest through the
''1 lonest Men," they gave the radicals a voice in the state legislature In their hostility to
nativism and the compromising aspects of national politics. Bird's followers were not
only irreconcilable opponents of Know-Nothingism, but also persistent irritants for
moderate Republicans.
- Bird's friends feared lhal h.s anger a( thanks wonid foslcr conlinncd fulile opposilion (o an
r.Iio? '"h^'"' ' '^«Ws. Thoy .heinsehes' onnd I hard "osuallovv B<>nksseominuedavouals of nalivism; see Alvord 10 Bird. 17.Mine 1857 Bird PapersTerrenec E. Coy ne. "The Hoosac Tunnel: Massachuselts s Weslern (Jaleuav." IUsUn-ical Journal offossae ,.ens 2. (Winler 1995): 14 - 15. notes Bird's inlense opposilion lo Ihc l unnel dunnu ,hc
I86()s. Ihc radical s dislrusl ol Banks in ihe I85()s may haxe been inlluenccd bv (he Tunnel lobby's
supporl lor Ihe ulurc governor. On ihe llonesi Men and Quincy s noininadon: sec Anbindcr. SaUv.sn,
onci Slavery. 216-17. 2.1.3 - 4. and Gienapp. Ongins ofthe Repuhhcan Party. .188.
" C W Hlliol 10 Robcr( Car(cr. 15 July 1856. Carlcr Papers; Advertiser. 1 November 1856'
Gienapp r>;7.,v/,.s ofiln- Kcpnhluan Parly. 420. Quincy carried (weiUv (owns: Pern in Berkshire
'
'
C ouiUy; Wes(porl m Bristol (^ounly; Ashficld. Buckland. Greenfield. Haulcv. Hcalh Monroe
Moiuague. and Shelburne in f ranklin Couiily; Chcslerricld. (^umingion. l^aslhaniplon Goshen
Middlcheld. Plainricld. Wcsllleld and Worlh.nglon in Hampshire (^ounlv; Mendon and M.lbun in
Worcester Counly Relurns of Volers. (Governor and Liciilcnanl (iox crnor. 1856. microfilm
Massachii.sells Stale Archives. Nine of lliese towns scnl rcpiesenlaln cs lo ihe 1857 (ieneral Courl- ihc
others either opted nol (o send reprcsciKadves or had e.xhausled (heir decennial share of leprcsenlalion
Radicals elected Henry I. Dawes, who later proved an allv of Banks, in Hie lOlh ( ongiessioiial Dislricl
over (he
-Frcmonl American " Mark fration This di.slrici included nianv of Ihe Oiiincv lowns
Norlhamplon Hampshire Gazette. 4 November 1856. For Banks s inlervenlion in favor of Tiaflon sec
Daniel W Alvord lo Frank Bird. 11 Oclobcr 1856. Bird Papers.
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By 1857, when Lornig s removal was again advoealal aggressively, (he faeade of
an almosl uManinuMisly ^TvamnC legislalure eoncealed an inicomfortabie josde of
laclions. '-' ^iM-enionl" solons might he (lardnerites. Republicans, or Ibllowers ol Banks,
'1'rcnionl Americans" elected on coalition tickets vied for inlluence with "Straight
iMcmont" radicals, veiled Wh.gs, and small pockets of Democrats and "National
Americans " "Americair and "iMemont" were meaningless indicators ol" legislators'
beliefs Were the men of I8S7 nalivists llisl, antislavery men, or something else?
Reviving the I .oiing question would force legislators, and ultimately the governor, to
restate their constitutional principles as a defining election approached.
By 1857, however, the ideological slakes involved in Loring's late had subtly
shilled In 1855, the Know-Somethings had demanded removal on the authority ol the
pcoplc\s unmediated sovereignty over their judicial "agenls " They blocked evei-y elVort
lo assert a statutory authority for removal as an attempt to replace the people's moral
authority with lawmakers' dictation Despite their reluctance to compromise democratic
sovereignty, the same legislalure answered (Jaidner's veto be creating a statutory
justillcalion for deposing l.oring through the l>eisonal Liberty Law. The judge deemed
the liberty law unconstitutional and refused lo be bound by it I le thus linked his fate to
debates over the liberty law's conslilulionality and the inherent authority of legislative
statute liy adopting I .oring's position, (iardner tried lo deline himself as a moderate
" The ulcniillcalion oficcislalors as I'icmoni men eomplieales any division olllie 1X57
legislalure inio parlisan hloe.s While \ilvcrlisrr. > Noveinher IXS(,, ;inlieipa(e(l a iinaininons I'leinonl
body, il did nole al leasi ten Demoeial or I'lllinoie wiiineis On 10 Jannaiy IX.S7 Ihe . ^/r(T//,v('/' lepoUed
Iwelve voles aj^ainsl Sumner s le-eleelioii lo Ihe Senale in a IS.S-inan lower house Hud's rmslialion
with peiceixed Repiihliean Inimmng led lo a llnlalion with secession, see his speeeh al Ihe Disunion
Conveiilion, lepoiled in A/Am//w, 1.1 January 1S.S7.
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constitutionally responsible antislave., leadet^ Antislavety radicals, nteanwhile, hoped to
again prove Gardner an inadequate foe of slavey. In the part.san confusion of 1857, a
renewed Lor.ng debate helped define contending factions in the legislature, and refined
their rhetoric for the next election.
Lorin^ and the I ihprty i f^^y
Wilson's defection left Know-Nothingism more amenable to Gardner's Whiggish
tendencies.- The 1856 legislature revived the district representation amendment with
Republican support.^^ Labor reform was moribund; a new ten-hour bill failed in the
senate before reaching the house^^ The procedural excesses of 1 855, as exemplified by
the Loring hearings and the raids on nunneries, had inspired a conservative backlash.
When 1 855's reforms seemed dangerous, the new legislature tried to reverse or evade
them. An 1855 constitutional amendment, for example, mandated the popular election
' While most 1 856 Know-Notli.ngs shared Gardner's conservatism, they did not neccssanlv
cons.der (hemselv.s h.s creatures. The Amencan legislative caucus re,eeted Gardner's ^po ^favorues for Speaker and Clerk of the louer house. See Springfield Rcpnh/icnn.
.1 Janua.. 1856 Votesof the who e legislature for leadership posts show that the Kno^^
-Nolh.ngs had a slim majority of theHouse, with Whigs (mostly from Suffolk) and Republ.cans yy.ng for second place, and a "decisive
majoriiy in the Senate. u^^^im c
Fall Riv er News. 10 Januan 1856; Mai/lish. "Meaning of Natiyism." 171. emphasizes linksbetween Gardner s small-governmenl philosophy and his nativ ism.
"Warrington." in Springfield Republican.
.1 April 1856. Robinson noted that enthusiasm for
ten hours had died down eyen in the factoi> towns. He attributed the decline to the emigration vyestward
01 (he original agitators, who were replaced by docile immigrants whom nativists didn't bother to
remind of their "rights and dignities." Some Know-Nothings considered labor issues a hindrance to
Protestant solidarity; Senator Carey of Middlesex had warned lodges while campaigning "if the ten
hour question inicrfered with their Americanism, lo drop it." In Robinson's subjective account the
leading senatorial spokesmen for ten hours were Republicans.
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of insolvency commissioners, politicizing an office concerned with delicate questions of
property and debt. In response, the 1856 legislature transferred the commissioners'
jurisdiction to a new class of life-tenure judges of insolvency. The Shaw Court
confirmed legislators' power to create new courts and transfer jurisdictions the following
year. What they created, of course, they could alter or destroy. That power,
Republicans later realized, applied equally to the probate courts, and thus to Loring.^^
More significant for Loring in 1856 was an attempt to defang the year-old
Personal Liberty Law. Few legislators, if any, had won office defending the measure,
and Gardner considered his re-election a vindication of his veto. In his inaugural address
he denounced the law as a dangerous embarrassment. Enforcing it, he warned, invited
sectional violence, while merely leaving it a dead letter, "unenforced when the hour of
trial comes," would reduce Massachusetts "to the humiliating position of enacting a law
she has not the courage to enforce." Legislators should repeal "so much" of it "as may
conflict with the Constitution of the United States, and all laws made in pursuance
thereof" While Gardner seemed to recommend only a partial revision, "Union-saving"
Democratic legislators urged a total repeal.'' The lower house first followed the
Democrats' lead, but on reconsideration opted only to revise the law, voting to eliminate
those sections that mandated the removal of public officials. Senators delayed
consideration of the bill for over a month before news of Charles Sumner's caning by a
"Warrington;" in SpringTidd Republican. 14 April 1856; Monthly Law Reporter n.s.. 9 (July
1856). 134: Reno. Memoirs ofthe Judiciaiy. 1: 71.
27
]856 Acts and Resolves. 303 - 4: Morris. Free Men All. 172
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South Carolina congressman made any mitigation of the liberty law politically
inexpedient. Rather than risk a radical reputation by rejecting revision outright,
however, senators tabled the bill and let it die with the session.^^
While the liberty law hung in suspense, its sole violator was strangely neglected
by antislavery solons, Loring seemed likely to escape the session unnoticed until an
April editorial in the New York Tribune recalled Gardner's alleged pledge to remove
him on statutory authority. "The ground taken by Governor Gardner" in his veto, the
editorialist wrote, ^was an objection, not to the substance, but merely to the form" of the
removal. According to the Trihurn^ the liberty law satisfied all Gardner's requirements.
A Boston correspondent intensified the pressure. 'T confess it had slipped my memory
that matters stood in so good a shape for further action," wrote "Byles." Given the press
of current business, and the drive to roll back the liberty law, he expected legislators to





would only rid us of that disgraceful magistrate."^^
He has been living for a year in the most flagrant and impudent disobedience to the laws of the
State, and common self-respect and ordinan resentment of an insult should prompt the
legislature to give him the cfTectual kick fin the] behind, which Governor Gardner intercepted
last year and hindered from sending him spraw ling into the street. His (Loring's or
Gardner's?] Webster Whig friends could make no objection now. when they remember that
"law is to be obeyed, however unpleasant it may be. when it is law."^"
1 followed the repeal/revision effort in Fall River News, 17 April. 29 May, 5 June 1856 See
aXso Morris, Free Men All, 111.
New York Tribune. 22, 25 April 1856.
New York Tribune. 25 April 1856.
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The Inlmne 's lobbying represented either an ignorance of the danger facing the
liberty law or an ellbrt to get Bay Staters to prove the law's authority by using u against
Loring. One week after the articles appeared, an interracial coninmtee hurr.edly
addressed a single petition to the senate while the revision bill lay on the table The letter
eschewed any moral suasion, simply reiterating the Inhunc \s contention that Gardner
had allowed for Loring's removal on a legal basis now provided by the liberty law.'^'
Senators responded dismissively When one moved immediately to lay the petition on
the table, another proposed fticetiously to put it "/Wcr the table," Most complained, as
"Byles" predicted, that the petition had been submitted loo late in the session to be dealt
with An elTort to refer it to the joint special committee on revising the liberty law failed,
8 - 12 f:iiher few senators were present, or few wanted to record an opinion on the
Loring question. Without benefit of another roll call, the petition was referred to next
year's legislature.^^
While one Republican-leaning paper chidcd senators for neglecting so important
a matter, William S F^obinson, the judge's avid enemy since the Burns verdict, advised
petitioners not to despair over the senate debacle. After all, ^They have reminded the
Judge that his case is still under consideration, and by no means likely to be forgotten."
Tlic 1836 pclilioii of I'rnnci.s Jackson and 70 ollicrs is in (tic Legislative Papers.
Massacluisells Slale Arclnvcs. in a liillerl> saline coininii in National Anli-Sloverv SlamlanL .3 May
1856. tidnuind Qwncy eredils (lie ////)////(' as llie rirel)rand Ironi (iomoiali ihal lias ligiiled afresh llic
pile of (Ins new hdward llie (\infes,sor " "One iniglil have hoped." Qniney wrote mockingly, "that lie
would ha\ e t)een left alone and allowed to protect the widows and orphans of Boston in the hiiinanc
spinl and with the legal acninen he had evinced towards the miserable Burns." but instead came "fresh
measures for the aniunance of this Mirror of Magistrates." Sec also Liberator, 2 May I X.S6.
- Fail River M^M'.v. 8 May 18.S6; Liberator. May IX.S6; Springlleld Republic aiK 7 May 1856.
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Yet in their anxiety over the liberty law, most antislavery leaders had proven reluctant to
resume the attack on Loring. While renewed petitioning might have reminded legislators
of the need to retain the liberty law intact, it might also have driven conservative senators
to finally eviscerate the law to preserve judicial independence. In any event, Robinson
conceded, "While Governor Gardner remains in office, no removal can take place."
Antislavery activism focused on building a reliable antislaveiy party. To men like
Robinson, proof of its reliability would include Loring's removal.''
The 1857 legislature, despite an apparent inftision of Republicans, proved little
more radical than its predecessor. Theodore Parker received only twenty-two votes for
the lower house chaplainate, one hundred fewer than he received in 1855.'" Legislators
approved the long-awaited district system, which voters ratified in a poorly-attended
May referendum,'^ Despite these Whiggish tendencies, legislators failed to overturn the
1 855 jury law, which prohibitionists denounced as a defacto nullification of the liquor
laws.'^ A senate voted for repeal was checked by the lower house, 11 1 - 194. Amona
Fall ^xQxNews, 8 May 1856; ^pnngTidd Republican, 7, 8 May 1856.
Ach'ertiser, 9 January 1857.
Massachusetts General Court. Debates and Proceedings m the Massachusetts Legislature
(Boston. I8,->7). 890; Fall River Mews. 1 May 1857; Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 17 March 28
'
April. 5 May 1857. Dedham Gazette. 25 April 1857. shows that many radicals, were reconciled to the
distnct system. Editor Edward L. Keyes. an ardent Coalitionist in 185.1. believed that the inclusion of a
residency requirement for representatives answered the small towns" understandable concern that they
would be co-opted by outside party hacks. One critique of the 1857 Republicans' Whiggish tendencies
IS Darnel W. Alvord to Frank Bird. 4 June 1857. Bird Papers.
Legislators vigoroush debated whether the jury law allowed communities effectively to
nullif> the 1855 liquor law. Since the passage of both laws, lawyers resumed the practice of arguing law
before juries that Chief Justice Shaw had squelched a decade earlier in Commonwealth v. Abbott. A
series of appellate trials pitted the precedent ofAbbott against the authority of the jury law. culminating
in 1857 in Commonwealth v. Anthes. which will be discussed in the Conclusion. See Commonwealth v.
Anthes. .303 - 4; Ad\>ertiser. 25 February. 26 March. 2 April 1857.
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the senate m.nority was O. W Albee, back in Boston after a year's absence. He may
have been encouraged by the survival of the jury law, as evidence of continued support
for democracy in the courts, to call anew for Loring's removal."
As a whole, the 1857 legislators opposed slavery more aggressively than Gardner
preferred. He vetoed their $100,000 appropriation for beleaguered free-soil settlers in
Kansas, rejecting their contention that it was constitutionally justified for the "good and
welfare of the Commonwealth." By basing his veto solely on constitutional and fiscal-
conservative grounds, Gardner kept the override vote from becoming an antislavery
referendum. His veto sustained, Gardner positioned himself for the fall campaign as
the conservative antislavery candidate.
Despite his clear conservatism, petitioners still believed Gardner would remove
Loring on the liberty law's authority. In his 1857 inaugural, however, he again urged at
least a partial repeal of the law. Nevertheless, most 1857 petitioners sought removal on
the same legalistic grounds as the perflinctory 1856 petition.''' Despite an occasional
restatement of the moral claims of widows and orphans, there is no evidence that
women's groups participated as a distinct interest group in the 1857 petition drive. The
emotionally muted campaign attracted far fewer signers, among both sexes, than the
1 855 etTort. Few petitioners asserted direct democratic sovereignty over judges as
Albce was joined in the 1857 Federal Relations Commitice by another erstwhile Know-
Something. John L. Swift of Boston. The committee members are idcnlined in . [dvertiser 16 January
1857.
1857 Acts and Rcsolves^ 759 - 65: IH57 Debates and Proceedings. 800-3.
Massachusetts General Coiirl. 1H57 Senate /document I6(K 8-9. The 'legalist" petition is
also quoted in full in Liberator. 6 March 1857, suggesting that this was the Garrisonians* otTicial form.
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aggressively as the Know-Somethings had. Arguing from the authority of the liberty law
seemed more likely to sway the more conservative legislature than the pleas that moved
the 1855 legislature, but less likely to galvanize radicals or politicized women.^^
As petitioners adopted legalistic arguments for Loring's removal, the judge
himself surprisingly claimed a moral prerogative to disregard the liberty law or any
statute he deemed unconstitutional. Every official, he noted, swore an oath ^to support
the constitution." This obliged him, Loring now declared, to reject unconstitutional
statutes. Whoever enforced a wrongfol statute at legislative dictate "violates his duty,
and is guilty of perjury." Since Lonng considered the liberty law unconstitutional on the
authority of Gardner, Clifford, and Shaw, he deemed it void. If legislators disagreed, he
argued, let them impeach him and test their views in a real court.'*'
Loring now staked his survival on a doctrine that superficially emulated the
abolitionists' elevation of conscience above the law. At first glance, his 1857 protest
seemed audaciously hypocritical from a man who had earlier denied himself the right to
select which laws to enforce. He differed from his enemies, however, by making the
written constitution, rather than conscience, his standard. The constitution was
1H57 Senate Doc. 160. 10. I was unable to find the 1857 petitions at the State Archives, so 1
cannot say conclusively which form made up the majority of petitions. Based on daily legislative reports
and the published 1857 house journal. 1 have records of the receipt of at least fifteen petitions during
March and April. Unfortunately, these reports did not always identify the number of signers on each
petition. This makes any quantitative comparison with the 1855 or 1858 petitions impossible. It is
unlikely from the number of petitions reported that there were more than 2. ()()(). or at best 3.000 signers
in 1857. The absence of women's petitions may have been due to the absence of the author of the 1854
petition. Anne Warren Weston, then residing in France. See Taylor. Women ofthe Anti-Sla\'ery
Movement, 10-11. At least one manuscript petition did restate the "widows and orphans" position, as
quoted in 1857 Senate Doc. 160, 9 - 10.
^' 1857 Senate Doc. 160, 11-12.
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consciously written as a "higher law" standard that entitled him ofi authority to disobey
wrongful statutes in a way that religion and conscience could not. On the other hand, by
allowing even the lowliest officials, if not common citizens, to overrule statutes, Loring
invited the same legal anarchy that conservatives inferred from the jury law. In effect, he
denied that legislative statutes were even provisionally binding, and seemed to usurp for
himself the appeals courts' prerogative ofjudicial review. After this outburst, Loring
could no longer convincingly stand as a champion ofjudicial supremacy.
The moderate majority in the 1857 Federal Relations Committee partly accepted
Loring's critique of the liberty law The committee leader. Representative John W.
Wells of Chicopee, had supported the Kansas appropriation, but opposed removal as an
extremist "vindication of [legislative] authority ... to require a compliance with
legislative injunctions
'
despite widespread reservations He thought that the 1855
legislature had unconstitutionally impinged on the governor's discretionary powers by
unilaterally commanding removal for specific causes. Loring could not be removed on
the authority of the liberty law. Wells concluded, without subverting the balance of
powers among the branches of government."*^
Writing for the minority, O. W. Albee revived the democratic rhetoric of 1855,
challenging Wells's identification of the liberty law solely with the will of past legislators.
What was any law, he wrote, if not "the will of the people, expressed through their
1857 Senate Doc. 160.1- 7. Wells supported the Hoosac Tunnel and opposed the district
representation amendment, probably because he thought Bostonian opponents of the Tunnel meant it to
reduce western influence in the legislature. He joined conservatives and prohibitionists in urging the
repeal of the 1 855 jur> law. For samples of his voting record, see 1S57 Debates and Proceedings, 296
800 -3,896- 7,914 - 15,918 - 19.
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legally constituted agents^" The liberty law adequately expressed that will; through their
representatives, the people had found slave-law commissions mcompatible with state
offices. The people's directive outweighed Wells's concern for the separation of
powers. In any event, until Shaw or another judge authoritatively declared the law
unconstitutional, the people's will bound even those who disagreed with it.''
Albee found ironic Loring's adoption a kind of higher-law doctrine. A ^reverent
disciple of law" two years ago, the judge now "set at naught his own advice" against
"follow[ing] his own feeling instead of standing laws." Albee himself reverted to higher-
law rhetoric on the senate floor, Loring, he said, had "trampled under foot the moral
sentiment of Massachusetts," and had again proven himself "manifestly destitute of the
inslwcts of liberty' required in a judge. Remembering his earlier error of submitting an
unenumerated address, Albee now drafted a document that emphasized both moral
arguments, including a resume of Loring's offenses against Burns, and the authority of
the liberty law. Ultimately, however, Albee believed that a popular, moral mandate to
remove Loring preceded and outweighed any legislative enactment.
In committee, Albee was outvoted, 3-4. To antislavery radicals. Wells and the
majority were no better than "pro-slavery Hunkers" appointed through "a stretch of
courtesy which might probably be characterized as a betrayal [by Republican leaders] of
the interests of the anti-slavery section of the community." To the petitioners' relief, the
majority report did not represent the "Fremont" majority in either house. In the senate.
1857 Senate Doc. 160, 13 - 22. See also Liberator. 24 April 1857.
1857 Senate Doc. 160, 23. 30 - 5: Advertiser. 6 May 1857.
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Albee won approval of his minority report, 20 - 1 5 Once he modiHed his address to
give more emphasts to Loring's violation of both the liberty law and an 1850 declaratory
Statute, it passed, 23 - 12.'*^
In the lower house. Wells restated the case against removal in terms reminiscent
of the remonstrants' language of 1855. Violations of moral sentiment, he argued, did
not warrant removal. Removmg Loring would compromise judicial independence,
"applying a greater evil to cure a lesser evil " Wells was seconded by Charles Hale, the
conservative Republican editor and legislator. "We cannot lose sight of the fact that this
removal is for the cause of a political difference of opinion," Hale contended, 'if this
policy is established judges will no longer hold their offices during good behavior,
but during the pleasure of the dominant party in the legislature, changing perhaps with
every year." The legitimate antislavery issue this year, he claimed, was the Kansas
appropriation, compared to which the Loring case was a pathetic sideshow "Men
shudder to give $100,000 to secure the freedom of Kansas," he scolded, "but they join
eagerly in hunting down a $1 ,000 judge." Hale proved unintentionally prophetic. The
house approved Albee's address, 210-69, outdoing the 1855 body in its enthusiasm to
depose Loring.''^
16
Lihcralor. 8 May 1857; Spxhigr\c\A Republican, 22 April, 6 May 1857.
The mosl detailed account of the 1857 house debates is in the anti-removal Advertiser 20 21May 18>7. The Hale organ s attention to the debate, compared u ith the sunnnary accounts of other
"
Boston papers, suggests that Charles Hale believed that his opposition to the removal, properly
pubhci/cd. uould win him favor among the more Whiggish Republicans. In 1857 his legislative
innuence was minimal. He supported the Kansas Resolves, the Hoosac Tunnel, and the district system
and voted to repeal the 1855 jun bill, while opposing Loring s removal and the nativist literacy
"
amendment. Out of .15.1 representatives, only one reproduced Hale's voting pattern on the most
controversial issues of the session.
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A plurality of every county delegation supported the address. Franklin County,
hostile to removal in 1855, had been radicalized during the 1856 campaign; its delegation
voted unanimously with Albee. Opposition also vanished from Hampshire Coumy's
delegation, and diminished sharply in the Berkshire delegation. Even Whiggish Suffolk
approved removal, 21-13. Only in Worcester County did removal votes diminish
markedly, but that delegation still approved the address handily. When counties
produced fewer votes for removal than in 1855, it was because they sent smaller
delegations.^^
More significantly, Loring was no longer a rallying poim for defenders ofjudicial
supremacy. By basing their demands on the liberty law rather than on radical democratic
doctrine, the petitioners made the removal seem less like a precedent for a wholesale
purge of the courts. In addition, Loring had probably alienated former supporters by
claiming an insupportable individual right to nullify statutes. The consequences are
apparent when the house votes for removal and against repealing the jury law are
compared in Table 6 below. The presumptive champions ofjudicial supremacy now
offered fewer votes against removal than did the defenders ofjurors' riahts.
1857 Debates and Proceedings. 918-19. The 1857 legislature was the last to meet under
the town representation system, which as modified in the 1830s gave smaller towns a decennial quota of
representation based on population. By 1857, many small towns had exhausted their quotas and could
not send representatives.
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Table 6: 1857 Removal and Jury Votes Compared"
Votes on Jury Bill
Pro-Repeal (n = 111)







The legislature's overwhelming verdict against Loring caught many observers by
surprise. Incredibly, many antislavery radicals thought Gardner was behind it.
According to political gossip, the governor wanted to punish Loring for reneging on an
alleged promise to resign upon passage ofthe liberty law. As well, radicals thought
Gardner would exploit radical disappointment with the Whiggish tendencies of legislative
Republicans. Despite his veto of the Kansas appropriation, he could still win radical
support, Robinson suggested, by removing Loring Observers who had carefully read
the 1855 veto, however, assumed that Gardner would again veto a removal address.
The new address only gave him a campaign issue lor the coming elections. '"
1857 Deholcs and Proceedings, S')6 - 7. ! 8 - 1 9. M;iny icgislalors coiild easily jiislily
removing Loring and repealing Hie jury law on the same gionnds: Ilie anlhorily ol slalule l;uv Neither
Lonng nor a pro-liqnor |ur\
.
in this view, eould be allowed to luilliry the will of legislators.
Charleslown Hunker I lill Aurom. 2^ May IS.-S7, S'nlional Anti-Slavery SUmdard, 16, .10 May
IS.'i7; Springfield Re/wh/ican. 6. 27 Ma\ IS.S7. By (he end ol May. Warrington" had abandoned his
early optimism; (iaidner s delay in responding to the address led him to expect a pocket veto. i.e.. a veto
through inaction before the end of the session. Springfield Repuhlu nn, 29. M) May IS57.
291
Gardner's Veto and the 1 857 Election
On 30 May, near the end of the legislative session, Gardner announced that he
had vetoed the removal address. Pressing business, however, would delay an
appropriate explanation until after the session closed. Rather than let the matter slide by
employing a pocket veto, Gardner hoped to impress conservatives with a principled
statement. Early in July, after rebellious Know-Nothings had nominated Nathaniel P.
Banks to replace him, Gardner published a veto that severely chided petitioners who
quoted his 1855 veto ^as if there was in it the slightest commitment on my part, to his
removal by me." "I had supposed," he wrote, "all the intelligent citizens of
Massachusetts were too well informed to need to be told" that he would sanction only
Loring's impeachment and trial, if that, and not his removal by address.'"
The liberty law, Gardner wrote, contained "provisions clearly repugnant to the
Constitutions both of the United States and of Massachusetts," and was "deeply
deplored by all law-abiding and right-thinking men." It represented "an attempt ... to
override the provisions of the [state] Constitution" regarding judicial tenure. Although
Gardner had appointed liberty-law commissioners under the 1855 law, he still considered
the sections cited by the petitioners seeking Loring's removal unconstitutional.'' "I
recommended its repeal in my annual message to the Legislature of 1856, because it was
1857 Acts and Resolves. 767.
^' 1857 Acts and Resolves. 770 - 1. Among the libert\ -law commissioners created by Gardner
was Loring's ultimate nemesis, the future governor John A. Andrew. His letter of commission, signed
by Gardner, is in the John A Andrew Papers, microfilm, Massachusetts Historical Society.
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////consliluhonair he reminded leg.slalors, ''and I now base my declining lo renKwe
Judge Loiing on my reason, drawn from its provisions, |lhal | it is //y/conslilutional.""
Gardncr^s reasoning pu/,/,lcd crities who considered the liberty law either authoritative m
toU> or meaningless. To them, CJardncr, like l.oring, had arrogantly employed a debased
form ofthe higher-law reasoning both had once denounced. If he had seemed a Hunker
before, now he looked like a hypocrite as well.^^
Gardner closed with a self-fulfilling piedicti(.n that l.oring would become a major
issue of the coming campaign
I rcgrcl llial llns qucslion li.is assumed a parly aspccl, inslcad oC being eons.deied as a mailer
iminedialelv anecliiif; llie periiKmence ol oiir jiidicurv. and llie rij^his and inlercsls of Hie
people olomCommonvveallh. Ycl llie ael.ons ol parly leaders, llie miimslak.il^le speeelies of
|)ailisaii oralors. and llie lone of a porlion of llie polilieal press, eonelnsivcly indieale lhal the
(|iieslion IS now lo he taken Iron, the halls of legislation and Irom exeeulive aclion lo he
adjudicated l)y llie voles ol onr eili/ens al llie ensuing State election."
Gardner's supporters eagerly helped fulllll his prophecy Invoking the imperiled
idol of judicial independence, former Whig leaders like Robert V Winthrop and George
S. I hllard endorsed the governor as the savior of l.oring and the courts. Like (Jaidner,
1857 Acts and Resolves. 770 - I; Liberator. 17 July 1857.
Conrusion persisted afler G;Mdner\s dcp;ir(iire from olTicc over his eilnlion ol\'in opinion
solieilcd from Juslice Slinw on Ihe liberly law's consliliilionalily In 1S5.S, Slum eonlended lhal
proMsions ol lhc law were nnconshhilional In 1S.S7, (iardner referred lo Shaw's eornnicnis loasscrl
lhal Ihe law had been deliinlively found unconslilulional Aniislavery publieisis either nnsinlerpreled or
nusrepresenled Ihe governor's reference, and accused luin of clainnng falsely lhal Ihe Supreme Judicial
( ourl had found the law unconslitiilionaf See Warriiif^lon s ' conunenls ni Sprmglleld Kcpublican. 13
March 1S5X.
IH57 Acts and Resolves. 11\ - 2; Monthly Law Reporter, n.s., 10 (Augus( 1857), 231 - 5.
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these Whigs gambled that the judiciaiy question would be as potent a conservative issue
in 1857 as ,t had been in 1853.^^ Radical Republicans, in turn, demanded that their state
platform include a promise to remove Loring.^^ Moderate Republicans, however, again
left local questions off their platform, apart from innocuous appeals for smaller
government. Their decision led to charges that the "Northern" party was ducking the
Loring question."
Nathaniel P. Banks was the choice of the Republican center. He had already
been nominated by anti-Gardner Know-Nothings, and was popular enough statewide to
seek Republican support on his own terms.'' The Wilson and patrician factions
respected his strength and dared not attempt to force an antinativist platform on him.''
To protest the Republicans' embrace of a nativist, Bird's radicals again bolted the party,
despite warnings that Banks was most popular where the '^Honest Men" had been
strongest in 1856. Nominating a candidate both younger and more obscure than Josiah
Quincy, the renamed "Straight Republicans" ran a hopeless campaign that served only as
Bee. 17 October 1857; Traveller. 12. 18 October 1857. C\iar\Qsiov^n Bunker Hill Aurora 7
November 1857; Mulkem, Know-Nothing Party, 158.
Some supporters of the regular Republican ticket agreed on the importance of Loring. Their
frankness allowed Gardner to mdict all Republicans for subserv lence to radical abolitionists See Bee
12 October 1857; Fitchburg Reveille. 1 October 1857.
The 1857 Republican platform appears in Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 30 June 1857.
and elsewhere.
Bee. 23 June 1857.
On Banks s popularit\'. see Fall River .V^\r.v. 3 September 1857; Daniel W. Alvord to Bird. 2,
3. 4 June 1857. Bird Papers. On his several nominations, see Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery^ 249 - 50,
and Kenneth M. Stampp, America in 1857: A Nation on the Brink, (New York; Oxford University Press
1990). 240 -2.
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a nuisance for Banks. Democrats and Gardnerites charged that the Straights showed the
true, disunionist face of the American Republicans.
Gardner was nominated in September by Know-Nothing bolters and former
Fillmore supporters His friends took up the winning argument of 1855: "the slavery
question is the great question," one supporter said, "but the only way to prevent the
extension of slavery is to cut off the foreign vote."'" Gardnerites hoped to label the
American Republicans an extremist single-issue party despite Banks's nativism. To
please conservative Whigs, Gardner denounced the profligate ways of Republican
monomaniacs who would have bankrupted the state for Kansans' sake. As a fiscal
conservative, he boasted of his consistent opposition to the Hoosac Tunnel. To better
distinguish himself from the dangerous Republicans, he played the Union card more
aggressively than he had in 1855. He solemnly recounted his opposition to the liberty
law and Loring's removal as a principled submission to the rule of law. "[Wjhen the
Constitution of the United States or the laws of Massachusetts prescribe to an executive
officer his duty in distinct terms, and he has sworn to perform it," Gardner declared, "I
would not allow a mere personal wish to interfere with the performance of that duty."''
Fall River News. 17 September 1857; Mulkcrn, Know-Nothing Party, 162: Stampp. . Iwmca
in 1857. 242. Most sccondar>' accounts sec Gardner's last campaign as nothing but a Hunkerish
courting of the Fillmore Americans. Mulkern acknow ledges that Gardner vetoed the Kansas Resolves
for economic and constitutional reasons, but portrays the veto as part of a calculated strategy of
ultraconservatism, forgetting, in the case of the Hoosac Tunnel, that the governor had been conservative
on railroad subsidies all along. Stampp. meanwhile, notes Gardner s veto of the Kansas bill w ithout
citing his reasons. By presenting this in the conte.xt of Gardner s reconciliation with the Fillmorites,
Stampp suggests, unjustly but perhaps unintentionally, that the governor had totally capitulated on the
territorial question.
^' Traveller, n.d. |1857|. in Robinson Political Scrapbook 1: 158.
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Gardner's Whig friends stated the case more bluntly. "You and I know well,"
said George S. Hillard, "that Governor Gardner stands committed one way on these
subjects, and does not expect to get the vote of any man who thinks Judge Loring ought
to be removed " Gardner "would not allow himself to be controlled by the radical
abolitionists," according to a Lynn orator, "as it was evidently expected that Mr. Banks
would." Extremists knew well that Gardner "would not remove Judge Loring, and
resolved that if Mr. Banks were elected they should call on him to comply with their
wishes in that respect." Robert C. Winthrop declared that he could not vote "for one
[such as Banks, allegedly,] who places so low an estimate on the value of an independent
judiciary, that he would remove a state judge for a decision or decree, however
unpalatable, which may have been given in the conscientious discharge of duty."
Meanwhile, Gardner noted. Banks "[has] said nothing about Judge Loring, nothing about
sustaining the Judiciary of Massachusetts under the constitution of Massachusetts."
Effectively dismissing pro-removal voters as a fanatic fringe, Gardner exploited Banks's
dubious silence on Loring to frighten wavering Whigs.
Gardner staked his re-election on what one Chariestown Whig called "the four
pillars on which he rests his permanent reputation as the Chief Magistrate of
Massachusetts." All four were negative: vetoes of the Kansas appropriation, the Hoosac
Tunnel loan guarantees, the personal liberty bill, and Loring' s removal. To Know-
Nothings nostalgic for the heady days of 1 855 this was a poor record. By boasting of an
^- Bee. 17 October. 2 November 1857: Trmeller. 12. 18 October 1857. By this time, the Bee
had abandoned Gardner for Banks, and the Traveller had become the Gardnerite organ.
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obstructionist record Gardner made it unnecessary for Banks to make radical promises.
By abandoning any resistance to the ftigitive law, Gardner effectively surrendered to
Banks the support of most antislavery nativists who had earlier spurned the
Republicans.^^^
Despite Gardner's Whiggish friends, the fUgitive question took a back seat to
economic issues m the 1857 campaign. The year brought a financial panic and an
exacerbation of the hard times felt by workers throughout the decade. Many Bay
Staters, especially in the western counties and the northern tier, resented Gardner's
opposition to railroad subsidies and the Hoosac Tunnel. While Banks and Gardner both
promised smaller government, Banks's reputation as a Tunnel supporter and a friend of
the small towns exempted him of charges of thralldom to Boston. The sight of men like
Hillard and Winthrop campaigning for Gardner, meanwhile, made the governor seem a
client of the Boston money power. Unlike in 1 855, Gardner had no record of reform,
apart perhaps from establishing district representation, to counterbalance his fiscal
conservatism.
"A Federalist." writing in Charlcstown Bunker Hi/I Aurora. 7 November 1857. echoed the
four reasons to support Gardner cited by Hillard, as reported in Bee, 17 October 1857.
The Bee and the Trmeller best illustrate the issues emphasized by Banks and Gardner. See,
among other numbers, the Bee of 4 November 1 857 for the Banks organ's emphasis on the Hoosac
Tunnel. Mulkern. Kiww-Nothing Party. 158. 172 - .1. condemns Gardner for an abandonment of the
"populist spirit" of 1854. which the author identifies with a desire for government intervention in
economic life. He understates. 1 think, the regional rivalries involved in the Tunnel question, and the
anti-Boston bias among many Tunnel supporters; the grow ing indifference of urban voters from 1857.
which Mulkern attributes to the absence of populist alternatives, may reflect their indifference to the
Tunnel, which would benefit the mral fringes. In 1857. Gardner was strongest in the developed eastern
counties, including metropolitan Suffolk.
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Banks won a comfortable plurality victory over Gardner, who had less than 30%
of the vote, the Democrats, who had nearly a quarter of the vote, and the Straight
Republicans, who collected 213 votes statewide. Antislavery radicals found this an
ambiguous victory at best Banks had made no promises to flighive-law resisters,
forcing them to choose between Gardner's dismal record and vague hopes for something
better He was the creature of neither Wilson nor the patricians, although Charles
Francis Adams, among the latter, endorsed him as a man of integrity," As the leader of
a ftision movement, he depended upon neither the old Know-Nothing apparatus nor the
Republican leadership It was unclear whether legislators elected as American
Republicans were nativists, antislavery men, or simply followers of Banks. In effect,
Banks's victory reproduced the conflision that followed the 1854 election. As they had
then, antislavery radicals felt compelled to test the priorities of a nebulous governor-
elect. A last sally against Loring was the obvious strategy.
1858. New Rules. New Players
Despite its conservative reputation, the 1857 legislature transformed
Massachusetts' s political landscape and changed the rules for popular lobbying. The
district system dramatically reduced the lower house to a consistent total of 240
representatives. Large cities were divided into districts, some of which fmally elected
Stampp. America in 1857, 240 - 2,
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Democrats sympathetic to working-class or immigrant interests. In senatorial elections,
countywide slates were replaced with single districts, with each voter choosing only one
senator. This narrowed the constituencies and interests of senators while district
representation supposedly rendered rural solons less parochial.^'
Petitioners, meanwhile, faced a new law requiring them, if a petition affected "the
rights and interests of individuals, or of private corporations," to secure publication of "a
true copy" of the petition for four weeks running in newspapers printed in Boston and in
the county where the party affected resided Petitioners had to clear their choice of
printers with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who then required an affidavit proving
that the petition had been printed the required times no later than a fortnight before the
new session. Completed petitions had to be presented during the first ten days of the
session. Like the reduction of the lower house, this measure was meant to save money
by blocking frivolous or wasteftil activism. At least one observer thought it would also
prevent petitions for Loring's removal. '^^
While some abolitionists questioned whether removal petitions affected Loring's
private "rights and interests," Garrison dutifully submitted a petition in November 1857,
and submitted clippings from the Liberator in January 1858 to prove that the law had
been obeyed. As in 1857, the petitioners stressed the authority of the liberty law.''
1857 Acts and Resolves. 852 - 3.
1857 Acts and Resolves. 609 - 10. "Agawam," in ^phn^xcld Republican. 8 Januar>' 1858,
speculated that "This rule, if enforced, must cut off the petitions for the removal of Judge Loring." if the
petitioners did not meet the terms of the law.
68 The Liberator printed the petition between 13 November 1857 and 1 Januar> 1858. Francis
DeWitt, Secretary of the Commonwealth, formalized his approval of the Liberator as paper of record in
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While the new law discouraged the circulation of a separate women's petition, women
activists aggressively circulated Garrison's petition. Maria Weston Chapman was the
champion campaigner of both sexes, collecting eight hundred signatures from residences,
shops, and factories in Weymouth. In all, however, women made up a smaller
percentage of petitioners than in ms'' Superior orgamzation brought more signatures
than in 1857, but barely half the 1855 total, as shown in Table 7 below.
















a document dated 20 November 1857, included with the 1858 removal petitions in the Legislative
Papers. Massachusetts State Archives.
69 o
Stange. Patterns ofAntislaverw 141, quotes Chapman^s boast to Harriet Bcecher Stowe, 5
Februar>' 1858, from the archives of RadclifTc College. Petition of Maria Weston Chapman nnd 800
others of Weymouth. Legislative Papers, Massachusetts State Archives. In contrast to Chapman's
appeal to all classes, "J. H. P.," a Salem activist, boasted of procuring all but four of his cit> s leading
clerg\men. Liberator. 25 December 1857.
1858 Loring Petitions, Legislative Papers, Massachusetts State Archives. I counted a total of
7,689 signers, including petitions w ith no verifiable point of origin, of w hich at least 1.000 were women.
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The 1858 petitions went to a legislature more clearly divided along party lines
than its immediate predecessors. While American Republicans were a dominant
majority, Gardnerites and Democrats were vocal minorities. The forty-one Democratic
representatives were led by Caleb Gushing, Franklin Pierce's attorney general. Despite
his diminished station. Gushing remained an influential figure nationally, and had a
national audience in mind when he entered the lists against the Banks Republicans He
had little hope of blocking their measures, but his celebrity and rhetorical skill gave him
the last word on many important issues, which he used to embarrass Banks, whom he
saw as a possible presidential candidate. Despite past flirtations with antislaveiy opinion.
Gushing had become a virulent negrophobe. He saw blacks, not Gatholics, as the alien
element in American society. Any attack on the rights of slaveholders, he charged,
subverted white men's sovereignty. The Democratic strategy was simply to label Banks
an abolition stooge and a race-traitor, with Loring's removal, if need be, as proof
The American Republicans themselves were less than a monolithic Banks party.
While founding figurehead Julius Rockwell became Speaker by an overwhelming margin,
he had little influence among Republicans, who were split between free-soilers, who
included Banks's moderate nativists and Whiggish conservatives, and states-righters,
themselves split between moderate conciliators and uncompromising radicals. The
fundamental division was between men who identified with a "free-labor" Northern
Fuess. Caleb dishing^ 2:213- 14. For Cushing's formidable reputation, see Bee. 30 January-
1858. and Henr\ Greenleaf Pearson. Life of.John J. .{mirew, Governor ofMassachusetts, 1861-1865. 2
vols.. (Boston. 1904). 1: 72 - 3. The best e.xamples of racist reaction to the Loring question are
Cushing's speeches, quoted below, and a broadside, addressed to "White Men of Massachusetts."
published after the removal, quoted in Liberator. 26 March 1858. Here, petitioners and radical
Republicans were labeled "enemies of [our J race."
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culture and those who upheld New England's moralistic cultural heritage Four
Republicans vied for lower-house leadership: John A. Andrew, a prominent antislavery
lawyer, member of the Boston Vigilance Committee, and first-year legislator chairing the
Probate and Chancery Committee; Charles Hale, the Finance Committee chairman and
leader of conservative Republicans; Robert C. Pitman, a New Bedford prohibitionist who
contested Andrew's leadership of the fugitive-law resisters, and Federal Relations chair
Henry Vose, a Springfield representative close to Banks and Samuel Bowles. More than
any other issue, the Loring question pitted these four against each other
Banks sympathized with moderates who now considered Loring' s removal too
radical a gesture for sensitivities outside Massachusetts, and sought a way to eliminate
the judge without appearing extremist. The governor's plan was to eliminate Loring's
office, and him with it, by merging the county probate courts with the unpopular and
expensive courts of insolvency created in 1856 Banks would then fill all vacancies in
the combined jurisdictions with his own appointees. Loring's remaining friends could
then complain only of spoilsmanship, not of persecution for opinion's sake.''^
Banks underestimated the stakes radicals and Democrats alike had vested in the
Loring question. The judge's fiercest enemies and last-ditch defenders agreed that
Banks was dodging the moral and constitutional issues involved in the removal
campaign. His scheme to conceal Loring's fall in a general purge irked both sides. "No
- John A. Andrew to Charles Sumner, 6 March 1858. Sumner Papers, identifies Hale and
Vose. along with Judiciary chairman Duncan (of Haverhill) as the leading opponents of radical
Republicanism.
7 3
Springfield Republican. 8 January 1858; Harrington. Fighting Politician, 44-7.
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reason under the sun exists why every judge of probate should be obliged to vacate his
office," a Democrat wrote, '^simply because the Governor wants to avoid meeting face to
face a legislative address for the removal of one of the judges " The consolidation
scheme, opponents jeered, deceived nobody, ^Will not the abolition of the office sound
just as bad on the road to the White House as the removal of the mcumhentT Radical
Republican Pitman agreed that consolidation "was connected in the public mind with the
removal of Judge Loring." To proceed without first considering the petitions against
Loring, he charged, would insult all the people who had long sought Loring's
punishment, and undercut the authority of all new judges/^ Banks's allies dismissed this
criticism as the baying of "pro-slavery fanatics" and "abolition fanatics." Samuel
Bowles warned the latter that efforts to force a removal might backfire. "They had
better be content to see their old enemy fall by the wayside without any grumbling
because they are not permitted to select the style of dispatch," he wrote, "for it may be,
if he was to be attacked again, in front, he would still hold his position."^^
Radical Republicans disagreed over the best response to the consolidation plan.
Pitman wanted a direct confrontation with a questionable party leadership, counseling
adamant opposition until Loring was removed by address. John A. Andrew, whose
antislavery credentials were impeccable, advised conciliation. In 1857 Andrew had
called Loring's removal "an inevitable exigency" if Massachusetts would defend "the
''^
Post, 2 February 1858; Ach'ertiser. 2 March 1858.
Springfield Republican. 6 February 1858. Bowles condemned all resistance to the
consolidation plan as "weak and worthless." and satirized radicals who "cannot believe any measure is
brought forward in the state house that does not. more or less directly, relate to |Loring"sl retention or
removal."
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rights of the people from the encroachments of federal authority." As a legislator,
however, he was reluctant to challenge Banks aggressively, or to turn the radicals into an
opposition bloc. He advised against obstructing the consolidation bill, but insisted that
Banks's men show equal respect to the coming removal address.''
Pitman more closely fit the stereotype of the radical Republican as moral
absolutist. The prohibitionist joined a renewed effort to overturn the 1 855 juiy law.
Although he failed to win repeal in 1858, Pitman continued into the next decade to
advocate limits on jurors' rights in the name of temperance.'' At least as far as liquor
laws were concerned. Pitman drew no distinction between dissidents and criminals.
Andrew, remembering efforts to suppress antislavery opinion during the Shadrach rescue
trials, consistently resisted imposing political tests on prospective jurors.'' He and
Liberator. 3 April 1857; Transcript, 25 January 1858; Pearson, Andrew. 1: 67 Andrew's
hbertv law commission, signed by Gardner on 2 June 1855. is preseived in the John A. Andrew Papers
His support for ten hours and judicial reform during an unsuccessftil campaign for a Plymouth County
Senate seat is noted in Commonwealth. 2. 14 November 1853. His abstention on the two-year bill is
recorded in Massachusetts General Court. 1858 House Journal. Appendix 9. manuscnpt. Massachusetts
State Archi\ es.
" Transcript. 27 Februaiy 1858; New York Tribune. 5 March 1858; Massachusetts General
Court. 18.^8 Senate Journal. 308. 456. manuscript. Massachusetts State Archives. Repeal of the jury law
was recommended b\ a special committee on uniform enforcement of the liquor law. Senators dismissed
the report as inexpedient, but House prohibitiomsts introduced a repeal bill that was defeated without a
roll-call before its third reading.
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Pitman and Governor Andrew came into direct conflict over questions of liquor and juries in
1864 and 1865. Pitman, then a senator, supported legislation transferring control of the Suffolk County
jury pool from the mayor and aldermen to an unelected jui> commission appointed by the Supreme
Judicial Court. When legislators sustained Andrew s 1864 veto, prohibitionists tried to quiet objections
over excessive discretionary powers by mandating that liquor-sellers be excluded from juries, which was
their original goal. Andrew vetoed the next bill on the ground that its ambiguous wording implied a
precedent for future politically-motivated efforts to exclude opponents of controversial laws from the
jurv pool Pitman replied that Andrew had overturned the constitutional requirement that jurors be
men of "good moral character." A liquor-seller. Pitman thought, was not a dissident, but a criminal.
Where Andrew saw ambiguity
.
Pitman saw the incontestable mandate of a moral law
. Robert C. Pitman,
Argument ofHon. Robert C. Pitman, ofNew Bedford, in the Massachusetts Senate, on the Question of
the Pa.ssage ofthe Jury Bill over the Governor 's veto, April 12 1865, (Boston, 1865), 4-15.^
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Pitman both adhered to higher-law reasoning, but Andrew allowed for a larger
democratic role in the judicial process than Pitman. Weighing the political danger
represented by a proslavery judiciary against the moral imperative of liquor laws, most
1858 legislators clung to the "great Saxon institution ' of the democratic jury7^
Pitman did not believe in unconditional deference to statute law. If Loring
executed an immoral law, Pitman believed that he should be removed. More important
for the coming debate, he believed that the petitioners^ demand for justice took
precedence over any scheme to eliminate Loring without punishing him. His effort to
delay the consolidation bill until after a removal found cynical allies in the Democrat and
Gardnerite delegations, who wanted Banks to squirm when asked to depose Loring.
While Pitman won plaudits from impatient abolitionists like Theodore Parker, Andrew
realized that the New Bedford extremist's defiance of Banks was playing into Caleb
Cushing's hands.'*'^
Transcript. 27 Fcbnian 1858. quoted veteran Coalitionist Aniasa Walker, who rcftised to put
his temperance sentiments before the rights ofjurors. The previous year-s Dred Scott decision in the
Supreme Court reminded legislators of the oppressive potential of an absolutist bench While Edward L.
Pierce to Sumner. 27 Februarv 1858. Sumner Papers, blames Cushing for introducing Dred Scot into the
jur> debates. New York Tribune. 5 March 1858, reported that Republicans first raised the topic.
Post. 19 February 1858; Theodore Parker to Charles Sumner. 28 March 1858. in Weiss,
Parker. 2: 220-1. The convalescing Sumner wrote to Parker on 5 March (2: 219). complaining. "What
is doing in Massachusetts.' Is ever\'bod\ asleep.' No resolutions against Leconipton [the
Administration-approved pro-slaverv' constitution for Kansas]! No persistent daily pushing of the
requisition for the discharge of Loring!" Parker assumed that Sumner was unaware of the consolidation
controv ersy, which had reached an acrimonious clima.x just before the Senator wrote.
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The Legislative End^ame: January - March 1858
Cushing had declared war on the radicals early in the session. While his
colleagues argued on dubious technicalities that the petitioners had violated the 1857
petition laws, Cushing directly attacked the campaign as an abolitionist conspiracy to
control the legislature, vowing to "contradict such false and arrogant dictatorship by
kicking these insulting petitioners out of the house."'' Late in January, he attacked the
Garrisonians' request to hold their annual meeting at Representatives' Hall as another
attempt at dictatorship, and endorsed the Public Buildings Committee's cautious
recommendation against their using the hall.'^' Andrew defied the committee and moved
to admit the Garrisonians, but a combination of Democrats, Gardnerites, and some
Banks Republicans narrowly thwarted him twice, the second time by a 90 - 90 tie.
Andrew only prevailed when Cushing and other opponents left the chamber.*^' Charles
Hale and other conservative Republicans consistently opposed opening the hall to the
Bee, 11 Januarv 1858; Springfield Repuhlicon. 12. Januan 1858. By the end of January,
"Warrington" reported. Cushing had adopted the 1857 law among the reasons to reject removal
petitions.
-Bee, 29, .30 Januarv 1858. The Public Buildings committee recommended against the
Garrisonians. without passing judgment on them, out of a reluctance to make Representatives' Hall a
meeting place for private groups. A Bee writer observed criticalh that antislavety societies had been
routinely welcomed to the hall by Whig legislatures. More recently, however, the 1855 Know-Nothings
had denied the hall to Garrison, according to Ncwburyport HeroUi 26 January 1855. Given the
antisla\ cr\ ardor of that body, their decision probably was based on the same reluctance to open the
public hall to private groups that motivated the 1858 Public Buildings Committee.
Post. 30 Januar\'. 3 Fcbruarv 1858. The Democratic Post repeatedly cniphasi/cd radicals'
exploitation of Cushing s absences during the sessions, as if to imply that, had he been present, his
brilliance in debate would have dissuaded legislators from following the extrennsts. The more rankling
implication, especially resented by Andrew, was that the Republicans were simply afraid to face Cushing
in direct debate.
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abolitionists. The ™ore pragmatic Vose. who criticized Cushing for turning the ™,ter
into a sectional issue, abstained throughout.'' Unfortunately for Vose's moderates, the
Garrisonians soon gave Cushing ample ammunition for fature attacks. A, their
triumphant meeting, Wendell Phill.ps boldly claimed precisely the controlling influence
over Republicans that Cushing suspected and the Banks camp vehemently dented.
vish. and was bolstered up by the petitions of the Abolitionists of the State I me?, m
what you want us to do." he replied.''
Phillips's boasts were red meat for Cushing. Legislators, he charged, should
"shake off the shackles of superstitious adhesion to the Anti-Slaveiy Society." To bow
before Phillips's admitted intent to control the government was a greater blight on state
honor, the Democrat argued, than anything Loring did. If abolitionists lacked the
courage to impeach and try Loring fairly, he thundered, they should withdraw their
petitions and trouble the legislature no longer.^^
Given abolitionist pressure and Cushing's attacks. Republican committee
chairmen were understandably reluctant to accept the removal petitions. Vose's Federal
V, ^ r u""'''
Springfield Republican.
.10 Februarv. 1 Februarv 1858 Towards
the end of the debate Vose chidcd Cushing for introducing sectional issues into local politics The
Democratic Post answered by blaming Banks and the Republicans for condoning the removal petitioners
and the Garrisonians.
85
National Anti-Sla\>ery Standard. 13 February 1858.
Liberator. 19 Februarv 1838.
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Relations Committee refused responsibility for them, as did Andrew's Probate and
Chanceo^ Committee. The legislature finally agreed to appoint a joint special committee,
but Senators delayed filling their allotted seats until late in February. Only in March did
the committee hold a single hearing. Garrison and Aaron Bradley, a black lawyer,
appeared for the petitioners.^ Garrison was impatient after four years of petitioning.
"Not an additional ray of light can be needed, on your part," he said, ''to guide you to
just conclusions." He stressed the liberty law's authority as both a duly enacted statute
and an expression of the people's will. Against this, Loring's constitutional quibbles
counted for little.
[Lonng s] is a contumacious and defiant spirit. He triumphs over the law and tramples it
under h.s feet. He declares that he will never obey it, and that he will not only be Slave
Commissioner, but Judge of Probate also, any law of this Commonw ealth to the contra^
notwithstanding. Either enforce the law or repeal it. The people will tolerate no repeal and
they demand its execution. Shall they, or a solitar> indiv idual. nile the old Bax State'> As
legislators, of what avail will your enactments prove, if every factious spirit is allowed to
disregard them with impunity?****
As usual, Loring sent a letter of protest. He had also grown impatient with the
annual ordeal. "As I admit the fact which the petitioners allege [i.e., that he'd defied the
liberty law], I need trespass no further upon your time to submit to you the reasons for
Bee. 1 February
. 3 March 1858: Transcript. 1 Februarv' 1858; Springfield 15, 16
Januar\ 1858. An account of the 1858 hearing from an unidentified paper in the Parker-Burns
Scrapbook suggests that Aaron Bradley struck the Loring committee as a crank. Bradley "said he
represented a society for mutual improvement, comprised of intelligent white gentlemen which had
been organized for ten years." Legislators frequently interniptcd his rambling remarks (the content of
w hich went unreported) until finally the hearing was adjourned w ithout waiting for a conclusion of his
argument." The scene fell far short of O. W. Albee s spectacular standards, and the hearing was poorly
attended.
Liberator. 5 March 1858.
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my procedure," he wrote. He then reiterated his constitutional doctrine: "An
unconstitutional statute
... is not a Icm, but a nullity, and every oath 7o support the
Constitution^ is an oath to treat such a statute as such." "This is, in our judgment, not a
bad doctrine on which to stand in any such case," according to the hostile Boston Bee,
-one little thing, however, being provided and included; viz., that he who assumes the
responsibility must also expect to abide the consequences:'^^
While legislators juggled the petitions like a hot potato, Banks's followers pushed
the consolidation bill through a friendly Judiciary Committee on 13 February and sent it
to the senate. Andrew and Pitman managed to force house consideration of the petitions
on 18 Februai^ in apparent defiance of Banks, while the intimidating Gushing was again
conspicuously absent. Their challenge caught some opposition observers by surprise.
There is a partv of radical Republicans in the House [a Democrat wrote], who. unawed by the
gravity of those eminent personages who assume to be their leaders, are determined that
Governor Banks shall have an opportunity to show his hand, to remove Judge Loring in a more
direct fashion than by signing the new insolvent and probate bill.^°
Since the Loring committee was not yet fully formed, however, the petitions
were tabled after a modest debate. The frustrated Pitman threatened ineffectually to
Loring's 1858 remonstrance appears m Transcript. 3 March 1858. Bee. quoted in Liberator,
12 March 1858. The Bee 's writer expected to go to jail should he have another opportunit> to defy the
fugitive law. so long as it remained law. Lonng. he wrote, must similarly bow before the legislature
until the courts took his side.
^^^Post. 19 February 1858; SphngTidd Republican. 15, 19 February 1858. The Democratic
Post singled out Pitman as the radical leader, while William S. Robinson identified a radical
triumvirate of Andrew. Pitman, and De.xter C, Parker of Worcester.
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exclude senators from the committee as the consolidation forces regained the initiative.
Their bill prevailed in the senate without a roll call on 23 Febrxiary, after a failed eff^ort to
exclude Suffolk judges, and thus Loring, from the merger. Fiscal conservatism, as much
as loyalty to Banks, compelled many senators to support consolidation. Many legislators
and journalists found Loring's $3,000 probate salaiy reason enough to elimmate the
office, regardless of their opinions of the man.^'
Radicals in the lower house, however, still sought to punish Loring explicitly.
When the consolidation bill came to a half-ftill lower house on 1 March, Pitman won a
motion to table it, 83 - 33. Most Democrats and Gardnerites joined Pitman, as did
Charles Hale, who probably wanted only to see the bill approved by a larger house.
Andrew now opposed Pitman, in part probably to demonstrate that he didn't oppose
consolidation, and in part because he realized that tabling it was pointless so long as the
Loring committee had not yet met.^^
On 2 March, the Banks Republicans called the bill from the table, 103 - 98. Hale
and Vose led the victors, while Andrew abstained (or had not yet arrived), and Cushing's
men voted with Pitman in opposition.'' Immediately, Pitman had the bill tabled again,
Bee, 15, 19 Februan 1858; Springfield Republican. 24 Februar\ 1858 The failed
amendment excludmg Suffolk County was based either on the metropolitan countx 's special needs or on
solicitude for Lonng. The Bee originally supported consolidation without comment on Loring citing
$3,000 as the Suffolk Probate Judge s salar> without naming the incumbent. Only after Democratic
papers attacked consolidation as a veiled remo\ al did the Bee take Loring into account, affecting
indifference to his fate while noting its consistent advocacy of his removal since 1855. The Bee. while a
Banks organ, might be considered a pnnt analogue to Andrew, u ho claimed to support consolidation
and remo\al equally.
^ 1858 House Journal. Appendix 14.




W," Banks-s men again called up, 102 - 93. assisted by Andrew." Pitman's
forces then moved unsuccessfuliy to delay consideration until 16 March " Finally,
representatives agreed to delay the bill only until 10 March.
Pitman's complaim that Banks's floor leaders were deliberately blocking
consideration of the removal petitions provoked a sharp exchange among Republicans.
Andrew assured Pitman that all Republicans supponed both consolidation and removal,
but each in its proper time. A Greenfield Republican asserted, to Cushing's glee, that
"This legislature was elected with a v,ew to [Loring's] removal, and it was sure to take
place." Unmolhfied, radicals denounced a moderate Republican conspiracy to stall the
Loring hearing unt.l after consolidation made it moot." This outburst alarmed observers
who had considered the Loring question a minor matter. Even if "the great mass of
people" cared little about the removal, as Samuel Bowles claimed, legislative animosity
over the matter threatened to cripple the American Republican majority Worse, if






1858 House Journal. Appendix 16.
1858 House Journal. Appendix 17.
1858 House Journal. Appendix 19.
Post.
.1 March 1858; Springfield /?f'/)/Y/)//m/7. 4 March 1858,
Bowles was worried over the impact of Loring before the outbursts of earlv March but those
events convmced h.m that only vengeful ultras sought the judge s remov al. Spnngf.eld Repuh/,can 6
Febniary. 5 March 1 858, In contrast, the Bcc turned from indifference to Loring's fate to active
'
^^''^ '^-'^ '^^h-'^h recommended mipeachment). with a 6March 1858 ed.tonal.
-Do the People Desire the Remov al of Judge Lonngr- Against the skepticism of
the conservative Republican Joimm/ (5 March 1858). the Bee answered affirmativelv By 19 March the
onetime Gardner organ boasted of being almost alone among Republican papers in consistently
advocating the removal. Given that Boston s rival Republican sheets were Hale s.^^/vcT//;vc'r and the
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At first glance. Pitman appeared to dommate the radicals, controlling more voters
than Andrew. Thirty-one legislators voted with him consistemly on the five procedural
questions, while sevemeen followed Andrew. Almost all of Pitman's
"followers,"
however, were Democrats and Gardnerites who actually followed Cushmg, the Jefaao
opposition leader. Unless they harbored prohibitionist sentiments, they would not follow
Pitman elsewhere With their support against consolidation, however, he briefly won
recognition as the leader of the radical Republicans. The speedy convening of a fiill
Loring committee shoitly after his tirade against the moderates signaled Republican
concern over Pitman's influence in and out of the lower house."''
Pitman could not introduce a removal address until the Loring committee
reported. In the meantime, John W. Foster's moderate motion to solicit the Shaw
Court's opinion on the Loring matter failed miserably, 28 - 198 Majority and
minority reports were finally published on 9 March. The majority rejected an initial draft
by Milton representative Joseph M. Churchill as too radical, and turned to William T.
Davis, a Plymouth senator and ftiture historian of the Massachusetts courts, for "a report
with reasons for removal which would not only avoid questions of constitutionality, but
Whiggish Joi,rnaL the Bees editor uas probably nght to brag On perceptions of Pitman as a part>
^ader. see New York Tn.une. 5 Mareh 1858. which reported the pronnses made b^ AndrcVv n^ Fosteramong others, as major concessions to the remox al camp.
io p .
^''''"^ °" ^^'"^ '^'''"^ P"^"^'''^^ in 1858 House Journal. Appendices 14 - 17
1 ). Pitman (and Cush.ng s) voting pattern was YNYNY. Andrew s pattern was N-NYN since he
'
missed the second Note, it was not taken into consideration in identifving Andrew's followers This
method onl> measures the minimum base of each man s following, smce legislators were excluded ifhey missed x otes. Charles Hale, elected Speaker the follou ing year, ccrtainh had a larger follow ingthan cither man on other issues. This anahsis also misses those xoters who changed stances during 2March due to the innucnce of the factional leaders. More often than not. however the balance shirtcd
because of abstentions or absences.
Transcript. 5 March 1858.
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would also commend themselves to the mmds of those whose anti-slavery sentiments
were not pronounced." Despite h.s retrospective disclaimer, Davis based his report on
the doctrine of incompatibility. Federal law, he noted, made fugitive cases the imperative
duty of commissioners, forcmg Judge Loring to cancel probate business during the Burns
case. Theoretically, Loring might be subject to a conflict of interest if approached in his
probate capacity by fugitive slaves. These difficulties made such dual ofT.ceholding
incompatible in practice, if not on principle. This, for Davis, counted for more than the




do not feel obliged lo base (he grounds for fLoring'sl removal upon ihc law of
. .
in iheir opinion, it is noi neccssar> to regard that law. e.xccpt so far as it is
declaratory of the scnlinients of the people.
. . If it is unconstitutional, they hold that the
principle so long acknowledged, which dictated its enactment, is also abundant cause and
jusUfication.
Davis's report was approved, 6-1 While four of the six signers issued a
statement endorsing the liberty law, Davis's address followed O W Albee's 1855
example, citing no reasons for removal. '"^ In the minority report, the Cambridge
Gardnerite William Page inaccurately accused petitioners of violating the 1857 petition
law, and otherwise summarized four years of ami-removal rhetoric The iligitive law
Massachusetts General Court, IH5H House Document H)7, 1-7; William T. Davis. History of
the Judiciary ofMassachusetts, (Boston. 1900). 278 - S2.
1858 House Doc. 107. 7.
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was constitutional, he wrote. wl,ile the liberty law was not Only the inHrn, should be
removed by address^ Sutlblk Cour,ty didn't want Loring removed. Finally eame the
mevitable appeal to judicial independence, a moot point to make when the judge's job
was doomed anyway.'"^
Failing some parliamentary maneuvering, removal still had to wait until the lower
house took up the consolidation bill. When it came up for consideration on 10 March,
Andrew moved to reassign it to the 12th Now that the Loring committee had reported,
Andrew thought it fair to introduce a removal address. A majority concurred.'"'
Cushing moved to recommit the address pending an investigation into possible
impeachable offense, but was humbled, 44 - 130, without Pitman's support.'"' Out of
courtesy to Cushing, who wanted time to prepare a speech, the question was reassigned
to the following afternoon.'"^' On 1 1 March, the debate resumed before "densely
crowded galleries." During the next two days, Cushing and (^harles Hale spoke against
the removal, while Andrew and Pitman supported it. Less certain was the opinion of
Democratic elder Marcus Morton, the former governor and longtime justice of the
1858 House Doc. 107, 8-12; Bee, 9 M;ircli 1S5X; Transcripl, 9 March 1X58.
^"'.Uhertiser. II March 1858; Transcript. 10 March 1858 Andrew's plan lo considcrlhc
address oul of order reqnircd an unlikely lvvo-(hirds niajorily. Dexter C. Parker of Worcester solved the
problem by mov ing to la\ the orders of the day on the table, then to discharge the rcinovai address from
the orders of the day. and linally to take up the address innnediately. Each step required only a simple
majority, which was readil> had.
Springfield /^('/w/?//a»7, 11 March 1858.
Transcripl. 10 March 1858.
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Supreme Judicial Coun, and the presumptive expe. on the constitutional aspects of the
removal. Once more, Lonng's ordeal became a riveting public spectacle.
At first, as in 1857, legislators characterized the issue as a test of strength
between legislature and judiciary. A Dorchester Gardnerite considered the address an
arrogant assertion of legislative absolutism, while a Lowell radical blasted judicial
presumptions of immunity from popular opinion. Hale emphasized the evils implicit in
the liberty law's provision for ^Yemoval by statute," and argued that Loring could hold
both his offices comfortably. Probate duties took up one day of Loring's week, he
noted, and in eight years his commission had interfered with those duties only once.
Surprisingly, he then engaged in a flitile defense of Loring's conduct of the Burns trial, a
self-defeating tactic when legislators cared only for how the trial ended.'"'
Gushing was uninterested in constitutional quibbles. He fiercely denounced the
petitioners and the legislative radicals as monomaniacal negro-worshippers outside the
pale of Bay State opinion. These extremists, he emoted, were like the Jerusalem mob
that called for Ghrist's crucifixion. The Democrat saved his strongest venom for the
black petitioner Aaron Bradley. 'There was, forsooth, a poor, half-demented man,"
Gushing sneered, "who made upon me the impression of a man who suffered a great
misfortune when he lost his master." This racist outburst appalled reporters. Radical
Ach'ertiser. 12 March 1858; Transcript, 11 March 1858.
Bee. 11.13 March 1 858. featured especially angr\ attacks on dishing, whom editors
deemed a supreme hypocrite for stooping to racist attacks after once avowing free-soil principles.
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Republicans immediately chastised Cashing. As far as Bay State opinion was concerned,
Cashing was more clearly the fringe figure than any petitioner or abolitionist.
Some Democrats distanced themselves from Cushing's extremist position. Party
elder Marcus Morton had always opposed Cushing's patronage-hungi^ faction, and
owed them no loyalty now. He opposed Loring's removal, but used his speech to
declare the liberty law constitutional. Even were it unconstitutional, Morton said,
Loring "should have paid more respect to a solemn enactment of the state" until a proper
court overturned it. As an old Jacksonian, Morton could not endorse a doctrine that
allowed individuals to nullify acts of a democratic legislature. His speech caused "a
noticeable sensation" as an act of resistance to Gushing, if not, as some embittered
Democrats charged, an outright and self-interested betrayal of their party. "'^
Pitman readily used Morton's speech against Gushing. Public officials, he said,
were accountable both to legislative statute and popular opimon. He read from Article 5
of the Declaration of Rights: '^All power residing originally in the people, and being
derived from them, the several magistrates and officers of government vested with
authority, whether legislative, executive ["Does it stop there, gentlemen?" Pitman asked]
orjudicial are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them."
On that ground, any removal address, for any reason, targeting any official, was




^""^ opponents of the removal. See Theodore Parker to Charles Sumner 18 March
1838. Sumner Papers, and Post. 16 March 1858. Considering Banks s supposed reticence to remove
Lonng by address, and his later criticism of the libertv' law. a bargain was unlikely, although Morton Sr
may have thought his speech a means of ingratiating himself to Banks.
316
legitimate "" Other states, he noted, had passed laws asserting incompatibilities among
judicial and other otf.ces. No one had explicitly declared the doctrine of incompatibility
unconstitutional. Morton's opinion. Pitman thought, was more authoritative than
Cushing's or Hale's,'" He agreed with Morton that public officials were obliged to obey
the people's will until excused by the courts.
1 put ( to Ihc conserv ative men of this Honse
. . . to say. wlieli.er a man who v iolates the law of
the Commonucallh. and sets the Connnonueallh at defiance not merely, but does it defiantlv
assuming upon his own private opinion of the constitulionalitv of a law to disobey it not as a"
marlyr. but as a man eating his master s bread and spurning both his wishes and conunands
and keeping his salary. - 1 put it to them to say. v\ hcthei the insulted majesty of the
Commonwealth does not demand some vindication at out hands?""
After repeating once more the catalogue of Loring's crimes against Anthony Burns,
Pitman fiercely denounced Cushing's racist doctrine.
ICushingI said to this House that the Caucasian race were the masters of this country
. , . , Now
sir. against the spirit of this I solemnly protest It is the spirit of the oppressor, all the world
over; it is Ihc spirit that finds expression in the pirate's arm. but never ought to find expression
in a legislature, or a judicial tribunal It is this spirit that says, because we are stronger, wc
should strike down the weaker; because we are more intelligent, we should deprive the less
intelligent of (he few priv ileges lhe> have had. - that because the negro is poor and degraded,
therefore the rights of citizenship may be taken from him. and he may be exposed to the
rapacity of every man who chooses to rob him It is this spirit that I protest against. This is not
Massachusetts doctrine."
'
Pitman's speech of 12 March is printed in full in Liberator. 19 March I8.S8.
"' Liberator. 19 March 1858.
* Liberator. 19 March 18.^8. The irony of a metaphor of masters and servants, in the context
of both the fugitiv e question and George S. Hillard s infamous •hand that feeds us" speech at the 1853
constitutional convention, was apparently lost on Pitman.
Liberator. 19 March 1858.
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Pitman's peroration made Loring once again a minion of an oppressive, racist,
ruling class, rather than the representative of a beleaguered judiciary, as Hale lamely
claimed, or a rallying point for White sovereignty, as Gushing implied. Unchecked,
Loring'
s
class would put down black and white alike, radicals believed, and impose
aristocratic rule in Massachusetts and throughout America. Pitman's speech and
Gushing'
s
outrages reminded wavering Republicans of what Loring stood for, and made
removal more palatable. Pitman also implicitly attacked nativism, and thus the
Gardnerites and possibly Banks, by denouncing any doctrine that limited the political
rights of "inferior" peoples. However radical he seemed. Pitman's remarks on this
occasion could as easily have come from a moderate like Abraham Lincoln On this
point, he defined a Republican consensus
The house majority, rejecting both Gushing's racism and Hale's Whiggish
arguments for judicial independence, approved the removal address, 127 - 101.
Republicans voted 123 - 36 for removal. Democrats voted 38-0 against it, and
Gardnerites voted likewise, 27 - 4."-' After sending the address to the senate, the house
approved the consolidation bill on 13 March. The 142 - 78 vote indicated a closing of
American Republican ranks; Pitman voted yes even though the house's vote again put
consolidation ahead of removal. Only a handftil of radicals continued to oppose the
bill
115
Most realized that consolidation would not take effect until July, and that Banks
could not evade the address until then. Democrats had already warned that they would
1858 House Journal. Appendix 23.
"
"^ 1858 House Journal. Appendi.x 24.
318
demand ,he judge's reappo,„,n,en, alier consolidation A, some poin,, ,he g
would have
.o passjudgn.en.,"- KeaN.n,
,„is, he may aheady have decided ,o ,e




Banks wottid be spared the burden ofrenK-ving Lor.ng only if senators rejected
ehe address Samuel Bowles advised then to leave it on the table and deny Democrats
.he oppomtnity to conv.nce gt.lhble Westerners that l.oring was a ntatlyr to abolition
fanaticisn,. For Bowles, Nortltern unity was tnore important than any threat to the
couns inrphei, in Loring's fate In ,S55, he had tnged the iudge's retnoval as a sacrifice
.o save judicial independence. By 1858 the courts seen.ed less endauget ed, and Bowles
echoed ,he 1 855 Republicans' dismissal of the Lo.tng ,uest,on as a n„nor matter, urging
radicals to sacrifice "personal and patty feelings" in otder not to distress Westerners,
••[Tlhis class of men we speak ofdo not apprehend, and cannot be made to understand,"
he wrote, "and therefore should not even their unfounded prejudices and I'eats be
respected, in consideration of the advantages to be gained" in 1860^ In effect, Bowles
asked Bay .State Republicans to tolerate Western piejudices against abolitionists and
Blacks aller rebuking the same prejudices when Caleb Cashing voiced Ihem.'"
Few Republicans heeded Bowles, Afier a debate that lacked the diatiia provided
by Cushing, Motion, and Pitman in the house, senators voted 24-14 against Loring,""
' Spriiignold /(iy»//)/;< ,;/;. IS Marcll 18,'iS; l'„sl. 24 I'cbniaiA IS,SS,
1 1 7




For the third time, the judge^s head was on the block,
.owles st.ll u,,ed Banks to
ignore the address and remove the judge cnnetly through the consolidation bill, but the
governor guessed that removing Lonng would reconcile radicals to a moderate rev.s.on
orthehbertylaw. He s.gned the address on lOMarch His announcement alllrmed
legislators' right to dellne incompatible oHlceholding and pun.sh U retroactively.
Loring's offices were incompatible. Banks expla.ned, because a judge should not serve
two governments. Section 13 of the hberty law, the unstated basis ofthe removal
address, thus correctly obliged judges not to hold otTlces deemed incompatible by
legislators."" Lormg could not defy the law on his own authority or according to other
men's informal opmions Banks removed him as much for defying . legislative statute as
for defying the liberty law, or public opinion, specifically
n-ITccn Icg.sl.Uurcs Ik.vc. by nddrcss (o .ho cxcculiNc brnnch of Ihc government rcquesied his
..nun nl .on.
... olllcc u h.ch ho ,l...s held ... eo..,^,^e..,.«n of h.u : bn,. u .,ho,.. s. 3 d ^ rUS .nod.l.c:.no.. or rcpcnl. as often as (he leg.,sl...„.,c has req..es.ed h.s .cnovnl he I,.s
reasserted h.s pnrpose and posilio... eo..se.e..l.o..sly i have ..o do..b(. ... l.-.,.t;.,,Pc u h.eh I
c.....o(
..,(e.p,el olherw.se lha.. as
.,.a...fes(..,j. n ll.xed resoh.l.on lo d.sregard a..d ... elVee. (o
a stan.le prov .sio.. of (he Con,.„o..ue:.hh For (h.s reason - no o(her op...,o., of his
en er..,g
...U) eons.den.l.on of (he q,.esl.on. a..d ..o ofT.e.al ae( eo.,.sl..,.,.,.u n.i ele.nenl in (hejudg.ne..
1 h.-,vc lor.,.ed - ..pon address of l)o(h ho..sesof (he leg.slad.re eon;(.(.,|.o..allv
prcse.,(ed. :.nd u.(h conse.n of (he eonne.l. I h;,xe .e.noved i;du;..d Greeley l.or.ng l.o.n (he
oll.eeol judge ol probale for (he (\M.i.(y of SiiHolk.' '"
Massaeh.ise((s (Jeneral Coi.r(. /S5S Acts am/ Rcw/vcs. (Bos(on. 1 85X), iX7 - 9 1 Banks's
.irgun.e.U for legislaiix e power over its ereadire eo..r(s is ei;.lw.a(ed bv (Jray. Power o/ lhc Lciiislaliirc
21 - I.) dele.ise of (he eo.isolidai.o.i bilf See also Monlhly Law Reporter n.s.. 21 (Ji...e 1X58), (,7 -
83, indiea(ing eo.iser\a(ive e.idorse.i.eiK of (he pr.i.eiple.
'-"
IS5H Acts ami Resolves, 188.
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Having removed Loring, Banks chided radicals for encouraging "a distrust, on
the part of the people, not only of the courts, but also of the legal profession, which has
no significant foundation, and that is inconsistent with the dignity, as it is with the
professional traditions of the State."'^' He then enumerated his objections to the existing
liberty law. Section 12, which mandated the removal of officials holding "Slave"
commissions, unconstitutionally impinged on the discretionary prerogatives of future
legislators and executives. He urged the repeal of that section and others imposing strict
penalties on lawyers or militiamen who aided slave-catchers. Subtly, Banks had absolved
himself of taking radical dictation He had removed Loring on his own terms.
Last Words
The legislative response to Banks's message gave Gushing a last chance to make
Loring an albatross around the governor's neck. Given Banks's request for alterations
of the liberty law, Andrew moved to refer the message to a special committee. This
allowed Gushing to make a speech denouncing the removal as "part of an onslaught
commenced in the Senate of the United States on the Supreme Judicature of the Nation"
after the Dred Scot decision. Once voters understood that all attacks on the courts were
part of a nationwide abolition plot, none "would consent to make the Judiciary the
football of any political athlete who might descend into the gladiatorial arena." Loring
1858 Acts and Resolves, 190.
^~ 1858 Acts and Resolves, 190.
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had fallen victim to abolition fury before his enemies could be exposed as race traitors.
"Those who have substituted a religion of hate for a religion of love," he mourned, "who
in their love of the black race are actuated by demoniac hatred of the white race, have
tnumphed Cushing's tirade echoed a Democratic broadside's charge that "Treason
sits unmasked in our Legislative Halls." White men's civil liberties had been subverted.
Democrats raged, in the interest of an alien race. Nothing short of Loring's election as
governor, some argued wildly, would redeem white power in Massachusetts.'^"*
Andrew was ready to answer Gushing. Throughout the session, he had sought an
opportunity to humble the Democrat with embarrassing information collected from
friends and advisors. He had debated Gushing several times already, but strains within
his party made him reluctant to risk controversy by launching a full-scale attack. This
time, however. Gushing had self-indulgently invited debate over an accomplished fact.
Pragmatic considerations no longer prevented Andrew from answering Gushing
according to his deserts.
Andrew also wanted to vindicate the liberty law and radical Republicans against
Banks's criticisms. He praised the governor's "courage to vindicate the law of
''^ Transcript. 19 March 1858: Liberator. 26 March 1858.
1
''4
The broadside and other outbursts against the removal, both conservative and racist, appear
in Liberator, 26 March. 2. 9 April 1858. in the "Refuge of Oppression" column. New York Times^ 24
March 1858. scoffingly discussed Democratic appeals that Loring run for governor.
'"^ John A. Andrew to Charles Sumner. 4. 9 February. 6 March 1858. Sumner Papers: Pearson.
Andrews 1: 74 - 5. Andrew also had to overcome the freshman's sense of having intruded into the
solemn halls of government, which was exacerbated by the palpable distmst felt for him by Whiggish
floor leaders like Hale. Vose. and Duncan. Only by immersing himself in legislative minutiae, he wrote
Sumner, did he finally gain confidence in his right to speak his mind.
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Massachusetts
- the constitutional law of Massachusetts," and thus "to assert and
vindicate the will (legislatively expressed) of the people of the Commonwealth." That,
more than any constitutional issue, was crucial. The liberty law, Andrew argued,
reflected the people's will rather than the work of a legislative faction. The law had
flaws, but its authority lay not in its constitutional soundness, but in its expression of the
people's will. In removing Loring, Banks had been an obedient public servant. '^^
It would be e.xtraordinary. Mr. Speaker, if in an act oflegislation combining so many
particulars, and spread out through so many sections as the act of 1855, there should be nothing
open to just remark and criticism. But when the Governor of this Commonwealth, in
obedience to the policy ofthat act. ... and in obedience to the leading idea of that act.
professing his allegiance to the principles admitted to be embodied and expressed in the
Personal Liberty Law. to the grand object of the law itself.
. .
. obedient to the will of the
people, and obedient to the request of the Legislature, performs a high and solemn ACT. in
conformity with the very letter as well as the scope and meaning and purpose ofthe statute, I
think no member of the opposition on this floor need plume himself with any high hopes as to
what is to be the policy of Massachusetts or of her Governor hereafter. I tell you. that the
Governor of this Commonwealth, and the Legislature of this Commonwealth, and the people of
this Commonwealth, arc all at one. There is one purpose pervading this great heart of
Massachusetts, and that is. the sentiment of Liberty. |italics added]'"'
Here was a twofold warning. While warning Gushing and the Gardnerites not to
draw conclusions from Banks's remarks on the liberty law, Andrew informed the
governor of where public opinion stood No matter how Banks interpreted his own
action, he had done no more than obey the people's will. Conformity with that will,
Andrew reminded the house, was the ultimate source of Banks's power and authority.
^-^ Liberator. 26 March 1858.
Liberator. 26 March 1858.
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Radical Republicanism, representing that will and controlling the legislature, was the real
force behind removal, and would have the last word on the liberty law.
Turning to Gushing, Andrew contended that the Democrat had no right to
protest the removal, since he had once condoned a Democratic legislature's removal of a
Maine judge for resisting the fugitive law/^^ Gushing had pledged himself to support the
federal laws, but Andrew wondered what he'd do if a Massachusetts sheriff asked him to
aid in serving a slave-catcher with a writ of personal replevin"^ Like Loring, Gushing
really upheld only those laws that served his interests. History, Andrew predicted
sharply, would shortly overtake the whole hypocritical gang.
This administration of the Federal Government
. .
. may adhere to that Fugitive Slave Bill, if
they choose. The> may make it a part of the polia of the last, w hich has gone down to the
dust, "unwept, unhonored. and unsung
. They may ride roughshod o\ er freedom in the
territories backed up by the Supreme Court of the United States, composed of nine men, nearly
all of them packed on to that bench b> the Slave Power of the go\'ernment - placed there, not
for merit, but by reason of a preordained and predestined subser\ iency. They may go on; but
the day of reckoning is at hand. Behmd that party stalks the headsman!'"^
The "sensation" reported by eyewitnesses was echoed in the Republican press.
"You ought to give these speeches to your readers," a journalist advised his editor. "The
Bois Guilbert of Pro-Slavery Democracy," according to one romanticized account,
"went down before the lance of Ivanhoe." "Mr. Andrew replied to the 'gentleman from
In a reversal of Loring "s plight. Woodbury Davis w as targeted for removal by Maine
Democrats for obstructing the fugitive law. Davis's plight may have seemed even more alarming to
conservatives than Loring's. since the former was a justice of his state's Supreme Court. Despite a
defense led by Rufus Choate. who appealed to Gardner's 1855 veto as a precedent against removal,
Davis was deposed in 1856. See Monthly Law Reporter, n.s., 9 (June 1856), 61 - 83.
Liberator. 26 March 1858.
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Newburyport'
.n a way he will never forget/' an abolitionist reported proudly,
"[Cushmg] had better have been 'crashed out' between an earthquake and a thunderboU.
Indeed, he looked at the close as if he had been." Gushing admitted defeat for a day,
congratulating Andrew as the gallenes thundered with applause. The Democratic press
now recognized Andrew as the true leader of their enemies.
One week later, on 26 March, Banks signed the consolidation bill. That same
day, the lower house joined the senate, 1 12 - 43, in revising the liberty law according to
Banks's recommendations. The minority combined Democrats, who opposed anything
short of repeal, and radical Republicans, led by Pitman, who wanted no revision at all.
Andrew opposed Banks only in seeking to retain the section disbarring attorneys who
represented slave-hunters. The lower house voted initially to keep the section in, but
withdrew it under pressure from the senate. The final vote demonstrated Andrew's
ascendancy over Pitman. He and 66 other pro-removal representatives voted to revise
the liberty law, while 42 others abstained. Only eighteen followed Pitman in die-hard
opposition. The liberty law remained as revised, despite late efforts to overturn it as a
sop to wavering secessionists, until the outbreak of civil war. Banks, meanwhile, could
retain some of his moderate credentials.
'
,
P«llsbui> to Charles Sumner. 22 March 1858. Sumner Papers; Post. 22 March 1 858Northampton Hampshire Gazette. 30 March 1858; Liberator. 26 March 1858; Pearson indrew I 84-'
y. Fuess. rushing. 2; 216; Albert G. Browne. Sketch ofthe Official Life ofJohn A. Andrew As
'
'
Governor of Massachu.setts. (New York. 1868), 23.
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858 House Journal. Appendi.x 32; Liberator. 2 April 1858
1858 House Journal. Appendix 32; lS58Acts and Resolves. 67 - 71, 151; Liberator 2 Apri
1858. Characteristically. Andrew was reluctant to obstnict Banks blatantly He opposed efTorts by
Pitman to refer the governor s message to the next legislature. Pitman's last elTort failed. 49 - 1 16
Again characteristically. Pitman complained that Republican leaders were suppressing "honest anti-
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Writing privately, Charles Francis Adams applauded Loring's removal In 1855
Adams had privately opposed Loring's removal as a precedent for evil, as had most
patricians. By 1858, with many other observers, Adams had grown s.k of the judge.
To save himself, Loring had expounded indefensible doctrines. He had allowed himself
to become a rallying point for Democrats and Gardnerites. Advocates of exclusive
judicial authority on legal questions could no longer defend him. Lacking that incentive
to defend Loring, Adams reverted to his original hatred for the State Street
Cottonocracy persomfied by the judge. Like Adams, others confessed that they had
grown to hate Loring more at the end of the struggle than they had when he had
condemned Anthony Burns.
Loring reciprocated that hate. As abolitionists gleefully marked the hour and
minute of his eviction from the probate court, he seethed over yet again losing a lucrative
job for political reasons.
'
^^ After four years of cold correctness in his correspondence
with legislators, he finally publicized his rage in an open letter to the inhabitants of
Suffolk County. Somewhat hypocritically, he accused Banks of "[making] his own
opinion on the question of law" the final authority on the constitutionality of the liberty
slavery sentiments," warning that in good time "such things would not be in the Massachusetts
legislature.
Adams Diar>. 19 March 1858. Adams Famiiv Papers; compare with his entries for 1 24March 1 8!>?. An opinion similar to that 1 ascribe to Adams can be found in Thyme-s" columns for theNew York Tnnes, 19. 24 March 1858: "Even those who have contended most strongly for ih^ Judge "
Thyme wrote, "heartily despise the man. and have been his champions only because they believed that
a blow was aimed at the Judiciary through his person." Loring the man proved "a silly, vain-glorious
and a stony-hearted egotist, who has not one solitary quality that can command respect of create
enthusiasm."
Liberator, 26 March 1858, Oliver Warner, the Secretary of the Commonvyealth. instructed
SherifT J. M. Clark to inform Loring of his removal at 1 1:30 a.m.. 19 March. Clark reported Loring s
receipt of the notice at 12:40 p.m.
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law. Lonng, by contrast, had always relied on opinions from men whom he considered
authoritative. Banks had dared not ask Shaw's opinion on the law or the removal, but
why should he, when Republicans denied anyone the right to challenge the law on
constitutional grounds^ In effect. Banks and the legislature had arbitrarily assumed the
right to declare any two public offices retroactively incompatible for political reasons.
This precedent, Loring warned, imperiled every officeholder, appointed or elected. 'The
probability and the peril of all this will be the greatest," he added bitterly, "when the
action of the Legislature of Massachusetts shall be controlled by a party, and her
executive, as the prostitute of a party " This outburst embarrassed many old supporters,
and did little to mollify his persecutors. The Boston 5^?^? treated it contemptuously.
Mr. Lonng s manifesto is as silly a piece of bathos as his previous defences of himself have
been. Of one thing he seems to be quite ignorant. \ iz.. that nobodv. not even the most
malignant of the hunkers, cares a fig for him: and when they find." as thev will find, that he
cannot be roasted into a martyr, they will let him drop as the people have already. 136
Democrats, however, did not abandon Loring. The party that had cost Loring his
chancery job out of spoilsmanship in 1843 now strove publicly to find him work. While
making him governor was absurdly implausible, other opportunities abounded for the
party in charge of federal patronage. Promptly, a vacancy opened at the United States
- Journal. 28 March 1858: Liberator. 2 April 1858. The Liberator claimed that several other
papers (presumably including the faithfiil Advertiser) had rejected Loring's letter before the Journal
agreed to print it. In all likelihood, his references to prostitution made most conservative papers
reluctant to publish Loring s outburst.
'^^ Bee, quoted in Liberator, 2 April 1858.
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Court of Claims in Washington. On 6 May President Buchanan nominated Loring for
the post. While Senators Sumner and Wilson offered token opposition for home
consumption, Loring was easily confirmed '^^ He moved to Washington and stayed for
nineteen years, making new friends as he faded from notoriety, until he retired at the age
of seventy-five in 1877. "Alike on the bench or in retirement, the judge was a man of
charming personality, a raconteur of the very highest order," a Washingtonian
remembered, "He, with his wife and daughters, each brilliant and witty, rendered the
Loring home
... a centre of social delight, unsurpassed elsewhere at the Capital ." In
time, he saw his evil fame eclipsed by the achievements of his son, Edward G. Loring,
Jr., who became one of the nation's leading opthamalogists and an innovative medical
technician. The old man retired to Massachusetts, outliving most of his persecutors, and
died there on 19 June, 1890.'^^
While abolitionists outside the Republican party denounced Banks's removal
message for its criticism of the liberty law, Frank Bird congratulated the governor for
"obliterat[ing] the last vestige of any purpose to oppose an administration every one of
whose acts, without an exception worth speaking of, meets my hearty approval." While
Bird urged fellow radicals not to contest Banks's renomination, the honeymoon did not
Henry Wilson. History ofthe Rise and Fall ofthe Sla\>e Power in America, 3 vols., (Boston,
1874). 2: 444. The victorious Wilson, who ended his career as Vice President of the United States,
observ ed archly that "the same action which rendered |Loringj odious to the people of Massachusetts
commended him to the confidence of the slave-holders, and to the favor of the national administration."
1 38
Pope. Loring Genealogy: 172; Frank Warren Hackctt, A Sketch ofthe Life and Public
Services of William Ames Robinson, (Washington. DC. 1898), 47. Beyond Hacketl s statement, I have
as yet found no other references to Loring as a society favorite in Washington.
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last long past the governor's landslide re-election In 1859, radicals failed to force a
more stringent hberty bill, forbiddmg slave-hunting outright, through a lower house
conservative enough to make Charles Hale its Speaker. In I860 a similar bill died ,n
committee,"" Banks himself disappointed radicals by vetoing a bill admitting blacks imo
the state militia. Despite radical discontent, however. Banks remained unassailably
popular. Bird and his allies could not hope to wm the statehouse until the governor
withdrew from politics.
Radicals focused their hopes on the rapidly rising John A. Andrew. The novice
representative's celebrity and proven leadership led to his selection as president of the
1858 state convention, and his chairmanship of the 1859 platform committee. Later in
1859 he joined John Brown's defense team after the Harper's Ferry raid. In 1860 he
successfully defended Franklin Sanborn, one of Brown's "Secret Six" backers, from
extradition on federal charges. While party moderates fretted that Andrew was giving
aid and comfort to insurrectionists, his popularity increased. Banks soon realized, to
his apparent distress, that Andrew was his most likely heir. To prevent a radical
takeover when he left office for a railroad post, he connived with Samuel Bowles to
announce his retirement only days before the 1860 state convention, in order to prevent
Parker to Sumner. 28 March 1858. in Weiss, ed.. Parker. 2: 220-1; Bird to Banks. 22 March
1858. in Harrington. Fightmg Politician. 46; Fall mxtr News. 16 September 1858; Liberator, 26 March
1 858.
^^"^ Liberator. 25 March. 15 April 1859. .10 March 1860; Springfield /?(';)/Y/)//cfl/7. 17. 23 March
1860.
Northampton //o/»/7.s77/re Gazette. 21 August 1860; Springfield Republican. 27 August
1860; Stuart John Davis. •Libert\ Before Union: The Massachusetts Republicans and the Coming of the
Civil War," (Ph.D. dissertation, Universit> of Massachusetts. 1975). 82. 90-1.
329
Andrew's supporters from organizing a candidacy in time. A radical party leader
exposed the scheme, but Banks had underestimated Andrew's popularity regardless of
his plans. Despite Bowles's efforts to reserve the nomination for western Massachusetts,
the convention chose Andrew, who easily won the first of five consecutive elections.>«
Andrew's conduct during the Loring debates encouraged Republicans to see him
as a "conservative radical." His conservatism consisted chiefly of respect for powerful
people's concerns. His radicalism never seemed as arrogant or slanderous as the rhetoric
of Sumner, Bird, or Pitman. Since most radicals trusted him to fight the Slave Power
without compromise, Whiggish Republicans respected his promise to "control" Frank
Bird. "Call me enthusiast, aye, fanatic, ifyou will, as God lives, those words are true,"
he once said, yet he managed, through his skillful stewardship of the removal address, to
convince moderates that he could safely succeed Banks. ^^-^ Andrew's rapid rise to
wartime power was probably the most significant consequence of Loring's fall. While
earning one radical Republican statewide fame, however, the removal proved less than
radical in its consequences for state politics.
- Fall River News. 30 August 1860; Northampton Hampshire Gazette 28 August I860-
Spnngfield Republican. 24-30 August 1860; Pearson. Andrew. 1; 120: Davis. •Libert\ Before Union "
111-15. Banks and Bowles were handicapped by the emergence of two westerners besides their man
Henrv L. Dawes, and by the conviction that westerners had had their turn in the saddle when Pittsfield's
Julius Rock\\ell headed the ticket in 1855. As 'An Old Ta.x-Payer" suggested in the Gazette, the
Hoosac Tunnel was a divisive factor in the western counties, if not a cause of outside distrust of western
candidates.
143
Fall Ri\Qr Mews, 16 September 1858; Davis. "Libert} Before Union," 113-15
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CONCLUSION
The heavens did not fall. Loring's removal did not inspire the wholesale
upheaval of the courts feared by Whiggish conservatives since the days of the Coalition
The Lowell Democrat Benjamin F. Butler later boasted of "reforms" achieved under his
leadership in 1859, but these were structural changes intended to clear congested court
dockets, and represented no democratization of the judicial system.' When J. Q. A.
Griffin proposed elections for the merged courts of probate and insolvency, the 1860
legislature gave him only forty-four votes.
^
The movement for an elective judiciary was already moribund when voters
rejected the 1853 constitution. It was a Jacksonian phenomenon rooted in distrust of an
aristocratic professional class using its exclusive powers against workers and urban
drinkers. That distrust persisted beyond 1 850, but the antebellum decade saw a
movement for greater control over dangerous elements in society - immigrant drinkers
especially
- that discouraged efforts to limit judicial authority. Prohibitionists proved
particularly hostile to any division of powers in the courts, leading repeated efforts to
curtail jurors' prerogatives after the passage of the 1 855 jury law. Antislavery anger at
' Butler, Butler's Book, 123; Albert P. Langlry. ed.. Metropolitan Boston: A Modern History 5
vols.. (New York. 1929). 1: 256 - 8. The 1859 legislature abolished the old Courts of Common Pleas
'
and created more efiicient superior courts in their place.
" Spnngfield /^c'/7wA//co/7, 3 March 1860.
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judges' intervention in favor of the Slave Power, and urbanites' resentment of
prohibitionists' coercive moralism, sustained the judicial reform movement beyond the
1853 debacle, but neither interest led a mass movement for judicial elections after the
reform constitution's failure.
Between 1855 and 1857, prohibitionists and jurors' rights advocates intensified
their struggle in response to the Know-Nothings' jury law. In a series of liquor cases,
judges defied the law by denying lawyers the right to argue legal points before jurors.
One case, CommonM eallh v. Anthes^ went to the Supreme Judicial Court in 1857,
permitting Lemuel Shaw to make a definitive statement against jurors' rights. His ruling
differed little from his earlier pronouncements against juries. Liberty and security, he
again insisted, depended on general deference to a court of last resort on legal questions.
Shaw equivocated on the jury law itself, opting not to strike it down outright, but
warning that it could not be interpreted to sanction jurors' defiance ofjudicial opinions.
Prohibitionists believed that the law was meant to defy not only judicial opinion, but law
itself, and renewed efforts to repeal the measure. They failed in 1858, and in 1860 the
law was retained in the general statutes, where it remained for the rest of the century.
'
Despite its unimpressive initial reception, Anthes, as a judicial review of a jury
law, became a historic precedent against jurors' right to interpret the law. In 1889, the
state court cited Anthes in the Commonweallh v. Marzynski case, ruling that "the jury
has no rightful power to determine questions of law contrary to the instructions of the
court." More importantly, the federal Supreme Court relied heavily on Afithes in ruling
^ Coivmonwealth v. Anthes. 30.1 - 4: Reno. Memoirs ofthe Judiciary, 1 : 86. The jury law was
still in the statute book when Reno published his hislor>' in 1901.
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agamst jurors' rights in Sparf.. Hansen (1897), which was long considered the last
word on the question.^ In the 1990s, however, activists on the left and the nght have
revived the issue out of distrust of alleged absolutist tendencies m the courts. Inevitably,
in a constitutional republic, ordinal^ citizens will find occasions to dispute judges'
reading of the founding charter, and will question why the judges' reading should be
automatically deemed superior to their own.'
In antebellum Massachusetts, jurors' rights had more support than the movement
for elected judges. Jurists in the Bay State enjoy "good behavior" tenure, albeit with a
mandatory retirement age, to the present day.^ On this point, whatever momentum the
movement retained in 1853 was due to amislavery activism. Although the Curtii of
Boston, including Loring, had always acted in a federal capacity in slavery cases, their
pro-slavery record provoked antislavery reformers to demand elected judges who would
better express the Bay State's hatred of bondage. The Curtii embodied all the judicial
evils that required elections as a remedy. Then, in 1857, they became Northern heroes.
George T. Curtis, as a lawyer, and Benjamin R. Curtis, as an associate justice,
took Dred Scot's side in the landmark federal case. George T. played the smaller role,
' ^cm. Memoirs ofthe Judiciary, I: 86; Abramson, We The Jury. 87.
' Papers as diverse ideologically as the Wall Street Journal and The Nation have published
favorable notices of the Fully Informed Jui> Association, which seeks to regain for juries the law-finding
prerogatives stripped away by Shaw. Many leftists have expressed distrust of the organization because
of members associations with "militias
"
and racist organizations, but The Nation 's Alexander Cockbum
has defended the movement as a democratic, populist phenomenon. After O. J. Simpson s acquittal
however, many writers have called for a counter-movement to further curtail jurors" remaining nghts or
to eliminate juries altogether.
'
In 1918. voters ratified the 48th Amendment to the state constitution, which formally
excluded questions ofjudicial tenure from consideration in popular initiatives and referenda. A
mandatory retirement age of seventy was finally ratified with the 98th Amendment in 1969.
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arguing as one of a corps of advocates that the federal government had a right to
regulate slavery m the territories. Benjamm, dissenting from the pro-slavery majority m
the Taney Court, adopted the doctrine he had opposed twenty years earlier in
Commorn.ealth v. Aves. A slave transported by his master to a free state, Curtis now
believed, could not be compelled to return to a slave state without a trial of his rights.'
Against Taney, he affirmed that black men could be flill citizens with voting rights, as
they were in Massachusetts, and that Congress could exclude slavery from the territories.
Angered by the Chief Justice's unwarranted pro-slavery advocacy, Curtis resigned his
post on the pretext that he needed more lucrative work to support his family.^ He
returned to Boston to find himself lionized, to the dismay of both his old clique and his
old enemies.^
The Curtii had not abandoned conservatism. George T. became a Democrat,
wrote an apologetic biography of President Buchanan, and opposed the Emancipation
Proclamation. Benjamin joined late calls for the repeal of the Personal Liberty Law
during the secession crisis. In 1868, he was a counsel for the defense at Andrew
Johnson's impeachment trial. Neither brother noticeably changed his views on the
relationship ofjudges and juries. Nevertheless, ^h^r Dred Scot, the Curtii could never
Curtis, ed.. Life and Writings. 1: 88 - 9. and VivktXman, An Imperfect Union, 103, note the
influence oiAves on Curtis's dissent in Dred Scot.
* Monthly Law Reporter, n.s.. 10 (September 1857). 299; Stampp. .4merica in 1H57. 97 - 100;
Allan Nevins. Ordeal ofthe Union: The Emergence ofLincoln, vol. 1. Douglas, Buchanan, and Party
Chaos. (New York: Scribners. 1950), 98 - 100, 115 - 16.
A t>pical bemused reaction to Curtis s new fame, noting his faction's embarrassment at
antislavery applause, is Charles Francis Adams to Charles Sumner, 7 April 1857, Adams Papers.
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,.,le ,ho, had Hilal in , 85
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iiigitivc-lavv controversy
Despite nnu/Sco,^ antislave.7 activists had sollened then opnm>n on the
judiciary in general during l.oring's ordeal, in 1855 an anonymous pan.phleteer
denounced
.judges as conspuators n. a Slave Power plot ,0 suppress resistance to the
lugUive law. A New York writer, conunent.ng on the l.oring controversy and other
issues, called thejudiciary slavery's 'last stronghold," where the wicked institution could
rely on ' c>ld Form and Precedent and rooted Prejudice" employed in its behali: In 1859,
however, Wendell Ph.ll.ps boasted that 'the ve,^ Ibrtress of the Ant.-Slavery nunen^en,
is in thejudiciary. The battle is to be fought in the jury box. The States are to be
redeen^ed by the judges.""' In the uUervening years, Ben,annn (^.rtis's dissent in Pnu/
SCO, had i>idicated that once-wicked individuals could change their minds tor the better,
while l.ormg's removal proved that irredeemable jurists could be deposed on demand
I-ori,ig hi.nseirbeca.iie less ofa representative figure By 1858 removal advocates rarely
invoked the Curtii or the judicial class in their diatribes against l.ormg. I lis removal no
longer implied a larger vendetta against a clique or a branch of government, except to
crypto-Whigs like Charles 1 lale and pioslavery Democrats like (^aleb (Wishing, and he
became, theoretically, easier to remove.
As diapler (> indicated, however, l.oring was finally removed in 1858 only aller a
more ditlicult legislative struggle than had been waged in 1855 or 1857. fhe judiciary
question was a less significant factoi, as lar as Banks was concerned, than it had been for
riw l\\li'mi\r Ira^nc i>l l-rccihm. (ii.p.. 11. d. jc. I8.\S|); Allviiiv I'vcniiiii Jounml. 26
i 'dmiar\ 1855; A/7)m//(V-. 8 July 1859.
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the Gardnerite Know-Nothings. While Gardner had raised the banner ofjudicial
mdependence in defense of Loring, Banks expressed no reservations on ,ha. po.n. whrle
removrng ,he judge. Whatever qualms he had were pragmatic rather than ideological.
Samuel Bowles's warnings that Loring's removal would alarm or alienate Western
voters probably weighed heavily as long as Banks considered himself a Presidential
prospect. Most Republican legislators, apparently, were less concerned about outsiders'
response to Loring's fall.
Radical Republicans were often indifferent to Western opinion. 'The solicitude
which is felt, lest the prospects of the Republican party in the Middle and Western States
should be damaged
,
is quite amusing," William S. Robinson observed m 1859.
Westerners, he wrote, had already cost Republicans the 1856 election by "dabbling in the
dirty pool of Know-Nothingism" in support of Millard Fillmore, and had since "pursued
a cautious and timid and time-serving policy" towards compromising nativism."
Radicals resented having to compromise their principles while Westerners offered little
more, in return, than votes for a national ticket which itself would probably represent the
West more closely than it would New England. On a matter like Loring's removal, a
purely local concern, radicals considered outsiders' opinions irrelevant.
The strains within Massachusetts Republicanism echoed Know-Nothing disputes
over the scope of "Protestam nationalism." Like the antislavery Know-Somethings, the
radical Republicans idemified chiefly with a moralistic New England heritage. Cultural
Robinson, ed.. -Warrington " Pen Portraits. 233. This particular column was written in
disappointment at the defeat of the radical 1859 Personal Libert> Bill which would have made slave-
hunting a crime in Massachusetts.
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integrity and local sovereignty alike, radicals believed, had been imperiled by Democratic
and Cotton Whig collaboration with the federal Slave Power. Bay State honor had to be
redeemed, either within a Union that granted states their moral rights, as most radicals
thought possible, or without, as Garrisonians and the occasional angry radical like Frank
Bird thought necessary. Their identification with a perfectionist, liberating Protestantism
made concessions to slavery intolerable. Their vehement emphasis on the home front
against slavery contrasted sharply with moderate Republicans' narrow focus on the
territorial issue. The moderates. Banks included, downplayed the radicals' local bias to
better accommodate Westerners who often resented New Englanders' perceived moral
chauvinism. To win national power, moderate Republicans emphasized a common
culture founded more on 'Tree labor" than on any sectarian moral vision. Not
surprisingly, this ideal attracted many former Whigs who had already mastered a doctrine
of individual liberty, and who more readily identified with national than local interests.
National considerations were less important to Loring's enemies than securing
local sovereignty. Loring's removal and the Personal Liberty Law were expressions of a
states-rights doctrine that acknowledged an adversarial relationship between the Bay
State and the federal Slave Power. While few radicals flirted with secession as Bird did,
their primary concern was with defending the honor, integrity, and independence of
Massachusetts. They shared these priorities with many of the 1854 - 55 Know-
Nothings. Popular nativism in Massachusetts was essentially localist. Suspicions about
Catholic influence in politics arose out of concern for the Protestant character of New
England culture. The populist element in Know-Nothingism identified by historian John
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were
R. Mulkern represented local communities concerns' - be they small rural towns or
urban neighborhoods
- about the '^centraHzmg" power of Boston capitalists over their
economies and lifestyles. Antislavery suspicions about a Slave Power using the federal
government to crush dissidents and dominate the West were consistent with the localist
concerns of Bay State Know-Nothingism. In 1854 nativists had debated whether the
Union or Massachusetts would be the focus of their loyahies. The Loring question and
the liberty law controversy reminded them that Massachusetts and the Union
distinct and potentially hostile cultures. Except for a nationalist minority, most Know-
Nothings sided with their state.
John A. Andrew's career-making speech after Loring' s removal owed its success
to the future governor's reiteration of the state-sovereignty theme. Since the passage of
the liberty law, the Loring issue had been entangled in the ongoing debate over the
constitutionality and binding authority of that statute. In 1857 especially, the removal
campaign was perceived as a struggle for legislative supremacy and for vindication of the
liberty law against its critics. In 1858, William T. Davis's majority report reduced the
case for removal to an argument that two jobs might compete for Loring's time, and
might cause a conflict of interests. In response. Banks offered the removal as a quidpro
quo in return for radical concessions on the liberty law. In reaction. Gushing denounced
the entire business as a conspiracy in favor of blacks against whites. In answer, Andrew
hammered home the point that ''the deed is done" on the authority of the people of
Massachusetts, and not merely according to the letter of the liberty law, or according to
Davis or Banks's opinions on the incompatibility of offices. Andrew identified the
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removal as a necessary assertion of state sovereignty against a persistent enemy - the
Slave Power
- embodied by the deposed Loring and the defiant Gushing, to whom
Andrew powerfully promised a similar fate. In effect, as Loring fell, Andrew included
the people in on the kill. Their will, and not some faction's, was done.
No more than one per cent of the state's population ever explicitly demanded
Loring's removal. Petition campaigns over the four-year period never approached the
mass support shown in 1843 for the original liberty law or even in 1859 for the failed bill
to ban slave-huming outright. It was probably true, as Samuel Bowles argued in 1858,
that few Bay Staters held any real, personal hostility towards the defiant judge. It was
probably equally true, however, that many Bay Staters retained an imerest in Loring's
fate as a test of their representatives' power, and indirectly their own power, to punish
an apparent traitor to the state. Since 1855, the people had been told that Loring could
not be removed because the constitution, as read by a governor, forbade it, or because
legislators had no right to make a law mandating it, or because it would harm the dignity
of the courts, or offend other parts of the country, or undermine white rule. As O. W.
Albee had argued in 1855, the cumulative effect of these complaints, if accepted, was to
limit democratic sovereignty. Andrew and Robert C. Pitman successfully resumed this
argument in 1858. Their sentiments fit the time and the popular mood.
A succession of outrages - the fugitive law; Sims' s extradition; the Shadrach
rescue trials; the Nebraska bill; the Burns trial; the "sack" of Lawrence, Kansas;
Sumner's caning; Dred Scot - convinced Bay Staters that the Slave Power represented
an imminent threat not only to the western territories, but to Massachusetts itself As
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activists on other fronts demanded more state coercion to enforce moral and cultural
standards, amislaveiy activists demanded similar vigilance and action from local
governments against the Slave Power menace. The movement for Lonng's removal and
strict liberty laws was consistent, in a broad sense, with the cultural and political trends
in the antebellum generation that spawned Know-Nothmgism. These developments
influenced the course of an older debate over the people's role in making and
interpreting laws. In the course of the amebellum decade, radical opinion shifted from a
position of presumptive opposition to the legal establishment to a qualified endorsement
of the courts as a newly-reliable instrument of the people's will. This shift marked the
end of a decades-long campaign for a democratized judiciary. It did not, however,
indicate an outright radical surrender.
Many radicals themselves came to demand that courts enforce moral laws more
strongly. Further, Loring's removal convinced Bay State radicals of the courts'
amenability to public opinion. Removal by address had proven a viable instrument of
indirect popular control over otherwise unaccountable judges. This discovery lessened
the apparem need for judicial elections. Removal may well have seemed the preferable
option, since regular elections might dangerously politicize the courts or render them
explicitly partisan. Reformers' objective had never really been rotation in office for its
own sake, but rather to ensure that voters could periodically review the conduct of
judges. Via the power of removal, such a review could take place at any time. While the
difficulty with which Loring was removed might argue otherwise, removal by address
may have seemed more practical as well as more expedient than judicial elections.
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While Loring's case belied Richard Henry Dana's 1853 contention that a judge
could be removed as easily as a man changed his name, it ultimately vindicated his real
argument that removal by address was a viable alternative to an elective bench. As well,
Loring's fall vindicated Samuel Bowles's 1855 analysis that removal would prove a
conservative act. While Bowles himself later opposed removal on pragmatic partisan
grounds, he observed rightly that a successful removal would dampen advocacy of both
judicial elections and outright nullification of the fligitive law Even though petitioners
waited four years to see Loring fall, they blamed delays on Henry J, Gardner and not on
a system needing radical change. Since antislavery activists were the last vital remnant of
the movement for judicial reform, the diversion of their attention to Loring effectively
ended the movement, if the failure of the Coalition had not already done so. Ironically,
Whiggish opinion did not realize this. The patrician Free-Soiler Dana and the erstwhile
Cotton Whig Gardner both opposed removal in the name ofjudicial independence. Both
were discredited, Loring was removed, and judges otherwise retained their
independence. The removal power has never been exercised since.
The removal clause of the state constitution was amended by ratification of the 98th
Amendment in 1969. This amendment granted the governor and council the power to "retire" judges on
the grounds of mental or physical debility, without first receiving a legislative address. Coalitionists had
advocated such an amendment in 1853. but did not specify grounds for removal, proposing only to give
the executiv e branch a unilateral right of removal. The 1969 amendment finally declared explicitly
what conservatives had alleged since 1780; removals without impeachment were intended for cases of
infirmit\
.
However, the original removal clause remains in the constitution, and with it the implication
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